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Judgment
This is an application under Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C. in respect of the decision of Mehta J. in Civil Second Appeal No. 45 of 1949 which arose out of a suit instituted by the applicants Gopalsa and Kisansa, sons of one Jadhavsa for possession of certain lands. The facts have been narrated fully in the judgment sought to be reviewed. Briefly stated the plaintiffs'' case was that they purchased land in execution proceedings of a decree held by Narayan against Raimal and his son Mohnya; that a sale certificate was granted to them on 17-4-1930, and that in 1948 Raimal and Mohnya forcibly dispossessed them of the lands. The defendants pleaded that the decree, in execution of which the land was sold to the plaintiffs, was obtained by fraud and that therefore the sale in execution proceedings of that decree could confer no title on the plaintiffs, and further that the land was originally mortgaged with possession by them to Jadhavsa and that on the expiry of the period of the mortgage they had with the consent of the plaintiffs taken possession of the property. The trial Court held that the decree in execution of which the land was sold was obtained by fraud by Narayan against Raimal and Mohnya, and that the sale-certificate was also fraudulent and the plaintiffs could therefore acquire no title as purchasers of the land in execution proceedings of that decree. Accordingly the plaintiffs'' suit was dismissed. In appeal the District Judge of Nimar decreed the plaintiffs'' suit. Our learned brother Mehta J, agreeing with the view taken by the trial Court set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge and restored the decision of the trial Court. In second appeal it was also urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that even though they did not acquire any title to the property by the purchase in execution proceedings, yet they were entitled to the possession of the land as usufructuary mortgagees, Mehta J. rejected the contention holding that the plaintiffs'' suit was on the basis of title as purchasers and not as mortgagees entitled to the possession of the property.
The ground urged in review is that on the plea of the defendants themselves that originally the plaintiffs were mortgagees in possession, and that on the expiry of the stipulated period for the mortgage they obtained the possession of the land from the plaintiffs and with their consent, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession of the property as the defendants had failed to prove that they had obtained the possession of the land with the consent of the plaintiffs, and that the learned Single Judge erred in thinking that the plaintiffs could not be granted any relief as their suit was on the footing of title as purchasers. Mr. Chafekar, learned Counsel for the applicants placed reliance on Srinivas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad and Others, to support his contention. In my view the applicants are entitled to a review of the judgment in Civil Second Appeal No. 45 of 1949. It is quite true that the plaintiffs'' case as made out in the plaint was that as purchasers of the property in execution proceedings of a decree held by Narayan against Raimal and Mohanya, they were entitled to the possession of the property, and that the defendants forcibly took possession of the land. But then the defendants themselves while contending that the decree in execution was obtained by fraud by Narayan and while denying the allegation of forcible dispossession, raised the plea that the plaintiffs were originally in possession of the land as mortgagees and that they had re-taken the possession on the expiry of the mortgage-period and with the consent of the plaintiffs. On this plea the trial Court framed an issue:-
Whether the defendants took possession of the land in suit with consent of the plaintiffs. If so, what is its effect ?
The trial Judge gave no finding on this issue. He thought it unnecessary to do so after having held that the decree in execution of which the land was sold had been obtained by fraud. In the memorandum of appeal before the District Judge the plaintiffs distinctly took the ground that the trial Court should have determined this issue. As the learned District Judge held that the decree held by Narayan was binding on Raimal and Mohanya and the sale of the land in favour of the plaintiffs in execution proceedings of that decree was valid, it became necessary for him to pronounce any opinion on the question whether the defendants as mortgagors took back the possession of the land with the plaintiffs consent. A finding on that issue, however, was necessary in the second appeal in this Court when the learned single Judge agreed with the reasoning of the trial Judge. In taking the view that the plaintiffs could not be granted any relief as mortgagees in possession, the learned single Judge omitted to consider the fact that the alternative case which the plaintiffs could have made, was put forward by the defendants themselves in reply to the plaintiffs'' claim, as also the fact that the question whether on the expiry of the mortgage-period the defendants did or did not obtain possession of the land from the plaintiffs and with their consent was a subject-matter of one of the issues framed in the suit. The decision of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner makes it plain that in circumstances such as those existing in the present case, the Court was bound to consider the question whether on the plea set up by the defendants themselves the plaintiffs were entitled to the possession of the land. Mukherjee J, (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows:--
A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P.C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder, In the alternative, the question, however, arises whether in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving a plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, When no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit.
On the authority of these observations we must hold that when in the present case the defendants pleaded that on the expiry of the mortgage-period the possession of the mortgage land had been restored to them by the plaintiff mortgagees, the learned single Judge was not right in refusing to consider whether the plaintiffs were entitled to relief of possession of the property as mortgagees on the ground that this was not the basis of their case. On the plea taken by the defendants and on the issue framed in the suit, two courses were open to the learned single Judge. He should have either decided himself the issue referred to above on the material on record or should have called for finding from the lower Court on the issue and according to the finding on that issue determined Whether the plaintiffs should or should not be granted a decree for possession of the property. The omission of the learned single Judge to consider the plea taken up by the defendants, and the issue framed on this basis, is in my opinion similar to a mistake apparent on the face of the record. That being so this petition must be granted and the appeal should be re-heard.
G.K. Shinde C.J
I agree.
