GURDEV SINGH vs Amarjeet Kaur

-THIS order will dispose of two appeals namely First Appeal No. 1374 of 2002 (Dr. Gurdev Singh and Another v. Jagdeep Singh and Another) and First Appeal No. 1375. of 2002, (Dr. Gurdev Singh and Another v. Amarjeet Kaur ). The questions of law and facts involved in both the appeals are the same, Therefore, both are being disposed of by common order. The facts are taken from First Appeal No. 1375 of 2002. The parties would also be referred to by their status in the present appeal.

AMARJEET Kaur, respondent was married to Jagdeep Singh (1st respondent in First Appeal No. 1374 of 2002) on 12. 9. 1999. She got pregnant and was expecting the delivery of a child in the month of August, 2000. She went to the house of her parents in Village Gumti Kalan, Tehsil Phul, District Bathinda for delivery purpose as per the custom and usage in their families. On 23. 8. 2000, the respondent felt delivery pains. Her husband, Jagdeep Singh, was informed and the respondent was taken to the hospital of the appellants who was running the hospital in the name and style of Dev Hospital in Village Jalal. Jagdeep Singh, husband of Amarjeet Kaur, respondent and one Madan Lal also reached the said hospital and they found that Amarjeet Kaur, respondent was in the Operation Theatre while Nasib Kaur (mother of Amarjeet Kaur. respondent) was present in the hospital of the appellants. At about 4. 00 p. m. , a full term male child was born to the respondent through minor operation called Episiotomies. At the time of delivery, the appellants had used forceps, scissors and other instruments for delivery of the child. The appellants are not qualified doctors but they were pretending to be qualified. They were not competent to handle the delivery case or the newly born children. The appellants had neither called any Surgeon nor any Anaesthetist to handle delivery nor they used the fully sterilized instruments while conducting delivery case of the respondent.

It was further pleaded that at the time of delivery, the appellants committed gross negligence and caused a blade injury of more than 5 cms on the back side of the ear upto neck of newly born child. The child was bleeding profusely due to aforesaid blade injury caused by the appellants. The appellants had applied stitches at the backside of the ear and neck of the newly born child to control the bleeding but the bleeding could not be controlled by the appellants. The child was taken to the Chandigarh Child Care Centre, Kotkapura where Dr. Ravi Bansal incharge of the said Hospital declared the newly born child as ''brought dead''. The death of the child has taken place due to the negligence committed by the appellants in the process of delivery.

IT was further pleaded that the respondent remained admitted in the hospital of appellants from 23. 8. 2000 to 25. 8. 2000. She was discharged by the appellants on 25. 8. 2000 after charging a sum of Rs. 5,000 from the respondent as delivery charges and other expenses. The appellants conducted the delivery case of the respondent rashly and negligently. It caused injury to the perineal and vaginal tears of the respondent with the result that the respondent was bleeding profusely from the vagina. The appellants being incompetent doctors, they applied cotton stitches on the perineal walls of the vagina. They also failed to understand the vaginal tears which caused profuse bleeding due to which the respondent developed septicemia and the respondent was passing urine from vagina. The respondent also developed Vesico Vaginal Fistula. It was also pleaded that after the discharge of the respondent from the hospital of the appellants, she was admitted to the hospital of Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana of Romana Nursing Home, Goniana Road, Bathinda who detected foul smell and severe infection in the vaginal parts of the respondent. The perineal tears extending from vaginal wall upto the anus in the midline was restured with catgut by Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana. The respondent was given anti-biotics and pain killers to control the severe infection as the respondent was bleeding too much and she was very week. Her HB was only 6 gm due to the aforesaid bleeding. She was given 4 units of B+ve Blood and the respondent remained admitted in the hospital of Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana upto 29. 8. 2000.

