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Judgment
Chandra Reddy, J.—The substantial question for determination in this second appeal is whether the judgment in a prior litigation between the same parties constitutes res judicata. The facts leading upto this point are these:
The first Defendant and the Plaintiff were brothers, Defendants 2 and 3 being the son and wife respectively of the former. They were the hereditary archakas of a temple of Sri Venugo palaswamy of Vadlamannadu. They belonged to the Vaighanasa ''sub-sect among the Andhra Sri "Vaishnavites. 15: acres of land were allotted as service inams for the archaka service in the temple. The 1st Defendant was in possession of 7 1/2 ''"Acres and the Plaintiff in possession of an equal extent. They had to perform service in the temple in alternative Telugu months. According to the Plaintiff he had performed archaka service in the suit temple in the month ofjjfeshtain of the year Tharana, and after hia rnVas over, he called upon the first Defendant Co do ''the service during the month of Ashadam. ''The- firsr Defendant refused to perform the service stating that the temple had become polluted by reason of the Plaintiff having dined in the house of one Rompicherla Narasimhacharyulu who though belonging to Vaighanasa sub-sect married a non-Vaighanasa girl as his second wife and so he could not do service in the temple unk.ss samprokshana was performed by the Plaintiff or in the alternative pay the first defen- % h dant-Rs, 300 for the expenses of the sampro-kshana. The Plaintiff, therefore, performed the service for 9 1/2 months and the first Defendant refused to compensate him. For the service rendered by him he filed a suit O.S. No. 509''of 1945 for recovery of Rs. 475 at the rate of Rs. 50 per month.
That suit was contested by the first Defendant that the Plaintiff permitted the above-mentioned Narasimhacharyulu to perform the archaka service as a proxy and that the temple had therefore become polluted, that samprokshana had to be done to the idol in the temple at an estimated cost of Rs. 300, that, as the Plaintiff refused to pay the amount or get the samprokshana done, the Defendant was justified in re- | fusing to perform the Archaka service and that, il therefore, the Plaintiff could not claim, any compensation or remuneration as the default was solely on his part. The defence was negatived J and the suit was decreed at the rate of Rs. 35 a month.
Even subsequent to that suit the 1st defendant did not comply with the demand of the Plaintiff to render the service in the temple with the result that he had to continue the service tip to 1st September, 1948. The present suit was instituted for recovering Rs. 825 as remuneration or compensation for services rendered by him for the subsequent period of 16 months on the same allegations as in the previous suit. Before the written statement was filed, the first Defendant died and his son and wife were added as Defendants 2 and 3 respectively. The defence was the same as in the prior litigation.
The Courts below overruled the objec tions and decreed the suit on the ground that the judgment in O.S. 509 of 1945 constituted res j judicata against the Defendant for a sum of Rs. '' v. 577-8-0 at the rate of Rs. 35 per month and interest. This appeal is filed by the Defendants who are dissatisfied with those judgments.
It is urged by Mr. Krishna Sarma that the view of the Courts below as to res judicata is wrong. According to him, the earlier decision, being erroneous in law and also because the present suit refers to a period different frorn that covered by the previous suit, could not operate as res judicata. In support of this contention reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a number of rulings of the various Courts and also of the Privy Council in Broken Hill Proprietary; Co, v. Broken Hill Municipal Council (1926) A. C.C. 94 (A). I will first refer to the last-mentioned,decision. There, the question bore oathe valuation under the Local Government Act, 1919, of New South Wales. In a pre- vious year the valuation was determined and the question was as ''to the valuation in the sub-sequent year. It was argued that the adjudication of the Court tor the previous year would be res judicata as regards the valuation lor thelf subsequent years. This argument was repelled life by Lord Carson with the following observation1987 3 IMC The present case relates to a new question b ''Mt -namely, the valuation for a different year and " the liability for that year. It is not eadern que-stio, and therefore the principle of res judicata cannot apply.
