Government of Pepsu vs Pratap Singh

Kesho Ram Passey, J.—This appeal by the State and the Patiala Biscuit Manufacturers, Limited, Rajpura, from the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Patiala, dated 29-12-2006, affirming those of the Sub-Judge 2nd Class Patiala, raises some important questions of Law, particularly whether the Patiala Biscuit Manufacturers Limited, hereinafter called the Company for whom the Patiala Government had acquired the land of the plaintiff was a ''person interested'' falling within the definition of those words given in Section 2 sub-clause (b) of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act 1995 (No. III (3) of 1995) whereby the law for acquisition of land for State purposes, for local bodies and for Companies was consolidated in the Patiala State and whether the Revenue Commissioner Patiala, acting u/s 19 of that Act had jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeal of the Company against the award of the Collector regarding the compensation to be paid to persons interested in the land acquired.

It is necessary to set out the facts which are neither complicated nor in dispute and the course the proceedings before the Collector, the Revenue Commissioner, the Revenue Minister and the Civil Courts have taken. Certain land belonging to Pratap Singh plaintiff and others was acquired for the Company under the provisions of Act No. III (3) of 1995 and on 26-1-2001, the Collector Patiala, S. Devindar Singh, gave an award as contemplated by Section 11, fixing compensation for the land at Rs. 600/- per bigha. The Company took an appeal to the Revenue Commissioner which was opposed by Pratap Singh on the ground that it had no right to file an appeal, as the right of appeal was conferred by Section 19 (1) only on a ''person interested'' who had not accepted the award of the Collector and that in that category the Company did not fall.

The objection was overruled by S. Pritam Singh Sidhu, Revenue Commissioner on 10-4-2001; the appeal of the Company was accepted and the case remanded to the Collector for giving a fresh award keeping in view the rules set out in the Patiala Land Acquisition Act for determination of compensation. Aggrieved by this order, Partap Singh filed a revision in the Court of the Revenue Minister Patiala, and raised the same objection against the maintainability of the appeal of the Company in the Revenue Commissioner''s Court. The learned Revenue Minister, vide his order dated 26-6-2001, held that as the Company was to be ultimately affected by the award and it had a right to adduce evidence as provided by Section 34 (2), it was a ''person interested'', and had the right to appeal against the award. It was further held by him that although the Collector was the agent of the Government in acquisition proceedings yet the Government had a right of appeal against his award if he failed to conform to the law and procedure prescribed by the Patiala Land Acquisition Act, 1995.

It may be mentioned here that these observations were obiter as the Patiala Government had not filed any appeal against the award and had, thus, impliedly accepted it. On the merits he did not find any ground to disturb the order of the Revenue Commissioner and consequently dismissed the revision petition. On remand the case came up before S. Dhanna Singh, who in the meantime had succeeded S. Devindar Singh as Collector. By his award dated 2-10-2001, S. Dhanna Singh fixed the compensation payable to Partap Singh at the rate of Rs. 220/- per bigha. Partap Singh did not accept that award and put in an appeal in the Court of the Revenue Commissioner. S. Gian Singh Rarewala who had succeeded S. Pritam Singh Sidhu as Revenue Commissioner, accepted his appeal to the extent of raising the rate of compensation to Rs. 400/- per bigha.

The Company went up in revision to the Revenue Minister who by his order dated 24-10-2002 accepted the revision, set aside the order of the Revenue Commissioner and restored that of the Collector dated 2-10-2001. About five months after that order of the Revenue Minister, Partap Singh instituted the present suit on 1-4-2003 praying that it be declared that the order of the Revenue Commissioner dated 10-4-2001 and all proceedings subsequent thereto were without jurisdiction and consequently null and void. The main ground on which the said declaration was asked for was that the Revenue Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain or accept the appeal of the Company as it had in law no right to question the validity of the award of the Collector given on 26-1-2001. It was urged in the plaint that Section 19 of Act III (3) of 1995 conferred the right of appeal upon a ''person interested'' as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Act, and in that definition the Company could not be included.