IT was also pleaded that the appellants are not qualified doctors and they were practising in allopathy although they have no degrees/licence to practise in allopathy. They have committed deficiency in service by not giving proper medical treatment to the respondent and her newly born child has died because of the negligence of the appellants. It was further pleaded that a case was registered against the appellants at Police Station, Dialpura, District Bathinda at F. l. R. No. 91 dated 10. 10. 2000. Hence the respondent filed a complaint for the recovery of Rs. 3 lacs as compensation for injuries to the self. The respondent and her husband filed another complaint for compensation to the tune of Rs. 4. 5 lacs with interest, compensation and costs for the death of their infant. The appellants filed the written reply. Preliminary objections were pleaded and the case was also contested on merits. It was admitted that the respondent was admitted in their hospital on 23. 8. 2000 (wrongly stated as 27. 8. 2001) for delivery of a child. She was already in delivery pain and could not be referred to any other hospital. The appellants had more than 12 years'' experience in delivery cases. Therefore, they attended the respondent due to emergency on her own request and on the request of her attendants. It was admitted that a small child was born in the hospital. The delivery was normal but the child was very weak. Therefore, the child was referred to a Child Specialist and the child was immediately discharged from the hospital by the appellants. It was denied if any instrument was used for the delivery of the child.

IT was further pleaded that the appellants are Medical Practitioners. Appellant No. l is duly registered with the Board of Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of Medicine, Punjab on 27. 5. 1976. Appellant No. 2 is duly registered with State Council of Ayurvedic Unani Medicines, Bihar, Patna. They are carrying on their private practice in village Jalal for the last 12 years. The appellants are entitled to practise under the notification dated 29. 10. 1967 issued under Rule 2 (cc) (iii) of the Rules framed under this Act by which Vaids and Hakeems were given the authority to prescribe allopathic drugs covered by the Indian Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1948. The said notification was upheld by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and Others v. The State of Punjab and Others, VIII (1998) SLT 204=iv (1998) CLT 203 (SC)=1998 (7) SCC 579. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the Director, Health and Family Welfare. Punjab had written a letter dated 29. 7. 1998 authorizing the persons registered with the Board of Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicine of States other than Punjab State to practise the modern system of medicine in Punjab State.

IT is, therefore, pleaded that the appellants were competent to practice in modern medicines and handle delivery cases also. It was denied if the delivery case of the respondent was handled in negligent manner rather it was handled with utmost care. The child was very weak at the time of his birth, and therefore, the child was referred to Child Specialist. It was denied if there was any bleeding on any part of the child. It was stated that the child died after the discharge from the hospital by the appellants because of his weak health. The post-mortem was not got conducted on the dead-body of the child by the appellants. It was denied if the death of the child was due to the negligence on the part of the appellants. It was pleaded that the respondent was discharged on 25. 8. 2000 in a satisfactory condition. It was denied if a sum of Rs. 5,000 was charged from her. Rather only a sum of Rs. 850 was charged from her. It was also pleaded that the respondent had given birth to a male child in the 2nd week of July, 2001 i. e. about one year after 23. 8. 2000. This also proves that the delivery case of the respondent was handled by the appellants cautiously and with full care and devotion which enabled her to become pregnant within two months of handling of her delivery case. Hence dismissal of both the complaints was prayed. The respondent produced affidavits and documents as Exs. C-1 to C-11 while the appellants also produced documents Exs. R-1 to R-9.

The learned District Forum vide judgment dated 17. 9. 2002 accepted the complaint filed by the respondent and her husband with cost of Rs. 10,000. They were awarded compensation of Rs. 2,40,000 for the death of their minor child and the appellants were also directed to pay interest @ 12% p. a. if the amount was not paid within a period of two months.

THE complaint filed by the respondent was also accepted with costs of Rs. 10,000 by the learned District Forum vide separate judgment dated 17. 9. 2002. She was awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 70,000 as compensation for mental agony, harassment, etc. Hence the appellants filed First Appeal No. 1374 of 2002 against the judgment dated 27. 9. 2002 by which compensation was awarded for the death of the minor child.

