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Judgment
F.M. Reis, J.—The petitioners filed both these Writ Petitions for quashing and setting aside the Resolution dated 28th August, 1991 passed by the Respondent No. 2 Nagpur Municipal Corporation in Writ Petition No. 3661 of 2001, and for a direction to the said Respondent to execute and register renewed Lease-Deed in favour of the petitioners for a period of thirty years commencing from 17th March, 1974. It is the case of petitioners that on 28th October, 1944, the Respondent No. 2 granted a lease of Plot No. 5 to Shri Gopaldas Mohta for a period of thirty years commencing from 17th March, 1944 for a yearly Ground Rent of Rs. 1312.50. The lessee paid a sum of Rs. 42,000/- as premium for the grant of said lease and a construction was raised upto the plinth area. It was stipulated in the said Lease-Deed, inter alia, that the respondent no. 2 will have the option to take over the construction at the end of the term of thirty years by paying the then market value of the construction, or to renew the lease on the revised Ground Rent, fair and equitable, for a further term of thirty years, or more.
The said plot was sub-leased on yearly rent of Rs. 6,000/- in favour of the respondent no. 3-Saroj Screens Pvt. Ltd., under a document dated 10th September, 1947 for the unexpired period of the lease. It was, inter alia, stipulated therein that the respondent no. 3 would be liable to pay the Ground Rent and other Taxes etc., to the respondent no. 2.
Thereafter, in the year 1959, there was a family partition, whereby the said plot was allotted to Smt. Gangabai wife of Gopaldas Mohta. Smt. Gangabai Mohta assigned the leasehold rights in favour of Shri Parmanand Kisandas Mundhada by a Deed of Assignment dated 12th August, 1960. The names of Smt. Gangabai Mohta and Shri Parmanand Kisandas Mundhada were recorded as lessees in the records of the respondent no. 2. The Ground Rent was paid by the respondent no. 3 to the respondent no. 2-Corporation from time to time. It is further the case of the petitioners that the sublease provided for transfer of rights of the lessee to the sub-lessee according to Term No. 5. However, the option given in the said term was not exercised by the Respondent No. 3.
The respondent No. 3, however, raised a dispute regarding the renewal of the lease and a Special Civil Suit No. 96 of 1974 was filed by them against respondent no. 2, Shri Parmanand Kisandas Mundhada, Shri Gopaldas Mohta and Smt. Gangabai Mohta for the specific performance of the Agreement dated 9th September, 1947. During pendency of the said suit, a Resolution was passed by the respondent No. 2 bearing No. 162 dated 29th October, 1975 deciding to renew the lease of the said plot in favour of the said Shri Parmanand Mundhada for a further period of thirty years with effect from 16th March, 1974. The rent was increased to Rs. 13,120/- and a penalty of Rs. 3,000/- was imposed by the said Resolution.
An appeal was preferred u/s 397(3) read with Section 411 of the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act by the said Shri Parmanand Mundhada before the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, and the same is still pending, having not been disposed of till this date.
During pendency of the said suit and the appeal, the annual rent was paid as before by the respondent no. 3 on behalf of the lessee to the respondent no. 2. The suit filed by the respondent no. 3 was decreed by the Trial Court vide its Judgment and decree dated 28th April, 1980. Shri Parmanand Mundhada expired during pendency of the said suit and his legal representatives were brought on record. The said legal representatives and the respondent no. 2 preferred an appeal being First Appeal No. 96 of 1980 before this Court. In the meanwhile, the leasehold rights in respect of the said Plot No. 5 were assigned by the legal representatives of the said Shri Parmanand Mundhada by two separate registered Assignment-Deeds dated 2nd September, 1985 in favour of the petitioners, namely 2/3rd share to the petitioner no. 1 and 1/3rd share in favour of petitioner no. 2. These assignments were duly intimated to the respondent no. 2 and Respondent No. 3 by the petitioners by letters dated 23rd September, 1985, which were received by them on 25th September, 1985. Thereafter, the said First Appeals were disposed of by Judgment dated 25th July, 1991, whereby the same were allowed and the Judgments and Decrees passed by the learned Civil Judge were set aside. It was held therein that the respondent no. 3 was not ready and willing to perform its part of the contract and consequently they were not entitled for the specific performance of the said agreement.
