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Judgment
A.R. Lakshmanan, J.—The plaintiff is the applicant in the original application which has been filed for interim injunction restraining the 1st
respondent, his men, etc., from interfering with the possession and operation of the vehicle TNX.5455 by the applicant on the route Cuddalore to
Villupuram and the 1st respondent from operating any other vehicle on the route in question pending disposal of the suit. R. Jeyasimna Babu, J., on
26.8.1994 has granted interim injunction for a period of four weeks and ordered notice to the respondents. The 1st respondent has filed
Application No. 5173 of 1994 for vacating the interim injunction.
The short facts which are relevant for the disposal of the above applications are as follows: The 1st respondent is the owner of the vehicle
TNX.5455. According to the applicant, the 1st respondent has borrowed certain amounts from M/s. H. Mahaveerchand Kothari and executed
hire purchase agreement in favour of the said M/s. H. Mahaveerchand Kothari in respect of the vehicle in question. The 1st respondent has also
borrowed amounts from the applicant on various dates as hand loan. Since the 1st respondent could not repay and discharge the amount due
under the hire purchase agreement executed in favour of M/s. H. Mahaveerchand Kothari, he approached the applicant and requested him to
come to his aid. The applicant helped the 1st respondent and the total liability as on 19.11.1993 was arrived at Rs. 9 lakhs. It is agreed between
the parties that the vehicle TNX.5455 will be handed over to the applicant for the purpose of operating on the route by transferring the said vehicle
and that the applicant will adjust the net collection towards his dues after deducting all expenses in respect of the said vehicle. The said agreement
was entered into at Madras on 19.11.1993. Stamp paper was purchased and the said arrangement was confirmed by the 1st respondent in writing
on 19.11.1993. The 1st respondent has also executed a hire purchase agreement in favour of the applicant at Madras on the same day in respect
of the vehicle in question for Rs. 9 lakhs. The said vehicle was handed over to the applicant and he is in absolute possession of the same. An
endorsement of hire purchase was also made on 27.1.1994 in the R.C. Book. The 1st respondent agreed to pay the entire amount and in the
meantime will not disturb the possession and operation of the vehicle by the applicant and will not also replace the said vehicle.
According to the applicant, in pursuance of the aforesaid arrangement, he discharged the loan due to M/s. H. Mahaveerchand Kothari.
Subsequent to the agreement dated 19.11.1993, the 1st respondent again received hand loans on various dates through his representative Suresh
Kumar, apart from the expenditures incurred by the applicant by paying quarterly taxes, etc., which comes to Rs. 6,31,220. According to the
applicant, a sum of Rs. 15,31,220 is due and the 1st respondent is liable to pay the same. The 1st respondent has also executed a general power
of attorney coupled with interest dated 28.2.1994, which was registered as Document No. 115/94 on the file of the 4th respondent. The 1st
respondent, with a view to defraud and cheat the creditors, is trying to replace the said vehicle by filing an application to the 2nd respondent behind
the back of the applicant. The 1st respondent has also revoked the power of attorney on 23.3.1994 within a short period of 23 days without
notice to the applicant. He has also set up his father to file a suit in the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore and obtained an order of injunction to stop
the vehicle. As a hire purchase financier, the applicant is the owner of the vehicle till all the amounts due to the applicant are paid and adjusted. In
spite of repeated demands and notice dated 26.3.1994. The 1st respondent had not stopped his illegal activities. Therefore, the present original
application for injunction as detailed above.
The injunction application was resisted by the 1st respondent by filing a counter-affidavit. According to the 1st respondent, the suit is neither
maintainable in law nor on facts since the applicant has already instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Madras, against the 1st respondent and
others on the same cause of action. Therefore, the present suit is directly hit by the provisions of Order 11, Rule 2, C.P.C. In that suit, the
applicant has also filed two applications for interim injunction restraining the 1st respondent from interfering with his possession and operation of
the vehicle and initially obtained ex pane injunction in both the applications. But, the interim order was vacated later on merits and both the
applications filed by the applicant were dismissed. The applicant further appealed in C.M. A. Nos. 85 and 87 of 1994 in the City Civil Court,
Madras. Those appeals are pending. In C.M.P. Nos. 10009 and 10010 of 1994 filed for interim relief in those appeals, no interim order has been
passed.
