Gyaniram and Another vs State of M.P.

I. Panduranga Rao, J.

The conviction u/s 498A, I.P.C. has been challenged by the learned Counsel for the applicants on two grounds.

The prosecution case is that the second applicant and the complainant P.W. 1 were married in or about 1982. Prosecution was launched on 13.12.1986 alleging that there had been demand by the applicants for registering certain lands in the name of the second applicant, who is the son of the first applicant and the husband of the complainant. In the trial Court, when the question of limitation was urged by the accused, the learned Magistrate brushed aside that objection on the ground that the question of limitation was not urged by the applicants at the time of framing of charge.

The Courts below have convicted the applicants and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default, to suffer R.I. for 3 months each.

The learned Counsel for the applicants submitted that the complainant herself stated that the marriage had taken place in 1982 and the alleged demand for registering the land was 15 days after the marriage and hence there is no scope for framing charge against the applicants u/s 498A, I.P.C., because the said provision received the assent of the President on 25.12.1983 and was published in the official gazette on 26.12.1983. Though the evidence of P.W. 1 is that the marriage had taken place in 1982, the learned appellate Judge has recorded a finding that the date of marriage is 15.4.1983. Even then, as admitted by P.W. 1 in her cross-examination, there was no demand at the time of marriage and the demand was made 15 days thereafter. It is stated that subsequently, the complainant and the second applicant were living separately. When the wife is living separately, there is no scope for making any further demands so as to result in cruelty against her.

Since the provision of Section 498A, I.P.C. had not entered Statute Book by the date of the alleged demand, the conviction u/s 498A, I.P.C. cannot be sustained.

Even otherwise, the filing of the complaint (Ex. P/1) is beyond 3 years from the date of the alleged demand. The learned Dy. A.G. tried to sustain the conviction u/s 472, Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that in the case of continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. In this case, there is no such proof of continuity of offence, because, as admitted by P.W. 1, after the demand, P.W. 1 and her husband (the second applicant) started living separately. It is, therefore, not possible to bring the case within the four corners of Section 472, Code of Criminal Procedure The learned Dy. A.G. further argued that even if the offence is barred by limitation, the Court is well within its rights to entertain a criminal case by condoning the delay. In support of that submission, he relied upon Section 473, Code of Criminal Procedure But, in this case, both the Courts did not advert to Section 473 Code of Criminal Procedure on satisfaction of the facts that delay has been properly explained, and hence taking cognizance of the offence is necessary in the interest of justice.

From the above discussion, I agree with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the applicants that the conviction is vitiated by reason of the alleged offence having taken place even prior to Section 498A, I.P.C., having entered the Statute Book and also by reason of the bar of limitation.

The revision is, therefore, allowed, setting aside the conviction and sentence against the applicants. The applicants are on bail. Their bail bonds are discharged.