High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 P&H CK 2921

Gian Chand & Anr. vs Didar Singh & Anr.

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 18 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Subhas Mehla, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
RSA Nos.1218-19 of 2018 (O&M)

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Judgment

43 paragraphs · 3,647 words

Subhas Mehla, J.

1.

The above-mentioned two regular second appeals, which arise out of the same litigation, have been filed assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.08.2017 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, whereby the appeal preferred by defendant No.1-Gian Chand, the vendor, and also the cross-objections preferred by defendant No.2-Smt. Sona Devi, the subsequent purchaser, against the judgment and decree dated 13.07.2015 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ambala, were dismissed. The learned Additional Civil Judge decreed the plaintiff’s (Didar Singh’s) suit for possession by way of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 18.12.2009. The findings of the trial court were concurred by the first appellate court in the impugned judgment dated 05.08.2017. Since both the appeals (RSA No.1218 of 2018 and RSA No.1219 of 2018) arise out of the same judgment and involve common questions of fact and law, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

Brief facts:

2.

For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their original status before the trial court.

3.

Plaintiff-Didar Singh, through his son, who was his duly constituted general power of attorney holder, instituted a suit for possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 18.12.2009 in respect of land measuring 8 Kanal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’), as detailed and described in the head-note of the plaint. A prayer was also made for declaring the sale deed No.7625 dated 31.01.2011 executed by defendant No.1-Gian Chand in favour of defendant No.2-Smt. Sona Devi, to be null and void and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiff under the earlier agreement to sell dated 18.12.2009. A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating or encumbering the suit land in favour of any other person was also sought.

4.

The case of the plaintiff is that defendant No.1 represented himself to be owner of the suit land and entered into an agreement dated 18.12.2009 (Ex.P2) to sell the suit land for a total consideration of Rs.8,40,000/- per acre and earnest money of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to defendant No.1. The suit land was under mortgage and the defendant No.1 was required to redeem the same before 15.08.2010, i.e. the date fixed for execution of the sale deed. 15.08.2010 was declared as holiday and the plaintiff contacted defendant No.1 on 16.08.2010 for execution of sale deed, but defendant No.1 sought more time to get the land redeemed. The plaintiff repeatedly requested defendant No.1 to get the sale deed executed in his favour after redemption of the land, but defendant No.1 kept postponing the matter on one pretext or the other. Thereafter, the plaintiff got served legal notice dated 14.10.2010 (Ex.P3) upon defendant No.1 calling upon him to intimate regarding redemption of the suit land so that the sale deed could be executed on 03.11.2010. Defendant No.1, however, did not appear for execution of the sale deed on the said date. The plaintiff thereafter gave another opportunity to defendant No.1 by serving legal notice dated 11.02.2011 (Ex.P5) calling upon him to execute the sale deed in his favour on 21.02.2011. The plaintiff remained present along with the balance sale consideration and got his presence marked in the office of Sub-Registrar, Ambala (Ex.P7, Ex.P8), but defendant No.1 did not appear for execution of the sale deed. Defendant No.1 sent a false and frivolous reply dated 04.03.2011 to the legal notice dated 11.02.2011. It was, thus, pleaded that defendant No.1 had been postponing execution of the sale deed on one pretext or the other, whereas, the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but it is defendant No.1 who is not ready and willing to perform his part and executed sale deed No.7625 dated 31.01.2011 in favour of defendant No.2 - Smt. Sona Devi. The said sale deed, according to the plaintiff is null and void and not binding upon his rights.

5.

