High Courts(1982) 02 P&H CK 0031

Gela Ram Prem Kumar and anr. vs Market Committee, Faridkot

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 5 February 1982

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kulwant Singh Tiwana, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 5598-M of 1981

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Judgment

39 paragraphs · 2,702 words

K.S. Tiwana, J.

1.

This petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, has arisen out of the complaint filed by the Market Committee, Faridkot. against the petitioners under sections 6(3), 10 and 13(2) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitionerfirm runs a pickles factory in Faridkot City. It purchases mangoes, lemons, chillies, ginger etc. and after subjecting those to various processes prepares pickles (Achar). The petitioner firm according to the complaint, has not obtained a licence as required under section 6(3) of the Act and has thus violated the provisions of the Act making itself liable for criminal action. On the receipt of the complaint. the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridkot summoned the petitioners and framed a chargesheet, Annexure P. 6 to the petition, on 29th of August, 1981. The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. This petition has been filed by the petitioners, mainly on the ground that they are not under an obligation to obtain the licence as insisted upon by the respondentCommittee because of the exemption granted to them under rule 18 (1)(a) of the Rules, framed under the Act.

2.

I have gone through the petition and the relevant documents added as annexures to this petition and heard the counsel for the parties at length. The charge against the petitionerfirm is framed only on two grounds, that is, it is engaged in the purchase of the agricultural produce and processed in the shape of pickles. It will be appropriate at this stage to notice the relevant provisions of the, Act, under which the complaint against the petitioners has been filed. Section 18 of the Act requires the person carrying on the business within the notified area of the Market Committee to obtain a licence in form `A'' by making an application under section 10 of the Act. Section 6(3) is as under :

"6(3) After the date of issue of such notification or from such later date as may be specified therein, no person. unless exempted by rules made under this Act. shall, either for himself or on behalf of another person, or of the Sate Government within the notified market area, set up, establish or continue or allow to be continued any place for the purchase, sale, storage and processing of the agricultural produce so notified, or purchase, sell, store or process such agricultural produce except under a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the rules and bylaws made thereunder and the conditions specified in the licence.

Provided that a licence shall not be required by a producer who sells himself or through a bona fide agent not being a commission, has own agricultural produce or the agricultural produce of his tenants, on their behalf or by a person who purchases any agricultural produce for his private use".

3.

Section 37 contains the penalties to which a person can be subjected after prosecution for violation of any provisions of the Act or the Rules. Rules 18(1)(a) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1962. hereinafter referred to as the Rules, is as under :

"18(1) Under subsection (3) of section 6 the following persons shall be exempted from taking licence for the purchase of agricultural produce :

(a) confectioners and purveyors of parched, fried or cooked food."

4.

Shri R.L. Batta, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued that the petitionerfirm is a purveyor and in that capacity manufactures pickles, which are an article of food by frying and other process. In that capacity, according to Sh. Batta, the petitioner is exempted from obtaining any licence. Shri H.S. Bedi, appearing on behalf of the respondentcommittee, has pointed out that there is a flaw in the argument of Shri Batta because according to rule 18(1)(a) even if the petitioner is held to be a purveyor the exemption for the ''licence is only for the purchase of agricultural produce. According to Shri Bedi, the sales, storage and processing of agricultural produce within the notified area cannot be carried on by the petitioner except under a licence. The question whether the petitionerfirm is a Purveyor will be taken up a little later. At this stage, the argument of Shri Batta that the petitionerfirm purchases the agricultural produce for giving it the shape of pickles but indulges in the process of manufacture requires to be noticed. In other words, according to him the petitioner firm manufactures pickles from the raw mangoes, lemons, chillies etc. Like other similar statutes, the word `manufacture'' or the manufacturing process are not defined either in the Act or in the rules. We have, therefore, to revert to the ordinary dictionary meaning or the word manufacture.

