Gramin Shikshan Sanstha vs Rajendra Vasant Zope & Anr.

The Petitioner-institution has filed this Petition challenging the judgment and order dated 25 March 2021 passed by the School Tribunal. By this order, the termination of Respondent No. 1 dated 3 February 2020 was set aside. This was the fourth time that Respondent No. 1 was terminated from service. Even the earlier termination orders were challenged by him before the School Tribunal and those orders were set aside. The present Petition was dismissed for default on 6 March 2026. Thereafter, the Interim Application filed by the Petitioner for restoring the Petition was allowed on 5 October 2026. Therefore, the Petition is now required to be considered and decided on merits.

The Petitioner, Gramin Shikshan Sanstha English High School and Junior College, is questioning the appointment, termination and reinstatement of Respondent No. 1, Rajendra Vasant Zope. The dispute has continued for several years and has resulted in proceedings before the School Tribunal and this Court on different occasions. Respondent No. 1 was appointed on 3 August 1995. His appointment was approved by the Deputy Director of Education, Nashik, on 3 September 1997. A approval was granted on 10 August 1998. Thereafter, probation orders were issued on 5 September 1997 and 13 June 1998.

On 23 July 1999, Respondent No. 1 was terminated from service for the first time. He challenged the termination before the School Tribunal. By an order dated 7 June 2002, the School Tribunal set aside the termination. The said order was challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002 on 2 August 2002. The Respondent No. 1 was reinstated in service on 6 July 2002 after the first termination. The Management filed Miscellaneous Application No. 02 of 2022 on 14 September 2022, seeking recall and setting aside of the order dated 7 June 2002 passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 90 of 1999. The School Tribunal rejected the application. The Management challenged the said rejection before this Court on 19 July 2024. The challenge was refused. Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002 was dismissed by this Court on 1 April 2025. The Review Petition, bearing No. 147 of 2025, was dismissed on 3 September 2026.

In the meantime, Respondent No. 1 was again terminated from service on 1 June 2009. He challenged the second termination before the School Tribunal. By an order dated 10 December 2009, the School Tribunal set aside the termination. The Management challenged that order before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 1777 of 2010. By a judgment dated 9 July 2010, the challenge to the order setting aside the second termination was dismissed. The Respondent No. 1 was reinstated in service on 4 September 2010. The Management filed an application seeking recall and setting aside of the School Tribunal's order relating to the second termination. The said application was rejected by the School Tribunal. The Management challenged the rejection before this Court. By an order dated 20 March 2025 the challenge was dismissed.

Respondent No. 1 was terminated from service for the third time on 30 April 2011. He again approached the School Tribunal. By an order dated 4 June 2012, the School Tribunal set aside the third termination. The Management challenged that order before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6025 of 2012. According to the list of dates, the said writ petition is pending. Respondent No. 1 was reinstated in service on 27 August 2014. The Management issued the fourth termination order on 3 February 2020. Respondent No. 1 challenged the said termination before the School Tribunal. By an order dated 25 March 2021, the School Tribunal set aside the termination order.

The Management challenged the said order before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 9030 of 2021. The said writ petition was dismissed for default on 6 March 2026. Respondent No. 1 retired from service on 28 May 2023. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an Interim Application seeking restoration of the writ petition. By an order dated 5 October 2026, the Interim Application was allowed. The present proceedings concern the challenge to the order of the School Tribunal dated 25 March 2021, by which the fourth termination order dated 3 February 2020 was set aside.

Mr. Modgi, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, invited my attention to the acknowledgement relied upon by the School Tribunal to hold that the appeal was duly served upon the Petitioner-institution on 7 March 2020. He submitted that the signature appearing on the acknowledgement does not match the signature of the Secretary of the Petitioner-institution. He submitted that the impugned order was passed when the guidelines relating to Covid were in force.

Relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal & Othersr, 1998 (4) Bom. C.R. 565, Mr. Modgi submitted that the School Tribunal was required to frame and decide three preliminary issues. One of these issues was whether the appointment of the concerned teacher was made in accordance with Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation, 1977 and the Rules framed thereunder, and whether such appointment was approved by the Education Officer as required under the Act and the Rules. He submitted that unless these preliminary issues were framed and decided, the School Tribunal could not have decided the appeal on merits, even if the Petitioner had failed to appear before it.