On 1st August, 1991, the petitioners wrote a letter to the respondent no. 2 and requested them to renew the lease in their favour. A Demand Draft of Rs. 1,312.50 was also submitted along with the letter dated 24th September, 1991, which, however, was returned to the petitioners along with a covering letter dated 15th January, 1992. In the Weekly newspaper Vidarbha Chandika for the week dated 27th January, 1992 to 2nd February, 1992, an advertisement was found to the effect that the respondent no. 2 has renewed the lease of Plot No. 5 in favour of respondent no. 3 vide Resolution NO. 137 passed at the meeting held on 18th August, 1991. Immediately thereafter, two letters were addressed by the petitioners to the Estate Officer and the Municipal Commissioner calling upon them to cancel any such resolution.
Being aggrieved by the said Resolution, and on the ground that the respondent no. 2 was not entitled to pass such Resolution considering the subsisting rights of the petitioners over the said plot, present Writ Petition No. 1613 of 1992 was filed to quash and set aside the said Resolution dated 28th August, 1991, which was admitted by issuing a Rule in the year 1993.
Thereafter, as the Respondent No. 1-State Government had granted approval to grant the said lease in favour of Respondent No. 3, the second Writ Petition No. 3661 of 2001 was filed by the petitioners to quash and set aside the communication dated 12th June, 2000 issued by the Respondent No. 1 granting sanction u/s 70(5) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, and consequent decision, if any, taken by the respondent no. 2.
The respondents to Writ Petition No. 1613 of 1992 did not file any Return to the petition in answer to the averments contained therein. Returns were filed by the respondent no. 2 as well as Respondent no. 3, on 16th April, 2002 in reply to the second Writ Petition No. 3661 of 2001, and a Rejoinder was also filed by the petitioners.
Heard learned Adv. Mr. Z.A. Haq for the petitioners in both the petitions, learned Adv. Mr. C.S. Kaptan for the respondent no. 2-Municipal Corporation, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. S.S. Doifode for the respondent no. 1-State and Shri Sunil Manohar for the respondent Saroj Screens Pvt. Ltd.
The learned Adv., appearing for the petitioners submitted before us that respondent no. 2 had no justification at all to pass the impugned resolution, in as much as the lease granted in favour of the petitioners was still subsisting and consequently there was no question at all to pass such resolution. It is his further contention that the respondent no. 2 has exceeded its authority in passing the impugned resolution, as the same has vitally affected the rights of the petitioners over the said plot. Learned Adv., for petitioners also contended that in the Civil Suit filed by the respondent no. 3 for specific performance, respondent no. 2 had not disputed the fact that the lease in favour of Parmanand Mundhada was still subsisting and as such there was no privity between the respondent no. 2 and the respondent no. 3 to enter into any arrangement with regard to Plot No. 5. It is the further submissions of the learned Adv., that as Rule was issued in the year 1993, the question of reverting the petitioners to get their rights adjudicated in the civil suit does not arise at all, considering that the matter was pending for last more than fifteen years. Learned Adv., for petitioners further argued that during pendency of the first petition, a Civil Suit was filed for eviction of respondent no. 3 and the same has been stayed in view of pendency of above petitions before this Court. Learned Adv., contended that the facts of the case glaringly manifest the illegality on the part of the Respondent No. 2 in passing the said resolution in an arbitrary and highhanded manner with the sole intention of depriving the petitioners of their legitimate rights over the said plot. It is the contention of Adv. that even in the appeal preferred by the legal representatives of said Parmanand before this Court, an application was filed by respondent no. 3, stating, inter alia, that the leasehold rights were assigned in favour of petitioners and claiming that the said legal representatives had no subsisting interest in the suit plot. Learned Advs., stated that the fact that necessary intimation was given to the Municipal Corporation was not at all disputed, as they failed to file a reply to the above petition. Lastly, the learned Adv., argued that petitioners had filed an affidavit in the present petitions, stating that they would not press for reliefs sought for in these petitions, in the Special Civil Suit No. 1135 of 1993 pending before learned Civil Judge [Senior Division], Nagpur.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 2 submitted that there are disputed questions of facts in the present petitions, which cannot be adjudicated in a Writ Petition before this Court and the petitioners have an efficacious remedy to get their rights vindicated before the Civil Court. It is his further contention that once the petitioners have already filed a Civil Suit which is pending, the question of adjudication of such dispute before this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not arise. Learned Adv., argued that the petitioners themselves have chosen to file a Civil Suit and as such the reliefs, which have been sought in the present petitions, can be obtained in the said suit.
Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 submitted that there was suppression of facts on the part of petitioners in failing to disclose the pendency of the civil suit, which itself disentitles the petitioners from obtaining the reliefs in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is his further contention that the petitioners have failed to show that they have a locus standi to file the petition, in as much as, the alleged Deed of Assignment in their favour has not been produced and consequently the question of granting any relief at the behest of the petitioners does not arise at all. The learned Adv., also contended that the petitioners have an efficacious remedy in getting their rights adjudicated in the civil suit, which is pending, and considering that there are disputed questions of fats, the question of getting any relief in these petitions does not arise at all. The learned Adv. argued that what has been granted in favour of respondent no. 3 is a fresh grant of lease and the question of petitioners challenging such grant in the present petition does not arise at all. Learned Adv., contended that the Municipal Corporation has acted in accordance with law and there is no infirmity of any kind in the resolution passed by it granting said lease in favour of respondent no. 3 and the consequent approval by Respondent No. 1 to the said Resolution.
Learned Adv., appearing for the petitioners, in reply to the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that considering admitted facts in the present case and the conduct of the respondent no. 2, the petitioners are entitled to get the relief sought for in the present petitions in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that in case the contention of the respondent no. 3 is to be accepted to the effect that a fresh grant of lease has been given to Respondent No. 3, the process, which is well recognized in law for granting such lease, namely inviting a tender, auction or any other process of a similar nature, was not followed by the respondent no. 2 and consequently such action on the part of respondent no. 2 is illegal. Learned Adv., submitted that there is no effective efficacious remedy available to the petitioners as contemplated by the learned counsel for the respondents and as such, reliefs sought for by the petitioners are to be granted.
To substantiate their contentions, learned Advs., for the petitioners relied upon the following judgments:-
[a] S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , and
[b] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others, .
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Saroj Screens pressed into service two judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court in cases of [i] State of U.P. and Another Vs. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam S.S. and Others, , [ii] Jai Singh Vs. Union of India and Others, , [iii] Shri Sachidanand Pandey and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, , and [iv] Bajaj Auto Ltd. Vs. Union of India, , to oppose the petitions.
From the submissions advanced by the learned counsel, and on perusal of the records, we find that the petitioners have essentially sought two reliefs in the petitions, namely to quash and set aside the Resolution dated 28th August, 1991, as well as grant of approval by the State Govt., vide its communication dated 12th June, 2000. The other relief sought by the petitioners is to direct the respondent no. 2 to execute and register the renewal of the Lease-Deed for a period of thirty years commencing from 17th March, 1974, and by application for amendment, the petitioners have also sought for a direction to execute and register the renewed lease-deed in favour of the petitioners for a period of thirty years from 17th March, 2004 in respect of said Plot No. 5.
There is no dispute that by Lease-Deed dated 28th October, 1944, the respondent no. 2 had granted lease of said plot to Mr. Gopaldas Mohta. The said plot was given on sub-lease in favour of respondent-No. 3 on 10th September, 1947. Thereafter, in the year 1960, pursuant to a Deed of Assignment, the rights were assigned in favour of Mr. Parmanand Kisandas Mundhada. It is also the fact that a Civil Suit was filed by respondent no. 3 for specific performance of the agreement executed in their favour which subsequently came to be dismissed in the appeal preferred before this Court.
The primary contention of the respondents to dispute the claim of the petitioners is firstly to the effect that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the present petitions, as, according to them, the Deed of Assignment in their favour was not produced by the petitioners.