A similar question arose in Parkash Woollen Industries v. State of Haryana and anothers, ILR (1980) Punjab and Haryana, page 487, which was a case decided under this very Act. Noticing the definition of the words manufacture and processing, the Division Bench examined the question in detail with reference to the ordinary dictionary meanings of these words. The Bench concluded :

"A consideration of the aforesaid meanings and the ratio of the decisions aforementioned leads to the conclusion that the expression processing in the context in which it has been used, unless the Act deliberately gives a specific meaning, as it does when it defines agricultural produce as meaning all agricultural produce whether processed or not... ... as specified in the schedule to this Act (as would be presently shown), means such treating of an agricultural commodity so as to make it consumable while the commodity remaining substantially the same while manufacturing envisages turning of original commodity into a different commodity with different use and marketable character thereof being different and distinct from that of the original agricultural commodity."

In Parkash Woollen Industries case the Bench arrived at a conclusion that the words processing and manufacture do not have the same or similar meanings. The word process as used in section 6(3) of the Act has a distinct and separate meaning to convey than the word manufacture.

The Supreme Court while deciding Civil Appeal No. 2383 of 1977, Idandas v. Anant Ramchandra Phadke (decided on 20th of November, 1981), 1982(1) RCR(Rent) 285 (SC) relied upon a passage from Joyant Hosiery Mills v. Upendra Chandra Das, AIR 1946 Calcutta 317, which is a follows :

"To manufacture, according to its Dictionary meaning, means to work up materials into forms suitable for use. The word material does not necessarily mean the original raw material for a finished article may have to go through several manufacturing processes before it is fit and made ready for the market. What is itself a manufactured commodity may constitute a material for working it up into a different product. Thus, for example for the tanner, the material would be the raw hide, but the leather itself a manufactured article would constitute the material for the shoemaker''s business, and we cannot say that the shoemakers are not manufacturers because they do not work on raw hides."

In Idandas''s case (supra), while examining the interpretation of the word manufacture in context with a lease under the Transfer of Property Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court after examining the cases decided under the different statutes summarised three points as a guideline, to understand the meanings of this word. These are as under :

"Coming now to the tests laid down by this Court the position may be summarised as follow :

1.

That it must be proved that a certain commodity was produced;

2.

That the process of production must involve either labour or. machinery;

3.

That the end product which comes into existence after the manufacturing process is complete, should have a'' different name and should be put to a different use. In other words, the commodity should be so transformed so as to lose its original character."

Shri H.S. Bedi has joined issue with the petitioners to contest that the process in which the petitionerfirm is engaged is not a manufacturing process, but only a process by the invocation of which the agricultural produce retains its same shape and is not converted into a different product. I do not agree with Shri Bedi on this point. When an agricultural produce is converted into pickles, it does not retain its same shape and the end product is something quite different from the original rawvegetable or fruit. Of course, the name of the agricultural product is to identify the species. Take the case of mango. After its purchase in the raw form, it is cut into pieces and sometimes skinned also for the manufacture of pickles. It is heated in that process and certain other things, like oil, condiments, spices, preservatives etc. are mixed to give it the form of pickle, taking into consideration the taste of human beings, who have an inclination to consume it as an edible food article. It is packed in tins and then marketed for sale. If the argument of Shri Bedi is accepted that the pickles retain the same shape as the original material with slight processing then the end product should be capable of being brought into the original shape again for its original use. The things which is converted into pickle after giving the required treatment in the manufacturing process cannot be restored to its original form. This example of mango as given is only illustrative and no exhaustive list can be prepared. So the pickles when they are in that form meet all three conditions as spelled out by their Lordships in Idandas case. The pickles are the result of the production of a commodity with the process of production involving labour and machinery and that the end product which comes into existence is completely different from the original vegetable product used for its manufacture. In Idandas case their Lordships dealt with the question whether the installation of a flour mill was a manufacturing purpose. It was held that it was a manufacturing purpose because the wheat after it was ground lost its original identity and was converted into flour. which is a new product. Though in the case of making pickles, it may not be a complete transformation or the agricultural produce into a new thing, but the manufactured thing remains distinct and separate from, the original one. For these reasons, I am of the view that the petitionerfirm is engaged in the manufacture of pickles and not simply processing. So far as the processing part of the charge is concerned, it does not apply to the petitionerfirm and it cannot he said that it is only processing of the agricultural produce. As a matter of fact, it manufactures the pickels and that word is not included in section 6(3) of the Act on that ground that charge regarding the processing cannot be legitimately and legally framed against the petitioner. It can be conveniently termed as groundless.

