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Judgment
O R D E R
Hon’ble Ms. Harvinder Kaur Oberoi, Member (J): -By way of the present O.A. filed u/s 19 of the AT Act, 1985, the applicant, in Para 8 of the O.A., has prayed for the following reliefs: -
“(a)Quash order dated 30.12.2022 (Annexure A-1) and order dated 28.08.2024 (Annexure A 2)
(c)Direct the respondent to reinstate the applicant in service with full back wages with interest, continuity in service, seniority promotion and all other consequential benefits.”
Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the applicant and have prayed for dismissal of the present Original Application. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder denying the contention of the counter affidavit and reiterated his claim in the OA.
The brief facts of the present case are that the applicant was appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police on 17.04.2009. In the year 2022, he was promoted to the rank of Head Constable and was posted at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, in December, 2022. On 24.12.2022, FIR No. 586/2022 came to be registered against the applicant and another Head Constable, namely Robin Singh, under Sections 365/392/384/427/34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 365/392 IPC and Sections 7/13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The allegations forming the basis of the aforesaid FIR were that two persons, namely Sh. Salaudeen Kathat and Sh. Shekh Khadar Bashi, had arrived at IGI Airport, New Delhi, from Muscat on the intervening night of 19/20.12.2022, and were carrying approximately 600 grams of gold. It was alleged that after leaving the airport, when they boarded a taxi, a Police Gypsy carrying two police personnel intercepted the taxi and the said persons were forcibly made to sit in the Police Gypsy. It was further alleged that the said police personnel thereafter took away/extorted the approximately 600 grams of gold being carried by the aforesaid persons.
It was also alleged that another person, namely Sh. Saikh Kadar, made a statement narrating a similar incident. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations and statements, the aforementioned FIR was registered against the applicant and the co-accused Head Constable Robin Singh. Pursuant to the registration of the FIR, the applicant was placed under suspension and arrested on 25.12.2022 in connection with the aforesaid case.
The applicant thereafter filed a statutory appeal against the order of dismissal, clearly asserting that he had been falsely implicated and arrested in the criminal case. He also submitted that based on the limited information available to him, the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution had been wrongly invoked in his case. In the said statutory appeal, the applicant placed reliance on several judgments of this Tribunal. The applicant contends that the Appellate Authority failed to properly apply its mind to the applicability of Article 311 (2) (b) and proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the allegations against the applicant already stood proved, despite the ongoing criminal trial wherein private witnesses are deposing and the remaining witnesses are official witnesses, against whom there can be no presumption of any influence or threat by the applicant. Hence, the present Original Application.
In these facts and circumstances, the applicant is left with no other legal efficacious remedy except to approach this Tribunal on following grounds: -
The applicant places reliance on a recent Circular dated 13.05.2024 issued by the DCP, Legal Division, PHQ, Delhi, in pursuance of a judgment of the Hon’ble High Court. However, despite the said circular, the impugned orders continue to be passed in a stereotyped manner, without due application of mind.
Along with the present O.A., the applicant is filing the list of witnesses submitted by the prosecution along with the charge-sheet before the Hon’ble Trial Court, to demonstrate that the majority of the witnesses are official witnesses. The applicant is also placing on record the depositions of four public witnesses who have already testified before the Trial Court, in order to establish that the reasons recorded by the authorities for invoking Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in his case are merely based on suspicion. On the contrary, the trial is proceeding in accordance with law, the witnesses are deposing freely, and the remaining witnesses are official witnesses, leaving no scope for any apprehension of influence or threat by the applicant.
The order of the Disciplinary Authority invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is arbitrary, unwarranted, and unconstitutional. The reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable are based merely on an assumption that the allegations against the applicant are true. The applicant, who is facing a criminal trial, was not given any opportunity to defend himself through a departmental enquiry. Yet, relying solely on a preliminary enquiry conducted behind his back, the Disciplinary Authority presumed that the allegations stood proved. A bare reading of Article 311 (2) (b) makes it clear that before invoking the said power, the authority must record reasons showing why it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. In the present case, however, the Disciplinary Authority has simply stated that the material and investigation prove the allegations against the applicant—this is not a valid ground for dispensing with the enquiry. Hence, there is clear non-application of mind.
The Disciplinary Authority has completely overlooked the fact that the applicant is merely a Constable in the Delhi Police, and the witnesses against him are official witnesses. Therefore, there is no possibility of the applicant influencing them. The reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority must be based on tangible material and cannot rest on conjecture or assumptions. In the present case, the reasoning that the applicant could influence witnesses is wholly baseless, absurd, and unsustainable in law, as it is unsupported by any material on record. Such assumptions have been repeatedly disapproved by this Tribunal in various cases, some of which have been cited in the body of the present statutory appeal.
The Disciplinary Authority’s reasoning that the applicant, being in custody, cannot be subjected to a departmental enquiry once again reflects non-application of mind. The power under Article 311 (2) (b) appears to have been invoked merely as a shortcut to avoid holding a regular departmental enquiry, with vague and evasive reasons recorded to justify such dispensation.
The presumption that the applicant holds an influential position is completely unfounded and false. The applicant is a Constable in the Delhi Police, and the witnesses against him are official witnesses. Moreover, the complainant and public witnesses have already recorded their depositions before the Trial Court. On the contrary, the applicant is facing a motivated complaint.
Without any basis or supporting material, the applicant has been suddenly and arbitrarily branded as a “desperate criminal” or a person with a “criminal mind.” On the contrary, the applicant has an unblemished service record. The Disciplinary Authority had no factual or legal foundation to arrive at such an extreme conclusion while invoking the power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
The so-called clarity of evidence (even though all charges are denied by the applicant) or the gravity of the allegations is not valid preconditions for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b). The Disciplinary Authority has completely misinterpreted the scope of Article 311 (2) (b) and the settled legal principles laid down by various judicial fora.
Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the following orders/judgments namely, (i) Order/judgment dated 14.08.2024 of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 11276/2024 titled as The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs OM Prakash & anr., (ii) Order/judgment dated 24.10.2024 Of Hon’ble High Court in W.P (C) 10572/2023 in the matter of Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Neeraj Kumar; (iii) Order/judgment of Hon’ble High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 4201/2024 on 20.03.2024 in the matter of Commissioner of Police and Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh. and the same was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11681/2024 filed by the Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 10.07.2024 has dismissed the said SLP and the judgment of Hon’ble Court of Delhi attained finality; (iv) Order/judgment of this Tribunal in OA No. 14/2018 titled as Sant Ram vs. Commissioner of Police and the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 5562/2024, CAV 181/2024 CM Appl. No. 22929/2024, and (v) Order/judgment dated 10.02.2022 of this Tribunal in connected OAs No. 1383/2020, 3508/2018, 4021/2016,. 3027/2018, 2777/2019, 3267/2019, 467/2020 and 34/2021 titled Sumit Sharma Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
The facts of the case, as borne out from the record, are that the applicant, namely HC (Exe.) Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A, and HC Robin Singh, No. 377/A, were serving in Delhi Police and were posted at IGI Airport Police Station, New Delhi. Both the officials were dismissed from service vide order No. 4769-4920/HAP(P-I)/IGIA dated 30.12.2022, on the allegations arising out of an incident reported at IGI Airport.