The plaintiff impleaded the Patiala Government only as a defendant but while the proceedings were in progress, the Company on 30-1-2004 applied to be made a defendant. The trial Court rejected the application but the Company''s revision petition was accepted by this Court on 30-11-2004 and it was consequently added as a defendant. In opposing the suit the defendants urged that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a matter which was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authority specified in the Patiala Land Acquisition Act and that that Act was a complete enactment in so far as the law of acquisition of land was concerned and the procedure in acquiring the land was to be followed. It was also claimed in the written statements that the Company fell within the definition of ''person interested'', and had a right to appeal to the Revenue Commissioner against the award given by S. Devindar Singh on 28-1-2001. According to the defendants, the decisions of the Revenue Commissioner dated 10-4-2001 and the Revenue Minister dated 26-6-2001 were final and that finality could not be challenged in a Civil Court.

Out of the pleadings of the parties five issues arose and barring Issue No. 1 ''Whether the Company was a necessary party to the suit'', they were all decided by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants took an appeal to the District Judge, Patiala, but have remained unsuccessful. They have now come up to this Court in further appeal. Before us arguments have been advanced on the following two issues only:

(2) Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? (3) Whether the order of the Revenue Commissioner dated 10-4-2001 is ''ultra vires?''

Issue No. 4 relates to the relief that the plaintiff may be entitled to and it is obvious that if issues Nos. 2 and 3 are decided in his favour and the superseding orders of the Revenue Commissioner dated 10-4-2001 and the Revenue Minister dated 26-6-2001 are declared void and consequently wiped off the award of S. Devindar Singh, dated 26-1-2001 would be automatically revived.

It is contended by the learned counsel of the appellants that the term ''person interested'' has been wrongly construed by the learned District Judge to exclude the Company, that the word ''includes'' in the definition of the term ''interested person'' given in Clause (b) of Section 2 has a more comprehensive scope and enlarged indication and that the said definition presumably applies to a person whose liability to pay compensation would be materially affected if the acquiring Collector fixes the price of the land at an unusually higher rate than the market-value. It is further argued that as Section 34. sub-section (2) of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act gives the Company the right to adduce evidence before the Collector so that he could determine the amount of compensation payable by it, the Company is a necessary party to the proceedings before the Collector and is, therefore, a ''person interested'' entiled to appeal if the amount fixed by the award of the Collector is unacceptable.

Continuing his argument on the point, the learned counsel stresses that in case the compensation goes very much above the Company''s own estimate of the value of the land, the Company would be an aggrieved person and would have the right to appeal. It is also argued by him that the omission of the proviso which occurs in the analogous Section 50, clause (2) of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, to the effect that the local authority or Company concerned shall not be entitled to demand a reference u/s 18 to the principal Court of original jurisdiction, from the Patiala Land Acquisition Act is indicative of the fact that the Patiala Act has removed that disability and enabled the Company also to file an appeal like any other ''person interested'' if it does not accept the award.

There are three Sections in the Patiala Land Acquisition Act which under specific circumstances and conditions confer a right of appeal upon a ''person interested.'' They are Sections 19, 27 and 21, but the last two of them do not relate to any appeal by the Government or the Company. It is thus Section 19 only with which we are in these proceedings concerned as that is the Section which makes a provision for an appeal in case the ''person interested'' does not accept the award of the Collector. Clause (1) of Section 19 states that any ''person interested'' who has not accepted the award of the Collector may appeal to the authority to whom appeals against the orders of the Collector do ordinarily lie and clause (iii) provides for a revision to the Revenue Minister in case the decision of the Collector is amended or reversed in appeal by the Revenue Commissioner.

Now the question arises as to what is meant by the expression ''person interested'' as used in Section 19- Does it include the Government or the Company at whose instance or for whose benefit the Government moves to acquire the land? It is obvious that if the expression does not mean the Government much less can it denote the Company. The meaning of the term ''person interested'' is to be gathered from the provisions of the Act itself which are in the nature of special provisions to be observed when acquisition of land in a compulsory manner is to be resorted to, and the usual popular or dictionary conception of the term has to be laid aside if it is not in accord with the spirit of the term as used in the Act. In Section 2 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act the words and phrases used in the Act have been defined and Clause (b) of that Section contains the definition of the words ''person interested.'' The said Clause (b) says that the expression ''person interested'' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land.

It is, thus, apparent that all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made and not persons against whom compensation is claimed or who are liable to pay compensation are covered by the definition. The expression ''person interested'' is to be found used in several sections of the Act besides Section 19, e.g., Sections 5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 25, 27 and 31 and in all of them the term means none else than the owner of or the person claiming an interest in the land acquired who has to be compensated. Wherever the words ''person interested'' have been used in the Act they do not signify the Government or the Company out only such persons who are interested on account of their right or interest in the land as proprietors, leaseholders, etc. u/s 19 of Act III (3) of 1995 the right of appeal is confined to that person only, who is a ''person interested'' and has not accepted the award. It, therefore, becomes imperative to consider whether the Government or the Company can, if they are intent on acquiring land, refuse to pay compensation at the rate fixed by the Collector and if they cannot, then the right to appeal cannot enure to them.