5.

The other part of charge is regarding the purchase. As noticed earlier, the petitioner claims exemption from the purchase being a purveyor. The word. purveyer has not been defined in the Act or the Rules. We have to revert to its ordinary dictionary meaning, as it is commonly understood by people and used in common parlance.

In shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume II, Third Edition, the meanings of the word purveyor as given are :

"In commercial use one who makes it his business to provide victuals, etc. esp luncheons, dinners, on a large scale; One who makes preparations or prearrangements; a manager, director, steward; one who procures or supplies anything necessary, or something specified, to or for others."

In the Random House Dictionary of the English language, the Unabridged Edition, the meanings of the word. purveyor have been given as :

"A person who purveys, provides, or supplies; an officer who provided or acquired provisions for the sovereign under the prerogative of purveyance.."

The word purvey, according to this Dictionary means, "to provide, furnish, or supply."

In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Fourth Edition, the word purveyor has been given the meaning;

"One whose business it is to supply articles of food, dinners etc. on large scale: and officer making purveyance for sovereign."

The word, purvey has been given the same meanings as have been reproduced from the other dictionary.

In Concise Oxford Dictionary, the meanings of the word victual given are "Food provisions if nourishment." In shorter Oxford English Dictionary Volume II. Third Edition, the meanings of the word, victual given are :

"Whatever is normally required or may naturally be used for consumption in order to support life, food or provisions of any kind; produce of the ground capable of being used as food : Articles of food; supplies or various kinds of provision; in later use cap. articles of ordinary diet prepared for use."

In the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (The unabridged edition), the meaning of the word victual given are :

"Food supplies; provisions; food or provisions of human beings; nourishment by way of living."

In Chambers Twentieth Century dictionary, the meanings of the word, victual given are :

"food, esp. human food; grain, crops, cut or ready for cutting to supply or store with provisions to feed."

6.

A reference to the dictionary meanings of the word purveyor indicates that it means a person, who deals in the supply of the articles of food for human consumption or human sustenance. The petitioner, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, falls within the meanings of this word, as he produces pickles, which is an edible food for human beings. There cannot be any two opinions that pickles is not a food necessary human sustenance. It is only consumed by people with food to make it tasty or enjoy it. This is used by those persons, who have a special inclination in its favour or have a taste for it. Every human being does not consume pickles in quantity with an idea to sustain himself. In rule 18(1)(a) two words have been used, that it is, a confectioner and a purveyor. The confectioner is a persons, who prepares food connected with human sustenance. A person preparing toffees, chocolates etc. can be described within the category of confectioner. A purveyor is a person of a different type. But a pickle producer in my view keeping in view the ordinary dictionary meaning of this word, cannot be brought within its ambit. The dictionary provides even a historical background for this word. At one time it was being referred to a person, who used to supply food articles to the king''s household Only a preparation of edible article does not make the producer or manufacturer of that a purveyor. I do not agree with Shri Batta to give this word a very wide or extended meaning to include the manufacturers of pickles as purveyors. No doubt. pickle is used as a human food to a limited extent in the manner that the people take supari (betal nut) or the people take betal leaves for the taste of these.

7.

For these reasons, I am of the view that the ambit of the word `purveyor'' cannot be extended to include the pickle manufactures in it. The petitionerfirm, therefore, does not get any benefit of the exemption allowed to this category of people under rule 18(1)(a) of the Rules.

8.

It was then argued by Shri R.L. Batta, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner purchases the agricultural produce the commission agents. who being the licensees of the Market Committee pay on its behalf the market fee. That is a question of fact which he can raise before the trial court and he can claim exemption, if he can substantiate that point there. The charge against the petitioner has been rightly framed regarding the purchase only. The other part of the charge regarding the process, in view of the abovediscussed circumstances, however, being groundless is quashed.

9.

As a result of the above discussion, the petition is dismissed. The parties are directed through their counsel to put in appearance before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faridkot, on 23rd of March, 1982.