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Judgment
Mohammed Nias C.P., J.
This second appeal is filed by the defendants against the judgment dated 13.07.2026 in A.S. No.83 of 2025 before the Additional District Court-VII, Thiruvananthapuram. The parties are referred to in this judgment as they appear in the suit.
The respondent (the plaintiff) filed O.S. No.56 of 2015 before the Additional Sub Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram, a suit for declaration, permanent prohibitory injunction and other consequential reliefs, which was dismissed by judgment dated 26.06.2025. Aggrieved by that judgment, he filed A.S. No.83 of 2025 before the Additional District Court-VII, Thiruvananthapuram, which, by judgment and decree dated 13.07.2026, reversed the judgment in O.S. No.56 of 2015 and decreed the suit.
The 1st defendant is the Trivandrum Club, a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955; defendant Nos.2 and 3 are its Secretary and President, while defendant Nos.4 to 6 are the subsequent office bearers impleaded in 2021. The plaintiff applied for resident membership of the Club pursuant to the applications invited in February 2013, submitting the prescribed form, documents, and a fee of Rs.10,000/-.
As per Article IX(1)(b) of the Bye-law, the requisite educational qualification is graduation from a UGC recognized University in India or a deemed University. The plaintiff had passed Pre-Degree in 1994 from Payyannur College under the Calicut University, obtained a three-year Diploma in Engineering in 1997 from the Govt. Polytechnic, Kannur under the State Board of Technical Education, and thereafter obtained an MBA in Information Technology from Sikkim Manipal University.
According to the plaintiff, his application was scrutinised by the Executive Committee, put to ballot voting, declared elected, and intimated by registered post. After he remitted the entrance fee of Rs.7,50,000/-, he was enrolled as member No.R3484 w.e.f. 19.05.2013, was issued a membership card and enjoyed all privileges, including voting rights. Meanwhile, a new Executive Committee assumed office and acted prejudicially against members enrolled by the 2013 Committee. Seven permanent members, including the plaintiff, had filed O.S. No.56/2015 before the Additional Sub Court-II, Thiruvananthapuram, challenging the arbitration commission report.
As a retaliatory measure, the Club issued Letter No. TC/Admn/2015/4933 dated 16.03.2015 terminating the plaintiff's membership with immediate effect, alleging that he does not possess a graduation from a UGC recognized University. The plaintiff contends that the termination is illegal, mala fide, arbitrary and void ab initio; that his MBA degree is valid; that his certificates were already scrutinised and approved, and that the Bye-law does not empower the subsequent Committee to review a membership granted by the earlier Committee. Hence the suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction.
Defendants 4 to 6 contested the suit. They contended that the plaintiff was enrolled illegally, in violation of the Bye-laws, and of the injunction order in I.A. No.2904/2013 in O.S. No.504/2013 of the Munsiff Court; that there were allegations of illegal gratification against the 2013 office bearers; that the plaintiff never had a graduation and that his MBA from Sikkim Manipal University, without a graduation, is not a UGC recognized degree; and that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove a valid degree. It was contended that the suit is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
The trial court framed issues as to whether the suit is maintainable, whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of declaration, whether the apprehension of the plaintiff is true and established, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree of injunction.
The trial court dismissed the suit by judgment dated 26.06.2025 on the finding that the plaintiff did not possess the educational qualification required for a member of the 1st defendant Club, as he was unable to prove that the institution from which he obtained an MBA degree is a University or Deemed University. Thus, the termination is valid, and the plaintiff has no right to continue as a member of the 1st defendant Club.
Aggrieved by this, the plaintiff filed A.S. No.83/2025 before the Additional District Court, Thiruvananthapuram, which allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. The first appellate court restored the plaintiff's membership, leaving it open to the Club to conduct a fresh enquiry in accordance with its Bye-laws. Aggrieved by that judgment, the defendants have preferred the present second appeal.
The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the first appellate court erred in law in shifting onto the defendants the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not possess the prescribed qualification; the defendants were not required to prove that the certificate was a forgery. Their defence was not, at bottom, that the paper was fabricated, but that, even taking the certificate at its face value, the plaintiff did not hold a graduation degree from a University in India recognised by the University Grants Commission or from a Deemed University established by law. That defence required no verification report from any University.
It is further argued that an act done in contravention of a mandatory eligibility condition is a nullity, and a nullity does not gain validity by the passage of a year. The entire reasoning of the first appellate court, that a successor committee cannot review or undo the decision of its predecessor, is misconceived. The successor committee was not reviewing an exercise of discretion. It was declining to perpetuate an act which was void for want of the very condition precedent upon which the power to admit rested.
It is further argued that the first appellate court erred in relying upon the decision in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India and others (2007 KHC 3513) in a manner directly opposed to the ratio thereof. The dictum that an illegal appointment is non est in the eye of law and renders the appointment a nullity, once the illegality is established, supported the defendants and not the plaintiff, the illegality here appears from the plaintiff's own admitted educational history. It was contended that the first appellate court has decreed the suit upon a case not set up in the plaint. There was no averment that the mandatory procedure under Article XV had not been followed, no averment that the Secretary acted without the authority of a resolution and no averment of a violation of the principles of natural justice. No issue was framed on any of these questions, and no opportunity was afforded to the defendants to meet them.
Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the available records.