Defendant No.1 contested the suit by taking preliminary objections that the suit was not maintainable; that the suit had been filed through general power of attorney holder whereas the agreement had been entered into much prior thereto; that market value of land was not less than Rs.16/17 lakhs per acre; that the amount of Rs.4,00,000/- paid by the plaintiff had already been forfeited, as the plaintiff himself had failed to come forward for execution of the sale deed; and that the plaintiff had no cause of action. On merits, it was averred that although defendant No.1 was the owner of the suit land, but he had never agreed to sell 8 Kanal. He had agreed to sell only 4 Kanal for a sum of Rs.8,40,000/-. The plaintiff had a dishonest intention from the very beginning and that a copy of the agreement had not been supplied to him at the time of its execution. It was pleaded that when the plaintiff failed to get the sale deed executed, as he did not have sufficient funds, defendant No.1 forfeited the earnest money of Rs.4,00,000/- and, consequently, the agreement stood cancelled and defendant No.1 became free to sell the land to any other person. It was further pleaded that the land measuring 4 Kanal was thereafter sold to defendant No.2 for a sum of Rs.8,00,000/-. It was specifically denied that any date such as 03.11.2010 had been settled for execution of the sale deed. There was no occasion for settling such a date, as the earnest money had already been forfeited on 03.09.2010, when the plaintiff had failed to appear for execution of the sale deed. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit was prayed for.

6.

Defendant No.2 did not appear before the learned trial court and, accordingly, she was proceeded against ex parte.

7.

The learned trial court, after considering the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:

1.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit property as detailed of head note in the plaint by way of specific performance of the agreement to sale dated 18.12.2009 on payment of stands sale consideration? OPP

2.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the agreed period of the contract dated 18.09.2009? OPP

3.

Whether sale deed No.4971 dated 06.12.2010 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 and sale deed No.7625 dated 31.01.2011 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3 are null and void ? OPP (This issue is not properly drafted, but the same does not affect the final outcome)

4.

If issues No.1 and 2 are decided in favour of the plaintiff, then whether the plaintiff is also entitled relief of injunction as prayed for? OPD

5.

Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit against the defendants? OPD

6.

Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee or jurisdiction? OPD

7.

Relief.

8.

After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court decided issues No.1 to 4 in favour of the plaintiff. It held that the agreement and the payment of earnest money stood proved and further held that defendant No.1 had led no evidence to support his plea that agreement was only for 4 kanal or that the land was worth 16-17 lakh per acre in value. Issues No.5 and 6 were decided against the defendants and the suit was decreed. The learned first appellate court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence, affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal as well as the cross-objections filed by defendant No.2 vide impugned judgment and decree dated 05.08.2017.

9.

Feeling aggrieved by the concurrent findings recorded by both the learned courts below, the defendants have approached this court by way of present two separate regular second appeals.

Submissions of learned counsel for the appellants-defendants

10.

Learned counsel for the appellant in RSA No.1218 of 2018, filed by defendant No.1-Gian Chand, has contended that the courts below have misread and misconstrued the evidence and wrongly granted a decree for specific performance. He has also contended that the agreement related only to 4 Kanal; that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement; that the plaintiff himself had failed to appear for execution of the sale deed on 03.09.2010; and that the plaintiff had not entered the witness-box. It has further been contended that the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for consideration and that the suit for specific performance was not maintainable without seeking an appropriate declaration concerning the cancellation of the alleged agreement. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for defendant No.1 has relied upon the judgments in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others, 2024 AIR Supreme Court 3017; I.S. Sikandar (D) by LRs. v. K. Subramani and others, 2013 (15) SCC 27; V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venila and others, 2026 (3) RCR (Civil) 804; and Prem Kumar v. Subhash Chand and others, 2026 Law Finder (P&H) 1143.

11.

Learned counsel for the appellant in RSA No.1219 of 2018, filed by defendant No.2-Smt. Sona Devi, has contended that she was a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the earlier agreement to sell and was, therefore, protected under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He has further contended that she was wrongly proceeded against ex parte and that she had shifted her residence before service of the summons.

Submissions of learned senior counsel for respondent No.1-plaintiff

12.

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-plaintiff has contended that the courts below, upon appreciation of the evidence adduced by both the parties, have concurrently found that the agreement to sell was duly executed; that the earnest money was received by defendant No.1; that defendant No.1 failed to redeem the land; and that the plaintiff had throughout remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has further contended that the subsequent purchaser cannot claim protection under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act in the absence of pleading and proof of good faith and due diligence, particularly when she had not contested the suit before the trial court. In support of his submissions, learned senior counsel has relied upon the judgments in Lehna Singh (D) by LRs. v. Gurnam Singh (D) by LRs. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 969 and Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2011 (1) RCR (Civil) 189.