THEY also filed First Appeal No. 1375 of 2002 against the judgement dated 17. 9. 2002 by which the compensation was awarded to the respondent. Record has been perused and submissions have been considered. This fact has not been denied that Amarjeet Kaur was admitted in the hospital of the appellants on 23. 8. 2000 for delivery purposes. It is also admitted that a full term male child was born to her on 23. 8. 2000 at 4. 00 p. m.

THE version of the respondent is that the delivery was handled by the appellants very negligently. They had used forceps, scissors and other instruments. As a result, they had caused a blade injury of more than 5 cms. on the back side of the ear upto the neck of the newly born child. They had also taken steps to apply stitches to this blade injury of newly born child to control the bleeding but bleeding could not be controlled. Therefore, the child was taken to Chandigarh Child Care Centre, Kotkapura for medical treatment where the child was declared as ''brought dead''.

THE version of the appellants, on the other hand, was that the child was born very weak for which the child was referred to a Child Specialist and the child was discharged immediately from the hospital by the appellants. The fact remains, therefore, that as per version of both the parties the child born to the respondent on 23. 8. 2000 was referred to the Child Specialist on 23. 8. 2000 although they have narrated different circumstances in which the child was referred. Therefore, the report of the Child Specialist would be of great help to determine the controversy between the parties.

The report of Dr. Ravi Bansal of Chandigarh Child Care Centre, Kotkapura dated 6. 9. 2000 has been proved as Ex. C-8. As per this report, full term male baby was brought dead to his hospital on 23. 8. 2000 around 6. 40 p. m. As the child was already expired, it was difficult to assess the cause of death but the child had 5. 0 cms. blade injury. It was superficial and stitched. Otherwise no obvious sign was present. The body was immediately handed over to the parents without giving any treatment. This report of Dr. Ravi Bansal clearly reveals that the child had 5. 0 cms. blade injury which was stitched. It clearly proves the version of the respondent that the appellants had used scissors and other instruments while conducting the delivery case and in the process, an injury was caused by the appellants to the minor child. The appellants had also attempted to stitch the injury for stopping the bleeding for which they failed and the child was referred to Child Specialist but by that time the child was already dead. This shows utter negligence on the part of the appellants in handling a newly born child.

THE version of the appellants that the child was very weak for which he was referred to Child Specialist and for which the child died is clearly falsified by the report of Dr. Ravi Bansal, Ex. C-8. Moreover, the respondent has pleaded that the child was born at 4. 00 p. m. and he had died at 6. 40 p. m. on 23. 8. 2000. The weakness of child cannot lead to death so soon and obviously it was the injury which was bleeding and the bleeding caused death. This also proves the version of the respondent. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that the report dated 6. 9. 2000, Ex. C-8, has been manipulated by the respondent. The respondent has not produced any report of 23. 8. 2000 from Dr. Ravi Bansal.

THIS submission has no legs to stand. The doctor has given the report dated 6. 9. 2000. Even the appellants themselves have admitted that the child born to the respondent on 23. 8. 2000 was referred to Child Specialist on 23. 8. 2000 itself. It clearly means, therefore, that child was taken to Dr. Ravi Bansal on that date. It cannot be believed if Dr. Ravi Bansal has concocted a false version about 5. 0 cms. long blade injury on the person of the child or that the said injury was stitched. Therefore, the respondent and her husband have clearly proved that it was a case of extreme negligence done by the appellants in the delivery case of the respondent and they have committed deficiency in service. The appellants have also proved report of Dr. Ravi Bansal of Chandigarh Child Care Centre dated 8. 1. 2002 as Ex. R-2. In this report also, Dr. Ravi Bansal has stated that the child born to Amarjeet Kaur, respondent was brought dead to his clinic and he had observed that there was some injury on the head of the child. This report of the doctor, which is a part of the evidence led by the appellants themselves, also proves that there was an injury on the body of the child. It also proves the version of the respondent. Even regarding the qualification of the appellants, the appellants admit that they are only Registered Medical Practitioners. They may be entitled to prescribe medicines but they are not fully qualified doctors to handle delivery.