The 1st respondent denied the borrowal of amounts from M/s. Mahaveerchand Kothari. He also denied that the vehicle is covered by the hire
purchase agreement. He admits that he received some money on various dates from the applicant as hand loan. According to him, the applicant
obtained blank signatures in various documents and also took signatures from the 1st respondent in the hire purchase agreement without filling up
any particulars. The 1st respondent would submit that finance was extended only to the tune of Rs. 1.60 lakhs and that on the insistence of the
applicant, he surrendered the vehicle even during September, 1993, and the applicant was plying the vehicle though no amount was due on that
date. The power of attorney was executed at the insistence of the applicant and registered in his favour on the sole promise that he would render
accounts to the 1st respondent. Contrary to the promise, no accounts were rendered. The applicant under the guise of the hire purchase agreement
has obtained necessary endorsement in the R.C. Book. The power of attorney has also been revoked and the factum of revocation has also been
informed to the applicant. According to the 1st respondent, in view of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the applicant has no role to play in
respect of dealing with the action of the permit holder for replacement of vehicle and the applicant has no right to restrain the 1st respondent from
replacing the vehicle, and that no financier could raise any objection for replacement of vehicle, transfer of permit, etc., before the civil court and
only the authorities constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act alone could decide the issue in question. The civil court has, therefore, no jurisdiction
to go into it.
The applicant filed a reply affidavit denying the averments contained in the counter-affidavit.
The only point that arises for consideration in these applications is, whether the applicant is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the 1st
respondent, his men, etc., from interfering with the possession and operation of the vehicle TNX.5455 pending disposal of the suit?
Point: Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, contended that the suit is not maintainable since the
applicant has already instituted a suit in O.S. No. 2523 of 1994 on the file of the Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras against the 1st
respondent and others on the same cause of action for a declaration that the applicant is the agent coupled with interest in respect of the very same
vehicle and for permanent injunction restraining the 1st respondent from disturbing the peaceful possession and operation of the aforesaid vehicle.
Therefore, the present suit is directly hit by the provisions of Order 11, Rule 2, C.P.C. Secondly, he contended that in view of the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act, the applicant has no role to play in respect of dealing with the action of the permit holder for replacement of the vehicle and
that the applicant has no right to restrain the 1st respondent from replacement of the vehicle. In support of the second contention, Mr. V.T.
Gopalan cited an unreported decision of this Court wherein a Division Bench of this Court held that no financier could raise any objection for
replacement of vehicle or transfer of permit, etc., before the civil court and only the authorities constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act alone
could decide that question and that the civil court has no jurisdiction to decide that question.
Before adverting to the question of maintainability raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent, it is proper for this Court to
notice certain admitted facts. They are:
(a) The 1st respondent has not denied the borrowal of certain amounts from M/s. Mahaveerchand Kothari.
(b) The execution of the hire purchase agreement is not denied.
(c) Likewise, the execution of the irrevocable power of attorney has also not been denied though it is contended that the said document was
executed, of course, on the insistence of the applicant.
(d) Though the borrowal is admitted, according to the 1st respondent, the same was only as a hand loan.
(e) The 1st respondent has not denied that he sought financial help from the applicant. In paragraph 6 of his counter-affidavit the 1st respondent
has not denied the execution of the agreement for making payment to the previous financier.
(f) It is also admitted by the 1st respondent that the applicant has extended financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 1.60 lakhs, which was paid to the
prior financier under the agreement.
(g) It is also not denied that the applicant was plying the vehicle in question, though according to the 1st respondent, no amount was due on that
date and no amount was paid to the prior financier.
(h) It is also admitted that the applicant has obtained necessary endorsement in the R.C. Book, (i) It is also not denied that the irrevocable power
of attorney executed by the 1st respondent in favour of the applicant has been revoked without any prior notice and that the applicant was
informed about the revocation only after the revocation was made.