We find on perusal of records that the Lease-Deed executed by respondent no. 2 contemplates that the lessee was entitled to create a sub-lease and only obligation was to inform the Respondent No. 2. In fact, after the Deed of Assignment was executed in the year 1960, the assignment in favour of Mr. Parmanand Mundhada was accepted by the Respondent no. 2. It is the contention of the petitioners that the legal representatives of said Mr. Parmanand K. Mundhada, by registered Deeds dated 2nd September, 1985, assigned their shares of leasehold rights in favour of petitioners and immediately thereafter the petitioners informed the respondents, namely Corporation and M/s. Saroj Screens Pvt. Ltd., by letters dated 23rd September, 1985, which were received by them on 25th September, 1985. No Return has been filed disputing the receipt of the said letter by the Respondent No. 2 as well as respondent no. 3. In fact, respondent No. 3 filed an application on 17th July, 1981 in First Appeal No. 95 of 1980 for dismissal of the appeal filed by the legal representatives of said Parmanand Mundhada, alleging that said heirs had claimed right to the said plot on the basis of Assignment Deed dated 12th August, 1960. However, during pendency of the said appeal, the said legal representatives have assigned their leasehold rights in the said plot in favour of petitioners herein. This shows that the respondent no. 3 was very well aware about the execution of Deed of Assignment in favour of petitioners, and the Respondent No. 2, which was also a party to the said appeals, was also aware, and did not dispute the fact that such assignment was, in fact, executed in favour of petitioners. The petitioners have further stated in the rejoinder that the respondent no. 3 has also informed the respondent no. 2 about the said assignment by letter dated 12th July, 1991. The legal representatives of the said Parmanand Mundhada had also informed about the said assignment in favour of the petitioners by letter dated 2nd February, 1993, and the fact about execution of the said assignment was also informed by the respondent no. 2 to the State Govt., by letter dated 4th January, 2000. As such respondent no. 3 is, therefore, estopped from raising the contention that they were not aware about the assignment in favour of petitioners. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 were duly informed about such assignment and as such it is not possible to accept the contention of the said respondents that they did not accept such assignment in favour of the petitioners. All these facts, which have not been disputed by the respondents, prima facie show that a Deed of Assignment was executed in favour of petitioners and that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 were duly notified to that effect and no objection with that regard was taken by respondent no. 2.
For the purpose of maintaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the concept of locus standi has been liberalized, and what is insisted is that the person invoking writ jurisdiction of the Court should not be a busybody, meddlesome, interloper or a total stranger. Infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering to the petitioner is necessary to give him locus standi in the matter. As such the petitioners cannot be said to be strangers to the dispute with regard to the leasehold rights in respect of the plot, as the impugned resolution will prejudice their legal interest in the suit plot. Therefore, considering that prima facie there is a document of assignment in favour of petitioners, we find that the petitioners have a locus standi to file the present petitions. We have only adjudicated prima facie the rights of the petitioners with regard to their claim of assignment of the leasehold rights for the purpose of deciding the locus standi to maintain the present petitions. We have not adjudicated about the validity or otherwise of such assignment which shall have to be decided on the basis of evidence in appropriate proceedings.
The next contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 is that the petitioners had suppressed filing of the civil suit. In this regard, we find that first petition was filed in the year 1992 and the Civil Suit was filed in the year 1993. As such, the question of suppressing filing of the said suit in the year 1992 would not arise at all. Apart from that second petition, which was filed in the year 2001, considering that respondent no. 3 is a party to the suit, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not entitled for the reliefs merely because of non-disclosure of filing of said civil suit, which was known to the parties in the said petition.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that as the civil suit was already filed and is pending, the question of getting some reliefs in the present proceedings does not arise at all. Admittedly, the Writ Petition was entertained in the year 1992 and same was pending for hearing upto this stage. The learned counsel for the petitioners has filed an affidavit to the effect that petitioners would not claim the same reliefs in the said suit, which have been claimed in the present petitions. As such we find that it would not be appropriate to relegate the petitioners with regard to validity of the said resolution in the suit considering that there is material to decide about validity, or otherwise, of the said resolution in the present petition. As such, the question of directing the petitioners to get validity of the said resolution adjudicated in the civil suit does not arise at all.
