Hakam Singh and Another vs State of Punjab

Pritpal Singh, J.—An F.I.R. No. 509 of 1981 recorded at Police Station Jalalabad, District Ferozepur, on Aug. 26, 1981, is sought to be quashed by the petitioners Hakam Singh and Abnashi Lai in this petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called ''the Code''). The order of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ferozepur, dated Aprl. 16, 1985, passed in pursuance of this FIR is also prayed to be set aside as a consequential relief.

The facts of this case are that the impugned First Information Report was recorded on the basis of a complaint dated June 23, 1981 submitted by the complainant Chaman Lal to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepur, wherein it was alleged that the petitioners had committed offences under Sections 193, 196, 419, 420, 466, 468 and 471 read with Section 120B, Penal Code. According to this complaint the offences had been committed by the petitioners on May 25, 1962. It is alleged that the complainant came to know of the petitioners'' having committed these offences on July 10, 1980.

Pursuant to the lodging of the First Information Report, after the completion of investigation, the challan was submitted in Court on Feb. 13,1985. The trial Magistrate, vide the impugned order dated Aprl. 16,1985, held that prima facie the petitioners had committed an offence u/s 419, Penal Code and a charge was framed against them under this section accordingly.

The grievance of the petitioners is that their prosecution u/s 419, Penal Code, in the circumstances mentioned above is barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 468 of the Code. The offence u/s 419, Penal Code, is punishable with three years'' rigorous imprisonment and as such u/s 468(2)(c) of the Code the Court could not take cognizance of this offence after the expiry of three years. It is said that the offence was committed on May 26, 1962, therefore, the trial Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of this offence above 23 years thereafter when the challan was submitted before him on Feb 1.13,1985. There is ample merit in this contention which deserves to be accepted.

According to Section 469 of the Code the period of limitation prescribed in Section 468 of the Code commences either on the date of the offence, or, where commission of the offence was not known to the complainant, on the first day on which such offence came to his knowledge. In the present case, admittedly, although the offence was committed on May 25, 1962, but its commission came to the knowledge of the complainant on July 10,1980 and in pursuance thereof he filed the complaint before the Senior Superintendent of Police on June 23, 1981. Thus the three years'' period of limitation provided in Section 468(2)(c) of the Code commenced with effect from July 10, 1980. Evidently, the trial Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the commission of this offence on the expiry of three years after 10th of July, 1980. The cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate much thereafter when the challan was produced in Court on Feb. 13,1985. The fact that the cognizance was taken by the Judicial Magistrate on the filing of the challan and not earlier to that cannot be disputed in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas Vs. The State of West Bengal, . The Supreme Court held in this case that it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding either u/s 200 or u/s 204 of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and, therefore, had taken cognizance. Thus, in a case of cognizable offence, like an offence u/s 419, Penal Code, the Magistrate takes cognizance when the police have completed their investigation and they come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process against the accused as held by the Supreme Court in R.R. Chari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, . It is, therefore, abundantly clear that in the instant case the trial Magistrate had taken cognizance of the commission of an offence u/s 419, Penal Code, after the expiry of the period of limitation which could not be done.

No doubt, u/s 473 of the Code the trial Magistrate could have taken cognizance of the offence even after the expiry of the period of limitation if he was satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. However, die impugned order of the trial Magistrate indicates that no such extension of the period of limitation had been granted by the trial Magistrate in this case.

In the light of what is stated above the impugned First Information Report dated Aug. 26, 1981 and the order of the Judicial Magistrate I Class, Ferozepur, dated Aprl. 16, 1985, are quashed.