Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. vs Ajeet Impex Pvt. Ltd.

Sujoy Paul, Judge

Parties are heard on IA No.938/2011, i.e., an application for interim direction on behalf of the respondents. Shri Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel pressed IA No.938/2012 and submits that this Court had permitted the respondent to sell certain pieces of land by order dated 16.2.2012. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Petition No.214/2012 directed the respondent to discharge his liability by 31st August, 2012, failing which the consequences would be faced by the respondent. Shri Arya submits that when the respondent made efforts to sell the said land, the Registrar Stamps declined to execute sale deeds and, therefore, the respondent impleaded the Registrar by filing IA No.2970/2012. The said IA was allowed on 27.7.2012 and the Registrar Stamps was impleaded. On 7.8.2012 the Registrar was directed to file his response and Registrar has now filed the response, which is devoid of substance. Shri Arya further submits that the reasons assigned in the reply of the Registrar is bereft of merits. By criticizing the inaction of the Registrar, learned senior counsel submits that heavy reliance is placed on Division Bench judgment of this Court, passed in W.P.No.1773/2006 (PIL) (Annexure C-2). He submits that the reliance on the said judgment is misconceived because in the said Division Bench judgment this Court has applied the Urban Land Ceiling Act in a property situated at Dabra. Learned senior counsel submits that the said Act has no application at Dabra and the said judgment is incorrect. He submits that the said DB judgment has been stayed by Supreme Court and, therefore, it cannot be applied. By criticizing the stand of the PF Organisation, it is stated that whatever liability the respondent has towards PF contribution, it can be fulfilled by attaching the other land. The said authority has already passed certain attachment orders and other pieces of lands available can very well satisfy the statutory requirement of PF Organisation. In other words, it is the case of the respondent that even if the lands, which were permitted to be sold on 16.2.2012 are sold, yet there is a sizable number of lands which can fulfill the statutory requirement under the Employees'' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for brevity, ''EPF Act, 1952'').

Per Contra, Shri R.K.Goyal submits that an attachment order of a land was passed by the PF Organisation, against which the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under the EPF Act, 1952. On paying 30% of the amount in question, the Appellate Tribunal had stayed the attachment order. Against the said interim order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the PF Organisation filed a Writ Petition No.3034/2012 before this Court and Division Bench of this Court on 30.4.2012 stayed the operation of the order dated 16.6.2011 passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Learned Counsel submits that if respondent is permitted to sell the land, it is difficult to ascertain at this stage whether the other land can satisfy the statutory liability under the EPF Act, 1952 against the respondent.

Shri J.D.Suryavanshi, Learned Counsel for the Financial Corporation, submits that in the order of this Court dated 16.2.2012 it was made clear that the respondent shall first clear the NPA dues of Financial Corporation up to 31.3.2012 and then only he can be permitted to sell the land. The respondent has not discharged the said liability till date and, therefore, there is no question to permit the respondent to sell the land.

Shri Pravin Newaskar, learned Deputy Government Advocate, by placing reliance on the Division Bench judgment passed in PIL (supra) submits that in the light of aforesaid judgment, the Registrar Stamps has not committed any mistake in not executing the sale deed. He submits that the judgment passed by this Court has not been set aside and, therefore, no fault can be found in the action of the Registrar for not executing the sale deed.

I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Registrar Stamps/State was not a party respondent in this matter when the order dated 16.2.2012 was passed. On respondent''s undertaking that he will deposit NPA dues of Financial Corporation, the permission was granted. However, when the Registrar was impleaded, for the first time it was brought to the notice of this Court that Division Bench of this Court has passed the order in PIL (supra). The Division Bench in para 21 held as under:

Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the State Government to ascertain and demarcate the pattas land on which factory is situated and also to demarcate the land declared surplus and vested in the Government under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Respondents No.1 to 11 may protect the aforesaid surplus land vested in the Government in the manner as prescribed by law.

(i) So far as the agricultural land is concerned, the same should also be demarcated and surplus land which has vested in the Government should also be demarcated and its management shall be subject to the final orders in the pending writ petitions.

(ii) The demarcation work of both non-agricultural and agricultural lands of both the companies shall be carried by the revenue authorities under the supervision and orders of the Collector of the district in accordance with law.

The stand of the parties opposing IA is that the order passed in SA No.482/2002 is not binding on the State or its authorities. It is stated that the entire adjudication which became subject matter of second appeal before this Court was between Nagar Palika Parishad Dabra and Gwalior Sugar Company. The State was not a party respondent and, therefore, the said litigation and its order has no binding force on the State. It is stated that the respondent has no title on the land and the sale deeds cannot be executed

Although it is vehemently argued that the Division Bench has erred in invoking and applying Urban Land Ceiling Act in the land situated at Dabra, I am afraid that this question cannot be gone into in the present proceedings. There is no occasion for this Court to address this question when a Division Bench of this Court has passed the judgment and matter is subjudice before the Supreme Court. The only question is what is the effect of the said judgment and the interim order passed by the Supreme Court. In other words, whether the Registrar Stamps is justified in not executing the sale deed because of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court.

Although a heavy reliance is placed on the interim order passed by the Supreme Court, in my considered opinion, there is a difference between an interim order passed staying the operation of a judgment and a final order/judgment by which some order/judgment is set aside. The quashing of an order results in restoration of position as it stood on the date of passing of the order which has been quashed. Stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This view was taken by Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, A Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Kunal Kanti Majee Vs. The Chancellor, Rani Durgawati Vishvavidyalaya and Others, has followed the same.

On the basis of aforesaid ratio decidendi, I am unable to hold that the effect of judgment of this Court in PIL (supra) is wiped out. Its operation is stayed by the Apex Court and, therefore, its execution is suspended. The said judgment is not totally wiped out. Accordingly, I am unable to hold that the action of the Registrar Stamps in not executing the sale deed is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. Consequently, I am unable to allow this IA.

IA No. 938/2012 is accordingly rejected.