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Judgment
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
The present batch comprises review petitions seeking review of the common judgment dated 22.05.2026 passed by this Court in LPA Nos. 522/2022, 630/2022, 631/2022, 632/2022, 718/2022, 719/2022 and 596/2023. By the aforesaid judgment, this Court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals and set aside the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7452/2019, including the principal order dated 27.01.2021 and the subsequent orders passed in the review and connected proceedings.
The Review Petitioners were Respondents Nos. 5 to 10 in the Letters Patent Appeals and had instituted W.P.(C) 7452/2019. The principal ground urged in review is that this Court, while deciding the appeals, proceeded on the premise that the order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the Land & Development Office (L&DO), cancelling the lease and exercising the right of re-entry in respect of the subject property, had neither been challenged nor set aside and continued to subsist. According to the Review Petitioners, this finding overlooks the order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, wherein it was recorded that the re-entry order stood withdrawn.
The Review Petitioners contend that the aforesaid order dated 03.03.2006 had been specifically pleaded in W.P.(C) 7452/2019 and had also been noticed by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 27.01.2021. It is, therefore, their case that the finding in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 that the re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 remained unchallenged and continued to operate constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.
The Review Petitioners have also raised other grounds concerning the interpretation of the original lease deed, the findings returned in relation to misuse charges, the maintainability of LPA No. 596/2023, the alleged estoppel against the L&DO and the nature of relief granted in the Letters Patent Appeals. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submit that the review petitions seek reconsideration of the findings already returned by this Court and are, in substance, an attempt to secure a rehearing of the appeals.
SCOPE OF REVIEW:
Before examining the grounds urged, it is necessary to reiterate the settled limitations governing the exercise of review jurisdiction. The power of review is not an appellate power and cannot be exercised merely because a party seeks reconsideration of the merits of a decision or wishes to persuade the Court to adopt a different view. An error apparent on the face of the record must be one which is self-evident and does not require an elaborate process of reasoning to establish.
In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi1, the Supreme Court explained that an error which is not self-evident and requires a process of reasoning cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record. The jurisdiction of review cannot be invoked as an appeal in disguise.
Similarly, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India2, the Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is intended to correct an error or mistake and cannot be exercised to substitute one view for another merely because a different view is possible.
The principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction have also been reiterated in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati3 and High Court of Tripura through Registrar General v. Tirtha Sarathi Mukherjee4. The Court, while exercising review jurisdiction, is required to identify whether an error apparent, warranting interference, exists on the face of the record. It cannot undertake a fresh examination of the entire controversy or reassess the merits as though it were hearing an appeal.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, the grounds urged by the Review Petitioners are examined hereinafter.
GROUND I: ORDER DATED 03.03.2006 PASSED IN W.P.(C) 3182/2006:
The principal ground urged by the Review Petitioners concerns the order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, instituted by the Bank claiming under the Tahilramani parties. The Review Petitioners submit that the said proceedings concerned the re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the L&DO in respect of the subject property. They specifically rely upon the following portion of the order dated 03.03.2006:
“Learned counsel for the Respondent correctly states that a hearing shall be granted to the Petitioner in respect of Notice dated 19.12.2005. Petitioner to appear before Mr. A. Bhattacharyya, Deputy Land and Development Officer on 8.03.2006 at 11:00 A.M. The Officer shall thereafter proceed at his convenience. Re-entry Order stands withdrawn. Petition stands disposed of in these terms.”
It is the submission of the Review Petitioners that the aforesaid order was specifically brought to the notice of this Court in the proceedings arising out of W.P.(C) 7452/2019. They refer, in this regard, to the averments made in their writ petition, particularly paragraphs 3(xiv), 3(xv) and 3(xvi), wherein they had referred to the order dated 06.02.2006, the subsequent proceedings instituted by the Bank in W.P.(C) 3182/2006 and the order dated 03.03.2006 passed therein. They further point out that the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 7 of the order dated 27.01.2021, had taken note of the said order and proceeded on the basis that the re-entry order stood withdrawn.
The Review Petitioners accordingly contend that the finding returned in paragraphs 45 onwards of the judgment dated 22.05.2026, to the effect that the order dated 06.02.2006 had neither been challenged nor set aside and had attained finality, overlooks a material order forming part of the record. It is submitted that the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, which expressly records that the re-entry order stood withdrawn, had a direct bearing on the question examined by this Court in the appeals.
Having considered the aforesaid submission and perused the order dated 03.03.2006, this Court finds that the said order is a material part of the record which was required to be noticed while considering the effect of the earlier order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the L&DO. It is not in dispute that, by the order dated 06.02.2006, the L&DO had cancelled the lease and exercised the right of re-entry in respect of the subject property. However, the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006 expressly records that the “Re-entry Order stands withdrawn”. The fact that such an order had already been passed could not have been overlooked while examining the submissions concerning the continued operation of the re-entry order.
The judgment dated 22.05.2026 proceeded on the premise that the order dated 06.02.2006 had neither been questioned nor set aside and, consequently, continued to subsist and had attained finality. However, the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, which records withdrawal of the re-entry order, was not considered while arriving at the aforesaid conclusion. The finding that the re-entry order continued to operate, without taking note of the subsequent order passed by this Court, therefore, cannot be sustained in its present form.
The submission advanced on behalf of the Delhi Government that the order dated 06.02.2006 continued to operate as an unwithdrawn order of re-entry cannot, in view of the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, be accepted in the manner in which it was urged. The latter order expressly records that the re-entry order stood withdrawn. The legal consequences of that order, however, raise questions which cannot appropriately be determined in the present proceedings.
In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not examining whether the order dated 03.03.2006 is binding upon all persons claiming rights in the subject property or whether its operation was confined to the proceedings instituted by the Bank in W.P.(C) 3182/2006. Equally, this Court is not examining the precise effect of the said order upon the cancellation of the lease recorded in the order dated 06.02.2006, or the rights and obligations of the respective parties arising therefrom. The question as to the persons upon whom the order dated 03.03.2006 operates, the extent of its binding effect and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are not matters which can be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings. This Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion thereon.
In view of the aforesaid position, the contention of the Delhi Government founded upon the continued subsistence of the order dated 06.02.2006, without accounting for the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, is rejected. It shall, however, be open to the parties to avail of such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with law before the appropriate forum for determination of the questions concerning the effect and operation of the aforesaid orders. No opinion is being expressed by this Court on those questions.
The omission to notice the order dated 03.03.2006 has a direct bearing upon the determination of Issue (ii) in the judgment dated 22.05.2026. In the circumstances, this Court does not consider it appropriate to retain the findings recorded in paragraphs 44 to 60 of the original judgment, which dealt with the question of maintainability of the writ petition in the context of the order dated 06.02.2006 and proceeded on the premise that the said order continued to subsist and had attained finality. The said issue, as originally framed, shall accordingly stand deleted and shall not be treated as having been adjudicated. Consequently, paragraph 1(ii), paragraphs 44 to 60 and paragraph 79 of the original judgment dated 22.05.2026, together with the observations in other paragraphs specifically identified in the concluding portion of this order, shall stand deleted or modified to the extent indicated therein.