On reading the provisions of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act it would be evident and it is also conceded by the counsel of the appellants, that when acting under the Act the Collector functions as the agent of the Government and it is in that capacity that he fixes the compensation to be tendered by the Government to the persons interested in the land. He has, however, the power to enforce the attendance of persons who may be able to give evidence regarding the matter which he is authorised to enquire into. If the Collector, in the capacity of an agent of the Government, fixes a rate according to which the value of the land is to be calculated, the Government must be bound by the award that its own agent gives if it desires to obtain the land.

In case the compensation suggested in the award is exorbitant or the award prescribes a rate at which the Government does not think it would be worthwhile to acquire the land then the only way that is open to the Government under the Act is to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings. ''Section 31 (1) of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act enables the Government to do so. Section 31 (1) says that except in the case provided for in Section 27, the State or the local body, as the case may be, shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which the possession has not been taken. Even in the case the Government elects to withdraw, it has to pay compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice issued to him or the proceedings held subsequent to the notice. Such compensation has also to be determined by the agent of the Government, viz., the Collector. The Government has no right to question the correctness of that compensation fixed by its own agent, apparently because the Collector acts for the Government and one cannot have a grievance against one''s own decision. In The Secretary of State for India in Council and Another Vs. Munshi Qamar Ali, , it was held by a Division Bench that:

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act resulting in an award are administrative and not judicial and the award in which the enquiry results is merely a decision binding on the Collector as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the land and if the judicial ascertainment of the value is desired by the owner he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court u/s 13 of the Act.

A similar view was taken in ''Ezra v. Secretary of State'', 30 Cal 36, which was affirmed by the Privy Council and has been reported as 32 Cal 605. It has been held in that case that:

the Collector holding an enquiry under the Land Acquisition Act is not a judicial officer nor is the proceeding before him a judicial proceeding. He acts as the agent of the Government for the purpose of acquisition clothed with certain powers to require the attendance of persons to make statements relating to the matters which he has to enquire into. The Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and consequently although the Government or the company at whose instance the Government is acquiring the land is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded.

I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that so far as the Government is concerned, it must either accept the award and tender payment to the person interested in the land, or if it finds that the cost of acquisition as fixed by the Collector is disproportionate to the market-value of the land or that at that cost it cannot be beneficial to itself or the company to buy it, it must decline to acquire the land. If the Government does not wriggle out by adopting the latter alternative, the award of the Collector in the matter of compensation to be given for the land would be final. That finality would equally apply to the Company at whose instance or for whose benefit the Government had initiated proceedings for acquisition. The Government cannot, as it has no right, challenge the award before any officer or Court superior to the Collector, and the Company has no independent status during the acquisition proceedings and cannot act differently from or claim rights independently of the Government. If the Government cannot require that the value of the land determined by the Collector on its behalf be brought into question before an appellate authority, much less can the Company do so.

At this stage it would be pertinent to examine if the Company can even be regarded to be a party to the proceedings before the Collector. Section 17 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act lays down that when the Collector has made an award u/s 11 he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances. The land on acquisition vests in the Government and not in the Company. It may be that by virtue of the agreement between the Government and the Company entered into before the proceedings for acquisition are started, the land would ultimately pass on and be delivered to the Company, but the Company during the continuance of the proceedings for acquisition does not figure as a party. The person that acquires the land is the Government and not the Company. Whatever proceedings are taken by the Collector while holding an enquiry into matters concerning acquisition, they are essentially between the Government on the one side and persons interested in the land on the other.