It was alleged that on 24.12.2022, two persons, namely Sh. Salaudeen Kathat and Sh. Saikh Khadar Bashi, approached the IGI Airport Police Station and made statements regarding incidents allegedly occurring on the intervening night of 19/20.12.2022. As per the statement of Sh. Salaudeen Kathat, he had arrived at IGI Airport at about 02:55 hours from Muscat by Flight No. AI-973 and was carrying approximately 600 grams of gold, which had allegedly been handed over to him by one Sh. Sikander in Muscat for delivery to another person in Rajasthan. It was stated that after clearing immigration, he crossed the Green Channel without being checked and, after coming out of the terminal, took a taxi.
It was further alleged that when the taxi reached the T-3 Exit Ramp, a police Gypsy carrying two police personnel stopped the taxi and he was forcibly made to sit inside the Gypsy. It was alleged that thereafter he was taken outside the Police Station to an isolated place near the Airport in a private vehicle, where the police personnel allegedly took away the 600 grams of gold being carried by him. He stated that he subsequently came to know the names of the alleged police personnel as HC Robin Singh and HC Gaurav Kumar (the applicant), both posted at IGI Airport Police Station.
Similarly, Sh. Saikh Khadar Bashi stated that on the same intervening night, he had arrived at Terminal-3 of IGI Airport, Delhi, at about 04:45 hours from Dubai by Flight No. AI-996 and was carrying approximately 400 grams of gold, which had allegedly been handed over to him by one Sh. Anil, a native of Rajasthan, for delivery to one Sh. Mohd. Arif at Mahipalpur, New Delhi.
It was alleged that after his arrival, he took a taxi from Terminal-3 in which two other passengers were also travelling. According to his statement, one police personnel subsequently entered the taxi and, when the taxi reached the T-3 Exit Ramp, a police Gypsy carrying another police personnel stopped the taxi. It was alleged that the police personnel took him out of the taxi and drove him to an isolated place near the Airport, where the 400 grams of gold allegedly being carried by him was forcibly taken away.
He also stated that he came to know the names of the alleged police personnel as HC Robin Singh and HC Gaurav Kumar (the applicant), both posted at IGI Airport Police Station.
Statements of both the aforesaid complainants were recorded. On the basis thereof, FIR No. 586/2022 dated 24.12.2022 was registered against HC Robin Singh and the applicant initially under Sections 384/427/34 IPC, and investigation was taken up. During the course of investigation, Sections 365/392 IPC and Sections 7/13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were also added. Both the Head Constables were arrested on 25.12.2022.
In view of their involvement in the aforesaid criminal case, the applicant and HC Robin Singh were placed under suspension vide order No. 4305-4405/HAP(P-I)/IGIA dated 25.12.2022, with effect from 25.12.2022, i.e. the date of their arrest.
A preliminary enquiry was thereafter conducted by the ACP/PG Cell/IGI Airport pursuant to order No. 4513/HAP/IGIA (P-I) dated 26.12.2022. In his report, the Enquiry Officer recorded a prima facie finding that the allegations against HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A and HC Robin Singh, No. 377/A, regarding extortion and serious misconduct stood established and that the matter warranted stringent departmental action.
On the basis of the aforesaid preliminary enquiry report, the competent authority, invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, dismissed the applicant and HC Robin Singh from service with immediate effect vide order No. 4769-4920/HAP(P-I)/IGIA dated 30.12.2022. The period of suspension from 25.12.2022 to 30.12.2022 was also treated as a period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes. In the meantime, the applicant's wife, Ms. Ruby, submitted an application addressed to the Joint Commissioner of Police, Transport Range, Delhi, seeking relaxation of time for filing an appeal against the order of dismissal on the ground that the applicant was in judicial custody and, therefore, was unable to prefer an appeal. Her request was considered by the then Joint Commissioner of Police, Transport Range, and she was informed vide letter No. 2946/HAP(IGIA)(P-I) dated 02.06.2023 that the matter would be examined in accordance with the rules as and when the applicant filed an appeal against the punishment of dismissal.
Aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 30.12.2022, the applicant preferred an appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Police, Transport Range, New Delhi. The said appeal, however, came to be rejected vide order No. 1736-37/SO Br./Joint CP/Transport Range dated 28.08.2024. A copy of the appellate order was served upon the applicant on 10.09.2024 against proper receipt.
It is against the aforesaid orders, particularly the order of dismissal dated 30.12.2022 and the appellate order dated 28.08.2024, that the applicant has approached this Tribunal by way of the present Original Application.
Keeping in view of the fact of the case and overall implication of such misconduct within a disciplined force and sensitivity of the matter, the then DCP/SHD dismissed the applicant from Delhi Police under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India with immediate effect. His suspension period from 11.03.2023 to the date of issue of this order was also decided as period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes and the same will not be regularized in any manner. The applicant filed an appeal which was considered and rejected by the appellate authority vide order No. 3202-06/SO/ER (AC-II), dated 19.09.2024.
The respondents further state that the applicant has rightly been dismissed from service under article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India without subjecting him to the departmental inquiry as the disciplinary authority was personally satisfied that conducting a regular DE against the applicant was not practicably possible as the appellant was absconding till 03.05.2023 and since then he was in judicial custody which imply there was physical or legal impediment to the holding of a departmental enquiry as observed by Delhi High Court in the matter of R. K. Misra Vs. General Manager, Northern Railway, ILR 1977 Delhi 424, 1977 LablC 643, para 9 that impracticability in holding the enquiry must, therefore, imply some physical or legal impediment to the holding of an enquiry. While it is not possible to put the expressions in the straitjacket of a judicially evolved definition or to exhaustively enumerate such circumstance, broadly, such a situation may arise where it is not possible to enforce the attendance of the delinquent. As such a preliminary enquiry was ordered against the applicant under rule of 15 (1) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 and the reason recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry is clear and justified. After completion of Preliminary Enquiry into the matter, in compliance of the circular issued from PHQ into the matter vide No. 5545-645/P. Cell (Vig.), dated 11.09.2007, the enquiry report was forwarded to Spl. C.P./L&O (North), Delhi for seeking his concurrence to dismiss the applicant under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and same was approved by the competent authority.
The respondents further state that the purpose of the preliminary enquiry is not hold anyone guilty. Purpose is to decide whether further action is called for or not. This preliminary enquiry is in the nature of fact-finding enquiry as observed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the matter of Mr. S. D. Luthra Vs. Chairman and Managing Director, 2005(1) SLJ, 451 Delhi. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while referring in general to preliminary enquiry observed in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah Vs. UOI, A.I.R 1964 S.C 1854 that "in short a preliminary is for the purpose of collection of fact in regard to the conduct and work of a government servant in which he may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for inflicting 1 of the three major punishments mentioned therein.
