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Judgment
Karuna Nand Bajpayee, Presiding Member
Learned counsel for the petitioners is present.
None appears for respondents no. 1 and no. 2 despite service.
Notice to respondent no. 3 could not be issued as the petitioners have not furnished fresh address despite repeated directions and opportunity granted by this Commission.
This revision petition has been filed under Section 21 (b) of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 23.05.2019 in Appeal No. 180 of 2016 of the State Commission Andhra Pradesh arising out of Order dated 27.01.2016 of the District Commission in Complaint no. 74 of 2013.
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 27.01.2016 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 23.05.2019 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.
The present petition has been filed with reported delay of 82 days.
As the delay does not appear insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not.
The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again. Submission is that petitioner put in appearance in the execution proceedings in the month of August, 2019. Thereafter took time to find a good advocate based at New Delhi. After selection of counsel relevant documents were obtained but they got misplaced and that consumed time. Time was also consumed in obtaining copies of documents. Submission is that because of the communication gap timely information of the impugned Order could not be acquired and hence the delay was caused which deserves condonation.
Normally, the Bench leans favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period. It is ordinarily preferred to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation. But while saying so it does not imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided can either be blissfully ignored or soft paddled at will. Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment on law of limitation. The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with. In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period. It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the Bench that there were justifiable reasons which explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Bench cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which this Bench exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously. The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioners which seek judicial indulgence in this regard.
When this Bench considers the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that are taken in the delay condonation application it is difficult to call them good grounds which may serve sufficient cause to condone the delay. There is hardly any explanation offered as to why and under what circumstances the belated knowledge of the impugned Order was acquired. It is not a case in which the appeal was decided in the absence of the counsel for the petitioners. To the contrary the appeal was decided on contest. In fact the perusal of the certified copy of the impugned Order shows that the same had been dispatched on 30.05.2019 itself and as such the plea that the petitioners did not have the knowledge of the impugned Order is apparently a specious plea and lacks merit. At any rate even if we go by what has been pleaded, for the sake of arguments, that the petitioner acquired knowledge during execution proceedings then too it is clear from the perusal of the ground taken in the delay condonation application that the appearance was put in the execution proceedings in the month of August, 2019 itself. It is again not at all justifiable as to how the present petition could be filed on 18.11.2019. There may be long delays and yet adequate explanation to serve as sufficient cause to vindicate the delay may be demonstrated and be made available. On the other hand, there may be smaller delays without any reasonable explanation for the same. The sufficiency of cause has to be determined judiciously in each case depending upon the nature of explanation proffered and the credibility and trustworthiness which it carries. When the bench evaluates the explanations given in the present case it finds that they scarcely qualify to be called good grounds.
The Bench does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the Bench has no hesitation in dismissing the application.
Resultantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.
The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioners. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.