Mr. Modgi submitted that the post in question was reserved for a candidate belonging to the Scheduled Caste category, whereas Respondent No. 1 belonged to the Other Backward Class category. According to him, Respondent No. 1 was terminated from service because of an inconsistency in the certificate produced by him in support of his appointment to the said post. He submitted that the Petitioner has filed a writ petition challenging the issuance of the validity certificate in favour of Respondent No. 1. The said writ petition is pending before the Division Bench of this Court. He submitted that any order passed in the present petition should be made subject to the final decision in that writ petition.

On the other hand, Mr. Wasif, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 1, submitted that the impugned judgment and order was passed on 25 March 2021, by which time the Courts had resumed their normal functioning after the Covid restrictions. He submitted that the acknowledgement relied upon by the School Tribunal was an extract from the register maintained by the post office. The said extract showed that the notice of the appeal had been served upon the Petitioner before the onset of Covid, that is, in the year 2019. Therefore, according to him, the Petitioner was required to appear before the School Tribunal in 2019 itself. Mr. Wasif submitted that the School Tribunal had rightly observed that although Respondent No. 1 was appointed in the year 1999, he had not received the benefit of his employment for the last 22 years. He invited my attention to the judgment passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002, arising out of the third termination of Respondent No. 1. He submitted that, while dismissing the said petition, the coordinate Bench had recorded a clear finding in paragraph 27 that Respondent No. 1 had acquired deemed confirmation in service. According to Mr. Wasif, the coordinate Bench had considered the contentions raised by the Petitioner and decided them against the Petitioner. He invited my attention to various paragraphs of the said judgment to show that the relevant issues had been examined by this Court. He submitted that once Respondent No. 1 had attained permanency in service after his appointment on probation, he could not have been removed from service without holding an enquiry.

Mr. Wasif submitted that the coordinate Bench, while deciding Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002, had considered the issues which the School Tribunal was required to examine as preliminary issues. The Petitioner could not reopen those issues in the present writ petition. He submitted that Respondent No. 1 had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation and was entitled to receive his pensionary and other monetary benefits from the Petitioner.

Mr. Wasif submitted that the notice of the appeal had been sent to the correct address of the Management. It was for the Petitioner to establish that the notice had not been served upon it. He pointed out that the Petitioner had not claimed that the notice was sent to an incorrect address. According to him, when notice is sent to the correct address, service can be presumed unless the contrary is established. He submitted that no interference with the impugned judgment and order was called for and that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.

I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Modgi, learned Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, and Mr. Wasif, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 1. The main objections raised by the Petitioner relate to service of notice before the School Tribunal, the effect of Covid restrictions, the need to frame and decide preliminary issues before considering the appeal on merits, the nature of appointment of Respondent No. 1 and the dispute about his caste certificate. On the other hand, Mr. Wasif opposed the Petition by relying on the earlier judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002. He relied on the earlier orders by which the termination of Respondent No. 1 was set aside. He pointed out that Respondent No. 1 has retired from service.

The first question which requires consideration is whether the Petitioner has shown that the notice of the appeal was not properly served upon it before the School Tribunal. Mr. Modgi submitted that the acknowledgement relied upon by the School Tribunal for holding that notice was served upon the Petitioner-institution on 7 March 2020 contains a signature which "does not tally with the signature of the Secretary of the Petitioner-institution." He submitted that the School Tribunal passed the impugned order at a time when the guidelines relating to Covid were in force. The objection about the acknowledgement has to be considered along with the submission made by Mr. Wasif. He submitted that the acknowledgement was an extract from the register maintained by the post office. According to him, the record showed that the notice of the appeal was served upon the Petitioner before the Covid restrictions started. There is some difference between the parties about the date of service. Mr. Modgi referred to the acknowledgement dated 7 March 2020, whereas Mr. Wasif submitted that the notice was served in the year 2019 itself. However, both sides refer to the notice having been sent to the address of the Management. The question is whether the Petitioner has shown that the notice was not served upon it and because of this it could not appear before the School Tribunal.

