GENERAL MANAGER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DIVISION, VIJAYA BANK & ANR vs L. GEETHA SUBRAMANIAM

This First Appeal, under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act"), has been filed by the General Manager, International Banking Division, Vijaya Bank, Karnataka and its Branch Manager at Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, the Opposite Parties in the Complaint under the Act, against the order, dated 26.08.2014, passed by the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Thiruvananthapuram (for short "the State Commission") in O.P. No. 93 of 2001. By the impugned order, while partly allowing the Complaint, preferred by the Respondent and her husband/Complainant No.1, alleging deficiency in service on the part of the Appellants in not crediting in the account of Complainant No.1 the proceeds of a cheque tendered by him to the Appellants, the State Commission has directed the

Appellants to pay to the Complainants a sum of 2,50,000/- along with interest @ 12% per annum from 01.03.2000, besides 10,000/- as litigation costs within a period of one month. Hence, the present First Appeal.

It is pointed out by the Office that this Appeal is barred by limitation; inasmuch as there is a delay of 255 days in filing the same. An application praying for condonation of the said delay has been filed along with the Appeal. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said application, a short and crisp explanation furnished for the delay, reads as under: "2. That the impugned order was passed on 26.08.2014 and thereafter was signed on 20.10.2014. The certified copy of the same was received by the advocate of the Appellants on 25.10.2014. However, the file of the present case was forwarded to the Branch of the Appellant by the Advocate through his junior but since the branch manager was not available at that point in time, the file of the case was entrusted to some staff of the branch but could not be traced.

That the file was traced on 31.03.2015 and thereafter necessary steps were taken to obtain requisite opinion for preferring an appeal against the said impugned order. After, obtaining the approval and opinion of legal expert, the appellants approached their dealing advocate in New Delhi but due to summer vacations, he was not available and as such the present appeal could be filed only on 31.07.2015. Therefore, a delay of 250 days has occasioned in filing the present appeal before this Hon''ble Commission."

We have heard learned counsel for the Appellants on the question of delay.

In our opinion, the explanation furnished is vague to the core and is wholly unsatisfactory. No dates relating to dispatch of the certified copy of the impugned order by the Advocate to the Appellants and receipt thereof, have been mentioned in the application. Admittedly, a copy of the impugned order had been received by the Appellants'' Advocate on 25.10.2014. The averments in the application to the effect that the case file was misplaced and was traced on 31.03.2005, in view of the receipt of the impugned order on 25.10.2014 and also in the absence of any details regarding the period during which the case file remained untraceable, show nothing but the laxity on the part of the Appellants. For the sake of argument, even if it is assumed that the state of affairs was in fact so, in the absence of any supporting affidavit of the concerned staff, who had misplaced the case file, and any other document, the same does not inspire confidence. Though, according to the Appellants, the case file was traced on 31.03.2015, they took more than four months in seeking approval for filing Appeal against the impugned order; approaching their Advocate in New Delhi; and finally filing the Appeal before this Commission. In this connection, the averment to the effect that due to summer vacation the Advocate was not able to file the Appeal in time also seems to be an after-thought. In the current year 2015, although this Commission was closed for summer vacation for the period from 1 to 28 June, 2015 but st th during this period the Registry was open; cases were being regularly filed and were in fact being listed during the whole of the said period. Furthermore, the Appeal was filed only on 06.08.2015, i.e. after over a month of the opening of not only this Commission but all Courts, after the

summer vacation, which shows that even by that time, the Appeal was not ready for filing. Bearing in mind the limitation period of 30 days, stipulated for filing the Appeal under Section 19 of the Act, as also the fact that the certified copy of the impugned order had been received by the Appellants'' Advocate at Kerala on 25.10.2014, the Appellants and their Advocate at New Delhi, whom the case had been assigned after tracing the case file on 31.03.2015, were expected to act promptly and with alacrity but it was not so.

The question of delay by the Government Departments in prosecuting the cases has been engaging the attention of the Courts. Recently, in Postmaster General and Ors. V. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. [(2012) 3 SCC 563], the Supreme Court has been pleased to observe as under : "28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

In our view, it is right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

In view of the above, the typical casual and lethargic bureaucratic attitude adopted by the Appellants is writ large. The Appellants are negligent in prosecuting their cause and the explanation furnished by them is absolutely unsatisfactory. We are of the opinion that not only the Appellants have failed to make out a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the present Appeal, the condonation of delay caused in this case would cause unnecessary harassment to the Complainants, who are waiting for justice for over 15 years.

Bearing in mind the afore-stated facts, we are not inclined to condone an inordinate delay of 255 days in filing of the present Appeal.

Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed in limine on the ground of limitation.