A provision, viz., Section 34 (2) no doubt exists in the Patiala Land Acquisition Act which enables the Company to appear and adduce evidence before the Collector so that he could be assisted in determining the amount of compensation to be paid by the Government, but that Section does not clothe the Company with the status of a party to the proceedings, much less does it put the Company in the category of a ''person interested'' as the term is defined by clause (b) of Section 2. Sub-clause (2) of Section 34 which permits the Company to adduce evidence regarding the value of the land has that restricted scope only. The object of the Section is that the Government may be assisted by the Company in proving the value of the land, as the Company may in certain cases be in a better position than the Government to lead evidence on the question of compensation. It is undoubted that the award of the Collector does not bind the Company. If the Company were a party it must have been bound by the award. The fact that there is a mutual agreement between the Company and the Government the material part of which is to take effect after acquisition, cannot place the Company at the level of the Government in proceedings concerning acquisition nor can it confer any right on the Company to take part in those proceedings independently of the Government. Except the proviso added to Section 50 (2) of the Indian Land Acquisition Act, Section 34 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act is a verbatim reproduction of Section 50 of the Indian Act.

Section 18 of the Indian Act confers on a person interested who has not accepted the award and who objects to the decision of the Collector regarding the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested the right to require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the principal Court of original jurisdiction. Because the Collector is an agent of the Government, the Government cannot ask for any such reference and the Proviso to Section 50 (2) has made it explicitly clear that a local authority or Company shall also not be entitled to demand a reference as contemplated by Section 18. If the Company was a ''person interested'' it would not have been denied the right of having a judicial decision regarding compensation payable to the owner or other person interested in the land.

The Patiala Land Acquisition Act does not make provision for any reference to a Civil Court but Section 19 of it gives a right of appeal to a ''person interested'' who has not accepted the award of the Collector. The appeal lies to the authority to whom appeals against the orders of the Collector ordinarily lie and provision for a revision to the Revenue Minister also exists in that section if the decision of the Collector is amended or reversed in appeal by the Revenue Commissioner. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that as the Patiala Land Acquisition Act does not provide for a reference to a Civil Court and it does not impose any disability on a Company similar to that contained in the proviso to Section 50 of the Indian Act, but, on the other hand, it gives a right of appeal to a ''person interested'' who has not accepted the award it should be presumed that it (The Patiala Land Acquisition Act) does not take away the right of appeal from the Company. Section 19 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act does not create a new class or category of persons entitled to appeal, nor does it enlarge the scope of the definition of the expression ''person interested.'' Only in place of a reference to a Civil Court the Patiala Act has provided for an appeal. Otherwise the provisions and the spirit of the Patiala Act are the same as that of the Indian Act. Under the Indian Act not only can a Company not demand a reference but it cannot appear as a party before a Civil Court seized of a reference. It has been held in ''Nihal Chand v. District Board Mianwali, AIR 1935 Lah 564, that the Company is no party to a reference u/s 18 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act and that the Government is the only party to that reference which has a right to defend the award.

I have already shown above that except for the purpose mentioned in Section 34 (2) the Company does not have any ''locus standi'' to take part in the proceedings before the Collector. My view that a Company is not an ''interested person'' finds support from the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in ''Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain'', 4 Ind Cas 332 (Cal) and of the Rangoon High Court in ''Mandalay Municipal Committee v. Maungit, 117 Ind Cas 247 (Rang). In the former case it was held that a Company or Corporation for whose benefit any land may be acquired if, not a necessary party in the proceeding and in the latter the words ''person interested'' were construed to mean only those persons who were interested by reason of their interest in the land acquired as owners, tenants and the like. It was further held in the Rangoon case that the persons interested in acquiring the land through the Government did not fall in the category of ''persons interested.'' My conclusion, therefore, is that the Company had no right to file an appeal against the award of S. Devindar Singh.

I now come to the question, whether the Revenue Commissioner was competent to hold that the Company was a ''person interested'' and to hear the appeal preferred by the Company although the Law of Land Acquisition did not invest it with any right of appeal. The objection of Partap Singh who was the contesting respondent in the appeal, that the Company had no ''locus standi'' to appeal against the award was disposed of by the learned Revenue Commissioner with these words:

A preliminary objection was raised by Partap Singh respondent that the order of the Collector was not appealable. This objection was untenable, as u/s 19 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act any person interested who has not accepted the award of the Collector may appeal against the order of the Collector. The appellant being a party interested in the award is competent to file this appeal.

The grounds on which this decision was maintained by the learned Revenue Minister have already been briefly given above.

The contention of the appellants'' counsel is that as the Patiala Land Acquisition Act invests the Revenue Commissioner and the Revenue Minister with special jurisdiction of an exclusive nature similar to that conferred by the Indian Land Acquisition Act on the District Judge on a reference by the Collector u/s 18, and on the High Court. On appeal against the decision of the District Judge, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is impliedly excluded. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, the Revenue Commissioner as an appellate Court and the Revenue Minister exercising powers of revision in certain cases, have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the disputes arising out of the award of the Collector and the plaintiff having remained unsuccessful up to the Court of the Revenue Minister has no other remedy to avail of and the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to call into question the validity of the orders of those Revenue Courts and to hold that they had acted without jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of the Company even though it was not an ''interested person'' as contemplated by Section 19 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act.