The Petitioner has not stated that the notice was sent to a wrong address. Its objection is only that the signature on the acknowledgement is not the signature of its Secretary. This fact does not show that the institution had not received the notice. It is not necessary that only the Secretary can receive postal articles on behalf of the institution. If the Petitioner wanted to show that the acknowledgement was false or that the notice was never received, it was necessary to produce some material in support of such claim. No such material has been pointed out before me. The mere difference between the signature appearing on the acknowledgement and the signature of the Secretary is not enough to hold that the postal record is false. The School Tribunal was entitled to look at the postal record while deciding whether the notice had been served. In the absence of any material showing that the notice was sent to a wrong address or was otherwise not received by the institution, I am unable to accept the submission of the Petitioner that the finding regarding service recorded by the School Tribunal is wrong.

The submission based on Covid restrictions does not give me any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The impugned judgment is dated 25 March 2021. It is true that Covid affected the working of Courts and other institutions during that period. But only because the order was passed during the Covid period, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was prevented from appearing before the School Tribunal. What is required to be seen is whether the Petitioner was served with notice and whether it has shown that some circumstances beyond its control prevented it from taking part in the proceedings. In the present case, the notice is stated to have been delivered at the correct address. The Petitioner has not shown that it informed the School Tribunal about any difficulty in appearing before it. It has not shown that it made any request for giving it some accommodation and that such request was rejected. No particular circumstance has been brought to my notice to show that the Petitioner could not take part in the proceedings because of the restrictions. Therefore, a general reference to Covid restrictions is not enough to set aside the impugned judgment.

The next submission of Mr. Modgi is about the requirement of framing and deciding preliminary issues. He relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Division Bench observed that while deciding an appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, the School Tribunal is required to frame and decide three preliminary issues. These issues are about whether the school is a recognised school under the Act, whether the appointment of the teacher was made according to Section 5 of the Act and the Rules, and whether the appointment was approved by the Education Officer as required under the Act, the Rules and the applicable Government Resolutions regarding reservation. The Division Bench observed:

The principle stated by the Division Bench is clear. The School Tribunal cannot ignore the questions about the validity of the appointment and the required approval only because the Management has not raised these questions. However, this principle has to be considered by keeping in mind the facts of the present case and the earlier decisions regarding the appointment of Respondent No. 1.

The record before me shows that the appointment of Respondent No. 1 and his position in service have been examined in detail by the School Tribunal and this Court in earlier proceedings. In this regard, the judgment in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002, decided on 1 April 2025, is important. It is necessary to clarify one part of the submission made by Mr. Wasif. He referred to the said judgment as arising from the third termination of Respondent No. 1. However, after going through the judgment, I find that this description is not correct. The said Petition was filed by Mrs. Sangeeta J. Shinde, who challenged the order dated 7 June 2002 passed by the School Tribunal. By that order, the termination of Respondent No. 1 was set aside and his reinstatement was directed with continuity of service and consequential benefits, but without back wages. Therefore, the earlier proceedings related to the termination challenged before the School Tribunal in Appeal No. 90 of 1999. This clarification does not reduce the importance of the findings recorded by this Court about the appointment and service status of Respondent No. 1. In the judgment dated 1 April 2025, this Court considered the appointment orders issued to Respondent No. 1, the approvals given by the education authorities, the circumstances in which he continued in service and the objections raised by the Management about his caste category and the absence of an advertisement. Paragraph 16 of that judgment records that the appointment order dated 5 August 1997 mentioned probation. The Court noticed that the Secretary of the Management had signed the said appointment order along with the Headmistress. The later appointment order dated 13 June 1998 mentioned probation. In paragraph 18, the Court considered the approvals given by the education authorities for different academic years. These included the approvals dated 26 August 1996, 29 March 1997, 3 September 1997 and 10 August 1998. The Court found that the appointment of Respondent No. 1 had been sent for approval from time to time and that the approvals were granted. These findings are important because the Petitioner now wants to question the service status of the same employee whose appointment and continuation in service have been considered by this Court.

The earlier judgment considered the objection that no advertisement had been issued when Respondent No. 1 was first appointed and that he had not been appointed against the category of post which, according to the Management, was vacant. In paragraphs 20 to 22, this Court examined the findings of the School Tribunal on these questions. Paragraph 22 records that the school leaving certificate of Respondent No. 1 did not show that he belonged to the Other Backward Class category. However, a caste certificate had been issued in his name showing that he belonged to the Leva Patil caste, which was identified as an Other Backward Class. The Court considered the submission of the Management that the available vacancy was reserved for the Nomadic Tribe category and that Respondent No. 1 could not be appointed against such a post.

