Government of A.P., Revenue Department and others vs K. Venkateswara Rao

M.S. Liberhan, C.J.—Cause shown for restoration of the appeal is sufficient. Application is allowed. The appeal is heard on merits.

The only question raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the High Court could not have given a finding that the land in dispute is an agricultural land and does not fall within the ambit of urban land'' as defined under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

The question arises in view of the following facts: The writ petitioner-respondent claiming to be owner of certain extent of the agricultural land approached the authority under the Act for permission to alienate the land. The authority passed an order dated 23-4-1997 rejecting the application to issue permission saying that the writ petitioner-respondent has not filed declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act. The writ petitioner-respondent preferred an appeal against the said order inter alia contending that the land does not fall within the definition of ''urban land'' under the Act; consequently, no directions can be given to him to file any declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act. The Commissioner of Land Reforms and Urban Land Ceilings dismissed the appeal. The writ petitioner-respondent, ignoring the order of the appellate authority, submitted the document of sale to the Sub-Registrar for registration inter alia contending that no certificate from the authority under the Act is required for registration of the document. The District Registrar sought clarification from the authorities under the Act and the writ petitioner has also filed representation for giving direction to the Special Officer and Competent Authority to give clarification sought by the Registration Department. The authority found that the writ petitioner-respondent is holding the land and sold certain land on various dates. It was observed that Poranki village is not covered under the master plan but it is partly covered under (he urban agglomeration i.e. R.S. Nos.302/5 to 490 and peripheral area of Vijayawada urban agglomeration; .Thus the writ petitioner-respondent is required to file a declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act as held by the Commissioner (o enable the Special Officer and Competent Authority to decide the case with reference to the Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court of India, and it was observed, "issue of no objection certificate to sell the lands nor the issuance of declaration did not arise at this stage."

The writ petitioner-respondent impugned the said order inter alia contending that the land docs not fall within the definition of ''urban land'' and consequently he is not duty bound to file a declaration u/s 6(1) of the Act nor the Registration Authority could refuse to register the document. The petition was contested before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge, after taking into consideration the counter filed and after going through the pleadings and hearing the arguments of the Counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that the petitioner is dealing with only agricultural land though it falls within the urban agglomeration and according to the clarification issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India the land does not fall within the definition of ''urban land'' u/s 2(o) of the Act. Thus the authorities cannot refuse permission for sale of the agricultural land as long as it is an agricultural land and it is within the urban agglomeration. As a sequel to the finding, the learned single Judge directed the authorities to register the sale-deeds. The learned Judge further observed that the impugned order is quashed so far it treats the land as urban land ignoring the fact that the land is only agricultural land and that in the eventuality of it being found that the writ petitioner-respondent has dealt with any land which is not actually agricultural land this order will not prevent the authorities from taking appropriate action. Thus, the learned Judge kept the right of the appellants alive to take appropriate action if the land falls within the ambit of ''urban land'' as defined under the Act and directed the authorities to register the document without insisting on the no objection certificate.

The learned Counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that no objection certificate could not be issued unless the authorities come to the conclusion that the land does not form part of the land falling within the definition of urban land which finding can only be given after declaration is filed by the writ petitioner-respondent. We have been taken through Section 6(1) of the Act which enjoins a duty on the person holding land beyond the limit prescribed under the Act but does not enjoin any duty where he does not hold the land beyond the prescribed limit. Thus the writ petitioner-respondent is not duty bound under the Statute to file a declaration until and unless he holds urban land, falling within the definition of the Act, in excess of the prescribed limit. It is further made clear by Section 6(2) of the Act that if the Competent Authority is of the opinion that in any State to which the Act applies and the person held on or after 17-2-1975 and before the commencement of this Act or holds at such commencement or holds at the commencement of this Act as adopted by the State, a vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and in spite of such holding, has not filed any declaration as envisaged by subsection (1) of Section 6, it may serve notice upon such person requiring him to file within such period as may be specified in the notice a statement referred to in sub-section (1). Thus, a reading of sub-section (2) makes it categorically inferable that the competent authority, after forming opinion that a person is holding land in excess of the ceiling limit, can issue a notice directing such person to file a declaration and proceed in accordance with law. Thus in view of the categorical provision of law we find no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the authority, without forming any opinion that the writ petitioner-respondent holds land beyond the ceiling limit under the Act, can direct him, without issuing any notice, to file declaration as envisaged by sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act.

In view of the observations made above we find no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants specially when it has been left open to the appellants to proceed in accordance with law as required in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act. Accordingly the writ appeal is dismissed.