The plaintiff was admitted as a resident member of defendant No.1 Club in the year 2013 after due scrutiny of his application and supporting documents, including the MBA certificate issued by Sikkim Manipal University, by the then competent managing committee. He remitted the membership fee, was allotted a membership number, and enjoyed all rights and privileges as a member for more than a year. It is only when a successor committee assumed office that Ext.A7 termination letter dated 16.03.2015 was issued by defendant No.4, the then Secretary, alleging that he lacks the requisite educational qualification.
The defendants built their defence on the plea that the admission was void ab initio, since illegality vitiates everything. The plaintiff discharged his initial burden by proving his admission after scrutiny, his enrolment and his enjoyment of membership. The termination rests on a fact asserted by the defendants alone, namely that the plaintiff lacks the requisite qualification, and the burden of proving a fact lies on the party who asserts it. When the society alleges that the university lacked recognition, the primary onus lies heavily on the society.
The society, having admitted the plaintiff after verification, cannot thereafter call upon the plaintiff to re-establish his eligibility. The onus is on the society. In the present case, except for the self-serving assertion of the defendants, no credible or competent evidence was produced. No proper inquiry was conducted; no formal verification was undertaken. No official certificate of disownment or non-verification was obtained from the university concerned. In the absence of such best evidence, the allegation remains in the realm of suspicion. The first appellate court has rightly concluded that the defendants have completely failed to discharge their fundamental burden. The trial Court, in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the institution is a University, placed the burden on the wrong party.
The defendants alleged that the degree is not UGC recognised, but produced nothing from the University, the University Grants Commission or any other competent source. Whether the plaintiff in fact satisfies Article IX(1)(b), is left open for determination by the Club in the manner provided in its Bye-laws, and this Court expresses no final view on it.
Article XV of the Bye-laws of the defendant No.1 Club provides a complete code for removal/expulsion of a member. The Bye-laws form a contract between the society and its members. The argument advanced by the defendants that the Bye-laws have no application when the initial admission was illegal ab initio is devoid of any legal basis and has been rightly rejected, because it presupposes that the illegality has been established, which is the very matter to be determined under the Bye-laws. Furthermore, the administration of a society is continuous. A decision taken by a legally constituted committee after due application of mind creates rights in the member which cannot be taken away merely because a successor committee takes a different view; they can be taken away only in the manner the Bye-laws provide. If such a course is permitted, there will be no finality to membership, and every change of committee will result in termination of members.
The reliance on Ashok Kumar Sonkar ‘s case (supra) does not assist the appellants. The proposition that an appointment made in breach of a mandatory condition is non est and a nullity operates once the illegality is established; it does not dispense with proof of it. Here the existence of the disqualification is itself the matter in dispute, and it was not proved. A successor committee cannot assume the very fact it must prove and then describe the earlier admission as a nullity. If the disqualification is established in the manner prescribed by the Bye-laws, the Club is free to act on it.
The contention that the first appellate court decreed the suit on a case not pleaded is not accepted. The plaint challenged the termination as illegal, mala fide, arbitrary and void ab initio, and as beyond the power of the successor Committee under the Bye-law. The defendants themselves set up that Ext.A7 was issued on the basis of a general body decision and the recommendation of a scrutiny committee. The authority of the Secretary and the procedure followed were therefore in issue between the parties. Ext.A7 is the defendants' own document, and its silence on any resolution appears on its face. No prejudice to the defendants has been made out.
A member's rights against a society arise from its Bye-laws, which form a contract between the society and its members. Where the Bye-laws prescribe a procedure for removal, the society must follow it, and a civil court may declare a termination invalid if it is contrary to the Bye-laws, beyond the authority of the person who made it, or in breach of natural justice. These requirements do not depend on the society being a public authority.
The impugned action of the defendants is ultra vires and violative of natural justice. Ext.A7 is issued by defendant No.4 in his capacity as Secretary. The defence version that it was issued based on a general body decision and on the recommendation of a scrutiny committee is not reflected in Ext.A7 itself. Ext.A7 does not refer to any resolution number, date of resolution, or authorisation. Therefore, the action is ultra vires. Admittedly, the Secretary issued a notice. But after that, nothing further happened after the member's response or lack thereof. There is nothing to show that there was a formal enquiry, or that the defendants had apprised the plaintiff that his certificate had been disowned by the University concerned. No reasoned decision was taken by the competent authority. Simply sending a notice and then jumping straight to termination is a violation of the principle of audi alteram partem.
Since the defendants failed to produce any evidence from the University or other competent source to prove that the plaintiff's degree does not satisfy Article IX(1)(b), the only lawful consequence is to restore the membership of the plaintiff. The first appellate court has rightly restored the membership of the plaintiff while preserving the right of the society to conduct a fresh, lawful enquiry strictly in accordance with its Bye-laws, if it still wishes to pursue the allegation. This approach balances the rights of both parties and upholds the rule of law.
The first appellate court has analysed the evidence in the light of settled principles regarding burden of proof, mandatory adherence to Bye-laws and principles of natural justice, and has arrived at correct conclusions. The judgment of the trial Court suffers from illegality in shifting the burden on the plaintiff, in accepting an unproved allegation as proof, and in ignoring the ultra vires nature of Ext.A7. The impact of the Bye-laws was also not considered.
Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court, reversing the trial Court and decreeing the suit, does not warrant any interference. No substantial question of law arises. However, the dismissal of this appeal will not preclude the appellants from taking any measures authorised by the Bye-law in the manner prescribed therein.
The second appeal fails and is dismissed.