THE learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Dr. Mukhtiar Chand and Others v. The State of Punjab and Others, (supra ). However, this judgment does not help the appellants as only the following points were under consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in this judgement: "1. Whether Rule 2 (ee) (iii) of the Drgus Rule is bad for want of legislative competence; and are the impugned notifi-cations issued by the State Governments, under Clause (iii) of the said rule, declaring the categories of persons who were practising modern system of medicine invalid in law? 2. What is the impact of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and Indian Medical Central Council Act, 1970 on Rule 2 (ee) (iii) of the Drugs Rules and the notifications issued thereunder? and 3. Whether the persons who have qualified the integrated courses in Ayurveda and Unani from various universities are entitled to practise in and prescribe allopathic medicines. "

IT was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court as under: "50. The upshot of the above discussion is that Rule 2 (ee) (iii) as effected from May 14, 1960 is valid and does not suffer from the vice of want of legislative competence and the notifications issued by the State Governments thereunder are not ultra vires the said rule and are legal. However, after Sub-section (2) in Section 15 of the 1956 Act occupied the field vide Central Act 24 of 1964, with effect from June 16, 1964, the benefit of the said rule and the notifications issued thereunder would be available only in those States where the privilege of such right to practise and system of medicine is conferred by the State Law under which practitioners of Indian Medicine are registered in the State, which is for the time being in force. The position with regard to Medical practitioners of Indian medicine holding degrees in integrated courses is on the same plain inasmuch as if any State Act recognizes their qualification as sufficient for registration in the State Medical Register, the prohibition contained in Section 15 (2) (b) of the 1956 Act will not apply. "

This judgment clearly does not apply to a situation needing determination if a Registered Medical Practitioner can handle delivery case or is authorized to handle medical tools while conducting a delivery case.

On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent has made reference to another judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel and Ors. , II (1996) CPJ 1 (SC)=1996 (2) CLT l (SC), in which the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word ''negligence'' by holding as under: "14. Negligence as a tort is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. [see Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co, etc. of N. L. Ry. (l873-74) LR 7 HR 213; Governor-General in Council v. Mt. Saliman, 1948 ILR 27 Pat. 207; Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort].

The definition involves the following constituents: (1) a legal duty to exercise due care; (2) breach of the duty; and (3) consequential damages.

The breach of duty may be occasioned either by not doing something which a reasonable man, under a given set of circumstances would do, or by doing some act which a reasonable prudent man would not do.

So far as persons engaged in Medical Profession are concerned, it may be stated that every person who enters into the profession, undertakes to bring to the exercise of it, a reasonable degree of care and skill. It is true that a Doctor or a Surgeon does not undertake that he will positively cure a patient nor does he undertake to use the highest possible degree of skill, as there may be persons more learned and skilled than himself, but he definitely undertakes to use a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill. This implied undertaking constitutes the real test, which will also be clear from a study and analysis of the judgment in Bolam v. Friem Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 2 All ER 118, in which, Mcnair, J. while addressing the jury summed up the law as under: "the test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art. In the case of a medical man, negligence means failure to act in accordance with the standards of reasonably competent medical men at the time. There may be one or more perfectly proper standards, and if he conforms with one of these proper standards, then he is not negligent. "

IT was further observed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court: "19. The test pointed out by Mcnair, J. covers the liability of a Doctor in respect of his diagnosis, his liability to warn the patients of the risk inherent in the treatment and his liability in respect of the treatment.

This Court in Dr. Laxman Balakrislma Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu Bodbole and Another, AIR 1969 SC 128, laid down that a Doctor when consulted by a patient owes him certain duties, namely, (a) a duty of care in deciding whether a (to) undertake the case; (b) a duty of care in deciding what treatment to give; and (c) a duty of care in the administration of that treatment. A breach of any of these duties gives a cause of action for negligence to the patient.

The principles were reiterated in A. S. Mittal v. State of U. P. , AIR 1989 SC I570, in which wide extracts from that judgment were made and approved.