The respondents also state that the appeal (Annexure-A/3) of the applicant was rejected by the Appellate Authority after due perusal and finding no ground to interfere in the punishment awarded to the applicant by the Disciplinary Authority, vide order No. 3202- 06/S0/ER(AC-II), dated 19.09.2024. Moreover, the applicant took plea that he has been falsely implicated in above said FIR, has no weight as the said case is sub-judice in the appropriate court of law and the applicant has yet not been acquitted by the court, he only just granted bail in this case.
The Disciplinary Authority while issuing punishment order dated 30.12.2022 (Annexure-A/1) has invoked the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismissed the applicant from service. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of the disciplinary order is as follows:-
“On 24/12/2022, two persons, namely Sh. Salaudeen Kathat S/o Sh. Mainudeen R/o Vill. Nanana, PS Shendhana, District Pali, Rajasthan and Sh. Saikh Khadar Başhi S/o Sh. Saikh Shahinsha Vall R/o 1-2-158, Shashahab Street, Karim Nagar, Telangana came to the IGI Airport Police Station. Sh.
Salaudeen Kathat stated that on the intervening night of 19-20/12/2022, he arrived at IGI Airport at 02.55 Hrs from Muscat via flight No. AI-973 and he was carrying 600 grams of Gold with him which was handed over to him by one Sh. Sikander in Muscat, with the direction to deliver it to a person who would further deliver the same to the residence of one Ramswaroop in Rajasthan. After clearing the immigration, he crossed the Green channel (Custom Clearance) without being checked. After coming out from the Terminal he took a taxi and when the taxi reached the T-3 exit Ramp, a police gypsy in which 02 police personnel were sitting stopped the taxi and forced him to sit inside the gypsy. After that, they took him outside the Police Station and forcefully took him to an isolated place near the Airport in a private car and extorted the 600 gm. of gold that he was carrying. He came to know the names of alleged.police personnel as HC Robin Singh and HC Gaurav Kumar, both posted in IGI Airport police station.
Similarly Sh. Saikh Khadar Bashi S/o Saikh Shahinsha Vali R/o 1-2-158, Shashahab Street Karim Nagar, Telangana stated that on same night i.e. intervening night of 19-20/12/2022, he arrived at Terminal 3 of IGI airport Delhi at 04.45 Hrs from Dubai via flight No. AI-996. He was carrying 400 grm of gold with him which was handed over to him by one Sh. Anil, native of Rajasthan who was working with him in Dubai. He was supposed to hand over the gold to one Sh. Mohd. Arif s/o Sh. Ajeez Khan R/o Village Saharaniabat, Distt. Nagaur, Rajasthan in Mahipalpur, New Delhi. He took a taxi from T-3 on arrival in which two other passengers were also sitting. Meanwhile, one police person came and sat in his taxi. When the taxi reached the T-3 exit ramp one police gypsy in which 01 police person was sitting, stopped the taxi and both the police person took him out from the taxi and drove the vehicle to an isolated place near the Airport and forcibly took away the 400 gm gold which he was carrying. He came to know the names of alleged police personnel as HC Robin Singh and HC Gaurav Kumar, both posted in IGI Airport police station.
Statements of both the complainants were recorded. Subsequently, as per their statements a case vide FIR No. 586/22 Dated 24/12/2022 U/s 384/427/34 IPC was registered against HC Robin Singh No. 377/A, PIS no. 28070591 and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A, PIS No. 28092272 and investigation was taken up. During Investigation both the Head Constables were arrested on 25.12.2022. Section 365/392 IPC and Section 7/13.1(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act have been added during investigation.
Being involved in the above case, HC Robin Singh No. 377/A) and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A were placed under suspension vide order No. 4305-4405/HAP(P-1)/IGIA dated 25.12.2022 w.e.f. 25.12.2022 i.e. the date of their arrest in the case.
In this regard, a preliminary enquiry has been conducted by ACP/PG Cell/IGIA vide order No. 4513/HAP/IGIA (P-I) dated 26.12.2022. In his report ACP/PG/IGI Airport has concluded that it has been prima facially established that the alleged police personnel i.e. HC Robin Singh No. 377/A and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A had committed a grave offence amounting to a serious misconduct and the same has to be dealt with stringent departmental action against them.
Policing demands utmost level of integrity, probity and upright public Image from a Police officer. A spotless conduct is of paramount importance for all police officers. In the given case the allegations in the FIR are of serious nature.
The act committed by HC Robin Singh No. 377/A and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A has not only tarnished the image and brought disgrace to the organization but also demoralized other police personnel. The misconduct committed by the above said defaulters has put the entire police force to shame. Such misconduct cannot be tolerated in any disciplined organization like Delhi Police whose basic duty is to protect the life and property of the citizens of the society.
The facts and the circumstances of the case are so serious that it will not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry against the defaulters as there is a reasonable belief that the witnesses may not come forward to depose against them owing to their influential positions. It also calls for great courage to depose against the desperate persons and the task becomes more acute and difficult where the police personnel could use their job to influence the statements of the witnesses. It is highly probable that during the entire process of departmental proceedings the complainant and witnesses would be put under constant fear or threat to their person and property from the defaulters. Under these circumstances I am personally satisfied that conducting a regular DE against the defaulters is not practicably possible.
After having committed above gravest misconduct, if the above named police officials are allowed to continue in the police force, it would be detrimental to public interest and further tarnish the image of police force in society. Therefore, in order to send a clear message to such undesirable elements in the police force and to maintain discipline as well as to prevent recurrence of such incidents, it has become absolutely necessary to dismiss HC Robin Singh No. 377/A (PIS No. 28070591) and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A (PIS No. 28092272) from service as they are completely unfit to continue further in police service.
Whereas, in the back drop of the position explained in the foregoing paragraphs of this order, it is crystal clear that HC Robin Singh No. 377/A(PIS No. 28070591) and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A (PIS No. 28092272) are persons with criminal bent of mind. Hence, under these set of compelling circumstances, I am constrained to take action under the provision of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India in this case for the sake of justice. On the basis of gravity of case, it can be safely concluded that both the Head Constables have become a liability to the police department and needs to be dealt with heavy hand. Moreover, their further retention in the department after their involvement/arrest in the above mentioned case is absolutely undesirable in the public interest, safety and security.
Keeping in view of the fact of the case and overall implication of such a misconduct within a disciplined force and sensitivity of the matter, I, Ravi Kumar Singh, IPS, Dy. Commissioner of Police, IGI Airport, Delhi hereby DISMISS HC Robin Singh No. 377/A (PIS No. 28070591) and HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A (PIS No. 28092272) from Delhi Police under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India with immediate effect.
They are not in possession of Govt. accommodation. They will deposit all the Govt. belongings i.e. Identity Card, Appointment Card, CGHS Cards, General Store and Clothing store articles etc. to the concerned authority at once.