According to the applicant, a sum of Rs. 15,31,220 is liable to be paid by the 1st respondent to the applicant. But, according to the 1st
respondent, a sum of Rs. 1.60 lakhs alone with usual interest subject to adjustment of the collections appropriated by the applicant in plying the
vehicle, is payable. It is stated in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit that except the aforesaid sum, the 1st respondent is not liable to pay any
amount. It is contended by the 1st respondent that since no account was rendered, the hire purchase agreement cannot be relied upon and that the
1st respondent has every right to revoke the power of attorney without any notice. Even in regard to the payment of Rs. 1.60 Lakhs, the 1st
respondent has no consistent case. In my opinion, the contentions raised by the 1st respondent can be decided only at the trial and after giving full
and sufficient opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence, both oral and documentary. Before doing so, it is the duty of this Court to protect
the interest of the party who advanced money to the 1st respondent under the hire purchase agreement.
The execution of the hire purchase agreement has not been denied at all. Under the hire purchase agreement dated 19.11.1993 between the
applicant and the 1st respondent, the hirer/1st respondent has agreed to pay the amounts advanced in 36 instalments at the rate of Rs. 38,500. It is
settled law that the financier is the owner of the vehicle of the borrower/hirer/ 1st respondent. The hirer under the agreement has agreed to pay the
rents specified in B schedule and also register the vehicle in the name of the financier/ applicant. The hirer has also agreed that he shall not
represent or suppress anything whereby he may be refuted to be the owner of the said vehicle. It is seen from the hire purchase agreement that a
sum of Rs. 13,86,000 is due and the same is repayable in 36 months at Rs. 38,500 per month. There is also an endorsement of cancellation dated
27.1.1994 of the hire purchase agreement held with M/s. Mahaveerchand Kothari.
As stated supra, the 1st respondent has executed a general power of attorney in favour of the applicant on 28.2.1994. The said power was a
registered one. It is clearly stated therein that the 1st respondent, due to ill-health, due to domestic affairs and financial strain, was not in a position
to effectively operate the bus on the route in question and cater to the interest of the public and since he has obtained loans on various dates in
connection with his business and for discharging personal debts and for the purpose of securing such advances, besides executing the deed dated
19.11.1992, he is appointing the applicant as his power of attorney. The power of attorney was permitted to perform the several acts as
mentioned in the deed itself. Particularly he is entitled to file applications for renewal of the permit in question on behalf of the 1st respondent
before the State Transport Authority, and to obtain renewal of the Fitness Certificate of the vehicle in question, on his behalf. The power of
attorney is also entitled to replace the existing vehicle by another vehicle and sign necessary applications for replacement on behalf of the 1st
respondent. He is also entitled to pay any fee due in respect of the said vehicle before the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport
Authority concerned. The power of attorney was also authorised to perform several other acts as mentioned in the power. Under Clause V of the
power of attorney, the applicant is entitled to transfer the permit in question to the name of anyone or himself by filing an application for transfer. In
the concluding portion of the power of attorney deed, it is declared that the irrevocable power of attorney deed authorises the applicant to do all
acts on behalf of the 1st respondent as if done by him for the efficient running of the transport business until all the debts due to the attorney is
settled, and if the permit is transferred to the attorney, it shall be re-transferred to the executor. The power of attorney deed was duly signed by the
executor/1st respondent and attested by two witnesses. The same was drafted by an advocate.
It is clearly seen from the terms of the power of attorney deed that the applicant is entitled to file applications for renewal of the permit of the
vehicle in question and obtain renewal of the fitness certificate. He is also entitled to replace the existing vehicle on payment of the necessary
charges to the authorities concerned. It is also stated that the power of attorney will be entitled to transfer the vehicle in question to the name of
anyone or to himself by filing an application therefor. The clauses above mentioned will only go to show that the said power of attorney executed
by the 1st respondent in favour of the applicant is coupled with interest. It is settled law that the power of attorney is acting on behalf of the
principal and any act done by him on the basis of the said power shall be binding on the principal since the said irrevocable power authorises the
attorney to do all acts on behalf of the executor as if done by the executor himself.
It is seen that the power in this case is irrevocable and is given to the applicant to secure an interest. Therefore, in my prima facie view, the
same cannot be revoked as the same is an irrevocable power coupled with interest and was acted upon. The action of the 1st respondent to cancel
the power of attorney without any notice was made only with a view to deprive the applicant of the rights over the subject-matter of the suit.