In case of The D.F.O., South Kheri and Others Vs. Ram Sanehi Singh, ,a Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed thus:-
Counsel for the appellants contends that since the dispute arose out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had authority to modify any action taken by a subordinate forest authority, the remedy of the respondent was to institute an action in the Civil Court and that the writ petition was not maintainable. But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially a contract for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, , there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power.
In Case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held thus:-
Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court under Article 226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a court entertaining an application under Article 226 will consider for exercise the discretion to issue a writ under Article 226. But the existence of such remedy does not impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If, however, a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the court to entertain the writ petition. The rule is based on public policy but the motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another court. But this Court has also held in Chandra Bhan Gosain V. State of Orissa that even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same relief. This Court has also held that when a party has already moved the High Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case, entertained the application under Article 32. Instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of, the Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226. Therefore, the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.
Thus, it is clear that one of the basic and fundamental considerations, which largely influences the Writ Court inducing it to interfere, is when manifest injustice resulting from grave and material legal infirmity, patent on the face of record is plainly discernible without requiring deep probe into contextual facts.
It is, thus, clear that when a Public Authority is acting contrary to law, the Court can grant a relief to the petitioner by exercising discretion, notwithstanding availability of an alternative remedy. If it is demonstrate that the action of the Statutory Authority exercising statutory powers is invalid and is contrary to law, and that such authority has failed to act fairly, justly and reasonably, and contrary to the principles of natural justice, the Writ Court can issue suitable directions to set aside any such arbitrary action on the part of such Statutory Authority. The Court has a power to scrutinize the material on record to ascertain whether the act complained of is arbitrary, in order to prevent arbitrariness in any action performed by the Statutory Authority.
In the present case, as already stated, we find that there is no material on record to come to the conclusion that the original lease, which has been accepted to be in favour of said Parmanand Kisandas Mundhada, has been determined in accordance with law and, in fact, the Resolution dated 29th October, 1975 was passed by the Municipal Corporation who was a landlord, to renew the lease in his favour for a further period of ten years with effect from 16th March, 1974 by increasing the rent as stated therein. It is also an admitted fact that rent was being accepted on behalf of the original lessor by the Corporation for all these years until the impugned resolution was passed by the Respondent No. 2-Corporation.
Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates that the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The lessee shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to the lease.
As such it is evident that there was no bar for the original lessee transferring the interest in the lease in favour of said Parmanand. In effect, the same was accepted by the respondent no. 2. So also, there is no bar for the legal representatives of Parmanand to transfer such rights in favour of petitioners, as claimed by them. As such the transferee has a right to enjoy the property as the lessee had, pursuant to the grant in favour of the original lessee by the respondent no. 2. It is also admitted that the sub-lease was created in favour of respondent no. 3 by the original lessee way back on 10th September, 1947. The said lease clearly provides that the original lessee Shri Diwan Bahadur Seth Gopaldas Mohta had reserved in his favour the right to get the renewal of the said lease for the future period after the expiry of the said lease, for his own benefit and respondent no. 3 shall have no claims to the interest thereby created. As such the terms of the lease itself provide that the respondent no. 3 had no right at all for getting any renewal in their favour. It is well settled that there is neither privity of contract nor of an estate between the original lessor, who is the respondent no. 2, and the sub-lessee, who is the respondent no. 3 herein. By the transfer and assignment of the interest in the leasehold rights in favour of the said Parmanand, he acquired the same right against the sub-lessee as his transferor had, against the respondent no. 3. As such, the stipulations in the said Deed creating the sub-lease are binding on the respondent no. 3 vis-a-vis the said Parmanand and all his legal representatives after his death.
The said lease was also renewed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of said Parmanand after the expiry of the original period of the lease. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 submitted that there was a fresh grant of lease in favour of respondent no. 3 by the respondent no. 2, as, according to him, the said Parmanand had abandoned his leasehold rights in the said plot. When question as to in what capacity the respondent no. 3 was occupying the said plot after the expiry of the original period of lease, learned counsel submitted that he was holding over the said lease after the expiry of the said period.
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that if a lessee or under-lessee of a property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.
