Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation vs Surendrasinh Bhupatsinh Vaghela

K.S. Jhaveri, J.—By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court, Anand in Reference (LCA) No. 618/1992 dated 24.09.2002, whereby, the said reference was allowed and the petitioner has been directed to reinstate the respondent on his original post with continuity of service and full back wages.

The facts in brief are that the petitioner is a Corporation established and constituted for the development of water resources in the State of Gujarat. It runs several tube-wells across the State for the purpose of supplying water to the farmers for irrigation and in discharge of the said function, it engages Contractors for the purpose of maintenance/use of the tube-wells.

For the purpose of running the tube-well at Village Sarsa-2, the petitioner and respondent entered into a written Agreement dated 17.03.1986 for the aforesaid purpose for a period of one year beginning from 20.03.1986. On completion of the contract, it was terminated w.e.f. 19.03.1987. After about 14 months thereafter, the Contractor who was appointed by the petitioner and was working as such pursuant to the termination of the contract with the respondent w.e.f. 19.03.1987, met with an accident and therefore, the respondent was engaged as a labourer on stop gap arrangement for the period from 11.05.1988 to 25.09.1988. When the regular Operator resumed his duties, the respondent was removed from work.

Being aggrieved by the said action of the petitioner, the respondent raised an industrial dispute, which, ultimately, culminated into a reference before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, after considering the evidence on record, allowed the reference of the respondent by way of the impugned award. Hence, this petition.

Mr. D.G. Chauhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner-Corporation, submitted that the respondent was earlier engaged as a Contractor by the petitioner-Corporation by executing a written Agreement dated 17.03.1986. After completion of the contract work, the said Agreement was terminated w.e.f. 19.03.1987. After about 1-years thereafter, the respondent was engaged on daily wage basis in order to meet with an exigency. However, the Labour Court has committed serious error in clubbing the contract period along with the period during which the respondent worked on daily wage basis for computing the total days of work. He submitted that the period from 11.05.1988 to 25.09.1988 can only be taken into consideration, which comes to 136 days. Thus, the Court below has committed serious error in law and on facts by passing the impugned award.

Mr. N.D. Joshi, learned Counsel for the respondent, supported the award passed by the Court below and submitted that the Court below was justified in passing the impugned award since the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year. Hence, this Court may not interfere in this petition.

Heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The document at Annexure-A to the petition is the copy of the Agreement dated 17.03.1986 entered into between the petitioner and respondent herein for the purpose of running the tube-well at Village Sarsa-2. The said Agreement was valid for a period of one year, i.e. from 20.03.1986 to 19.03.1987. At the end of the contract period, the Agreement was terminated w.e.f. 19.03.1987, by way of a written letter of termination. Therefore, indisputably, the period from 20.03.1986 to 19.03.1987, during which the respondent had worked with the petitioner, was under a specific contract. For the period from 11.05.1988 to 25.09.1988, i.e. for 136 days, the respondent was engaged on a daily wage basis as a stop-gap arrangement. Both the above periods, viz. the contract period of one year and the subsequent period of 136 days, cannot be clubbed together for the purpose of counting 240 days under the provisions of the I.D. Act inasmuch as in the earlier period, the respondent had rendered services under a specific Agreement and was not employed by the petitioner. For the subsequent period, the respondent was employed by the petitioner. Therefore, for the purpose of calculating 240 days under the provisions of I.D. Act, the subsequent period can only be taken into consideration, which, the respondent has not fulfilled. Hence, the Court below has committed serious error in law in clubbing both the periods for computing the period under the provisions of the I.D. Act. Consequently, the impugned award passed by the Labour Court deserves to be quashed and set aside.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned award dated 24.09.2002 passed by the Labour Court, Anand is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.