It is in the light of the above principles that it is to be seen now whether there was a breach of duty of care on the part of respondent No. 1 in the process of treatment of Parmod Verma. "

In Poonam Verma''s case (supra), it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that it was a clear cut case of negligence and the doctor was directed to pay the amount of compensation.

THIS judgment was also considered in Dr. Mukhtiar Chand''s case (supra), but it was distinguished. Reference may be made to the judgment of Hon''ble National Commission reported as P. N. Thaku (Prof.) and Anr. v. Hans Charitable Hospital and Ors. , III (2007) CPJ 340 (NC), in which the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Dr. Mukhtiar Chand''s case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants and the judgment in Poonam Verma''s case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent were duly considered. The Hon''ble National Commission also made reference to the later judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Jacob Mathew (Dr.) v. State of Punjab and Anr. , III (2005) CPJ 9 (SC)=iii (2005) CCR 9 (SC)=vi (2005) SLT 1=122 (2005) DLT 83 (SC) and it was held as under: "supreme Court came down heavily in cases where Homeopathic Doctors treated the patients with Allopathic medicines. In Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel and Others, II (1996) CPJ 1 (SC)= (1996) 4 SCC 332, where a Doctor holding Diploma in Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery (DHMS) and registered under Bombay Homeopathic Practitioners Act, caused the death of a patient due to administration of Allopathic medicine, the Supreme Court held him being not qualified to practise Allopathy, was a quake or pretender to the medical knowledge and skill as a charlatan and hence guilty of negligence per se. The facts being similar in this case, we hold that there is total negligence in treating the deceased patient. "

The facts of the present case are still worse for the appellants. Being the Registered Medical Practitioners, they may prescribe medicines for ailments like fever, head ache, etc. but they have no right to undertake a delivery case which needs special skill as it involves the precious life of two human beings. This is a case which can be handled by a Gynaecologist who is duly trained and fully qualified. The Registered Medical Practitioners like the appellants cannot claim to be at par with fully trained and fully qualified Gynaecologist. It takes years and years to acquire this qualification and not like the appellants who keep some medicines, chairs and the table and open dispensary pretending to be qualified and trained doctors. It was the duty of the appellants to tell the respondent to go to a qualified doctor and if it was not possible for her to move as the appellants have made out, then it was their duty to hire the services of some specialist doctor to their own clinic. But unfortunately the appellants assumed that they could do what could be done only by a qualified doctor. Not only they failed to requisition the services of a qualified doctor but they also failed to call for the services of an Anaesthetist whose services were also extremely necessary and urgent in such like cases.

NO doubt in villages, there used to be Dais who used to perform such like cases but again the mortality rate was very high. Half of the women used to die while delivering a child as these were handled by a non-qualified persons like the appellants. The law of torts was dormant in those days and these midwives used to escape unpunished but not now when the law has been enacted and the people have become aware and conscious.

IN the present case, not only the appellants handled the delivery case of the respondent even when they knew that they were not qualified doctors, but to pretend that they are competent doctors, they started using the instruments like scissors and other instruments and in the process, they caused 5. 0 cms. long blade injury starting from the backside of the ear upto the neck of the newly born baby. In order to hide their negligence, they tried to stitch the blade injury and that too without the service of an Anaesthetist. Look at the condition of a poor child who could not survive in this world for more than 2-3 hours because of the negligence of the appellants. It is a case of extreme negligence on the part of the appellants, and therefore, there is no merit in the appeal. Accordingly, the First Appeal No. 1374 of 2002 is dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000 and the order of the learned District Forum awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,40,000 with cost of Rs. 10,000 is upheld. If the appellants fail to make the payment of this amount within a period of 45 days after the receipt of a copy of this order, they would be liable to pay interest @ 9% p. a. from the date of passing of the impugned judgment dated 17. 9. 2002 till payment.

