AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.—In this case the Subordinate Judge has extended the time for the payment of the price of certain lands, in respect of
which specific performance had been asked for by way of a conveyance from the defendant to the plaintiff. The only two sections to which he
refers as giving him the power are Sections 151 and Order XLI, Rule 33, of the Civil Procedure Code. I do not think that either of the two
sections can apply to a case of this sort. In Ramaswami Kone v. Sundara Kone 3 M.L.T. 26 where the decree was practically in the same terms
as the present one, this Court held that the Court which passed the decree had no power to extend the time, much less any Appellate Court. A
similar decision was arrived at in Moideen Kuppai v. Ponnuswamy Pillai 1 L.W. 882. It is contended for the respondent that, because the original
decree was confirmed in appeal, the plaintiff had one month''s time from the date of the appellate decree. I am unable to agree with this
proposition, because the confirmation by the Appellate Court of the original decree is a confirmation of all its terms, and does not mean that the
plaintiff has one month from the date of the confirmation of that decree by the Appellate Court. It is also to be noted that the first Court''s decree
fixed a particular date before which the money is to be paid. In this case, as is further pointed out, the money was not offered till long after one
month from the date of the appellate decree. The respondent relies on Satvaji Balajirao Deshmukh v. Sakharlal Atmaram Shet 26 Ind. Cas. 754
for the position that the confirmation of the original decree by an Appellate Court, as a matter of course, extends the time which is fixed for
payment in that decree. If that is the effect of that decision, I am unable to agree and I prefer to follow the decisions of this Court in Ramaswami
Kone v. Sundara Kone 3 M.L.T. 26 and Moideen Kuppai v. Ponnuswamy Pillai 26 Ind. Cas. 63. The order of the lower Court is, therefore,
reversed and the application for extension of time must be dismissed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs both here and in the lower Court.