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Judgment
K.M. Thaker, J.—Present application is taken out with a request to condone delay of 673 days caused in preferring Misc. Civil Application seeking review of order dated 22.01.2009.
The said order dated 22.01.2009 has been passed in Special Civil application No. 5699 of 1999. By the said order, the said petition was partly allowed. The said order was essentially passed in view of the declaration and stipulation made by Mr. Joshi, learned advocate for the Petitioners. It is, now, claimed (in the accompanying application seeking review) by the applicant that:
The applicants are the original Respondents of SCA No. 5699 of 1999 that was decided by the Hon''ble Court by judgment and order date 22nd January 2009. By the said judgment and order, the Hon''ble Court had party allowed the petition and directed the Petitioner company to make the payment of wages to the Resp. No. 1 i.e. Govind bhai Bhav sing Jala for the period between 15th December 1995 and 3rd August 1996 and also to pay retiral dues to the said Respondents. The relief against the other workmen was granted mainly on the ground that they have not entered their appearance in the proceedings. A copy of the judgment and order passed by the Hon''ble Court is produced herewith and marked as Annexure-A to this application.
The applicants state that they were of the bonafide belief that the dispute was a representative dispute sponsored by the union and was a collective dispute, therefore, did not file their appearance. In view of the fact that the original Petitioner company was closed down, they had lost their hope and were not pursuing the mater as it would also involved financial implications They were bonafide of the impression that the matter was over for all practical purposes and were engaged in other employments. However, the union pointed out that they there was no contest, they were not paid their legitimate dues and therefore the union addressed a letter on 3rd May 2009 to the original Petitioner company calling upon them to make available the details of any amount paid to the applicants, a copy of the letter is produced herewith as Annexure-B to this application. No response is received by the union till date.
The applicants state that the applicants were similarly situated as those employees who had settled with the Respondent company during the pendency of the proceedings and they are also entitled to and willing to accept the same benefits as were paid to some of the Respondents by the original Petitioner company, a copy of one such settlement is produced herewith and marked as Annexure-C.
The said averments and statements are made by the applicants in the accompanying MCA whereby the applicants seek review of the order dated 22.01.2009. On the grounds and for the reasons stated in the application. The applicants also seek condonation of delay of 673 days caused in filing the said application. In addition to the aforesaid statements and averments made in the application seeking review of the order, in present application (seeking condonation of delay), the applicants have stated that:
The applicants state that there is a considerable delay in preferring the application. The reasons are that the applicants were working as lowest paid workmen in the original Petitioner company which had closed down its affairs and the workmen were scattered at various places having no single place of a meeting except visiting the union office from time to time. The dispute was old and the matter was pending before the Hon''ble High Court for 10 years. Therefore, the applicants who were engaged in small time jobs for meeting their two ends meet could not pursue the matter with the union in time. However, in the month of April 2009, they had approached the union when they were informed about the disposal of the petition. The union accordingly addressed a letter to the Respondents, but there was no response to the same. The applicants also approached the original Petitioner company ''s owner, but they did not get any response, therefore they had no option but to approach their advocates through the union for seeking the filing of present review application. The process has taken considerably long time but the same is bona fide and in the interest of justice the delay may be condoned by this Hon''ble Court taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances and facts of the case.
Accordingly, the applicants have tried to explain delay. The request-application is opposed by the Respondent-Company i.e. the employer. It is claimed that the each days has not been properly explained.
In this context, a reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case between N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, wherein the Hon''ble Apex Court has observed in para Nos. 9 and 11 to 12 as under:
It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un condonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in re visional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refused to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Low o limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Low of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" u/s 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari and Others, and The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others,
Earlier, in case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
To condone, or not to condone, is not the only question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said context is another.
The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ''merits''. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the Appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 389 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour''s delay, every second''s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ''State'' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the ''State'' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in-390 he rited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs. Appeal allowed.
A reference may also be made to the observation of this Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Godhra v. Lilavatiben Kodar Ranchhod and Ors. reported in 2002(3) GLH 226 wherein at para 7 it is observed that:
Apart from that the ultimate anxiety of the Court while dealing with an application of condonation of delay has been, to see that ordinarily no meritorious matter is thrown over board on the technical grounds of delay. The purpose and design incorporating the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to see that ordinarily a substantial justice is required to be given and ordinarily, unless there are circumstances running counter to the spirit of the provision of Section 5, the meritorious matters are required to be dealt with and adjudicated upon on merits. It is rightly said that no party or person would stand benefited by filing appeal or application late without any reason ordinarily when he has made up his mind to challenge the impugned order, award, judgment or decision, as the case may be. There cannot be such presumption also. This proposition of law is also very well settled since long. Therefore, while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, one cannot start with presumption that party did not intend to question it. On the contrary, the presumption may be other way round. Whereas in the present case it is manifested in the application that the certified copy of the impugned common award was applied for on the same day when the Reference Court finalized the matters. Therefore, the contention that delay cannot be condoned in this group of matters is unsustainable and unacceptable.
Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the Respondent-Company, has submitted that the amount was offered to the concerned workman. He has also tried to make other submissions as regards the allegations of the applicants in the petition. However, the said submissions are on merits of the matter/dispute and would be relevant at the time when the application for review is to be considered. The Respondents would get an opportunity to oppose, on merits, the application seeking review. However, the said objections are not relevant so far as the request for condonation of delay is concerned. It is pertinent that any allegations of mala fides are not made.
Having regard to the explanation given by the applicants and in view of the observations in the aforesaid decision, in my view, the applicants have made out sufficient cause to condone delay and the cause for delay has been satisfactorily explained.
Under the circumstances, the application deserves to be allowed. Therefore, the following order is passed.
10.1 The relief prayed for in Para-3(A) is granted, delay of 673 days caused in preferring application seeking review of the order dated 22.01.2009 is condoned.
10.2 With the clarification that it would be open to the Respondents to raise objections on merits at the time when the application for review is considered.
10.3 With the aforesaid clarifications, observations and directions, present Civil Application stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to aforesaid extent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to cost.