So far as the present appeal (First Appeal No. 1375 of 2002) is concerned, Amarjeet Kaur respondent has also suffered because of the negligence of the appellants. She was admitted by the appellants in their hospital on 23. 8. 2000 and she was discharged on 25. 8. 2000. At the time of discharge, Amarjeet Kaur was totally in a shattered condition. She was rushed to the hospital of Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana. The Discharge Slip of Dr. Jasbir'' Kaur Romana dated 29. 8. 2000 has been proved as Ex. C-9 in which it is reported "that the patient came in this hospital on 25. 8. 2000 with history of full term internal vaginal delivery on 23. 8. 2000. According to the patient, outlet forceps seem to have been applied". On investigation, the HB was found to be 6 gm. The local examination revealed "foul smelling discharge P/v+nt Severe infection +nt. Cotton stitches seen superficially old perineal and vaginal tears present". Regarding the medical treatment given by her, it was stated in the Discharge Certificate, Ex. C-9, as under: "anti inflammatory drugs were given. Perineal care was given with betadine solution. On 28. 8. 2000 the perineal tear extending from vaginal wall upto the anus in the midline was restured with catgut. Patient was given 4 units of B+ve blood supplied from Civil Hospital, Bathinda. The respondent was discharged on 29. 8. 2000 in satisfactory condition. "

THIS report of Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana clearly reveals that had Amarjeet Kaur, respondent not been handled by Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana from 25. 8. 2000 onwards and had she stayed for one or two days more in the hospital of the appellants, possibly she would have reached the place of no return. Such a delicate medical case has been handled by the appellants with extreme negligence knowing well that they were un-trained and not qualified and still they played with the life of Amarjeet Kaur, respondent and her newly born child.

THE submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that Smt. Amarjeet Kaur was handled with care and caution by the appellants and it was for this reason that she had become pregnant within 2 months of her discharge from their hospital and she had delivered a male child in the second week of July 2001. This submission has been considered. There could be some merit in this submission if Dr. Jasbir Kaur Romana had not handled the case of Amarjeet Kaur respondent from 25. 8. 2000 to 29. 8. 2000 i. e. immediately after the discharge of the respondent from the hospital of the appellants. The credit goes to Dr. Romana for restoring the health of the respondent to normalcy, and not to the appellants. This submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants, therefore, has no force. In view of the discussion held above, the impugned judgment dated 17. 9. 2000 by which the appellants have been burdened with Rs. 70,000 as the amount of compensation and Rs. 10,000 as costs is upheld and the appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000. The amount shall be paid by the appellants within a period of 45 days after the receipt of copy of this order failing which they would be liable to pay interest @ 9% p. a. from the date of impugned order dated 17. 9. 2002 till payment.

BEFORE closing the judgment, it may be stated that F. l. R. No. 91 dated 10. 10. 2000 was also registered against the appellants for this very occurrence. It was tried by Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo. The appellants were convicted in the judgment dated 15. 1. 2007, a copy of which has been placed on the file. It is ordered to be taken on record as Annexure FA-1. However, the appellants have filed an appeal which is pending consideration in the learned Appellate Court.

IT was submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate has also awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. l lac (Rs. 50,000 each ). Hence it was prayed that if the order of the learned District Forum is upheld the amount may be adjusted against the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo. This submission has been considered. The judgment of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo dated 15. 1. 2007 is under appeal, and therefore, it is yet to be determined by the Appellate Court whether the judgment dated 15. 1. 2007 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo is to be upheld or set aside. Therefore, this Commission does not deem it proper to make any observation on that account. The learned Counsel for the appellants may make this submission before the Appellate Court which is seized of the appeal against the judgment dated 15. 1. 2007 passed by the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Talwandi Sabo.

As a result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,000 each and with observations made above.

THE appeals could not be decided within the statutory period because of heavy pendency and non-availability of the requisite Benches and infrastructure in the State Commission. It is in the process of being constituted. The arguments in these appeals were heard on 31. 3. 2008 and the orders were reserved. Now the orders be communicated to the parties. Appeals dismissed.