The scope of these remarks fell to be considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Sankaralinga Nadar and Brothers v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, 58 MLJ 260 : AIR 1930 Mad 209) (D). The observations of the learned Judges made at p. 272 case above to be extracted may pertinent are regard: But if the question is decided by a Court on a reference which depends upon consideration which may vary from year to year e.g., the case in (1926) A. C.C. 94 (A), in which the average valuation had to be taken there can be no question of res judicata.
Therefore, the dictum of Lord Carson doea not, in any way, help the Appellant.
Mr. Krishna Sarma next strongly relied on a judgment of Justice Ramesam who delivered the leading opinion of the Full Bench in S.M. Narayana Aiyangar Vs. S.P.R.M. Subramanian Chettiar and Others, . But, a reading of the judgment indicates that, far from supporting the Appellant, it is helpful in negativing his contention. In a suit for rent relating to certain faslis, the tenant pleaded that he could, not be called upon to pay increased rent as the holding in his possession comprised a cocoanut garden and was the subject of an improvement within the meaning of Section 3 (4) (f), Madras Estates Land Act. This defence did not find favour with the Court because in its opinion cocoanut garden was not a fruit garden and therefore not an improvement. In a later suit between the same parties for recovery of rent in respect of'' subsequent faslis, the same plea was raised by the Defendant. But the cocoa-nut garden which was raised was on a different pot of land. The Plaintiff tried to meet this defence by the argument that the Defendant was prevented from raising this question once again by. reason of the judgment in the earlier suit. Dealing with this argument, Justice Ramesam stated as follows the principle of res judicata should be confined only to matters which actually existed at the time of the former decision, if there are new areas in patta No. 54 which were not planted with cocoanut at the time of the former suit and in respect of which no claim for enhanced rate of rent was or could be made in the former suit, the matter is not res judicata in the present suit in respect of such areas.
These remarks must be understood in the context of the facts of that case namely that the earlier suit related to cocoanut plantation in one particular area whereas ''the subsequent suit is concerned with cocoanut trees planted in a different plot of land and subsequent to the earlier decision. In such a situation, it was stated that
the decision must be confined to the matter to which it has been applied at the time of the former decision. Areas and trees to which it was not applied then will be governed by the correct principle of law.
It has also,to be observed that the Full Bench accepted, as, correct the earlier view that if the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly & substantially in issue in the former suit and has been heard and finally decided the principle of res judicata should not ba ignored on the ground that the previous decision was erroneous either on a point of law or on fact. An aittempt made before the Full Bench to .reopen the decisions which took the view that if in the prior litigation the general principle was decided, that would constitute res judicata, failed. Dealing'' with the argument that 1926 A. C. 94 (A) supports the submission that a decision in a previous litigation in regard to rent or valuation for one year could not operate as res judicata for the subsequent years the learned Judge said that the decision therein may be explained:
On the footing that the valuation of land for purposes of rating for each year is so peculiar to that year and has to be made on considerations confined to that year and should be so uninfluenced by considerations that, prevailed in prior years that no question should be considered as a general principle and what happened in one year - whether a matter of principle or a matter of detail - should not be used in another year and therefore the decision of one year is not res judicata for another year.
It was also added by the learned Judge that if 1926 A. C.C. 94 (A) was not to be explained that way he would prefer to follow the later decision of the Privy Council in Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation, 1926 A. C.C. 155 (D), in the same volume.
This case is an authority for the proposition that the decision in the prior litigation would be res judicata in the subsequent suit in regard to subsequent years. I may here extract a passage from the judgment in the above decision (at page 165) which is pertinent in this context:
...........it is settled, first, that the admission of a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at cannot be withdrawn and a fresh litigation started, with a view of obtaining another judgment upon a different assumption of fact; secondly, the same principle applies not only to an erroneous admission of a fundamental fact, but to an erroneous'' assumption as to the legal quality of that fact. ''Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result either of-, the construction of the documents or the weight.of certain circumstances. If this were permitted litigation would have ho end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of law that this cannot be permitted, and there is abundant authority reiterating this principle.