Therefore, in my prima facie view, the revocation is in complete breach of the terms of the power of attorney. The applicant has acquired interest
by virtue of the very authority given to him under the power of attorney and therefore, the 1st respondent/principal cannot revoke the same unless
there is a contract to the contrary.
In the decision reported in Seth Loon Karan Sethiya Vs. Ivan E. John and Others, , the Supreme Court has also taken the same view while
interpreting the power given to a bank under a document. In that case also, the bank was appointed as an irrevocable power of attorney to
proceed in execution of the decree passed in the suit and to proceed in execution of the decree that may be passed in the appeal and to realise and
recover the decretal amounts. Certain other directions were also given in the power of attorney deed. While considering the question whether the
power of attorney in question is a power coupled with interest and if it is so, whether the same is revocable, the Supreme Court, was of the opinion
that the power of attorney in question containing identical clauses as in the present case was a power coupled with interest and hence the same was
not revocable. Section 202 of the Contract Act provides that where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter
of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest. The Supreme Court in the
above case has observed as follows:
It is settled law that where the agency is created for valuable consideration and authority is given to effectuate a security or to secure interest of the
agent, the authority cannot be revoked. The document itself says that the power given to the bank is irrevocable.
The decision reported in Board of Revenue, Madras, Referring Authority Vs. Annamalai and Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and Another, , is rendered by a
Full Bench of this Court. That was a case of a company borrowing several sums of money from a bank and hypothecated with the bank
immovable properties as security for the loan. Subsequently, the company executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the bank to
enable it to sell the scheduled properties and out of the sale proceeds thereof, obtain repayment of the loan. While construing the power of
attorney deed, the Full Bench held that the power of attorney was clearly irrevocable till the loan was repaid or the properties were sold. It is
useful to extract the following portion from paragraph 9 of the judgment.
...that on the part of the bank there was an executed promise in the form of a loan advanced. But the reciprocal consideration, proceeding from the
company for this promise was executory. As long as that reciprocal promise remained executory, the company could take successive steps
towards discharging the liability there under, and for each successive step so taken, the loan advanced earlier by the bank or such part of it as
remained undischarged could operate as consideration. The execution of the irrevocable power of attorney constituted such a step in the discharge
of the obligation, and the consideration therefore was relatable to the loan advanced earlier by the bank. The power of attorney, therefore, fell
under Article 48(e).
Therefore, I am of the prima facie view, that the cancellation of power in the instant case has been done with an ulterior motive in order to
prevent the applicant to enjoy the benefits and the interests given to him under the power of attorney deed, which he has already acquired under
the power of attorney deed, which was also acted upon. Even otherwise, I am of the prima facie view, that the applicant is entitled to be in
possession of the vehicle in his capacity as the owner of the vehicle under the hire purchase agreement whereunder he has advanced more than Rs.
13 lakhs to the 1st respondent, which is repayable in 36 monthly instalments. Under such circumstances, the admitted possession of the vehicle in
the hands of the applicant cannot at all be disturbed and that he will be entitled to an order of injunction restraining the 1st respondent, his men,
etc., from interfering With the peaceful possession and operation of the vehicle in question.
Mr. V.T. Gopalan cited some decisions reported in The Union of India v. S. Kesar Singh AIR 1978 J.&K. 102, Abnashi Singh v. Lajwant
Kaur AIR 1977P.&H. 1, Arunachalam Pillai Vs. M. Velamma and Others, and Shri Inacio Martins, Deceased through LRs. Vs. Narayan Hari
Naik and others, , to say that the present suit is not maintainable in view of the earlier suit instituted in O.S. No. 2523 of 1994 on the file of the
Second Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, against the 1st respondent and others on the same cause of action. There is no quarrel or
dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the above decisions.
It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the suit and the application for interim injunction are not hit by Order 11, Rule 2, C.P.C. The
cause of action is a bundle of facts and what is relevant for the suit alone should be considered. The suit filed earlier proceeds on the basis that the
applicant is entitled to the possession of the bus and to operate the same on the route in question. In the suit before the City Civil Court, it was only
when the 1st respondent herein disputed that he is liable to pay only Rs. 1.60 lakhs, which was paid to Mrs. Mahaveerchand Kothari and even
that has been disputed alleging to have been adjusted by the running of the bus forgetting his borrowings, it is stated, that the applicant was
compelled to file the present suit for the recovery of the monies due to him. This suit is, therefore, based on the right to recover the amount
advanced by the applicant and the other reliefs claimed are only ancillary. Therefore, it is contended that there is no question of the applicant
omitting or relinquishing his right to recover the amount which is due to him. The application for injunction is incidental to the suit as provided for u/s
94, C.P.C. in order to preserve the property. I see force in this contention.
This apart, whether the subsequent suit is hit by the provisions of Order 11, Rule 2, C.P.C. has to be considered only at the time of trial. We
are now concerned only with regard to the interim prayer for injunction. Hence, I am of the view that it is premature to decide the said issue at this
preliminary stage.
As already stated, under the law of hire purchase, the ownership of the bus in question accrues to the 1st respondent only after all the
instalments are paid. Therefore, in any event, the 1st respondent is not entitled to interfere with the applicant''s possession of the bus. The 1st
respondent having admitted that he entered into hire purchase agreement and having entered an endorsement in the R.C. Book to that effect,
cannot now be heard to say that he is not liable to pay. Further, the 1st respondent having voluntarily surrendered possession of the bus and
agreeing to the applicant operating the same on the route in question cannot interfere with the applicant''s possession and operation of the bus on
the route in question. I have already held, on a prima facie consideration of the entire materials placed before me, that the power of attorney is
coupled with interest. Therefore, the 1st respondent cannot act contrary to it and revoke it without notice to the applicant unless by specific terms
such power is given. The very fact that the 1st respondent has originally chosen to surrender the bus and also execute the power of attorney and
later revoke the power without any provocation and without prior notice to the applicant shows the fraudulent character and the illegal intention of
the 1st respondent.
The decision cited by Mr. V.T. Gopalan, reported in Maniam Hiria Gowder v. Naga Maistiy (1957) 2 M.L.J. 264, will be of no assistance to
the 1st respondent. In that case, an agreement of partnership was entered into between the parties which will entail a transfer of a licence or permit
granted by the Government. The Division Bench in that case observed as follows:
Where a penalty is imposed for the contravention of law, it is an indication that the transaction which involves such a contravention is prohibited
and therefore illegal. But where there is no penalty imposed the question whether a contract is illegal or not has to be determined on a
consideration of the purpose of legislation-whether the prohibition is purely a measure to protect the revenue to the Government or intended to be
in the interests of the public; in the later case the contract will be void.
This apart, Section 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, prohibits transfer of permit except with the permission of the transport authority. The
above was also a case of partnership in respect of a lorry business, which involves the transfer of the route permit. The court held that a suit for
dissolution of such partnership and for accounts was not sustainable and the transfer of route permit would, therefore, be illegal, though the
aggrieved party may have his remedies otherwise as against the others. The case on hand is not a case of partnership. The 1st respondent has
executed a hire purchase agreement and an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the applicant to enable him to act upon the terms and
conditions of the hire purchase agreement and also the power of attorney. It is settled law that the financier is the owner of the vehicle and the
person who availed such finance is a hirer. Since admittedly, possession of the vehicle has been entrusted to the applicant pursuant to the hire
purchase agreement, the said agreement cannot be termed as illegal or void.
This part, even though Clause V of the power of attorney deed enables the applicant to apply for transfer of the permit to the name of anyone
or to himself, the applicant has not taken any such step in this regard. Therefore, it is premature on the part of the 1st respondent to contend that
the contract is illegal and void. It is time enough for the 1st respondent to oppose any proposal for transfer if made by the applicant before the
appropriate authority.
The decision reported in A. V. Varadarajulu Naidu v. K.V. Thavasi Nadar AIR 1963 Mad. 413, is a case in which a partnership was
constituted for carrying on transport business with the permit obtained in the name of one partner. The Division Bench held that such a partnership
is illegal and opposed to public policy as it involves contravention of Sections 42(1) and 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the instant/case, the
facts are different. The permit still stands in the name of the 1st respondent and the vehicle is entrusted with the custody of the applicant pursuant to
the hire purchase agreement and the power of attorney deed.