It is further stressed by the learned counsel that the Revenue Commissioner on being seized of the appeal by the Company had jurisdiction to decide whether it was an ''interested person'' competent to appeal or not and that even if he wrongly decided that it was an ''interested person'' his decision cannot be impugned in a Civil Court as when a Court has jurisdiction to decide a matter it has jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that it has decided that matter wrongly does not prove lack of jurisdiction in that Court. The counsel of the respondent, on the other hand, maintains that a Civil Court has Jurisdiction to determine whether an authority administering a special law has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it by that law, and if it is clear that the four corners of that law have been transgressed, it (Civil Court) being the Court of general jurisdiction would be competent to declare that the decision of the special authority which is m excess of the jurisdiction with which it is clothed by the special Law is a nullity.

Precisely his argument is that a civil Court has jurisdiction to hold that the orders of the Revenue Courts whereby the right of the Company to appeal under S. 19 of the Patiala Land Acquisition Act was recognised are null and void. It is a well established rule of law that when a tribunal comes into existence pursuant to an enactment specially made for deciding disputes intended by the Legislature to be decided by that special tribunal, that tribunal and no other Court would be competent to determine those disputes. Consequently there can be no doubt that if the Revenue Commissioner had decided the controversy arising out of the award of the Collector on appeal by a ''person interested'', his order if not open to be revised by the Revenue Minister, would have been final, and the Court of general jurisdiction would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of that order, even if it were wholly defective or erroneous.

But the question is whether the Revenue Commissioner could assume jurisdiction in hearing an appeal by a person who under the statute had no right to impugn the award of the Collector. If he exercised jurisdiction where he had none and acted in excess of the powers the Patiala Land Acquisition Act invested him with, he would be regarded to have acted without jurisdiction and in that case the civil Court would have jurisdiction to declare that his order in appeal had no legal validity. In disputes regarding jurisdiction the distinction between wrong assumption of jurisdiction and wrong exercise of jurisdiction must be kept in view. If the case is one of wrong exercise of jurisdiction, the civil Courts would be precluded from correcting the error, for when an authority has jurisdiction to determine a question then the determination of that question by it, however wrong in fact it might be, would be final and not liable to be agitated in a Court of general jurisdiction. So long as the jurisdiction of the special authority to determine a question is undoubted, the power of that authority to determine that question rightly or wrongly must also be undoubted. A wrong exercise of jurisdiction cannot, therefore, be set right by a civil suit. But the case would be entirely different if the special authority wrongly assumes jurisdiction or exercises jurisdiction when it does not exist. In that case there would be nothing that would prohibit the civil Court on a suit by an aggrieved person from holding that the order of the special authority being ''ultra vires'' is invalid. In this connection it would be useful to refer to the observations of Mookerjee Acting C.J. in ''Hirday Nath v. Ramchandra'', AIR 1921 Cal 34 (FB). This is what the learned Judge said:

The authority to decide a cause at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction; and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction... We must not thus overlook the cardinal position that in order that jurisdiction may be exercised, there must be a case ''legally before the Court'' and a hearing as well as a determination. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend upon the correctness of the decision pronounced, for the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. There is a clear distinction between the jurisdiction of the Court to try and determine a matter, and the erroneous action of such Court in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The former involves the power to act in the particular way in which the Court does act. The boundary between the error of judgment and the usurpation of power is this: The former is reversible by an Appellate Court within a certain fixed time and is, therefore, only voidable, the latter is an absolute nullity.

In the case before us the appeal by the Company to the Revenue Commissioner did not lie as the Company was not a ''person interested'' and consequently the Revenue Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal at all. It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in ''Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee'' 153 Ind Cas 896 (PC) that

Appeals exist merely by Statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled, no jurisdiction is given to any Court of Justice to entertain them.