Analysis and observations

13.

This court has considered the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned courts below as also the material available on record.

14.

A Regular Second Appeal arising from State of Punjab and Haryana is adjudicated under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, and not by Section 100 of the CPC, as has been settled by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (dead) through LR vs. Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157 and later in Satyender vs. Saroj, (2022) 17 SCC 154. Section 41(1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, permits a second appeal on the grounds, mentioned herein below. Section 41 (1) is reproduced as under: -

“41.

Second appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court on any of the following grounds, namely:-

(a)

the decision being contrary to law or to some custom or usage having the force of law;

(b)

the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or custom or usage having the force of law;

(c)

a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908) or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits.

[Explanation. - A question relating to the existence of validity of a custom or usage shall be deemed to be a question of law within the meaning of this section].”

15.

Although there is no requirement for framing of substantial question of law, however, the jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, is still confined to questions of law and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence to interfere with questions of facts concurrently found by the courts below, unless the findings are wholly perverse or based on no evidence. The appeal is required to be examined against this footing.

16.

The first and foremost contention of learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. It is apt to take into note that the agreement contemplated redemption of the mortgaged land by the vendor before execution of the sale deed. The learned first appellate court has noticed that defendant No.1 asserted that the land had been redeemed, but he failed to produce the redemption certificate or any other documentary evidence from the concerned bank. No official from the bank was examined by defendant No.1. On the other hand, the plaintiff got issued legal notice dated 14.10.2010 (Ex.P3) and thereafter another legal notice dated 11.02.2011 (Ex.P5) requiring execution of the sale deed. The evidence further shows that the plaintiff remained present before the Sub-Registrar on 21.02.2011 and produced material in the shape of demand draft No.327355 dated 08.02.2011 for a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- in the name of defendant No.1 - Gian Chand thereby showing availability of balance sale consideration. The learned first appellate court also observed that defendant No.1 admitted receipt of the legal notices. The finding that the plaintiff had shown his readiness and willingness is, thus, based upon documentary as well as oral evidence.

17.

The contention that the plaintiff himself ought to have entered the witness-box has been examined by the learned first appellate court in the light of the evidence on record and found that the attorney holder had proved the relevant documentary record and that the material facts relied upon by the plaintiff stood otherwise established. There can be no quarrel with the general propositions of law contained in the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant. However, the applicability of those principles depends upon the factual matrix of each case. The plaintiff had instituted and prosecuted the suit through his son, who was his duly constituted power-of-attorney holder and was not a stranger to the transaction, but was well conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and appeared as a witness to prove the plaintiff’s case. The power-of-attorney holder, while appearing in the witness-box as PW1, furnished an explanation for the plaintiff’s non-appearance in person by stating that his father, i.e. the plaintiff could not appear in court on account of having suffered a brain hemorrhage. His testimony was considered by both the learned courts below along with documentary evidence showing the plaintiff’s presence before the Sub-Registrar with the balance sale consideration. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the plaintiff was competent to institute and prosecute the suit through his power-of-attorney holder and no adverse inference can be drawn merely from the fact that the plaintiff himself did not step into the witness-box, particularly when a cogent explanation for his non-appearance was furnished by his attorney holder. Therefore, the objection raised on behalf of the appellant cannot be considered in isolation from the nature of evidence brought on record. None of the authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant lays down that plaintiff suffering from a physical incapacity or other circumstance preventing personal appearance is debarred from prosecuting a suit through a power-of-attorney holder, who is conversant with the material facts and is competent to depose in respect thereof. The said authorities are, therefore, distinguishable or inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In these circumstances, no adverse inference can legitimately be drawn merely from the fact that the plaintiff himself did not step into the witness-box, particularly when his case stood corroborated by the documentary evidence on record.

18.

