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Judgment
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
This Writ Appeal has been preferred by the General Manager and Disciplinary Authority, Discipline Management Hub (East), State Bank of India, calling in question the judgment dated 22.07.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.21225 of 2026, whereby the order of dismissal dated 01.07.2026 passed against the respondent-writ petitioner was quashed and liberty was granted to her to submit her reply to the show-cause notice dated 28.03.2025.
The facts, in brief, is that the respondent was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding on 18 charges relating to alleged financial irregularities in sanctioning and maintenance of expense credit loans. The Inquiry Officer, by report dated 05.03.2025, held all the charges to have been established. The inquiry report was furnished to the respondent, who submitted her representation thereagainst, and thereafter, upon a proposal to impose the major penalty of dismissal, she was afforded an opportunity of personal hearing, which she availed on 19.04.2025. In the meantime, the respondent challenged the show-cause notice dated 28.03.2025 in W.P.(C) No.9668 of 2025. While disposing of the said writ petition on 13.05.2026, this Court permitted her to file her reply to the show-cause notice on or before 30.06.2026, directing the Bank to take a final decision in accordance with law upon such reply being filed. The respondent, who was in custody at the time, was released on bail on 27.06.2026 and, on 29.06.2026, filed an application seeking extension of time for filing her reply. No reply was filed by 30.06.2026, and the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of dismissal on 01.07.2026. The respondent thereafter approached this Court in W.P.(C) No.21225 of 2026.
The learned Single Judge, taking note of the fact that the respondent had remained in custody until 27.06.2026 and had sought extension of time on 29.06.2026, held that the Bank ought to have waited for some further time before passing the order of dismissal on 01.07.2026. The order of dismissal was accordingly quashed and the respondent was permitted to file her reply to the show-cause notice by 01.08.2026, with a direction to the competent authority to take an appropriate decision thereafter.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Bank contended that the respondent had been afforded adequate opportunity throughout the disciplinary proceeding, including an opportunity to submit her representation against the inquiry report and to avail personal hearing on the proposed punishment. It was submitted that, pursuant to the order dated 13.05.2026 in W.P.(C) No.9668 of 2025, the respondent was specifically permitted to file her reply to the show-cause notice dated 28.03.2025 by 30.06.2026, but no such reply was filed within the stipulated period. The Disciplinary Authority, therefore, was justified in passing the order of dismissal on 01.07.2026. It was further contended that the application seeking extension of time was served upon the Bank only on 02.07.2026 and, therefore, the Bank could not have been expected to await its outcome before passing the order of dismissal.
Learned counsel further relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India & Others v. B.R. Saini, reported in AIROnLine 2017 SC 485, to contend that there was no statutory requirement of a further show-cause notice before imposition of penalty under Rule 68(3) of the SBI Officers’ Service Rules, 1992, particularly when the respondent had already been furnished with the inquiry report and had been afforded an opportunity to represent against the same. It was accordingly submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in interfering with the order of dismissal.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that although this Court, by order dated 13.05.2026, had stipulated 30.06.2026 as the date for filing the reply, the respondent remained in custody until 27.06.2026 and, immediately upon her release on bail, moved I.A. No.11958 of 2026 on 29.06.2026 seeking extension of time. It was contended that, in these circumstances, the Bank ought to have awaited consideration of the said application instead of proceeding to pass the order of dismissal on the very next day after expiry of the stipulated period. It was, therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the order of dismissal had been passed in haste and in granting the respondent an opportunity to submit her reply to the show-cause notice.
We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. The controversy, in our considered view, is required to be examined in its proper perspective. The appellant-Bank has principally relied upon the statutory scheme governing disciplinary proceedings and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.R. Saini (supra), contending that the respondent had already been afforded adequate opportunity in the course of the disciplinary proceeding. The respondent, on the other hand, does not seek to assert an independent right to a further show-cause notice under the applicable Rules. Her case is that, once this Court, by order dated 13.05.2026, granted her an opportunity to submit her reply by 30.06.2026, the said opportunity was required to be given effect to in a manner consistent with the principles of natural justice, particularly having regard to the undisputed circumstances in which the time granted was required to be availed.
At the outset, it would be appropriate to notice the distinction between the opportunity afforded to a delinquent employee at the stage of the inquiry report and the stage of consideration of the proposed penalty. In Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, the Constitution Bench explained the distinct nature of the two stages and recognised the relevance of an opportunity to represent against the proposed punishment. The relevant paragraph is reproduced below:
“24.Since the Government of India Act, 1935 till the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the Government servant had always the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer/authority and to represent against the findings recorded in it when the enquiry officer/authority was not the disciplinary authority. This right was however, exercisable by him at the second stage of the disciplinary proceedings viz., when he was served with a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. The issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty necessarily required the furnishing of a copy of the enquiry officer’s report since, as held by the Courts, the right to show cause against the penalty also implied the right to represent against the findings on the charges. This was considered to be an essential part of the ‗reasonable opportunity’ incorporated earlier in Section 240(3) of the GOI Act and later in Article 311(2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. The right to receive the enquiry officer’s report and to show cause against the findings in the report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two rights came to be confused with each other because as the law stood prior to the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the two rights arose simultaneously only at the stage when a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority after considering the enquiry officer’s report had dropped the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there was no occasion for issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee had neither the right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause against the proposed penalty. The right to receive the report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the acceptance of the report by the disciplinary authority and the nature of the penalty proposed. Since the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty proposed even if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some courts took the view that the Government servant was deprived of his right to represent against the findings of guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure to distinguish the two rights which were independent of each other.
