Government of India and Others vs Sqn. Leader A.S. Savant

The respondent joined the Indian Air Force in 1961 and was promoted as Squadron Leader in 1973. On 21/1/1976 he wrote a letter to his Commanding Officer seeking premature retirement for reasons stated therein. The reason for seeking premature retirement was that his grievances were not being redressed even though he had moved in accordance with the procedure laid down in that behalf. To this, the department sent a response on 20/5/1978 inter alia stating that government could consider his case for premature retirement only if he agrees to waive all non-effective benefits. Thereafter, the respondent wrote another letter on 9/6/1978 once again seeking premature retirement. In this letter also he set out his grievances, three in number, namely (1 denial of married accommodation; (2 arrears of qualification pay; and (3 arrears of pay and then proceeded to state that he was compelled to seek premature retirement as his aforesaid grievances were not redressed. He further stated that he did not want to cause any embarrassment to the Air Force, but he could not understand why Air Headquarters is eager to deprive him of the non-effective benefits. He proceeds to add that if Air Headquarters in their discretion want to deny him non-effective benefits he would have no option but to accept the same since he was no more interested to continue in the organisation. Treating this as a letter of resignation it was decided to release him without non-effective benefits. Thereupon he filed a petition in the High court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution. His petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. He filed an appeal under the letters patent. His appeal was allowed, the division bench holding that he was virtually compelled to give up non-effective benefits. Since there was no voluntary waiver, the division bench came to the conclusion that the said letter could not be treated as a letter of resignation. It is against the said order of the division bench that the present appeal is filed.

WE have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the division bench. Under the rules, release from service can be by resignation, voluntary retirement, removal or dismissal. Para 215 of the regulations governing the Air Force provides for voluntary retirement. It says:

"VOLUNTARY retirement will only be permitted subject to the interests of the service. An officer who had been refused permission to retire voluntarily may, at the discretion of the government, be permitted to resign his commission."

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It will thus be seen that under the said regulation the respondent was entitled to seek voluntary retirement and that could be denied only if the interest of the service so demands. But in the instant case his request for voluntary retirement was not refused on that ground but a condition was imposed that it could be accepted if he gave up his claim in regard to non-effective benefits. There is no doubt that the division bench was right in taking the view that he was virtually compelled to forego non-effective benefits if he was keen on seeking premature retirement. The question of waiver being a mixed question of fact and law had to be answered in the backdrop of the attendant facts and circumstances. There were some grievances which were unattended, whatever be the reasons. The respondent was, therefore, unhappy and he decided to bid farewell to the service. It was not correct to impose the condition of giving up non-effective benefits. The short question which had to be answered in this background was whether the letter of 9/6/1978 would tantamount to resignation. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that it was wrong to read the letter as one of resignation and held that the respondent was entitled to premature retirement with consequential benefits. We do not think that this is a fit case for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this appeal must fail. We dismiss the appeal, but make no order as to costs. We grant the appellants time of three months to grant all the monetary a benefits available to the respondent on the premise that he was released w.e.f. 1/5/1982.