It is made clear that this Court has not adjudicated whether the lease stood restored, whether the cancellation of the lease recorded in the order dated 06.02.2006 continues to have any legal effect, or whether the order dated 03.03.2006 binds all persons claiming rights in the subject property. The precise scope, operation and legal effect of the order dated 03.03.2006, including its effect upon the earlier order of the L&DO, are left open to be considered by the appropriate forum in proceedings instituted by the parties in accordance with law. The only correction made in the present review is that the findings in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the continued subsistence and finality of the re-entry order could not have been recorded without noticing the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006.
GROUND II: INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE DEED AND THE EFFECT OF THE PARTITION DECREE:
The Review Petitioners have also questioned the findings returned in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the effect of the partition decree and the interpretation of Clause 1(viii) of the original lease deed. Their principal submission is that the lease deed, which they describe as a grant, does not prohibit sub-division beyond the initial period of five years. They further contend that they had not sought splitting of the tenancy or an alteration of the terms of the lease so as to bind the L&DO. According to them, the issue of sub-division arose because the L&DO itself had taken the stand that the rights, title and interest of the Tahilramanis had been suspended qua their portion of the property on account of non-payment of Government dues.
In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it is necessary to notice the terms of the settlement which formed the basis of the decree dated 24.04.2008 passed by the Civil Court. The said decree was passed in terms of paragraph 5 of the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Paragraph 5(a) of the said application reads as under:
“ (a) That the share of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in the suit land on which the superstructure shall be as follows:
The Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 = 1/6 share
The Plaintiff Nos. 4 to 6 = 1/6 share
The Defendant No. 1 = 1/6 share
The Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 = ½ share”
The aforesaid terms of settlement are required to be read in the context of the nature of the rights which were the subject matter of the civil proceedings. The decree dated 24.04.2008 was passed in proceedings between the parties to that suit. The Government, which is the lessor under the lease deed, was not a party to those proceedings. Consequently, the decree could regulate the rights and obligations of the parties to the suit inter se, but could not, by itself, compel the lessor to recognise a sub-division of the leasehold plot or to alter the terms on which the property had been leased.
The Review Petitioners contend that Clause 1(viii) of the original lease deed restricts the prohibition against sub-division to the initial period of five years and that, in view of the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895, the terms of the lease must prevail. They further seek to contend that they had not asked for splitting of the tenancy, but had only sought recognition of the rights flowing from the decree passed by the Civil Court. This submission, however, does not advance their case. Even assuming that the lease deed does not contain an absolute prohibition against sub-division throughout the entire term of the lease, it does not follow that the lessees acquire an unrestricted right to sub-divide the leasehold plot or that such sub-division must be recognised by the lessor. Any sub-division of the leasehold plot would necessarily require the permission of the lessor or the competent Government authority. The allocation of specified portions of the property under a decree passed between private parties, to which the Government was not a party, cannot, by itself, create an obligation upon the lessor to recognise such allocation as resulting in a splitting of the tenancy or the creation of two independent or unconnected leasehold rights. As already noticed in the judgment under review, Clause 4.43 of the Master Plan for Delhi prohibits sub-division of plots. The Review Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim recognition of two separate leases merely on the basis of the terms of the settlement recorded in the Civil Court decree or on the ground that the restriction contained in Clause 1(viii) of the lease deed was confined to the initial five years.
The Review Petitioners have, in the review petitions, also taken a stand which is not consistent with their contention that the question of sub-division did not arise in the writ proceedings. In Ground II(1) of the review petition, they have stated as follows:
“1.That the Review Petitioners, in their Writ Petition, have not sought the splitting of the tenancy as a consequence of the Final Partition Decree nor sought to bind the L&DO to effect an alteration of the terms and conditions of the lease.
It was the L&DO who, in response to the Writ Petition seeking mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the Hingoranis, took the stand in its Counter Affidavit dated 24.12.2019 (Annexure RP-7) that it had suspended the rights, title and interest of the Tahilramanis qua their portion in the suit property for non-payment of Government Dues claimed from them.
The Review Petitioners, who claim under a different and independent title than the Tahilramanis, submitted that this was no ground for rejecting their request for mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the Hingoranis. Moreover, if the L&DO had suspended the rights, title and interest of the Tahilramanis qua their portion in the suit property, the L&DO ought to have taken physical possession of such suspended share after physically demarcating the same as per law. This led the L&DO to claim that such step would indirectly lead to subdivision of the suit plot, to which the Review Petitioners submitted that there is even otherwise no legal impediment to do so since Clause 1 (viii) of the government lease deed of 1956 (Annexure RP-8) itself confines the prohibition against sub-division to only the first five years of the lease in terms thereof. It is settled law that the Government lease is governed by the Government Grants Act, 1895, and that the combined effect of Sections 2 and 3 of the said Act is that the rights and obligations of the parties to such lease would be completely regulated by the terms of the lease, and would prevail over the Master Plan or any rule of law, statute or enactment to the contrary (Reference may be made to M/S. Hajee S.V.M. Mohamed Vs. The Government Of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1997 SC 1368).”
The aforesaid averments also demonstrate that the question of sub-division was very much part of the controversy raised by the Review Petitioners. Their attempt to distinguish between a division of rights amongst co-lessees inter se and a splitting of the tenancy does not alter the position that the relief of mutation sought by them was founded upon the allocation of specified portions under the Civil Court decree. Such allocation, by itself, could not compel the lessor to recognise a sub-division of the leasehold plot in the absence of its permission. The fact that the Review Petitioners may not have expressly sought alteration of the terms of the lease does not answer the question whether the lessor could be required to recognise the separate portions claimed by them.
The Review Petitioners have also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/S. Hajee S.V.M. Mohamed v. The Government of Tamil Nadu5. The said judgment has been carefully considered. The observations relied upon by the Review Petitioners were made in the context of rescission of a contract granting rights to collect chank shells. The Supreme Court interpreted the expression “grant” in its etymological sense and, while considering Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, which excludes the application of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, held that the lease in question could not be cancelled in the manner sought to be done in that case. The controversy in the present case is entirely different. The question here is not whether a grant can be cancelled contrary to its terms, but whether the allocation of portions of a leasehold property under a decree passed between private parties, to which the lessor was not a party, must be recognised by the lessor as effecting sub-division of the leasehold plot and resulting in the creation of two independent lease deeds. The aforesaid decision, therefore, does not advance the Review Petitioners‟ case on this aspect.
The findings in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the distinction between an arrangement governing possession and enjoyment of portions of the superstructure inter se the co-lessees and the creation of separate and independently enforceable leasehold estates vis-à-vis the lessor are, thus, not shown to suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record. The submissions now advanced essentially seek a reconsideration of the interpretation of the lease conditions, the effect of the Master Plan and the legal consequences of the Civil Court decree. Such reconsideration is beyond the permissible scope of review. The findings returned on Issue (i), subject to the consequential deletion indicated hereinbelow in relation to the order dated 06.02.2006, do not warrant modification or recall.
GROUND III: MISUSE CHARGES:
The Review Petitioners have next contended that the judgment dated 22.05.2026 proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge concerning misuse charges. According to them, the learned Single Judge did not adjudicate the inter se civil liability of the parties, but merely took note of the stand of the L&DO that its claim for Government dues was against the Tahilramani parties. Reliance has also been placed upon the subsequent orders dated 16.12.2021 and 21.04.2022, as well as the demand letter dated 07.09.2021 issued by the L&DO.
Learned counsel representing the Review Petitioners have also contended that it was the L&DO which had decided to recover misuse charges only from the Tahilramanis. In this regard, it may be observed that it would not be appropriate for the Court to adjudicate the inter se rights and liabilities between joint lessees. The question as to which of the joint lessees is liable, and to what extent, for the alleged misuse of the property and the consequential charges, would require consideration of the relevant facts and the respective obligations of the parties. The Court cannot, in writ proceedings, conclusively determine such inter se liability merely on the basis of the stand taken by the lessor in its pleadings or the demands raised by it against one set of lessees.
The judgment dated 22.05.2026 examined the nature of the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and held that a categorical exclusion of the Review Petitioners from liability towards misuse charges for the period prior to their obtaining possession amounted to a determination which could not appropriately be undertaken in writ proceedings, particularly in the absence of a full-fledged examination of the relevant facts and contractual obligations. The direction in this regard has, accordingly, been modified, leaving the parties to avail of such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with law. The respective rights and liabilities of the joint lessees have not been adjudicated by this Court.
The Review Petitioners‟ reliance upon the demand raised by the L&DO against the Tahilramanis, or upon the stand taken by the L&DO in its counter-affidavit, does not alter the aforesaid position. The fact that the lessor may have raised a demand against one or more of the joint lessees does not, by itself, require the Court to determine the inter se liability of all persons claiming under the lease. The submissions now advanced seek a fresh appreciation of the effect of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the subsequent conduct of the L&DO. Such an exercise is beyond the permissible scope of review.
GROUND IV: MAINTAINABILITY OF LPA NO. 596/2023:
The Review Petitioners have also questioned the maintainability of LPA No. 596/2023 preferred by the L&DO. Their submission is that the said appeal was directed against the order dated 11.04.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in the review proceedings and that no appeal could have been maintained against an order passed in review. Reliance has been placed upon the decision in Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. v. Mool Chand Sharma6.
The aforesaid submission, however, overlooks the fact that the other joint lessees had independently preferred various Letters Patent Appeals against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the proceedings arising out of W.P.(C) 7452/2019. The common controversy concerning the rights claimed under the lease deed, the effect of the partition decree and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge was, therefore, also the subject matter of those appeals. Consequently, even if the objection of the Review Petitioners with respect to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the Union of India against the order passed in the review proceedings were to be examined in isolation, the common judgment was nevertheless required to adjudicate the issues arising in the other Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the joint lessees. The objection, therefore, does not disclose an error apparent warranting review of the common judgment.
GROUND V: ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE L&DO:
The Review Petitioners have further urged that the L&DO was topped from challenging the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in view of the statements made on its behalf in the contempt proceedings. They rely upon the orders dated 09.09.2021, 26.09.2022 and 27.03.2023, as well as the communication dated 23.06.2022, and contend that the L&DO had represented that the lease deed would be executed in terms of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge.
The aforesaid circumstances and the effect of the statements and communications relied upon were part of the controversy arising in the appeals. The findings in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 concerning the nature of the leasehold rights, the restrictions governing the property and the effect of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be reopened merely because the Review Petitioners seek a different conclusion on the basis of the subsequent conduct of the L&DO. The Review Petitioners have not demonstrated that the consideration of this aspect in the judgment under review suffers from an error which is self-evident and apparent on the face of the record. No ground for review is, therefore, made out on this count.
GROUND VI: RELIEF BEYOND THE SCOPE OF LPA NO. 596/2023:
The Review Petitioners have also contended that the L&DO had challenged only the order dated 11.04.2022 and had not sought setting aside of the orders dated 27.01.2021 and 16.12.2021. According to them, the common judgment dated 22.05.2026, by setting aside the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in their entirety, granted relief beyond the scope of the appeal preferred by the L&DO.
The aforesaid contention does not furnish a ground for review. The common judgment was rendered in a batch of connected Letters Patent Appeals, including appeals preferred by the joint lessees against the orders passed in W.P.(C) 7452/2019 and the subsequent proceedings. The judgment considered the common controversy arising from those orders and adjudicated the issues raised in the connected appeals. The relief granted by the common judgment was not confined to the challenge raised by the L&DO in LPA No. 596/2023, but was also in the context of the other appeals which were heard and decided together. The Review Petitioners‟ contention, therefore, does not disclose an error apparent on the face of the record.
Thus, save and except the error identified in relation to the order dated 03.03.2006 passed in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, the other grounds urged by the Review Petitioners do not satisfy the requirements for exercise of review jurisdiction. The findings returned in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 on the remaining issues, including the effect of the partition decree and the limits of writ jurisdiction in adjudicating disputes concerning misuse charges, do not warrant interference.
CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Review Petitions deserve to be allowed to the limited extent indicated hereinabove. The original judgment dated 22.05.2026 is accordingly reviewed to the extent that the findings and conclusions recorded in paragraph 1(ii), paragraphs 44 to 60 and paragraph 79 thereof, along with the consequential observations identified in the succeeding paragraph, stand deleted. The question originally framed as Issue (ii), concerning the maintainability of a writ petition seeking mutation of leasehold rights without first challenging the order of cancellation of the lease and re-entry passed by the lessor, shall stand deleted and shall not be treated as having been adjudicated.
The consequential observations in paragraph 43 of the original judgment, insofar as it proceeds on the premise that the consequences of the cancellation and re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 operated uniformly upon all co-lessees, shall stand deleted. The observation in paragraph 63 of the original judgment concerning the lessor‟s right to recover dues before revoking cancellation, and the clarification contained in paragraph 79 concerning revocation of cancellation upon receipt of misuse charges, shall likewise stand deleted. The scope, operation and legal effect of the order dated 03.03.2006 passed in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, including the question of the persons upon whom it operates and the extent to which it binds them, are expressly left open to be determined by the appropriate forum in accordance with law.
It is clarified that the findings returned in the judgment dated 22.05.2026 on the remaining issues, particularly those concerning the effect of the partition decree and the limits of writ jurisdiction in adjudicating inter se disputes relating to misuse charges, shall remain undisturbed, subject to the modifications expressly set out herein. The deletion of the findings concerning Issue (ii) and the observations relating to the order dated 06.02.2006 shall not have the effect of altering the ultimate decision rendered in the Letters Patent Appeals. The ultimate result of the Letters Patent Appeals, as recorded in the judgment dated 22.05.2026, shall accordingly remain unchanged.
Keeping in view the fact that various paragraphs of the judgment dated 22.05.2026 are being deleted and consequential modifications are being made, the modified and renumbered judgment is annexed herewith as Annexure-A, which shall be read as an integral part of this order. For the avoidance of doubt, the paragraph references in this order to the judgment dated 22.05.2026 are references to the original judgment, and Annexure-A reflects the judgment as modified pursuant to the present review order.
The present Review Petitions are, accordingly, partly allowed in the above terms. The pending applications also stand closed.
The aforesaid conclusion is confined to the nature of the leasehold interest and the effect of the partition decree upon the rights of the parties vis-à-vis the lessor. It does not involve, or amount to, any determination of the legal effect of the order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the L&DO or the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006. Those questions are left open.
ANNEXURE –A
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. :
(Note:- This revised judgment is being released along with the order passed in the Review Petitions.)
The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals raises the following issues for consideration:
Whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property, passed without impleading the lessor, can result in splitting of tenancy or otherwise bind the lessor so as to effect an alteration of the terms and conditions of the lease?
Whether disputes inter se between co-lessees, particularly with regard to liability for payment of misuse charges, are amenable to adjudication in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals arises out of a common set of facts and impugns a series of orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 7452/2019, including the principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, as also the subsequent review and corrigendum orders dated 16.12.2021 and 21.04.2022.
The controversy, though arising out of a dispute relating to mutation and leasehold rights in respect of an immovable property, in substance raises significant questions concerning the nature and incidents of leasehold estates, the permissibility and legal effect of partition thereof without impleading Lessor as a party to the partition proceedings, the scope and limitations of writ jurisdiction in matters involving contractual and public law elements, as well as the extent to which inter se disputes between co-lessees can be examined in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
FACTUAL MATRIX
In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present batch of Appeals, it would be necessary to briefly notice the relevant facts leading to the present proceedings.
The dispute pertains to property bearing No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, admeasuring approximately 800 square yards [hereinafter referred to as the „subject property‟]. The said property was originally allotted by the Union of India in favour of Shri Ramchand B. Tahilramani, pursuant to which a lease deed dated 06.09.1956 came to be executed in his favour for a term of ninety-nine years, subject to the terms and conditions contained therein.
It is not in dispute that the original lessee, Shri Ramchand B. Tahilramani, subsequently transferred the leasehold rights in favour of his wife, Smt. Sati Tahilramani, by way of a gift deed dated 27.07.1959. Thus, Smt. Sati Tahilramani came to be recorded as the lessee in respect of the subject property under the terms of the original lease.
Disputes thereafter arose with respect to rights in the subject property, culminating in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974, wherein Shri Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani asserted claims against Smt. Sati Tahilramani. The said suit came to be decreed, declaring both Shri Hardasmal Banasing Hingorani and Smt. Sati Tahilramani as co-lessees, each holding 50% undivided share in the subject property.
It is the case of the Hingorani family that, subsequent to the aforesaid declaration, the Tahilramani side inducted a contractor in or around the year 1988 for redevelopment of the subject property. The contractor, in turn, is stated to have inducted various occupants/tenants, including a banking institution, namely Laxmi Vysya Bank (subsequently succeeded by Kotak Mahindra Bank).
However, significantly, during the subsistence of the aforesaid disputes and prior to culmination of the proceedings, the Union of India, acting through the Land & Development Office (L&DO), passed an order dated 06.02.2006 cancelling the lease of the subject property on account of alleged misuse and exercising the right of re-entry.
The Hingoranis contend that the re-entry order dated 06.02.2006 stood withdrawn in view of the order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3182/2006, wherein it was recorded that the re-entry order stood withdrawn.
Thereafter, disputes inter se between the co-lessees escalated, leading to the institution of Civil Suit No. 364/2004 seeking partition and rendition of accounts. The said suit culminated in a final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008, which was passed on the basis of a settlement between the parties.
A perusal of the said decree, read with the terms of the settlement (Ex. C-1), indicates that the partition effected between the parties does not result in a vertical subdivision of the plot into independent sub-plots, nor it can be characterised as a purely horizontal division or floor-wise division. The arrangement envisaged under the decree is one whereby specific portions of the existing superstructure, including basement, different floors, individual flats, and terrace rights, have been allocated to the respective parties, while the land beneath continues to remain undivided and no independent division of the plot itself is affected by metes and bounds. The decree also preserves various common areas and creates mutual rights of access, user, and enjoyment.
In that view, the partition is essentially in the nature of an inter se arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different portions of the superstructure, without effecting any physical or legal subdivision of the plot itself. However, the settlement forming part of the decree does contemplate that the parties may apply for mutation and/or freehold conversion of their respective portions in their individual names, and for execution of separate lease deeds in respect thereof. Paragraph 5(i) of the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC, which formed part of the decree, reads as under:-
“That each plaintiff/defendant 1 to 3 will be entitled to apply and obtain from the competent authorities mutation and /or freehold conversion in their individual names of their respective portions of the suit property so partitioned by metes and bounds. There will be no requirement of obtaining NOC from each other for such purpose.”
It is also a matter of record that subsequent proceedings ensued for enforcement of rights flowing from the partition decree, including proceedings for possession. Ultimately, by order dated 15.01.2013, a decree for possession came to be passed, which was carried in challenge up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and attained finality. The occupants, including the successor of Laxmi Vysya Bank, were directed to vacate the premises by December, 2018.
Following the passing of the final decree of partition and conclusion of possession proceedings, applications came to be submitted by the parties before the L&DO seeking mutation/substitution of their respective names in the records of the lessor. The said applications were, however, rejected by the L&DO vide communication dated 03.05.2019, inter alia, on the ground that the lease of the subject property already stood cancelled and the property had been re-entered by the Government.
Aggrieved by the rejection of their request for mutation, the Hingorani parties instituted W.P.(C) 7452/2019 before this Court, seeking, inter alia, the following:
“(a)issue appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting aside/quashing the Rejection Letter for Mutation No. L&DO/PS3/62952/389 dated 03.05.2019 issued by Deputy Land & Development Officer rejecting the mutation application of the Petitioners in respect of their share in Property No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi;
(b)issue an appropriate Writ, Direction and Order setting aside/quashing the Mutation-cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-III/195 dated 02.02.2005 pertaining the lease hold rights in respect of Property No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in the names of the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4;
(c)issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1 to 2 to mutate/substitute such lease hold rights in respect of Property No. 13, Main Road, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi in favour of the Petitioners in terms of the final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008 with Exhibit C 1 passed by the Court of Shri NK Sharma, A.D.J., Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Suit No. 364/2004;
(d)issue a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and all persons claiming under them from acting on the Mutation-cum-Substitution letter No. L&DO/PS-III/195 dated 02.02.2005;
(e)issue a Direction to the Respondent No. 5 to pay the misuse or other charges for breach of lease deed terms, if any, levied by the Respondent No. 1 and 2;
(f)award costs of this Petition to the Petitioners; and”
The writ petition, as framed, was thus directed not only against the rejection of the request for mutation vide communication dated 03.05.2019, but also sought to question the earlier mutation/substitution effected in favour of certain co-lessees, while simultaneously seeking a positive direction for mutation of the writ petitioners‟ names in terms of the final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008.
The learned Single Judge, vide principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, proceeded to dispose of the writ petition by granting, inter alia, the following reliefs:
The writ petitioners were held entitled to seek mutation/substitution of their names in respect of their share in the subject property in terms of the partition decree;
It was observed that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis Family) could seek conversion of their share of the property from leasehold to freehold without requiring any No Objection Certificate from the other co-lessees;
It was further observed that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis) could deal with or alienate their respective shares in the property;
Significantly, it was also held that the writ petitioners, having been put in possession only on 08.12.2018, could not be saddled with liability towards misuse charges for any prior period.
The aforesaid findings, particularly those relating to (i) permissibility of dealing with the property as if independently held, and (ii) exclusion of liability towards misuse charges, form the core of the present controversy.
Subsequent to the passing of the principal Impugned Order, further proceedings were initiated by the parties, including review petitions as well as proceedings in contempt. The record reveals that, in the course of such proceedings, certain statements were made on behalf of the L&DO indicating that steps would be taken for execution of lease deeds.
The matter was thereafter considered by the learned Single Judge in Review Petition No. 209/2021 and connected proceedings, which came to be disposed of by order dated 14.12.2021, followed by a corrigendum dated 16.12.2021 [hereinafter collectively referred to as the „second set of Impugned Orders‟]. A perusal of the said orders indicates that the learned Single Judge, while declining to interfere with the operative directions contained in the principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, proceeded to clarify and, in certain respects, reinforce the scope and effect thereof. The following clarifications were issued:
The observations in the principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021 do not amount to an approval of the levy, quantum, or recoverability of misuse charges by the L&DO, which was left at liberty to proceed in accordance with law;
ii.Any disputes between Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the L&DO would not operate as an impediment to mutation/substitution of leasehold rights in favour of the writ petitioners;
iii.There existed no impediment to execution of lease documentation in favour of the writ petitioners (Hingoranis) in terms of the earlier directions; and
iv.Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were left at liberty to avail of appropriate remedies in accordance with law in respect of their disputes with the L&DO.
Thereafter, further proceedings ensued at the instance of the L&DO and other parties seeking modification/clarification of the earlier orders. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 11.04.2022 in Review Petition Nos. 49/2022 and 66/2022, followed by a corrigendum dated 21.04.2022 [hereinafter referred to as the „third set of Impugned Orders‟], issued the following directions:
i.The Court took note of the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 (as corrected on 07.09.2021), whereby the L&DO had already recorded mutation of the property in favour of the parties as joint holders of undivided shares, on the terms of the original lease deed dated 06.09.1956;
ii.The said memorandum specifically stipulated that sub-division of the property would not be permitted at any stage;
iii.Notwithstanding the above, the Court held that there was no impediment to execution of the lease deed, provided that the lease expressly reflects that the parties hold undivided shares in the property;
iv.Accordingly, a direction was issued to the L&DO to execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioners and other co-lessees in terms of the said memorandum, within a stipulated time;
v.It was further clarified that inter se disputes between the co-lessees, including with Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, were outside the scope of the writ proceedings.
All these three sets of orders, namely, (i) the principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021, (ii) the review and corrigendum Orders dated 16.12.2021, and (iii) the review and corrigendum Orders culminating on 21.04.2022, are the subject matter of challenge in the present batch of Letters Patent Appeals.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties have advanced elaborate submissions both assailing and supporting the Impugned Orders passed by the learned Single Judge. For the sake of convenience, the array of parties as reflected in LPA 522/2022 is being followed.
25. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants (Tahilramani side)
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants assailed the Impugned Orders on multiple grounds, both on maintainability as well as on merits. At the outset, it was submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in granting substantive reliefs in a writ petition which, in essence, arose out of a purely contractual relationship of lease governed by the terms of the lease deed read with the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895. It was contended that rights flowing from such lease could not have been altered or expanded in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
It was submitted that the lease in respect of the subject property stood validly cancelled by the competent authority vide order dated 06.02.2006 on account of alleged misuse, and the right of re-entry had been duly exercised by the lessor. In the absence of any challenge to the said order, it was contended that no subsisting leasehold rights survived in favour of any party, and consequently, no direction for mutation or substitution could have been issued in respect of a lease that had already been determined.
Elaborating on the issue of maintainability, it was submitted that the writ petition was fundamentally defective, inasmuch as it sought consequential reliefs without first assailing the primary order of cancellation. It was urged that the writ petitioners could not have bypassed the order dated 06.02.2006 and proceeded on the premise that mutation could be directed notwithstanding the extinguishment of leasehold rights. In this regard, it was submitted that any relief flowing from the alleged partition decree could not be enforced in the absence of revival or restoration of the lease.
It was further contended that a decree for partition between co-lessees cannot result in splitting of tenancy or creation of independent leasehold estates. It was submitted that the lessor was not a party to the partition proceedings, and therefore, the decree could operate only inter se the parties and could not bind the Union of India. It was emphasized that the terms of the original lease govern the relationship between the lessor and lessees, and any arrangement between co-lessees cannot override or modify those terms.
It was also argued that the learned Single Judge erred in observing that the writ petitioners could deal with, alienate, or otherwise transact with their respective shares independently. According to the Appellants, such findings effectively recognize severable and independent rights in a leasehold property, which is impermissible in the absence of express consent of the lessor. It was submitted that the leasehold interest remained joint and indivisible vis-à-vis the lessor, and could not be treated as partitioned for the purposes of alienation or conversion.
On the aspect of misuse charges, it was submitted that the liability arises out of breach of lease conditions and attaches to the lessee as well as to the property. It was contended that the learned Single Judge erred in excluding Respondents No. 5 to 10 from liability towards misuse charges, particularly when such determination involves disputed questions of fact and inter se rights between co-lessees. It was argued that such disputes are not amenable to adjudication in writ jurisdiction and ought to have been relegated to appropriate civil proceedings.
It was further submitted that the directions issued in the review proceedings, particularly those relating to execution of lease deeds, go beyond the scope of the original writ petition and amount to granting substantive reliefs in review jurisdiction. It was contended that the power of review is limited and cannot be exercised to enlarge the scope of the original order or to grant fresh reliefs which were neither sought nor considered at the initial stage.
It was also urged that reliance placed on the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 and the corrigendum dated 07.09.2021 is misplaced, inasmuch as the said documents cannot override the original lease conditions or the effect of cancellation. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that administrative communications cannot confer substantive rights contrary to the governing legal framework.
It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the fundamental distinction between mutation and execution of a lease deed. Mutation, it was urged, is a ministerial act intended to record or recognize pre-existing rights in the revenue or administrative records, whereas execution of a lease deed creates or reconstitutes contractual rights and obligations between the lessor and the lessee. It was contended that the directions contained in the principal Impugned Order dated 27.01.2021 stood fully complied with upon issuance of the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 (as corrected on 07.09.2021), whereby mutation/substitution was duly effected. Consequently, the subsequent direction compelling execution of lease deeds amounts to grant of a fresh and substantive relief, wholly dehors the pleadings and beyond the scope of the writ proceedings.
It was also contended that at no stage in the writ petition had the writ petitioners sought execution of any lease deed or creation of fresh leasehold rights. The reliefs claimed were confined to mutation/substitution in terms of the partition decree. In such circumstances, the directions issued in the review and contempt proceedings travel far beyond the pleadings and effectively rewrite the scope of the original writ petition by introducing a relief which was never sought.
It was further submitted that the directions for execution of separate lease deeds are, in effect, contrary to the prohibition on subdivision of plots under the applicable planning norms and lease conditions. Reliance was placed on the relevant provisions of the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021, as well as the applicable municipal policies, which prohibit subdivision of plots in such categories of properties. It was urged that execution of separate lease deeds in favour of different parties would, in substance, amount to recognition of subdivision, which is impermissible in law and contrary to the express stipulation that the property must remain undivided.
Learned counsel further submitted that the statement recorded on 09.09.2021 in the contempt proceedings, to the effect that a lease deed would be executed, was made without proper instructions and under a mistaken understanding of the legal position. It was contended that an inadvertent or erroneous concession by counsel cannot create enforceable rights, particularly where such concession runs contrary to the governing legal framework and the scope of the original judgment.
26. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 5-10 (Hingorani side)
Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents No. 5 to 10, supported the Impugned Orders and submitted that the same do not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction.
It was submitted that the title of Respondents No. 5 to 10 to 50% share in the subject property stands conclusively established and has attained finality up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the decree in Civil Suit No. 640A/1974 declared equal ownership of the property, which position was subsequently affirmed in appellate proceedings. The final decree of partition dated 24.04.2008 further crystallized the respective rights of the parties. It was emphasized that the Respondents were put in actual physical possession of their share only on 08.12.2018, pursuant to orders passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
It was further submitted that Respondents No. 5 to 10 derive title through a distinct and independent line of succession tracing back to Shri H.B. Hingorani, and are not claiming through the Appellants. It was argued that the rights of the Respondents cannot be prejudiced by any alleged acts of misuse or breach attributable to the Appellants or their predecessors.
On the issue of mutation, it was contended that mutation is a ministerial act intended to reflect existing rights, and once the civil court decree has attained finality, the L&DO was ought to give effect to the same. It was submitted that the rejection of mutation by the L&DO was arbitrary, particularly when the Respondents‟ title and entitlement stood conclusively determined by a competent court.
With regard to the order of cancellation dated 06.02.2006, it was contended that the said order was issued only against the Appellants and cannot operate to the prejudice of Respondents No. 5 to 10, particularly when the L&DO itself has confined its claim for dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended that the Respondents‟ rights were never extinguished. It was further submitted that the failure of the L&DO to take physical possession of the property pursuant to re-entry is contrary to its own policy framework and established legal position. It was argued that mere issuance of a re-entry order without taking actual possession ought not to be used to defeat the rights of lawful co-owners, and that the re-entry, in the absence of actual resumption of possession, cannot defeat accrued rights.
On the issue of misuse charges, it was submitted that Respondents No. 5 to 10 cannot be held liable for any alleged misuse for the period prior to 08.12.2018, when they were not in possession of the property. It was emphasized that the misuse, if any, was attributable exclusively to the Appellants and their inductees. It was further pointed out that the L&DO itself, in its affidavit, confined its claim for Government dues to the Appellants. It was thus contended that no breach of lease conditions is attributable to the Respondents, and that disputes relating to Government dues are essentially inter se between the Appellants and the L&DO, falling outside the scope of the present writ proceedings.
Learned Senior Counsel also supported the direction for execution of lease deeds, submitting that the memorandum dated 24.08.2021 itself recognizes the parties as co-holders of undivided shares. It was contended that execution of lease deeds reflecting undivided shares does not amount to subdivision of the property, and therefore, the objection raised on the basis of planning norms is misconceived.
It was further submitted that the rights of the parties are governed by the terms of the original lease read with the Government Grants Act, 1895, and any execution of lease deeds would necessarily be subject to such terms. It was argued that there is no legal impediment in recognizing co-lessees holding undivided shares under a common lease; and that the continued refusal to effect substitution of leasehold rights or permit dealing with the property has resulted in an unreasonable restriction on the Respondents‟ right to enjoy their property, thereby infringing Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
Learned Senior Counsel also raised preliminary objections as to the maintainability of the Appeals, contending that certain Appeals are barred by limitation and that no Appeal lies against an order dismissing a review petition. It was further submitted that the Appellants cannot be permitted to widen the scope of the original proceedings by raising disputes which were never the subject matter of the writ petition.
27. Submissions on behalf of Union of India / L& DO
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India and the L&DO submitted that the rights of the parties are governed by the terms of the lease and applicable policy framework. It was reiterated that the lease stood cancelled vide order dated 06.02.2006 on account of misuse, and that any further action would necessarily be subject to clearance of outstanding dues and compliance with applicable conditions
It was submitted that, pursuant to the directions of this Court, the L&DO issued the memorandum dated 24.08.2021, as corrected on 07.09.2021, recording mutation in favour of the parties as holders of undivided shares. It was submitted that the said action was taken in compliance with the directions of the Court.
However, it was contended that certain practical and legal difficulties arise in relation to execution of separate lease deeds, particularly in view of restrictions on subdivision of the property under applicable norms. It was submitted that execution of multiple lease deeds may be construed as recognition of subdivision, which is not permissible.
It was further submitted that any observations or statements recorded in prior proceedings, including contempt proceedings, cannot be construed as binding admissions where the same were made without proper instructions and were subsequently sought to be recalled. It was emphasized that under the terms of the lease deed and applicable municipal norms, subdivision of the property is impermissible, and execution of separate lease deeds would amount to recognizing such subdivision, which is legally untenable.
It was also contended that the impugned directions, particularly those issued in review proceedings, effectively mandate a restructuring of the leasehold arrangement contrary to the original terms of the grant. At the same time, learned counsel fairly submitted that the L&DO would abide by the directions issued by this Court and take appropriate steps in accordance with law, subject to resolution of outstanding issues including recovery of dues.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.
Issue (i): Effect of Partition of Leasehold Property by the Civil Court without Impleading the Lessor
The first and foremost issue that arises for consideration is whether a decree for partition of a leasehold property, passed in proceedings inter se between co-lessees where the lessor is not a party, can result in a legal severance of the tenancy so as to create independent and separately enforceable leasehold estates vis-à-vis the lessor.
At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the nature of a leasehold interest created by the Government. A lease granted by the Union of India is not merely a transfer of a limited interest in immovable property, but is in the nature of a Government grant, the terms whereof are governed primarily by the grant itself. In this context, the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 assume significance, particularly in view of Sections 2 and 3 thereof, which mandate that the terms of the grant shall take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law.
The legal consequence of the aforesaid position is that the rights and obligations of the lessee, as also the incidents of the leasehold estate, must be gathered strictly from the terms of the lease deed. The relationship between the lessor and lessee is thus regulated not merely by general principles of property law, but primarily by the stipulations embodied in the Government grant.
At this stage, it becomes necessary to advert to the relevant clauses of the lease deed governing the subject property. Clause 1(vi) expressly prohibits construction of more than one building on the plot, except outhouses and servant quarters. Similarly, Clause 1(vii) mandates that the premises shall not be used for any purpose other than that of a residential house, except with the express permission of the competent authority. The relevant Clauses read as under-
“(vi)not to erect more than one building upon the said land and except such outhouses and servants’ quarters as may be approved by an officer appointed by the lessor in this behalf;
(vii)not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose other than the purpose of constructing a house without the previous consent in writing of an officer appointed by the Lessor in this behalf; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the said officer;”
These stipulations clearly indicate that the lease contemplates the property as a single, indivisible residential unit, and not as a property capable of fragmentation into independent units.
The above position stands reinforced by the planning regime applicable to the property. Clause 4.4.3 of the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021, provides that subdivision of residential plots is not permissible. The relevant stipulation reads as under:
“Master plan Delhi 2021 master plan for Delhi Vide clause 4.4.3: Control for building/buildings within residential premises
A. residential plot - plotted housing
Terms and conditions: vide condition number (iv):Subdivision of plots is not permitted...”
A conjoint reading of the lease conditions and the Master Plan leaves no manner of doubt that subdivision of the plot into separate and independent units is impermissible, unless permitted by the lessor, namely, the concerned Government.
At this stage, it also becomes necessary to examine the concept of subdivision of a leasehold plot in the context of the present controversy. A distinction must be maintained between an inter se arrangement regulating possession and enjoyment of different portions of the superstructure, and a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate itself. The former may regulate enjoyment amongst co-lessees, whereas the latter would entail recognition of separate and independently enforceable rights in distinct portions of the plot vis-à-vis the lessor.
A perusal of the partition decree dated 24.04.2008 and the settlement forming part thereof indicates that the arrangement between the parties is confined to allocation of portions of the existing superstructure and allied rights of enjoyment. The land underneath continues to remain undivided and the parties continue to hold undivided interests therein. The decree, therefore, does not effectuate a legal subdivision of the leasehold estate.
It is true that the learned Single Judge has not expressly directed subdivision of the subject property. However, the effect of the directions permitting execution of separate lease documentation and independent dealing with the respective portions would, in substance, amount to recognition of severable and independently enforceable leasehold interests. Such a consequence would run contrary to the terms of the original lease as well as the planning norms governing the property, both of which proceed on the basis that the plot constitutes a single indivisible unit.
The partition decree dated 24.04.2008 must, therefore, be understood as an arrangement governing inter se possession and enjoyment between the parties. Any delineation of portions for use and occupation thereunder cannot be construed as creating independent leasehold estates enforceable against the lessor.
It is well settled that a lease, particularly one granted by the Government, is indivisible in nature, unless the terms of the grant permit fragmentation with the permission of the lessor, which permission can be granted only in accordance with the Master Plan, the applicable Town Planning Scheme or the rules governing urban planning in the area. The original lease in the present case was created in favour of a single lessee. By virtue of judicial determination, the parties came to be recognised as co-lessees; however, such recognition does not alter the fundamental nature of the tenancy.
The status of the parties, therefore, is that of co-lessees under a single indivisible lease, and not that of independent lessees holding separate tenancies. The principle that splitting of tenancy is impermissible without the consent of the lessor is well established and admits of no exception in the facts of the present case. The partition decree, admittedly passed in proceedings to which the lessor was not a party, cannot bind the lessor or compel it to recognize multiple tenancies. It operates only inter se the parties and remains subject to the overarching terms of the lease. The co-lessees, by any arrangement inter se, cannot compel the lessor to recognise a fragmented tenancy or impose altered obligations upon it
In the aforesaid backdrop, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge permitting the writ petitioners to seek execution of lease documentation in respect of their respective portions, and to independently deal with or transact in relation thereto, cannot be sustained. Though the Impugned Orders do not expressly direct subdivision of the plot, the effect of the directions issued therein would be to recognise separate and independently enforceable leasehold interests in distinct portions of the property. Such recognition would, in substance, operate as a fragmentation of the original leasehold estate, which is contrary to the applicable planning norms. It is well settled that a decree for partition operates only inter se the parties to the proceedings and cannot enlarge, alter, or bind the rights of the lessor, who was not a party thereto. Consequently, while the partition decree may regulate possession and enjoyment between the co-lessees, it cannot compel the lessor to recognise separate leasehold estates or independent tenancies in respect of portions of the leased property.
This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the directions issued by the learned Single Judge proceed on a legal assumption inconsistent with the indivisible nature of the leasehold estate, in the absence of permission from the lessor, and could not have resulted in the creation of independent rights enforceable against the lessor.
Accordingly, it is held that the partition decree does not result in splitting of tenancy, nor does it bind the lessor to recognize separate leasehold estates. The lease, as originally granted, remains a single and indivisible grant. Consequently, rights flowing under such a common lease cannot be asserted in a fragmented or independent manner by one or more co-lessees to the exclusion of others.
Issue (ii): Scope of Writ Jurisdiction in Inter Se Disputes and Liability Towards Misuse Charges
The second issue pertains to the permissible limits of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly in the context of disputes arising inter se between co-lessees and the determination of liability towards misuse charges levied by the lessor. This issue assumes significance in light of the findings returned by the learned Single Judge, whereby not only were certain rights recognised in favour of the writ petitioners, but it was also held that they could not be held liable for misuse charges for the period prior to their obtaining possession.
At the outset, it must be noted that the writ jurisdiction is primarily designed to enforce public law rights and to ensure that statutory and constitutional authorities act within the bounds of law. While the jurisdiction is wide and flexible, it is equally well settled that it is not intended to serve as a forum for adjudication of purely private disputes, particularly those requiring detailed examination of disputed questions of fact or enforcement of contractual obligations inter se private parties.
In the present case, the controversy relating to liability to deposit misuse charges amongst the co-lessees arises from alleged breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease deed, which is a contractual arrangement governed, in the case of government grants, by the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895. The determination of liability for such charges would ordinarily depend upon a range of factors, including the nature of the breach, the identity of the party responsible for such breach, the period during which such misuse occurred, and the contractual stipulations governing the consequences of such breach.
The Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 have contended that they cannot be saddled with liability towards misuse charges, as they were neither in possession of the property during the period of alleged misuse nor responsible for the acts leading to such misuse. On the other hand, the Appellants contend that the liability, if any, cannot be apportioned in the manner suggested and that the issue involves complex questions relating to the rights and obligations of the parties under the lease.
In the considered view of this Court, such a dispute, which essentially concerns the allocation of liability arising out of alleged contractual breaches and involves competing claims between co-lessees, squarely falls within the realm of private law. The adjudication of such disputes would necessarily require examination of evidence, determination of factual responsibility, and interpretation of contractual obligations; functions that are not ordinarily undertaken in proceedings under Article 226.
The learned Single Judge, however, proceeded to record a categorical finding to the effect that the writ petitioners (Hingoranis-private respondents herein) could not be held liable for misuse charges for the period prior to 08.12.2018, i.e., the date on which they were put in possession of the property. While the reasoning appears to be founded on considerations of equity, the question that arises is whether such a determination was within the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.
It is well settled that even where a public authority is involved, the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, ordinarily refrains from adjudicating disputes that are essentially contractual in nature, unless the action of the authority is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or in violation of statutory provisions. The writ court does not sit as a court of plenary jurisdiction to decide all disputes that may have some nexus with a public authority.
In the present case, the liability towards misuse charges is intrinsically linked to the terms of the lease and the conduct of the parties. The L&DO, as the lessor, is entitled to determine the liability for such charges in accordance with the lease conditions and applicable policies. Any dispute with regard to such determination, including the question as to who is liable to pay such charges, would ordinarily be amenable to challenge in appropriate proceedings where evidence can be led after framing of the issues arising between the parties.
Furthermore, the dispute between the Appellants and Respondent Nos. 5 to 10 regarding apportionment or exclusion of liability is clearly an inter se dispute between co-lessees or persons claiming under them. The writ court, in such circumstances, ought to exercise restraint and leave the parties to avail of appropriate remedies in civil proceedings, rather than rendering conclusive findings that may prejudice the rights of parties without a full-fledged trial.
It is also relevant to note that the L&DO itself, as per the record, issued a demand letter dated 07.09.2021 quantifying the dues payable by the Appellants. The determination of liability by the lessor, and any challenge thereto, would have to be examined in the context of the relevant contractual and statutory framework. The writ court could not have pre-emptively adjudicated upon such liability, particularly in the absence of a direct challenge to the demand or a comprehensive examination of the underlying facts.
The observations of the learned Single Judge, to the effect that the writ petitioners cannot be made liable for misuse charges for the prior period, effectively amount to a determination of civil liability between the private parties. Such a determination, in the absence of a proper evidentiary foundation and outside the framework of an appropriate proceeding, cannot be sustained.
The effect of the findings returned by the learned Single Judge is that the liability towards misuse charges for the prior period stands confined to the Tahilramani parties. Such a determination, which directly adjudicates liability between co-lessees, travels beyond the permissible scope of writ jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Issue (ii) is answered by holding that the adjudication of inter se disputes between co-lessees who are private parties, including determination of liability towards misuse charges, falls outside the limited scope of writ jurisdiction and must be left to be decided in appropriate civil or other competent proceedings.
The submission advanced on behalf of the Delhi Government that the order dated 06.02.2006 continues to subsist and operate, notwithstanding the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006 passed by this Court, cannot be accepted in the manner in which it has been urged. The operative part of the order dated 03.03.2006 reads as under:-
“Learned counsel for the Respondent correctly states that a hearing shall be granted to the Petitioner in respect of Notice dated 19.12.2005. Petitioner to appear before Mr. A. Bhattacharyya, Deputy Land and Development Officer on 8.03.2006 at 11:00 A.M. The Officer shall thereafter proceed at his convenience. Re-entry Order stands withdrawn. Petition stands disposed of in these terms.”
It is evident that the order dated 03.03.2006 expressly records that the re-entry order stood withdrawn. The legal consequences of that order, however, raise questions which cannot appropriately be determined in the present proceedings.
In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that this Court is not examining whether the order dated 03.03.2006 is binding upon all persons claiming rights in the subject property or whether its operation was confined to the proceedings instituted by the Bank in W.P.(C) 3182/2006. Equally, this Court is not examining the precise effect of the said order upon the cancellation of the lease recorded in the order dated 06.02.2006, or the rights and obligations of the respective parties arising therefrom. The question as to the persons upon whom the order dated 03.03.2006 operates, the extent of its binding effect and the legal consequences flowing therefrom are not matters which can be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings. This Court, therefore, refrains from expressing any opinion thereon.
In view of the aforesaid position, the contention of the Delhi Government founded upon the continued subsistence of the order dated 06.02.2006, without accounting for the subsequent order dated 03.03.2006, is rejected. It shall, however, be open to the parties to avail of such remedies as may be available to them in accordance with law before the appropriate forum for determination of the questions concerning the effect and operation of the aforesaid orders. No opinion is being expressed by this Court on those questions.
Equally, the further observations permitting the writ petitioners to deal with, alienate, or otherwise transact with their respective shares as if they held independent and severable interests, also trench upon areas that are closely intertwined with the nature of the leasehold rights and the contractual obligations governing the property. As already noted while dealing with Issue (i), such matters cannot be decided in isolation from the terms of the lease and the rights of the lessor.
The Petitioners contend that Clause 1(viii) of the original lease deed restricts the prohibition against sub-division to the initial period of five years and that, in view of the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895, the terms of the lease must prevail. They further seek to contend that they had not asked for splitting of the tenancy, but had only sought recognition of the rights flowing from the decree passed by the Civil Court. This submission, however, does not advance their case. Even assuming that the lease deed does not contain an absolute prohibition against sub-division throughout the entire term of the lease, it does not follow that the lessees acquire an unrestricted right to sub-divide the leasehold plot or that such sub-division must be recognised by the lessor. Any sub-division of the leasehold plot would necessarily require the permission of the lessor or the competent Government authority. The allocation of specified portions of the property under a decree passed between private parties, to which the Government was not a party, cannot by itself create an obligation upon the lessor to recognise such sub-division. Clause 4.43 of the Master Plan for Delhi prohibits sub-division of plots. The Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim recognition of a sub-division of the leasehold plot merely on the basis of the terms of the settlement recorded in the Civil Court decree or on the ground that the restriction contained in Clause 1(viii) of the lease deed was confined to the initial five years.
The Petitioners attempt to distinguish between a division of rights amongst co-lessees inter se and a splitting of the tenancy does not alter the position that the relief of mutation sought by them was founded upon the allocation of specified portions under the Civil Court decree. Such allocation, by itself, could not compel the lessor to recognise creation of two independent leases.
CONCLUSION
In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings on all the issues, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned Orders passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in their entirety.
It is clarified that the rights and disputes inter se between the co-lessees, including liability towards misuse charges, shall remain open and may be agitated by the parties before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.
Insofar as the objection regarding limitation in the appeal preferred by the GNCTD/L&DO is concerned, this Court is of the view that having regard to the fact that the Impugned Orders are under challenge in the present batch of Appeals and are being examined on merits, it would not be appropriate to non-suit the said appellant solely on the ground of delay. The delay in filing the Appeal is, accordingly, condoned in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
The present batch of Letters Patent Appeals, along with all pending applications, is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