25.While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment.”
The underlying requirement, however, is not satisfied by the mere existence of an opportunity in form. The question is whether the person concerned had a reasonable opportunity to present his case and whether the procedure adopted was fair in the circumstances. In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while explaining the content of the principles of natural justice, held as follows:
“8.The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person.
9.It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272, 308-F] the Constitution Bench held that „civil consequences‟ covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edn., page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or country ... they include ... rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.... In State of Orissa v. (Miss) Binapani Dei [(1967) 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269 : (1967) 2 LLJ 266] this Court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further emphasised that a decision having civil consequences cannot be taken without first affording the person concerned a fair opportunity to meet the case against him. The same principle finds expression in CCT v. Shukla & Bros., reported in (2010) 4 SCC 785, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while explaining the essential requirements of audi alteram partem, emphasised that the procedure adopted must be fair and transparent and that the authority must apply its mind before taking an adverse decision. The relevant observation is reproduced below:
“10.The increasing institution of cases in all courts in India and its resultant burden upon the courts has invited attention of all concerned in the justice administration system. Despite heavy quantum of cases in courts, in our view, it would neither be permissible nor possible to state as a principle of law, that while exercising power of judicial review on administrative action and more particularly judgment of courts in appeal before the higher court, providing of reasons can never be dispensed with. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely must be granted an opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the authority concerned should provide a fair and transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned or speaking order. This has been uniformly applied by courts in India and abroad.”
The aforesaid principles make one aspect clear. The requirement of natural justice is not a technical formality which stands exhausted merely upon the formal grant of an opportunity. The opportunity must be real, reasonable and capable of being effectively availed in the circumstances in which it is granted. At the same time, the principles of natural justice cannot be invoked to disregard the applicable statutory framework. The Court is, therefore, required to strike a balance between the two: while the disciplinary authority must act within the Rules, the procedure adopted by it must also preserve the substantive fairness which the Rules are intended to secure.
In this context, the reliance placed by the appellant-Bank on B.R. Saini (supra) also requires consideration. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while examining Rule 68(3) of the SBI Officers’ Service Rules, held that there is no requirement of issuing a separate second show-cause notice before imposition of penalty once the delinquent employee has been furnished with the inquiry report and afforded an opportunity to submit his response thereto. The said decision, therefore, makes it clear that the statutory rules do not, by themselves, contemplate a further opportunity merely for the purpose of enabling the delinquent employee to respond to the proposed penalty.
There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition. However, in our considered view, the said decision does not conclude the controversy arising in the present case. The respondent is not claiming that the SBI Officers’ Service Rules, by themselves, mandated issuance of a second show-cause notice before imposition of penalty. The distinguishing feature here is that an opportunity to submit her reply to the show-cause notice dated 28.03.2025 was specifically granted to the respondent by this Court itself by order dated 13.05.2026. The question, therefore, is not whether the Rules required such an opportunity, but whether the opportunity so granted could, in the circumstances of the present case, be treated as having been meaningfully afforded when the respondent remained in custody until 27.06.2026, sought extension of time on 29.06.2026, and the order of dismissal came to be passed on 01.07.2026.
The distinction is important. Once this Court had permitted the respondent to submit her reply on or before 30.06.2026, the Bank was certainly entitled to proceed in accordance with law upon expiry of the period so stipulated. But the exercise of that power cannot be viewed in isolation from the circumstances in which the opportunity was required to be exercised. The respondent was admittedly in custody when the order dated 13.05.2026 was passed and was released on bail only on 27.06.2026. Within two days thereafter, on 29.06.2026, she approached this Court seeking extension of time. The final order of dismissal was, however, passed on the very next day after expiry of the stipulated period.
In such circumstances, the issue is not whether the respondent had been given an opportunity in the abstract, but whether the insistence upon the precise expiry of the stipulated date, followed by the immediate imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal, was consistent with the requirement of a reasonable and effective opportunity. In our view, the answer has to be in the negative. The insistence upon procedural finality, in the peculiar circumstances obtaining here, would elevate the procedural prescription above the very purpose for which the opportunity was granted.
We are conscious that the respondent had earlier participated in the disciplinary proceeding and had also availed the opportunity of personal hearing. That circumstance cannot, however, obliterate the subsequent order of this Court dated 13.05.2026 granting her a specific opportunity to submit her reply to the show-cause notice. Once such opportunity was granted, the same could not be rendered merely illusory by adopting an unduly rigid approach to the time within which it was to be exercised, particularly when the respondent had approached this Court for extension before the expiry of the stipulated period.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, in our view, was justified in taking note of the respondent’s custody till 27.06.2026 and the application for extension filed on 29.06.2026 and in holding that the Bank ought to have waited for some further time before taking the final decision. The conclusion does not amount to holding that a second show-cause notice was mandated under Rule 68 of the SBI Officers’ Service Rules. It only recognises that an opportunity already granted by the Court was required to be given a fair and meaningful operation in the facts and circumstances of the case.
We accordingly find no reason to take a different view from that taken by the learned Single Judge, and hence the judgment dated 22.07.2026 in W.P.(C) No.21225 of 2026 does not warrant any interference.
Accordingly, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed. The order of dismissal dated 01.07.2026 shall remain quashed. The respondent shall be at liberty to submit her reply to the show-cause notice dated 28.03.2025 within three (03) weeks from the date of communication of this judgment, whereafter the competent authority shall consider the same and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law, and on its own merits.