G.S.R.T. Corpn. vs Mahmedbhai Rehamnbhai Vohra

D.H. Waghela, J.—The Appellant-Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation has called into question oral judgment dated 21.06.2001 of learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1239 of 2001. Apart from the legal contentions of the parties, there was limited consensus about factual aspect of the matter which is that, after the Respondent being removed from service on 17.04.1997, he has retired upon reaching the age of retirement on 29.02.2000, while the award on the Appellant''s application for approving the removal u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was declared on 06.10.2000. Thus, the Respondent retired before the award of the Industrial Tribunal could be given effect to. Learned Single Judge had also not granted stay against the award. Then came the impugned decision of learned Single Judge on 21.06.2001, whereby the petition of the Appellant was dismissed and the impugned award of the Tribunal remained operative even after filing of the present appeal in 2001. The civil application of the Appellant for stay against order of learned Single Judge and award of the Tribunal was rejected on 21.12.2001 by Division Bench (Coram: J.M. Panchal, J., as His Lordship then was, and P.B. Majmudar, J.). Thus, in short, the removal from service of the Respondent was never ever approved by any court even temporarily.

It was stated at the bar that during pendency of the appeal, the Respondent is already paid full back-wages and all retirement benefits on the basis that he retired on 29.02.2000, on reaching the age of superannuation. Therefore, if the appeal were to be allowed on any ground, the consequences would be recovery of the amount of back-wages and marginal differences in retrial dues, after nearly a decade. On the other hand, main ground of appeal is that the Appellant had, in its original approval application filed in the year 1997, made a prayer to permit the Appellant to lead evidence of alleged misconduct of the Respondent before the Tribunal, in case the Tribunal arrived at the finding that the inquiry held by the Appellant was in any way defective or any of the principles of natural justice were violated. Therefore, even if the appeal were allowed, the impugned decision of learned Single Judge were set aside and the award of the Tribunal were also set aside, the only relief that the Appellant can obtain is that it would get an opportunity of leading evidence before the Tribunal about the alleged misconduct of the Respondent.

In view of above factual situation and the developments that took place during the pendency of the petition and the appeal of the Appellant, it was fairly stated that the litigation was outliving its utility except for asserting the legal proposition that the Appellant was required to be given an opportunity by the Tribunal to lead its evidence and the impugned judgment was incorrect to the extent that such right of the Appellant was not recognized. There was limited consensus in that context and accordingly we hold that the Appellant ought to have been permitted to lead its evidence before the Tribunal while its approval application was pending, if the demand therefore were duly pressed. Therefore, there was also a limited consensus that the impugned oral judgment dated 21.06.2001 will not be cited as a precedent for any other case and it shall be treated to have been a decision in peculiar facts of the case. Otherwise, the reopening of the proceeding before the Tribunal by remanding the matter or permitting the Appellant to produce any evidence in support of the charges against the Respondent is no longer feasible and may turn out to be wholly in fructuous and wasteful exercise. Therefore, the appeal is allowed only to the above extent of making a clarification about the impugned judgment and it stands disposed of accordingly.