In W.A. No. 43 of 1961 dated 24.4.1963, a Division Bench of this Court held that no agreement inter-parts to which the State is not a party
can have the effect of a transgression u/s 42 unless the permit- holders/user, of the vehicle is virtually displaced by that of any other partner or
partners. The Bench observed that Section 59(1) does not really indicate the offence which might be committed by the permit holder and what it
really on acts is a prohibition which if transgressed would not bind the authorities and would not confer on the transferee any right to recognition by
the authorities regarding any of the privileges of a permit. Also to the extent to which a partnership does not actually involve the transfer of property
in the permit itself, it may not be illegal where it involves an attempted transfer of the property permit itself and the consent is not forthcoming, it
would be certainly illegal and void, but the mere preparation of such documents of partnership particularly may well amount to no transgression
whatever. As already stated, in the instant case, the applicant has not taken any steps for transfer of permit in his name.
The next decision cited by Mr. V.T. Gopalan is by a Division Bench of this Court in O.S. A. Nos. 259 and 260 of 1993 dated 23.8.1994.
That was a suit for a decree for a sum of Rs. 9,03,734. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed two applications seeking temporary injunction against
the respondents from selling or transferring the route permit in relation to the vehicle in question and for replacing the bus by another bus. Both the
applications were dismissed by a learned single Judge, which was under challenge before the Bench. The learned single Judge who heard the
applications was of the opinion that the suit has become barred by limitation and also found no justification for grant of injunction as prayed for.
The prayer in that case for temporary injunction relates to operating the route permit by any bus other than the bus MSL.4047. The Bench, while
observing that the grant of relief would mean that the respondent therein will have to run the bus on the aforesaid route and the grant of such relief
would affect the public convenience. The Bench was also of the view that normally, temporary injunction which has the effect of preventing a
statutory authority from performing its statutory function, is not granted. This would sufficiently indicate that there was no valid justification for
seeking an injunction. As far as the prayer for injunction against selling or transferring the route permit is concerned, the Bench has observed that
the transfer is required to be approved by the authorities under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Bench has further observed that if
and when such a transfer takes place and the matter is placed before the authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellants/ plaintiffs therein
can object to the said transfer and that the objections, if any, raised will get consideration strictly in accordance with law. In my opinion, this
judgment also will be of no aid or assistance to the 1st respondent. As already observed, Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act expressly prohibits
transfer of permit except with the permission of the transport authority. Therefore, as pointed out by me already, the transfer is required to be
approved by the authorities under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and if and when such an application for transfer is made by the
applicant, it is time enough for the 1st respondent to oppose the same. The same is the view taken by the Division Bench in para 5 of the judgment
in O.S.A. Nos. 259 and 260 of 1993.
Therefore, on a careful consideration of the entire materials placed before me and of the arguments advanced by the respective learned
Counsel, I am of the view that the applicant has made out a prima facie case for the grant of interim injunction. However, he may approach the
authorities concerned for replacement of the vehicle or for transfer and on such application, if any made in public interest, the authorities concerned
may consider the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The injunction granted herein is
confined only to the extent of restraining the 1st respondent, his men, agents, etc., from interfering with the peaceful possession and operation of
the vehicle TNX.5455 by the applicant on route Cuddalore to Villupuram.
The balance of convenience lies only in favour of the applicant and in confirming the injunction already granted. It is the case of the applicant
that the 1st respondent has to pay a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs towards arrears of motor vehicle tax with penalty on the said vehicle and as financier, he is
also deemed to be an operator and a person in possession and control of the vehicle and as such, the burden will fall on the shoulders of the
applicant to pay the same apart from the existing dues of Rs. 15,31,220. Therefore, I am of the prima facie view that the applicant will be put to
irreparable loss and prejudice unless he is allowed to continue in possession of the bus and operate the same on the route in question for the
realisation of the amounts due. The balance of convenience and the interests of justice therefore require that the injunction should continue till the
disposal of the suit.
For the foregoing reasons O.A. No. 802 of 1994 and Application No. 5222 of 1994 are allowed and Application No. 5173 of 1994 is
dismissed on the lines indicated above.