GSRTC and Another vs Jinabhai Dhanjibhai Baraiya

K.S. Jhaveri, J.—By way of present appeal, the Appellants have inter alia challenged the legality and validity of the judgment and order dated 08th May 2000 passed by the District Judge, Rajkot, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1996 arising out of the judgment and order dated 31st January 1996 passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge (S.D.), Rajkot in Regular Civil Suit No. 326 of 1995, whereby the Courts below have rejected the case of the Appellants herein by allowing the suit and confirming the judgment and decree in the appeal.

The facts of the case in brief are that the Respondent is the employee of the Appellants-Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and the relevant point of time, he was serving as a Head Mechanic with the Appellants. Prior to the same, the Respondent joined his service with the Saurashtra Road Transport Corporation. The age of retirement was fixed at the age of 60 years. Thereafter, the Gujarat State came into existence on 01st May 1960 and the said Saurashtra Road Transport Corporation was merged with the Appellant No. 2. The Appellant No. 2 includes the Saurashtra area of the Corporation and its existing permanent workers, who are allowed to retire at the age of 60 years, in case they are permanent employees.

2.1 As per Resolution No. 139 dated 27th January 1961 the Respondent is entitled to serve upto 60 years of his age. The date of birth of the Respondent is 28th September 1931 and thus, he was to retire on 28th September 1996. It is the case of the Respondent that though he is a permanent employee of Saurashtra Workshop, the Appellant No. 1 issued a notice dated 12th January 1994 intimating that on attaining the age of 58 years, the Respondent was to be retired with effect from 30th September 1994. The Respondent replied to the same. However, the Appellant No. 1 rejected his request vide letter dated 25th August 1994 on the ground that he is not a permanent employee of former Saurashtra State Road Transport Corporation and, therefore, he is not entitled to get the retirement on attaining the age of 60 years instead of 58 years. Hence, the Respondent herein preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 326 of 1995 before the Court of the 2nd Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division), Rajkot, which ultimately came to be decreed vide judgment and decree dated 31st January 1996.

2.2 Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Appellants herein preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1996 before the District Judge, Rajkot, which ultimately came to be dismissed by the District Judge, Rajkot vide impugned judgment and order dated 08th May 2000. Hence, present Second Appeal.

Mr. Mitul Shelat, learned advocate for the Appellants, has submitted that the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have erred in law in holding that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute covered under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') and that the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have erred in law in interpreting the word ''confirmation'' to mean the same as ''permanent''. In view of aforesaid it is prayed that present appeal may be allowed.

Ms. Khyati Hathi, learned advocate for the Respondent, has submitted that there are concurrent findings of facts and the Courts below have arrived at the impugned conclusion after going through the relevant facts and documentary evidence produced on record as well as after hearing both the sides and, therefore, the impugned order is just and proper. Hence, present appeal is required to be dismissed.

When present appeal came up for admission hearing on 20th November 2011, this Court (Coram: A.R. Dave, J) has raised the following substantial questions of law while admitting the matter:

Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the courts below have erred in law in holding that the civil court has jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute covered under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act?

Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court and the lower appellate court have erred in law in interpreting the word ''confirmation'' to mean the same as ''permanent''?

Having considered the rival contentions raised by the learned advocates for the respective parties, contentions raised in the appeal and the documentary evidence produced on record as well as the substantial questions of law as aforesaid, it transpires that there are concurrent findings of facts. The Courts below have arrived at the impugned conclusion after going through the facts and circumstances of the case and the documentary evidence produced on record. So far as the substantial question of law as to jurisdiction of the Civil Court is concerned, the Appellate Court has rightly relied upon the decision of the Apex Court, including the Three Judges Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others, wherein it is held that jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of dispute regarding dismissal pursuant to disciplinary inquiry and dispute whether inquiry was conducted in accordance with standing orders would be barred, however, when reliefs are based on general law of contract, suit would be maintainable. Thus, the view taken by the Courts below that Civil Court will have jurisdiction is just and proper.

6.1 So far as the of the Appellants that the Courts below erred in interpreting the word ''confirmation'' to mean the same as ''permanent'' is concerned, it is required to be noted that the Appellate Court to satisfy the meaning of ''confirmation'' has rightly relied upon the decision in the case of Ajudhyanath v. Union of India, reported in 1975 (2) SLR 280. It is pertinent to note that in the said decision, it has been categorically observed that confirmation means giving approval to the employee to hold post in a permanent capacity from the date of confirmation in a permanent capacity. Thus, there is no question of the Respondent not being a permanent employee.

In view of aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the Courts below have assigned cogent and convincing reasons for arriving at the conclusion. Over and above the aforesaid reasons, I adopt the reasons assigned by the Courts below and do not find any illegality much less any perversity in the findings recorded. I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Courts below. No case is made out to interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below. Hence, present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, present appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.