Furthermore, defendant No.1 himself admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of Rs.4,00,000/-. His specific defence was that the agreement related only to 4 Kanal and that the plaintiff had subsequently failed to perform his part of the contract. Thus, execution of the agreement and receipt of earnest money was not in dispute. The controversy essentially related to the extent of land covered by the agreement and the alleged failure of the plaintiff to perform his part. The courts below have concurrently found that the agreement related to 8 Kanal. Learned first appellate court noticed that there was no cutting or overwriting in the agreement (Ex.P2) and that once execution of the agreement and receipt of earnest money had been admitted, the burden in respect of the specific allegation that the document had been manipulated so as to convert an agreement concerning 4 Kanal into one concerning 8 Kanal lay upon defendant No.1, who had raised the allegation. Defendant No.1 admittedly did not produce the scribe or any attesting witness to establish his plea of fraud, manipulation or forgery. No independent evidence was produced to show that the agreement had originally been executed in respect of only 4 Kanal. The concurrent finding, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence.

19.

The next contention that the plaintiff was required to seek a separate declaration that the cancellation of the agreement was invalid does not merit acceptance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Both the learned courts below have concurrently found that defendant No.1 never validly communicated any cancellation of the agreement to the plaintiff prior to institution of the suit. The plaintiff had repeatedly called upon defendant No.1 to complete the transaction whereas defendant No.1 relied upon the alleged failure of the plaintiff to appear on 03.09.2010. The plea of cancellation cannot be treated as established merely because defendant No.1 asserted that the earnest money had been forfeited.

20.

The next question concerns sale deed No.7625 dated 31.01.2011 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of Smt. Sona Devi. The agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff was anterior in point of time. The subsequent sale was, therefore, subject to the rights created in favour of the plaintiff under the earlier agreement, unless the subsequent purchaser establishes the statutory protection available to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Learned first appellate court specifically noticed that defendant No.2 had remained ex parte before the learned trial court. She neither pleaded nor proved before the learned trial court that she had purchased the property in good faith and after making the requisite enquiries regarding the existence of any prior agreement affecting the property. A plea of bona fide purchase without notice is not established merely by showing that consideration was paid or that the purchaser relied upon the revenue record. The statutory protection under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act requires the purchaser to establish the requisite ingredients, including good faith and reasonable care to ascertain as to whether any prior agreement affecting the property existed or not.

21.

In the present case, defendant No.2 had an opportunity to contest the claim before the learned trial court, but she did not appear despite service and was proceeded against ex parte. She did not place before the learned trial court any evidence to establish that she had made reasonable enquiries regarding the title and any prior agreement concerning the suit land. The factual foundation necessary for claiming protection under Section 19(b) was, therefore, absent. Learned first appellate court has rightly declined to permit the subsequent purchaser to establish, for the first time in appeal, a factual foundation which had neither been pleaded nor proved before the learned trial court. The subsequent purchaser cannot derive a better title than that which the vendor could lawfully convey, subject to rights already created by the earlier agreement, unless the purchaser successfully brings herself within the statutory exception.

22.

The contention raised by learned counsel for defendant No.2 that she was wrongly proceeded against ex parte does not advance her case in the present second appeal. The record shows that she was served at the address mentioned in the sale deed, but did not appear before the learned trial court. No application was moved before the learned trial court seeking setting aside of the order by which she was proceeded against ex parte nor was any application made seeking an opportunity to contest the suit.

23.

The propositions of law laid down in the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for defendant No.1 have been considered, but the factual circumstances therein are materially distinguishable from the present case. The present case is one where execution of the agreement and receipt of earnest money were admitted; the defence regarding the extent of the land covered by the agreement remained unproved; the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness was supported by the documentary evidence and the subsequent purchaser failed to plead or prove the statutory requirements of Section 19(b).

Conclusion:

24.

In view of the foregoing discussion and cumulative assessment of the material on record, this court is satisfied that the appellant has failed to show that the findings recorded by both the learned courts below are perverse and based on no evidence or contrary to any settled principle of law. Consequently, both the appeals are dismissed being devoid of any merit. The impugned judgment and decree dated 05.08.2017 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, affirming the judgment and decree dated 13.07.2015 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ambala, are upheld.

25.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.