Hakam Singh vs The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal Bathinda & Anr.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL)

The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the quashing and setting aside of the Award dated 05.09.2013 (Annexure P-1), passed by respondent No.1, whereby the statement of claim preferred by the petitioner was decided against him. The petitioner further seeks a direction to respondent No.2 to reinstate him in service with continuity of service, full back wages along with interest, and all consequential benefits.

As per the pleaded facts, the petitioner-workman was initially appointed as a Chowkidar with respondent No.2-management on 01.12.1983, promoted as a Salesman on 01.03.1989 and thereafter as an Honorary Secretary on 01.01.2000. He claimed to be a permanent employee drawing a monthly salary of Rs.6,418/- and alleged that his services were illegally terminated on 08.12.2003 without notice, charge-sheet, proper inquiry or compensation. He further pleaded that he had completed more than 240 days of service, yet his services were illegally terminated, while juniors were retained and fresh employees engaged. The case of respondent No.2-management before the learned Tribunal was that although the workman was appointed with the department only on a temporary basis. It was further pleaded that the workman had embezzled a substantial amount belonging to the society, whereupon he was suspended and served with a charge-sheet. According to the management, the workman failed to submit any reply to the charge-sheet and did not participate in the inquiry conducted by a Sub-Committee. During the pendency of the inquiry, he deposited Rs.17,000/- towards the embezzled amount and thereby admitted his guilt. The management, therefore, contended that the services of the workman were validly terminated. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Tribunal framed issues, inter alia, as to whether the services of the workman had been validly terminated and, if not, to what relief he was entitled; whether the claim was maintainable and whether the workman had the requisite locus standi and cause of action; and whether the case attracted the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The parties led their respective evidence. The workman examined himself as WW-1, whereas the management examined MW-1 Nachattar Singh, Secretary, and MW-2 Ram Dass, Salesman.

Vide the impugned Award dated 05.09.2013, the learned Tribunal held that the termination of the workman's services by respondent No.2-management was legal and valid, and consequently declined to grant him any relief.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Tribunal wrongly held that the petitioner was served with the show-cause notice and charge-sheet, and that he had admitted his guilt. It is contended that the petitioner had specifically denied service of the charge-sheet and explained that the deposit of Rs.17,000/- was not an admission of embezzlement. Furthermore, even the alleged inquiry was neither fair nor properly conducted, as the inquiry proceedings and witness statements suffered from serious irregularities. Learned counsel further contends that the management failed to examine material witnesses or produce reliable documentary evidence to prove the alleged misconduct. Learned counsel contends that the learned Tribunal failed to properly appreciate this evidence and wrongly upheld the termination. Accordingly, it is prayed that impugned Award deserves to be quashed.

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the petitioner, while working as Salesman-cum-Secretary, was found involved in embezzlement of the funds of the Society. It is submitted that the petitioner was duly suspended, served with a charge-sheet and afforded an opportunity to participate in the inquiry; however, he neither submitted any reply nor appeared before the Inquiry Committee. Consequently, an ex parte inquiry was conducted, in which the charges were found proved. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner, being entrusted with supervisory duties as Secretary, did not fall within the definition of a “workman”. It is further contended that an alternative statutory remedy of appeal and revision under the Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural Service Society Service Rules, 1997, was available to him, which the petitioner failed to avail. Therefore, the termination of the petitioner was made after a proper inquiry and that the impugned Award dated 05.09.2013 calls for no interference.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

A perusal of the impugned Award shows that the learned Tribunal, upon appreciation of the evidence led by the parties, recorded a finding that the charge-sheet had been duly served upon the petitioner and that he had failed to submit his reply or participate in the inquiry proceedings. The learned Tribunal further found no sufficient material to establish that the inquiry was vitiated on account of bias or any fundamental illegality. The explanation furnished by the petitioner with regard to the deposit of Rs.17,000/- was also not accepted by the learned Tribunal and, on an overall appreciation of the material available on record, the charge of misconduct was held to have been established.

The grievance of the petitioner before this Court is essentially with regard to the appreciation of the evidence by the learned Tribunal. The petitioner seeks this Court to re-assess the material concerning the service of the charge-sheet, his alleged participation or non-participation in the inquiry, the circumstances in which the amount of Rs.17,000/- was deposited and the evidentiary value of the material relied upon by the management. Such an exercise would, in substance, amount to re-appreciation of evidence.

It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not ordinarily sit as an appellate court over findings of fact recorded by a duly constituted Tribunal. Interference is warranted only where the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from a patent error of law or jurisdiction.

In the present case, the petitioner has not been able to show any such perversity or jurisdictional error in the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the rival stands and the evidence available before it and thereafter recorded its conclusions. Merely because another view of the evidence may be possible is not, by itself, a ground for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Likewise, no material has been pointed out which would establish that the inquiry proceedings suffered from such an illegality or denial of reasonable opportunity as would warrant interference with the Award. The findings of the learned Tribunal regarding service of the charge-sheet, failure of the petitioner to participate in the inquiry and proof of the charges are findings based upon the material before it. This Court, in exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction, finds no legally sustainable ground to substitute its own appreciation of that evidence for that of the learned Tribunal.

Consequently, the petitioner has failed to make out any ground warranting interference with the impugned Award dated 05.09.2013. The present writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.