AIR 1948 33 (Privy Council) is an authority in support of the view that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits when the question is whether the executive authority has acted ''ultra vires''. There is no provision in the Patiala Land Acquisition Act that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in any of the matters covered by the Act would be barred. The Revenue Commissioner in accepting the appeal of the Company and reversing the award of the Collector dated 26-1-2001 did not function in erroneous exercise of jurisdiction but he assumed jurisdiction with which he was not clothed by statute. In Sat Narain Gurwala vs. Hanuman Parshad and Another , it was held by a Division Bench composed of Harries C.J. and Mahajan J. that

where a statute creates a right and provides for constitution of a special tribunal for determining questions as to that right and the special tribunal functions in accordance with the spirit and intent of the statute, the civil Courts will have no jurisdiction to determine questions as to that right. Even if the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is excluded by reason of the special tribunal functioning effective, the civil Courts will have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the statute constituting the special tribunal have not been complied with or the tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

To similar effect is the decision of the Full Bench in AIR 1941 234 (Lahore) . It was held in that case that

the powers of a tribunal of special jurisdiction are circumscribed by the statute under which it is constituted. Such tribunal must act within its powers and so long as it does so, its orders whether right or wrong, cannot be challenged. But where and in so far as, its actions are in excess or in contravention of the powers conferred on it they are ''ultra vires'' and of no legal effect. Whenever the question arises whether the Court of special jurisdiction has or has not jurisdiction to try a particular cause, then the Court of general jurisdiction, that is the Civil Court, is always the final authority as to whether the cause is or is not within the special jurisdiction of the special tribunal. This principle is, of course, without prejudice to the general principle that all Courts must have inherent jurisdiction to decide whether a certain cause is or is not within their jurisdiction to try. But a Court cannot merely by a wrong exercise of discretion or by a wrong construction of law confer jurisdiction upon itself to try a cause and hence when the question arises as between the special Court and the Court of general jurisdiction as to whether a cause is within the jurisdiction of the special Court or the jurisdiction of the Court of general jurisdiction then the decision of the Court of general jurisdiction must override the decision of the Court of special jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Revenue Commissioner under the Patiala Land Acquisition Act was restricted to dealing with appeals against the Collector''s award by a ''person interested'' as defined and contemplated by the Act and not by any person whom he allowed to pass as ''person interested''. He had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by a person not covered by that definition and he could not give himself jurisdiction by a wrong interpretation of the law. He assumed to himself jurisdiction which in law he did not possess and acted illegally in accepting the appeal of the Company by deciding that it was an ''interested person'' competent to appeal. He obviously conceded to the Company a qualification and right which it did not in law enjoy and therefore the plaintiff''s suit that the Revenue Commissioner''s order is void is not barred and the civil Court can grant a declaration that his rights under the award dated 26-1-2001 would not be affected.

It was next urged on behalf of the appellants that the plaintiff had presented a petition to the Petition Committee of the Ijlas-i-Khas against the order of the Revenue Minister dated 26-6-2001 but the same was dismissed and that as the Petition Sub-Committee exercised the powers of Ijlas-i-Khas no Court could go behind that order. The argument has no force. The Committee was not a judicial tribunal nor have the defendants proved that it was invested with the powers of the Ijlas-i-Khas and its orders amounted to the decision of the highest authority in the Patiala State which could not be challenged in a civil Court. No evidence has been led which could throw any light on the functions or the powers of the Petition Committee. The rejection order of the Petition Committee, therefore, can be no bar to the maintainability of the present suit.

Finally it was argued that as consequential relief was available to the plaintiff inasmuch as he could sue the Collector for recovery of compensation at the rate of Rs. 600/- per bigha, his suit for a mere declaration did not lie. No such objection was taken in the written statement nor was any plea of non-joinder of a necessary party urged during the trial of the suit or in the lower appellate Court. In my view it was not necessary for the plaintiff to ask for any further relief, for if the order of the Revenue Commissioner dated 10-4-2001 is pronounced void that order would fall to the ground and the award of the Collector dated 26-1-2001 would hold good and operative as from the date on which it was made.

It has been held in Sachindra Kumar Roy and Others Vs. Nabendra Kishore Roy, that a suit for a mere declaration, without any consequential relief, that certain order passed by the Revenue Court was without jurisdiction and ''ultra vires'' of the Statute under which it was passed is competent. If the Government is anxious to retain the plaintiff''s land it shall be bound to pay to him compensation according to the terms of the award and if it does not do so, the acquisition proceedings would be abortive and in that case the land will have to be delivered back to the plaintiff and compensation may also be payable by the Collector for the occupation of the land from the date he took over possession.

The result therefore is that the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

Teja Singh, C.J.

I agree.