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Judgment
M. Jeyapaul, J.—4th defendant, Gram Panchayat, now merged in Municipal Corporation, Gurgaon, has filed the present appeal. Plaintiff Inder Singh filed a suit for declaration and also for consequential relief of permanent injunction. Trial Court non-suited the plaintiff. In the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, first appellate Court though declined the relief of declaration, granted the relief of permanent injunction. 4th defendant, Gram Panchayat, now merged in Municipal Corporation, Gurgaon, has challenged the judgment of the first appellate Court.
Plaintiff would contend that he is a permanent resident of village Nathupur. He is a landless poor person. He belongs to a weaker section of the society. A plot measuring 100 yards was allotted to him by the Government of Haryana under 20 Points Programme Scheme. But unfortunately, the said plot fell in the approach road constructed from village Nathupur to Mehrauli, therefore, his property was acquired by the Public Works Department. 4th defendant, Gram Panchayat, allotted an alternative plot to the plaintiff in khasra No. 764. A Panchayat resolution No. 6 was also passed to the same effect. Plaintiff has also put up a construction in the said plot. Hence, he has sought for not only declaration but also for permanent injunction.
The defence of defendants No. 1 to 3 was struck off as they had not filed the written statement within time. 4th defendant contended that the land comprised in khasra No. 764 is rasta sare-aam and reserved for ingress and egress of the villagers. No plot could have been allotted to him out of the same. Mere resolution passed by the Panchayat will not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the 4th defendant has sought for dismissal of the suit.
Trial Court accepted the contention of the 4th defendant and non-suited the plaintiff.
First appellate Court having found that a resolution was passed by the 4th defendant allotting the suit property to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had admittedly put up construction therein, though refused to grant the relief of declaration, granted the relief of permanent injunction.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-4th defendant would submit that the suit property being rasta sare-aam reserved exclusively for ingress and egress of the villagers, cannot be doled out to an individual. Mere resolution passed by the Panchayat would not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is his submission that the plaintiff is not entitled to even the relief of permanent injunction.
It is on record that the plaintiff, a landless poor person, hailed from a weaker section of the society. The Government of Haryana thought it fit to allot a plot to him but unfortunately, the plaintiff had to lose the absolute right in the plot as his ownership had been knocked out by the Public Works Department for widening a road. Very mercifully, the 4th defendant-appellant had passed a resolution, Exhibit P-4, on 30.7.2001, recommending allotment of a plot in khasra No. 764. Of course, the jamabandi for the year 1995-96, marked as Exhibit P-11, would disclose that khasra No. 764 (9-6) is a gair mumkin rasta owned by the Gram Panchayat. There are instances where such a property had been transferred to the weaker section of the society for the purpose of construction of house. At any rate, the appellant had already passed a resolution and the resolution had been sent to the 1st defendant for consideration.
It is also the admitted case that the plaintiff has put up construction and is living over there. Though the plaintiff is not entitled to seek for declaration as he has not got ownership over the property proposed to be allotted to him by virtue of the resolution passed by the appellant, he cannot be evicted from the settled possession except by due process of law. 1st defendant also is bound to take a decision on the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat. I do not find any error in the judgment passed by the first appellate Court granting the relief of permanent injunction. There is no substantial question of law arisen for determination. Therefore, the appeal merits no consideration and is hereby dismissed.