After considering the submissions of both sides, the Court observed that the School Tribunal had taken a possible view on the material before it. The Tribunal had found that there was an Other Backward Class vacancy and that Respondent No. 1 was appointed against that vacancy. This Court did not interfere with that finding while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the question about the category of the post and the appointment of Respondent No. 1 was not left completely undecided in the earlier proceedings. It was considered on the basis of the records which were then available. The Management cannot now proceed on the assumption that these questions have never been examined by a Court.

The most important finding in the earlier judgment is recorded in paragraph 27. The Court observed:

After considering the relevant provision, this Court held:

This was a clear finding about the service status of Respondent No. 1. It was not an observation made without looking at the relevant material. The Court considered the appointment orders and the period of probation. Thereafter, it accepted the finding of the School Tribunal that Respondent No. 1 had acquired deemed confirmation in service. In paragraph 28, the Court held that the view taken by the School Tribunal was a possible view and that there was no reason to interfere with it. Finally, the Petition was disposed of and the Rule was discharged by the judgment dated 1 April 2025.

The Management was represented in those proceedings. Its objections regarding the appointment, reservation category, absence of advertisement and deemed confirmation were considered. The fact that the earlier Petition was filed by another employee does not allow the Management to ignore the findings recorded after hearing the parties on these questions. It is true that the present Petition challenges a later termination order dated 3 February 2020, whereas the earlier proceedings were about the termination which took place in 1999. Therefore, the cause of action in both proceedings is different. However, the legal status of Respondent No. 1, as found in the earlier judgment, is relevant for deciding whether his services could be terminated in 2020. The Management cannot reopen the entire question of deemed confirmation only because a later termination order has resulted in a fresh proceeding. The earlier judgment may not decide every question relating to the fourth termination, but its findings about the appointment and deemed confirmation of Respondent No. 1 cannot be ignored.

I have considered the submission that the original post was reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Caste category, whereas Respondent No. 1 belonged to the Other Backward Class category. The earlier judgment records a somewhat different position. It refers to an advertisement dated 2 June 1999 for filling a post in the Scheduled Tribe or Nomadic Tribe categories. It records the earlier contention of the Management that the vacancy was available in the Nomadic Tribe category. This difference about the description of the reserved category is important. The material before me does not give a clear basis to accept the Petitioner's present description of the post as one reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. More importantly, the question about the reservation category was considered in the earlier proceedings, and this Court did not find sufficient reason to disturb the view taken by the School Tribunal. The Petitioner cannot succeed only by repeating a contention which has been considered and rejected. It must show some new fact or circumstance which would justify taking a different view in the present case. No such material has been shown.

Mr. Modgi submitted that Respondent No. 1 was terminated because an inconsistent certificate had been produced in support of his appointment. He submitted that the Petitioner has filed a separate writ petition before the Division Bench challenging the issuance of the caste validity certificate in favour of Respondent No. 1. He requested that any order passed in the present Petition should be subject to the decision in that proceeding. This submission requires separate consideration. The earlier judgment in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002 took note of the difference between the school leaving certificate and the caste certificate of Respondent No. 1. It considered the objection of the Management about the category of the available post. Even after considering these objections, the Court found that the School Tribunal had taken a possible view on the material before it. The mere fact that a separate writ petition challenging the caste validity certificate is pending does not prove that the certificate is false or that Respondent No. 1 obtained his appointment by fraud. No final order invalidating the caste validity certificate has been shown to me in the present proceedings. In the absence of such a decision, the pending challenge cannot be treated as proof of the allegation made by the Management. The validity of the certificate must be decided in the proceeding where it has been challenged. It would not be proper for me to hold in the present Petition that the certificate is false when the proceeding about its validity is still pending.