Descriptive particulars of HC Gaurav Kumar, No. 299/A
S. No. Particulars 1. Name 2. Rank & Belt No. 3. PIS No. 4. Father's name 5. Caste 6. Date of Birth 7. Date of appointment 07.04.2009 8. Height 9. Identification Mark 10. Permanent Address 11. Present Address Descriptive particulars of HC Robin Singh, No. 377/A
S. No. Particulars 1. Name 2. Rank & Belt No. 3. PIS No. 4. Father's name 5. Caste 6. Date of Birth 7. Date of appointment 11.06.2007 8. Height 9. Identification Mark 10. Permanent Address 11. Present Address Their suspension period from 25.12.2022 to the date of issue of this order is hereby decided as period not spent on duty for all intents and purposes.”
We have perused the pleadings available on record and considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the Orders/Judgments referred to and relied upon by the learned counsels for the respective parties carefully.
The learned counsel for the respondents pleaded that the respondents have given detailed justification of invocation of the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in their Disciplinary order and Appellate order. They repeatedly stated that further continuation of the applicant in disciplined force like Delhi Police which is responsible for protecting the society and citizens of the country from immoral and disrespectable activities will rudely shake the faith of the citizens in Delhi Police Force. The applicant has acted in a manner which is highly unbecoming of a Police Officer. Therefore, keeping in view the position in the matter, the respondents have resorted to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismissed the applicant from the government service.
The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have come to the decision on the presumption that alleged offence has been committed by the applicant, so there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry, these reasons cannot stand to the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. It needs to be tested whether the reasons recorded in the impugned order for imposition of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are justifiable or invoked only to avoid the disciplinary enquiry and get rid of the applicant in convenient manner. The Disciplinary Authority did not mention the reasonable grounds even when Preliminary Enquiry was ordered against the applicant. It could be seen from the appellate order that Appellate Authority had rejected the appeal in a mechanical manner without addressing specific submissions of the applicant and merely on presumptions that the allegation against the applicant is presumed to be proved and the witness might not have come forward to depose against the applicant. The Appellate Authority is simply assuming that the allegations against the applicant stands proved and this justification is good enough to invoke the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and dismiss the applicant. The Appellate Authority did not explore, in the present case, that majority of the witnesses are official witnesses. If preliminary enquiry is possible, then the departmental enquiry is also possible. Similarly, if the trial is possible then the departmental enquiry is also possible. However, both Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority did not make any efforts to conduct departmental enquiry and resorted to invocation of provision of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India to impose the penalty of dismissal. This could be construed as strong bias of respondents towards the applicant and their disdain approach to uphold Rule of Law. The respondents being senior police officer holding high position are required to run the administrative decision making lawfully. Earlier also while deciding other matters we have pointed out that a serious course correction is needed in the respondent Department while handling such cases and it is for their betterment if they take effective steps in that direction. We need not further ponder upon this point and leave it here.
In the recent matter decided on 14.08.2024 by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No.11276/2024 and CM Appl. 46705/2024. CM Appl. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs OM Prakash & anr., wherein the Commissioner of Police has been directed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi to look into the matters where Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked by the police authorities and police personnel have been removed from the service. Only on presumptions and assumptions without any material, coming to the conclusion or that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct regular departmental enquiry as witness might not come forward to decide the case and Appellate Authority depose against a police officer respondents have rejected the appeal which could be construed as bad in law.
It is apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has assumed as if the allegations made in criminal case (FIR) already stand proved and thus with this presumptions, the present impugned order has been issued. Once the order of Disciplinary Authority is based on assumption as if the allegations made against the applicant already stand proved that too on the content of FIR, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of Disciplinary Authority as the same being bad in law and being based on assumptions, suspicion and surmises. Further, the Disciplinary Authority is assuming that the offence has been committed by the applicant and under this assumption, the present order of Disciplinary Authority is being passed invoking Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. There are circulars, judgment of judicial forums which clearly state that if the allegations are grave then more opportunity should be provided to the delinquent official to put forward his defense. The applicant has not been subjected to a departmental enquiry and merely on assumptions the disciplinary authority adopting a short cut and has invoked the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority is based on suspicion and surmises. There is no occasion for the disciplinary authority to record that in the present case departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable. The usage of expression like “as there is a reasonable belief” itself shows that the reasoning is based on suspicion and surmises. The reasoning recorded by Disciplinary Authority for dispensing away the departmental enquiry has been dealt by this Tribunal in various OAs qua the same department i.e. Delhi Police. It is observed that most of witnesses are official witness in criminal case; once the criminal trial and preliminary enquiry are possible, then departmental enquiry is also possible. There is no material in the hand of Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order which could even suggest that witness or complainant will not come in departmental enquiry. There is no clear and robust evidence in front of respondent authority that the applicant has made any attempt to influence any witness thus making the order of disciplinary authority as bad in law.
The applicant is Constable in Delhi Police. It is a lower rank among the subordinate officer, thus, it is absolutely wrong to record that applicant is in a position to influence or threaten any witness. There is no admissible material or evidence before the authorities to conclude that any witness is threatened or intimidated or will not depose in departmental enquiry and thus reason recorded for dispensing the Departmental Enquiry under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India are not tenable. As stated above, the applicant is only Constable in Delhi Police, if as per the allegations, the case of the department is so good on merit then come what may the applicant should be given a chance to put forward his defense in disciplinary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondents in order to construe that the allegations are true against the applicant that too at the back of the applicant. This fact clearly shows that Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been adopted as a convenient tool to dismiss the applicant method in the present case. There is no material in hand of Disciplinary Authority while passing the impugned order which could even suggest that witness or complainant will not come in the Departmental Enquiry. The impugned order is passed with the presumption that the allegations are proved against the applicant. In such a situation, Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked on the same as it amounts to abuse of process of law.
In the public interest and even as per Rule of law, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities not to put to use Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India in present case and to give opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence in the departmental enquiry. The gravity of misconduct alleged in the present case cannot be a ground to invoke the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The applicant as per rule of law must be given opportunity to put forward his defence in regular Departmental Enquiry until and unless the same is not reasonably practical. The reasons recorded in present impugned order to dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry are just not tenable in the eyes of law. Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been used as a short cut method. It is not known as to why DE which was ordered in this case was not conducted and respondents suddenly decided to invoke provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
The reasoning to dispense away with the departmental enquiry cannot be based on suspicion and surmises and probability. Once the Disciplinary Authority records that there is a probability that complainant and witness are put on constant fear and threat as a reason to dispense away with departmental enquiry, the onus to establish that such situation prevails is based on the efforts made by them to conduct departmental enquiry and imminent failure to hold the said departmental enquiry due to such actions of the applicant. Therefore, on the one hand taking no action to conduct disciplinary enquiry and while on the other citing the imaginary reasons of giving threat to witnesses etc., are the reasoning based on mere probability, suspicion and surmises and cannot be attached any credence. No material is placed before the authority to come to the conclusions that Departmental Enquiry is not possible and invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is the only solution available to the respondents.
It is also observed that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked subsequent to a preliminary enquiry. The object of conducting the preliminary enquiry for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is being laid down in circular dated 11.09.2007. The cases in which preliminary enquiry is being conducted but in absolute violation of circular dated 11.09.2007 and straightaway the Disciplinary Authority passed an order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is in violation of circular dated 11.9.2007 which was framed by department in pursuance of judgment of Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Suresh Kumar Vs. GNCTD in O.A. No. 2500/2006.
The decision of the Disciplinary Authority dispensing away with the Departmental Enquiry is bad in law. As also stated above, the Disciplinary Authority did not even make the slightest possible effort to initiate a departmental inquiry as only after initiating a departmental inquiry a Disciplinary Authority can come to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not reasonably practicable. Without making any efforts and only acting on the presumption and surmises, the Disciplinary Authority on its own, came to the conclusion that departmental inquiry is not practicable. No order for initiating the Departmental Enquiry was made by the department thus it is wrong to say that the present Departmental Enquiry is not reasonably practicable.
The Disciplinary Authority is not able to apply its mind that the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has to be exercised with a pre-condition. The pre-condition is that if a disciplinary enquiry is not reasonably practical and to arrive at such conclusions, the Disciplinary Authority has to record reasons. The present reasoning is based on the assumption that the applicant has committed the alleged crime and thus departmental enquiry is not required. The Disciplinary Authority on the presumption that the act committed by the applicant is so grave that it is practically not feasible to conduct enquiry, hence, came to conclusion that there is no need to conduct the departmental enquiry the scrutiny of law for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The law on the subject is that graver are the allegation then more opportunity should be provided to the delinquent official to submit the defence. The gravity of the charge will never be an imminent factor in deciding whether power under Art 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India is to be invoked or not.
The present case is a case of absolute misuse of power vested in the Disciplinary Authority under Article 311 (2) (b) of Constitution of India and hence bad in law. The reasons recorded by the authorities to dispense away with the departmental enquiry do not withstand the scrutiny of law. The so called reasons recorded by the authorities in the impugned order to invoke the power under the Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India as being mentioned are only to avoid the departmental enquiry. It is a well settled law that without conducting any departmental enquiry, if the finding of guilt against the applicant has been arrived on to, the same act is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority. There is a finding of guilt against the applicant without conducting the Departmental Enquiry and further the disciplinary authority has come to such conclusions without even giving the opportunity to the applicant to put forward his defence, hence, the same is enough to vitiate the order of the disciplinary authority. The authorities failed to consider that no substantial material has been collected to come to the conclusion that witness will be discouraged to appear in a D.E. Thus the order of the authorities establishes non-application of mind, bias, arbitrariness and to adopt a short cut method of dismissing the applicant by invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India only keeping in mind the gravity of the allegations.
The applicant preferred an appeal (Annexure-A/3) against the punishment order of dismissal dated 26.05.2023 (Annexure-A/1). The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal on 19.09.2024 (Annexure-A/2). The present case is not a case for invoking the power under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex court has laid down clearly that the gravity of the charge will not be a tilting factor in deciding whether a Departmental Enquiry is a reasonably practicable or not. The graver the charge the opportunity to defend him should be more.
We place reliance on the following judgements/orders:-
Order dated 13.12.2023 passed by this Tribunal in the case of Dushyant Kumar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. The relevant portion of the same is reproduced below:-
“8.A catena of cases of the Orders/Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and of this Tribunal on the issue as involved in the present case were also considered by the Division Bench (consisting one of us) while deciding the case of Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra).
9.Having regard to the above, we have carefully perused the impugned order(s), we find that nothing has been recorded in the impugned order(s) or shown to us that the applicant had ever threatened or harassed any of the witness (es) and/or the prospective witness (es). From the impugned orders, it is also evident that neither any effort was made by them to conduct an enquiry, nor there is any evidence that despite their best efforts, the respondents would not have been able to produce the witness (es) to lead evidence against the applicant. Further 18 OA No.1019/2023 nothing is brought on record that witness (es) has/have been threatened by the applicant or they were too scared of the applicant to come forward in the regular enquiry proceedings. It is also found that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order has very casually come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to conduct the departmental enquiry against the applicant, as no reason at all has been recorded in this regard and the applicant is guilty of committing grave misconduct and was involved in the aforesaid offences.
10.Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned orders passed by the respondents are not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circular dated 11.9.2007. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Courts and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, including in one referred to hereinabove.
11.In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA is squarely covered by the common 19 OA No.1019/2023 Order/Judgment dated 10.2.2022 in Ct. Sumit Sharma (supra) and a batch of cases. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be partly allowed and hence, the same is partly allowed with the following directions:- (i) Orders dated 03.10.2022 (Annexure A/1) and dated 10.3.2023 (Annexure A/2) passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively are set aside; (ii) The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and law on the subject; (iii) The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order; and (iv) However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
12.However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.”
The order of this Tribunal was challenged in the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 2407/2024 in the matter of Govt. of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Dushyant Kumar, The Hon’ble High of Delhi dismissed the Writ Petition being meritless. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as under:-
“14.In the light of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in concurring with the Tribunal that the petitioners' decision to dispense with the enquiry was wholly unsustainable. The petitioners appear to have proceeded on an erroneous presumption that merely because a criminal case has been registered against the respondent, he was to be treated as guilty of the misconduct. No doubt, the respondent is a police officer, whose misconduct can never be condoned, but this would not imply that the principles of natural justice should be given a complete go by. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have not given any valid reason for dispensing with the enquiry except for repeatedly stating that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. This course of action, in our view, is completely impermissible.
15.Before we conclude, we may also consider the decision in Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) relied upon by the petitioners. We, however, find that instead of forwarding the case of the petitioners, the said decision supports the case of the respondent. It would, therefore, be apposite to refer to paragraph no.44 of the said decision, which reads as under:-
"44.We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre- decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Even before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge [(1723) 1 Str 557:93 ER 698].) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated:" „To do a great right‟ after all, it is permissible sometimes „to do a little wrong‟." [Per Mukharji, C. J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential"."
16.We are, therefore, of the considered view that the petitioners have not only ignored the decisions of the Apex Court laying down the parameters for applicability of Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution of India, but have also ignored their own circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007. We, therefore, find no infirmity with the impugned order.
17.The writ petition being meritless is, accordingly, dismissed with all pending applications.”
In the order dated 16.04.2024 passed in OA Nos. 542/2023 & 591/2023 in the case of Deepak vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors by this Tribunal. The Tribunal held as under:-
“20.In the present case, as apparent from the reasons recorded by the respondents in the impugned order, it is apparent that the respondents have arrived at the conclusion for dispensing with the regular inquiry due to the involvement of the applicants in a grave and serious case. The respondents have jumped to the conclusion that on account of serious allegations, the applicants have become ineligible to be continued in police force. There is no finding that the 24 applicants and/or anybody on their behalf have at any point of time even attempted to influence or coerce any of the witness. Even there is no finding that the applicants in the captioned OAs who are very junior officers under the respondents were in a position to influence the witnesses who are generally senior officials working in the Government of India and particularly in CBI. It is also nowhere recorded by the respondents as to how if not only preliminary inquiry was found possible, but also the criminal trial is possible in the said case FIR with the support of more than nineteen witnesses and at no point of time the prosecution has even felt that those witnesses are not likely to turn up and regular inquiry was not possible in the matter. It is undisputed that regular inquiry is a Rule whereas dispensing with the same is only an exception. Though the respondents have recorded that if regular inquiry is initiated, the same is liable to take a long time, however, no reason has been given for the same and it is apparent that such reasoning and finding is based on surmises and conjectures.
21.In view of the aforesaid, we find that the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the OAs are allowed with the following order(s) :- (i) impugned orders dated 10.08.2022 and 25.01.2023 are set aside. The applicants shall be reinstated in service forthwith. (ii) the applicants shall be entitled for all consequential benefits in accordance with relevant rules and instructions on the subject. (iii) the aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the respondents as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (iv) the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicants if they are so advised, of course in accordance with rules and instructions on the subject. 22. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.”
In Writ Petition (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM App. No. 4759/2023 in the case of Commissioner of Police Delhi Police & Ors. Vs. Manjeet; The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi vide its judgement dated 22.04.2024 has held as under: -
“9.A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was that due to seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed by him it would not be reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental enquiry. It also emerges that on the basis of the allegations levelled against the respondent in the FIR coupled with the findings of the preliminary enquiry, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of a serious offence and therefore deserve to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The petitioners have sought to dispense with the enquiry in such a casual manner and that too only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, an enquiry against him was likely to be difficult on account of his influence. This course of action is clearly violative of Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
10.We have also considered the decision in Dushyant Kumar (Supra) and find that in the said case, this Court had rejected a similar challenge by the petitioners to the Tribunal's quashing of a dismissal order passed after dispensing with the enquiry. In fact, this Court after considering the circulars dated 21.12.1993 and 11.09.2007 issued by the petitioners themselves, observed that despite there being a requirement to record cogent reasons to dispense with the enquiry, the petitioners were passing cryptic orders dispensing with the enquiry in the most mechanical manner.
11.No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, with an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent's guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry. Furthermore, it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him, as the learned Tribunal has already granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12.For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all applications.
13.Before we conclude, we are constrained to observe that in a large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed by the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner, Delhi Police to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons.”
In other Writ Petition (C) No.4201/2024 on 20.03.2024 in case of Commissioner of Police and Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has held as under:-
“10.From a perusal of the aforesaid, we find that the petitioners have proceeded to dispense with the enquiry against the respondent only because of the grave nature of allegations levelled against him and have simply observed that since the respondent had lowered the image of the police department and goodwill of a uniformed organisation, an exemplary punishment of dismissal ought to be imposed upon him so as to send a clear message to undesirable persons and to prevent reoccurrence of such crimes. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to differ with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal that the dismissal order passed by the petitioners did not contain any justifiable reason whatsoever for dispensing with the enquiry. What clearly emerges is that the petitioners have proceeded on the premise that such police officers, who are charged with serious misconduct, should be immediately dismissed from service. This approach, in our view to dispense with an enquiry, would not meet the parameters laid down under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India.
11.At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that merely because the respondent was a police personnel, would not entitle the petitioners to give a complete go-bye to the requirement of holding a departmental enquiry against him without recording any justifiable reasons as to why departmental enquiry could not be held against him.
12.For the aforesaid reasons, we find no infirmity with the impugned order. The writ petition, being meritless, is along with accompanying application, dismissed.”
In the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11681/2024 filed by the Commissioner of Police & Anr. Vs. Jagmal Singh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its judgment on 10.07.2024 has dismissed the said SLP and the judgment of Hon’ble Court of Delhi attained finality.
In another matter, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 5562/2024, CAV 181 /2024 CM Appl. 22929/2024 vide its judgment dated 23.04.2024 in the case of Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sant Ram, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in paras 9 to 12 has held as under:-
“9.A bare perusal of the aforesaid reasons contained in the dismissal order makes it clear that the primary reason for the petitioners not holding any enquiry against the respondent was their presumption that the respondent would threaten or intimidate the complainant and other witnesses. The petitioners were further of the view that a prolonged enquiry would cause more trauma to the complainant. It is also evident from the dismissal order that the petitioners had, on the basis of the evidence led in the preliminary enquiry, already made up their mind that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and had lowered the image of the police force in the eyes of the public.
10.In our considered view, even though the charges against the respondent are very serious and the interest of the complainant deserves to be protected, it does not imply that the principles of natural justice as also the provisions of section 11 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 should be given a complete go by on the basis of mere presumptions. Only because the respondent is a police personnel, would in our view, not be a ground either to presume that the witnesses will not come forward to depose against him in a regular enquiry or to hold him guilty without conducting the statutorily prescribed departmental enquiry and that too in a matter like the present where the complainant and the witnesses are also police personnel. In fact, what emerges is that on the basis of the report of the preliminary enquiry itself, the petitioners presumed that the respondent was guilty of serious misconduct and therefore deserved to be dismissed at the earliest. This in our considered view, as has been rightly held by the learned Tribunal, could not be treated as a ground to reach a conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the respondent. This course of action, in our considered opinion, was clearly violative of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
11.No doubt, the respondent is a police personnel and any misconduct on his part is liable to be dealt with appropriately. This, however, does not imply that the petitioners could, on the basis of the gravity of the charges levelled against him, dispense with the requirement of an enquiry on absolutely vague grounds. As noted hereinabove, the petitioners have given no reason whatsoever in the impugned order for dispensing with the inquiry. The impugned order of dismissal proceeds on the basis that the respondent’s guilt had already been proved in the preliminary enquiry and had also been admitted by him. We therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Tribunal that the petitioners have dispensed with the enquiry only on the basis of a perceived notion that the respondent being a police personnel, would threaten the witnesses and holding of an enquiry would cause trauma to the complainant. Furthermore, we find that it is not as if the respondent has been let off without any departmental action being taken against him. As is evident from the impugned order, the learned Tribunal, while setting aside the dismissal order, has granted time to the petitioners to initiate departmental proceedings against him as per law.
12.For the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition being meritless is dismissed along with all accompanying applications.
In pursuance to the order of this Tribunal in OA No. 14/2018 titled as Sant Ram vs. Commissioner of Police and the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) 5562/2024, CAV 181/2024 CM Appl. No. 22929/2024, the respondents reinstated the services of the applicant Shri Sant Ram in that case. The order dated 26.07.2024 is reproduced as under:-
“In pursuance of judgment dated 06.02.2024 passed by the Principal Bench of Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) & Hon'ble Mr. Sanjeeva Kumar, Member (A), Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in O.A. No.14/2018 titled Sant Ram Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. and judgment dated 23.04.2024 passed by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Rekha Palli & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, High Court Delhi in W.P.(C) No.5562/2024, CAV 181/2024, CM Appl. 22929/2024 – Stay, CM Appl. 22930/2024 - Ex./LLOD titled Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sant Ram as well as opinion of Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Ld. Addl. Solicitor General of India that “this is not a fit case for filing of SLP", the order of the disciplinary authority passed vide No.1833-1900/HAP/PTC (P-II) dated 01.08.2017 vide which Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324PTC (PIS No. 28060573) was dismissed from the Delhi Police force under Article311(2) (b) of Constitution of India deciding his suspension period as period not spent on duty and the order passed by the Appellate Authority vide No. 106-66/SO/Jt. C.P/Trg, dated 03.11.2017 rejecting his appeal, are set aside. Accordingly, Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No. 324/PTC (PIS No.28060573) is hereby re-instated in service from dismissal with immediate effect without prejudice to the further departmental action to be taken against him in accordance with the law.
He is deemed to be under suspension from the date of his dismissal as he had already been placed under suspension vide D.D.No.29-A/PTC/JK dated 22.07.2017 and formal issued vide order No.1738-70/HAP/PTC (DA-II) dated 26.07.2017. His dismissal/suspension period will be decided later on.
Let Const. (Exe.) Sant Ram, No.324/PTC (PIS No. 28060573) be informed accordingly.
In other judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet, the following circular was issued by the Office of Commissioner of Police as under:-
“No. 174/C/HC/24 5110-60 DA-III/Court Cell/PHQ dated 13.05.2024
To The Deputy Commissioner of Police, All District including Units, New Delhi.
Sub: W.P. (C) No. 1258/2023 & CM Appl. No. 4759/2023 in the matter of Commissioner of Police, Delhi vs. Manjeet.
Memo
Enclosed please find here with a copy of letter No. 10264/W/DHC/ Writs/D-9/2023 dated 26.04.2024 received from the Registrar General, Delhi High Court along with copy of the order dated 22.04.2024 wherein the Hon’ble has observed that “ in large number of petitions filed by the Commissioner of Police which are coming up before the this Court, we are finding termination orders are being passed b y the petitioners by dispensing with departmental enquiries in a most mechanical manner without recording any valid reasons. We, therefore, direct that a copy of this order be placed before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to ensure that in future, enquiries are not dispensed with without assigning justifiable reasons.
It is, therefore, requested that the aforementioned directions of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi shall be taken into consideration before passing termination orders by dispensing with the departmental enquiries in future.
This issues with the approval of Commissioner of Police, Delhi.
(Hareesh H.P) Deputy Commissioner of Police Legal Division/ PHQ, Delhi”
Relying upon the circular issued on 11.09.2007, a similar order was passed by the respondents in the OA No. 1088/2021 as under:-
“The respondents, after considering the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) and the Order(s)/Judgment(s) passed by this Tribunal have issued another circular dated 11.09.2007 (Annexure A/13 of the rejoinder filed in OA 467/2020). In the said circular, they have emphasized that the disciplinary authority should pass a speaking order(s) based and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior inquiry and before passing such order(s), the disciplinary authority should be satisfied that it is not practicable to hold an inquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and the disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. The said circular dated 11.09.2007 reads as under:-
“CIRCULAR No. 5545-645/P. Cell/Vig. Dated 11.09.2007
An analysis has been done by PHQ in 38 cases pertaining to the period between 1.1.2000 to 31.12.05 where action under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India was taken against the defaulters. The analysis shows that out of the 38 cases, the action of the department has been upheld by CAT only in two cases and out of these two cases and only one case action was upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and most of these cases have been remanded back in the Department by the Tribunal for initiating departmental inquiry.
Though some cases are still pending in the Hon’ble High Court for decision, in a majority of cases, Disciplinary Authorities have resorted to Article 311 (2) (b) on assumptions and conjectures. No speaking orders were passed based on and supported by material/facts on record for dispensing with prior enquiry. Orders for dismissal were passed arbitrarily violating Article 311 and the principles of natural justice.
Henceforth, it has been decided that whenever any Disciplinary Authority intends to invoke Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, he must keep in mind the judgment in the case of UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416. Only in cases where Disciplinary Authority is personally satisfied on the basis of material available on file that the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation, affiliation with criminals etc. and keeping in view of specific circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has no option but to resort to Article 311 (2) (b) should such an action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be conducted and it is essential to bring on record all such facts. It has also been decided that before passing on order under Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India, Disciplinary Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.
This has the approval of C.P., Delhi.
Sd/-(S.N. SRIVASTAVA) JT. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: HDQRS,: DELHI””
The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in WP (C ) No. 11276/2024 and CM Appl. No. 46705/2024, CM Appl. No. 46706/2024 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash & Anr. decided on 14.08.2024 has taken a serious cognizance of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority resorting to invocation of Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India. For facility of reference, the relevant portion of above-mentioned judgment is as follow:-
“20.Accordingly, finding no error in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, the present petition is dismissed.
21.Before parting with this matter, we hereby direct the Commission of Police Delhi to personally look into such matters and take proper decision so that Courts/Tribunals are not burdened with a case where departmental inquiries can be initiated. We hereby make it clear that if such like petitions are filed in future wherein dismissal or suspension orders are passed without holding any enquiry without any plausible reasoning, certainly heavy cost will be imposed and that too, will be recovered from the Officer, who takes such type of unwarranted decision.
22.A copy of this order be transmitted to the Commissioner of Delhi Police for information and compliance.”
We would like to observe that the Disciplinary Authority while passing order dated 26.05.2023 (Annexure-A/1), as quoted in para 16 supra, has mentioned the caste of the applicant which has no connection/relevance with the misconduct for which he has been allegedly held accountable. This clearly shows mere aping the old and archaic way of working without reforming the way the organisation work. We would like to point out with stress that India, that is Bharat, has resolved to become a developed nation by 2047, marking the centenary of its Independence. To truly realize this vision, it is imperative that we eradicate the deeply entrenched caste system from our society. A nation's development is best measured not just by economic growth, but by two fundamental benchmarks: the effective implementation of the rule of law and the realization of an egalitarian society. If we are sincere in our commitment to becoming a truly developed nation by 2047, the annihilation of such tendencies, belief and practices must be a central part of our national agenda. Respondents as important functionaries of the government need to pay heed and update their archaic regulations, forms and practices to reform their administration in ever changing time.
Recently, in its judgment dated 16.9.2025, while adjudicating the issue in Application u/s 482 No. - 31545 of 2024, titled Praveen Chetri Versus State of U. P. and Another, the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has elaborately delved upon the issue of usage of caste/sub caste while conducting official business. For facility of reference, it would be appropriate to quote relevant paras of the judgment supra which are as follows: -
“23.This historical experience teaches us an essential lesson: the mere existence of law does not guarantee justice. Procedural codes, however well-structured, can fail to serve the people if they are not grounded in principles of JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and the integrity of the Nation.
24.Therefore, in the contemporary Indian judicial landscape, the pursuit of justice demands a holistic appreciation of the entire judicial framework rather than mere adherence to codified law and the law propounded through judgments. Structural judicial reform is urgently needed- reform that prioritizes justice not only in theory but in alignment with the rule of law, ensuring that the law and government policies serve WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, not the other way around.
25.Caste in India is not merely a system of social stratification - it isa deeply embedded psychological and legal phenomenon that influences identity, behaviour, and access to rights. Caste has been institutionalized over centuries through religious texts, social customs, and cultural practices. The caste-based notion of superiority, especially among historically privileged castes, persists in the collective consciousness despite constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity. It is a human-made construct- not a genetically evolved condition, like the evolution of humans from homo sapiens to present-day human beings; It’s not a divinely ordained system.
26.The Constitution of India enshrines the principle of equality and explicitly prohibits caste-based discrimination through several key provisions. Article 14 guarantees "equality before the law" and "equal protection of the laws" to all individuals. Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Yet, caste-based discrimination continues to exist in society, and the Courts have recognized this in various judgments, particularly in matters involving atrocity laws and reservations.
27.Many individuals from privileged caste(s) experience cognitive dissonance when confronted with their privilege. While they may intellectually accept constitutional equality, they often deny structural discrimination, attributing marginalized groups. This denial acts as a psychological defence mechanism to preserve caste identity and caste-based privileges without overt guilt. This fosters implicit bias and a persistent sense of social superiority, which resists rational legal intervention.
31.The resurgence of caste identifiers in public and digital spaces is not the beginning of a cultural phenomenon- it is a coded assertion of social power that contradicts India's constitutional values. In the northern part of India- in states like Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, and parts of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar-individuals commonly mark their cars, bikes, and sometimes homes with caste identifiers. Vehicles adorned with caste emblems, slogans or even warnings.
34.The collective political will, bureaucratic setup, and law enforcement agencies are oblivious to the aforementioned social trend. The reasons are best known to them; either they have accepted it as the future of the new India, or their cognitive behaviour and social psyche have been shaped by caste narcissism.
35.The police and other law enforcement agencies are not immune to these societal biases. They often reflect, reproduce, and sometimes intensify caste-based prejudices. It becomes necessary to deal with the cognitive behaviour of law enforcement officials in India when influenced by caste-ridden thought, combining insights from the conduct infused by social psychology, and behavioural patterns reflected in contemporary cases. This is evident from discrimination and segregation in the education and justice departments that remain rampant across India, driving inequality in education, life opportunities, and in justice delivery system.
37.Even though Article 15 of the Indian Constitution protects individual Indians from discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. Yet, nearly 75 years after the Indian Constitution came into force, the critical and influential institutions of State are still influenced by a malignant system that often adopts immoral caste, sex and religion-based preferences under the guise of so-called “independence” and “transparency” ……..
38.The psyche behind an inflated ego is a myth, and the constitutional instrumentalities need to bust it. It is not just regressive- it is resistant to the idea of a progressive, transformed, developed, modern, and unified India. India's future lies in social integrity and participative democracy. Confronting this psyche requires more than regulation; it demands social re-education, moral awakening, and deconstruction of caste as a symbol of worth. The real pride of a citizen must lie not in caste, but in character- and not in legacy, but in equality and fraternity. Equality means equal opportunities for all, and fraternity means a collective sense of brotherhood. It is not a subject of good and impressive literature, but rather one to be embodied in practice through body, action, and behavior. It's about engaging your whole self.
39.To address the psychological dimensions of system-based privileges and behavior sentiments, legal reform must go beyond punitive measures, and the rule of law shall be given prominence while dealing with biases, and to eliminate such biases and prejudices, the sensitization of the judiciary and police through anti-bias training programmes and introducing new curricular reform to challenge casteist and sexiest narratives in schools and colleges, and in bureaucratic set-ups. Strengthening social justice jurisprudence with attention to lived experience, rather than just legal definitions, and implementing legal literacy campaigns to dismantle internalized superiority may serve a useful purpose in establishing a caste-less and gender-neutral society.
45.The law alone cannot change hearts and minds. The absence of sustained government programmes to eliminate discrimination may not fulfil its Constitution obligation towards a casteless society. India must move beyond punishment and economic schemes to create proactive programmes of education, awareness, and social reform to achieve constitutional morality and the vision of an equal and inclusive society in participative democracy. The affirmative programmes and economic schemes have their own worth but cannot substitute the aforesaid pro-active programmes.
46.The investigative impartiality and enforcement neutrality must be consciously cultivated, especially in a society where caste is pervasive. Writing or declaring the caste of an accused- without legal relevance-amounts to identity profiling, not objective investigation. It reinforces prejudice, corrupts public opinion, contaminates judicial thinking, violates fundamental rights, and undermines constitutional morality.
49.The sole purpose of the observation made herein above is merely an attempt to invoke constitutional morality and awaken a sense of compassion and justice in the conscience of those occupying the highest constitutional offices. Constitutional authorities must never forget that the dignity of the Nation does not emanate from lineage or caste affinity, but from adherence to constitutional morality and the collective effort of building a strong national character. Pride in ancestry or social identity cannot be a substitute for the values of equality, justice, and fraternity enshrined in the Constitution. True honour for one’s office, and true service to the people, lies in upholding these principles with humility and devotion. Reverence for the Constitution, rather than for lineage, is the highest form of patriotism and the truest expression of national service. Such conduct, if any, by the constitutional authority undermines the constitutional morality.”
Recently, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of GNCTD & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh Chauhan decided on 20.09.2024 recorded the following order:-
“1.Learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submits that in view of judgment dated 14.08.2024 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) 11276/2024 titled as The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. OM Prakash & anr., petitioners may be allowed to withdraw the present petition.
2.Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
3.Petitioners are directed to examine all such petitions pending before this Court which are falling under similar circumstances and to file application to withdraw the said petitions, if they consider it necessary.”
It is pertinent to mention that despite the aforesaid directions of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi vide order/judgment dated 14.08.2024 in W.P. (C) No. 11276/2014 in the matter of The Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash and Anr., the respondents have not taken care of the aforesaid directions.
Having regard to the above, we are of the considered view that impugned order passed by the respondents is not only in violation of the settled law but also of their own circulars. The reasons given by the respondents for dispensing away with the enquiry are not in consonance with the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Court (s) and followed by this Tribunal in a catena of cases, a few of which are referred to hereinabove.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the present case, we are of the considered view that the instant OA deserves to be partly allowed and the same is partly allowed with the following directions: -
The impugned order dated 30.12.2022 (Annexure-A/1) passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 28.08.2024 (Annexure-A/2) passed by the Appellate Authority are quashed and set aside. The applicant shall be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject;
The respondents shall implement the aforesaid directions within eight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order;
However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in accordance with the law.
Pending MAs, if any, stand closed.