In the present case, though a resolution was passed to renew the lease in favour of said Parmanand, nevertheless, even considering that there is a dispute as to whether such renewal was actually executed and considering further that the appeal was preferred by said Parmanand before the Appellate Authorities with regard to fixation of the rent, in view of the said provisions of Transfer of Property Act, effect of holding over is that the lease stands renewed.
In the present case, once the lease stands renewed in favour of the lessee or under-lessee, the same has to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this case, the lease in favour of said Parmanand or his legal heirs, in any event, has not admittedly been determined by the respondent no. 2, nor has there been any evidence to establish that said Parmanand had ever abandoned his rights over the said plot. As a matter of fact, legal representatives of said Parmanand had pursued appeal before this Court, which itself shows that the contention of the respondents to the effect that said Parmanand had abandoned his leasehold rights cannot be accepted.
Once it is found that the lease in favour of said Parmanand had not been determined, considering that there is no privity of contract between the respondent no. 2 and the respondent no. 3, there can be no occasion for respondent no. 2 to renew said lease in favour of respondent no. 3. Said act on the part of respondent no. 2 in passing the Resolution in the year 1991 in favour of Respondent No. 3 is arbitrary and contrary to the well settled principles of law, and the same is invalid. Such arbitrariness cannot be committed by the respondent no. 2, which is a Statutory Authority, as they have an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably. It cannot be comprehended as to how the impugned resolution was passed immediately after the suit for specific performance filed by the respondent no. 3 was dismissed by this Court. The act of the respondent no. 2 in entering into an arrangement with the respondent no. 3 without the consent or knowledge of the legal representatives of said Parmanand and/or the petitioners herein shows that they acted contrary to provisions of law and in breach of the principles of natural justice, as no notice was given to that effect to the said legal representatives or the petitioners herein. The said contention of the learned counsel for respondent no. 3 that fresh grant was given is to be rejected, as it is not ever the case of respondent no. 2 that a fresh lease was created in favour of respondent no. 3 and in any event, the process to grant fresh lease by auction was not complied with. The resolution specifically shows that a renewal of the lease is granted in favour of the respondent no. 3. The contention about negotiations with the respondent no. 3 would not arise, as the action of respondent no. 2 is not fair and the original lease is held to be renewed in favour of the lessor and not determined in accordance with law. In view of the above, we find that the Resolution dated 28th August, 1991 and the consequent communication issued by the respondent no. 1-State Govt., dated 12th June, 2000 deserve to be quashed and set aside.
With regard to the next prayer in the petition to direct respondent no. 2 to get the renewal of the lease in favour of the petitioners, we find that there is no enough material on record to come to the conclusion as to the assignment by the legal heirs of said Parmanand in favour of petitioners. The original Deed of Assignment has not been produced, the persons, who have executed such assignment, are not known, there are disputed questions with regard to the existence, or otherwise, of the leasehold rights of the said Parmanand. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Civil Suit is wide and plenary. The writ proceedings cannot be a substitute for a civil suit and the writ jurisdiction cannot be made a forum for adjudicating civil rights. The questions of title cannot be determined in the writ jurisdiction. As such whether there is an effective and legal assignment in favour of petitioners will have to be adjudicated in the civil suit which is pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge [Senior Division], Nagpur. There are disputed questions of facts with regard to compliance of the terms and conditions in the original lease. The validity of the assignment in favour of the petitioners will have to be determined in the said suit. The question whether the appeal is pending or not before the Commissioner, Nagpur, filed by Parmanand, as claimed by the petitioners, will also have to be decided in appropriate forum. As such the question as to whether the petitioners are entitled for the renewal of lease will be a matter to be decided on the basis of evidence to be adduced by both the parties in the said civil suit. As such, the prayer of the petitioners to that effect is to be rejected.
In view of the above, both petitions are partly allowed. The impugned Govt. Resolution dated 28th August, 1991, as well as the communication dated 12th June, 2000 by the State Govt., are quashed and set aside. The learned Civil Judge [Senior Division], Nagpur, is directed to decide the Special Civil Suit No. 1135 of 1993 as expeditiously as possible, and in any event, on or before 31st December, 2010. Rule in above terms. Petitions are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.