The earlier finding that Respondent No. 1 had acquired deemed confirmation is important while considering the manner in which his services could be terminated. A teacher who has acquired such status cannot be treated as a temporary employee whose services can be ended merely according to the choice of the Management. If the Management alleges that an employee obtained employment on the basis of a false document, it must establish the facts needed to support that allegation and act according to the applicable law. The allegation about an inconsistent certificate is not enough to establish that the employee has lost his right to service. In the present case, the Management relies upon the pending challenge to the caste validity certificate, but no final decision invalidating the certificate has been brought to my notice.

In these circumstances, I am unable to accept that the fourth termination of Respondent No. 1 can be upheld only because the Management has questioned his caste certificate before another Court. The result of that proceeding must be left to the Court which is considering the validity of the certificate. The present Petition has to be decided on the material and findings available before me.

The Petitioner has relied upon the requirement of deciding preliminary issues laid down in Anna Manikrao Pethe. This requirement is important, and the School Tribunal must follow it in proper cases. However, the present dispute cannot be decided only by seeing whether separate preliminary issues were framed in the proceedings relating to the fourth termination. The important question is whether the matters which were required to be considered as preliminary issues remain undecided and whether the Petitioner has suffered any prejudice which requires the impugned order to be set aside.

In the present case, the appointment of Respondent No. 1, the approvals given by the education authorities, the relevant reservation category and his deemed confirmation have been examined in detail in earlier proceedings. The finding about deemed confirmation was recorded by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002. The Petitioner has not shown any fresh material which would justify reopening these findings. In such circumstances, setting aside the impugned order only to have the same questions examined once again would not serve any useful purpose. It would cause delay in a dispute which has continued for many years despite the earlier decisions of the School Tribunal and this Court.

The history of the dispute needs to be considered. The list of dates placed before this Court shows that Respondent No. 1 was first terminated on 23 July 1999. The School Tribunal set aside that termination on 7 June 2002. The second termination, dated 1 June 2009, was set aside by the School Tribunal on 10 December 2009. The third termination, dated 30 April 2011, was set aside by the School Tribunal on 4 June 2012. The fourth termination, dated 3 February 2020, was set aside by the School Tribunal on 25 March 2021. The fact that Respondent No. 1 has repeatedly approached the School Tribunal does not mean that the present Petition must be decided in his favour. Every termination has to be considered on its own facts and according to law. However, the repeated setting aside of the termination orders is a relevant circumstance. It shows that the Management has not been able to sustain its earlier termination decisions before the School Tribunal. The record shows that the earlier proceedings resulted in a finding that Respondent No. 1 had acquired deemed confirmation in service. Unless that finding is displaced according to law, the Management cannot treat Respondent No. 1 as an employee whose services could be terminated without following the legal requirements applicable to a confirmed teacher.

Respondent No. 1 has retired from service on 28 May 2023. This fact is relevant while considering what relief should be granted. In the earlier judgment in Writ Petition No. 6022 of 2002, this Court took note of the fact that Respondent No. 1 had continued in service for several years and had crossed the age of retirement. Paragraph 23 records that he was waiting for payment of pensionary benefits. In paragraph 27, the Court accepted the finding that Respondent No. 1 had acquired deemed confirmation in service. The present Petition concerns a later termination. Even so, the long period during which Respondent No. 1 has remained involved in service litigation cannot be ignored. His retirement does not make the present Petition meaningless, because the challenge to the termination order affects his service record and the monetary and pensionary benefits, if any, payable to him under the applicable rules. At the same time, the Management is entitled to have its separate challenge to the caste validity certificate decided according to law. Therefore, dismissal of the present Petition should not be treated as a final decision on the validity of that certificate. The Court dealing with that issue will decide it on the basis of the record and merits of that proceeding.

Considering all these circumstances together, I find no reason to set aside the order passed by the School Tribunal.

The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and order dated 25 March 2021 passed by the School Tribunal, setting aside the termination of Respondent No. 1 dated 3 February 2020, is maintained.

The question regarding the validity of the caste validity certificate shall be governed by the final decision in the separate writ petition in which it is under challenge. The present judgment shall not be treated as a finding that the caste validity certificate is either false or invalid.

The Petitioner shall within four weeks take the necessary steps to determine and release the service and retirement benefits admissible to Respondent No. 1 according to the applicable rules and the consequences of the School Tribunal's order. This shall be subject to the final decision in the pending proceedings concerning the caste validity certificate and any other adjustment permitted by law.

Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.