It is thus clear that even an erroneous decision of law in one suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent litigation provided the question arose as between the parties. and it was substantially in issue between them. That this principle would extend to cases where the later suit covers the subsequent years or faslis or not appears from the observations of the Full Bench in (1937)'', 1 Mad LJ 233 : AIR 1937 Mad 254) (C), namely that if the earlier case decides a matter of general principle it would be res judicata in later, years.
This is, also Illustrated by Sri Sri Sri Ramachandra Deo, Maharaja of Jeypore (dead) and Others Vs. Sutapalli Ramamurthy and Others, . There the Maharajah of Jeypore filed a suit claiming kattubadi.for three years from the mokhas.adars of Pachipenta estate and the usufructuary mortgageesiromtbe mokh.
, aadars of a portion of the mokasa. It was contended by the mortgagee-Defendants that there i was no privity of contract between them and the Plaintiff and therefore they were not liable for the sums payable by the mortgagors. The same contention was raised by the mortgagee defen-lj dants in an. earlier suit and was negatived.
It was decided by a Bench of the Madras I High Court consisting of Madhavan Nair and ( Jackson, JJ., in an appeal against the judgment "| of tho Agency Additional District Judge that the decision in the prior suit constituted res judicata in the subsequent litigations. The learned Judges ruled that the correctness or otherwise of a.judicial decision has no bearing on the question whether it operated as res judicata or not though it was given with reference to the previous years. The following observations at page �90 of the learned Judges are apposite in this connection:
Both on principle and on authority it fol-laws that the argument that the previous decision was erroneous in law and that it was given with respect to previous faslis have no bearing on the question whether that decision doos or does not operate as res judicata.
There was an elaborate discussion on the subject and the case-law was reviewed at some length. Referring to Mangalathammal v. Narayanaswamy Aiyer, ILR 30 Mad 461 (F), which took the view that the erroneous decision of a competent tribunal on a question of law directly and substantially in issue between the parties to a suit did not prevent a Court from going into the same question between the same parties in a subsequent suit, the learned Judges expressed the opinion that it did not lay down the correct law.
It is stated in Venkata Narasimha Naidu v, Venkataratnam, 32 MLJ 63 : AIR 1918 Mad 1309) (G), that ILR 5O Mad 461 (F) did not accurately express the law. In this last-mentioned case, Justice Napier who wrote the leading judgment after referring to a number of rulings including Badar Bee v. Habib Meri-"an Noordin, 1909 AG 615 (H), oame to the conclusion that.
where a decision on a point of law, whether it be on the construction of a document or of a statute or on common law or on customary law settles a question that arises directly out of conflicting views, as to the rights of the parties, I- It is repudiate.
It was also pointed out there that Wallis, C. J., who was a party to ILR 30 Mad 461 (F), changed his view in Secretary of State for India v. Maharajah of Venkatagiri, 31 MLJ 97 : AIR 1917 Mad 299) (I). I express my resirsctfull accord with the principle of Sri Sri Sri Ramachandra Deo, Maharaja of Jeypore (dead) and Others Vs. Sutapalli Ramamurthy and Others, .
Thus, it is clear that, in judging whether the decision in a previous litigation operates as res judicata or not, the test is whether it decided a general principle that is applicable to. the later years also or whether it was peculiar or special to that particular year; in other Words, whether the considerations vary from year to year or such as would govern the subsequent years also. In the decision of that question, it is also irrelevant whether the previous judgment was erroneous either in law or on fact.
The other ruling cited by Mr. Krishna Sarma Mare not very helpful in this inquiry. In the instants case the rule as to the liability of the first Defendant to compensate the Plaintiff for the services rendered by him is the same in both thel suits. It follows that the judgment in O. S. No. 509 of 1945 is the present litigation between the parties. In this view of mine, it is not necessary to consider again whether the present case falls within the ambit of Section 70 of the Contract Act or not. It follows that the judgment and decree of the Court below are) correct and have to be confirmed. The result is, the second appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave.