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Judgment
B.S. Dhillon, J.—The petitioner-panchayat has impugned the order of the learned Commissioner, Patiala Division, Patiala dated 9th September, 1970. The learned Commissioner recorded the findings as follows :--
The Learned Counsel for the appellant urged that under the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act the Collector alone could order the eviction of a person who is in un-authorised occupation of the land in dispute while u/s 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, it was the Assistant Collector of the 1st Grade who can evict a person in unauthorised possession of the land in dispute. In this connection he referred to section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulations) Act, 1961, and sections 2, 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises & Lands (Eviction & Rent Recovery) Act. I have gone through the relevant sections. In my view the plea taken by the counsel for the appellant is correct. On this score the appeal is accepted.
A bare reading of this finding would go to suggest that the learned Commissioner recorded a finding that the provisions of section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 were ultra vires as the same were discriminatory in view of the provisions of sections 2, 4 and 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Lands (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act. It cannot be disputed that the learned Commissioner who himself was a statutory authority for hearing the appeals under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, was the creation of the provisions of the said Act and had no jurisdiction to declare the provisions of section 7 of the Act as ultra vires. This aspect of the provisions of section 7 of the Act could only be looked into by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Articles 226 read with 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Commissioner being himself the creation of the said statute was bound by the provisions of section 7 of the Act and therefore, had gone wrong in refusing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him.
It is no doubt true that the learned Commissioner rejected the pleas on merits raised on behalf of respondent Ajaib Singh, but since he was accepting the appeal, therefore, it appears that he did not go into the merits of the appeal deeply. Since the order of the learned Commissioner is being quased, therefore, it will be fair to the parties if the appeal of Ajaib Singh is remanded to the learned Commissioner, who shall pass fresh order on merits after hearing the parties, after issuing notice to them. I order accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
