Garunesh Singh & Anr. vs State Of U.P.

Heard Sri Maharaj Baksh Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Counsel for the State- respondent.

The instant criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C. challenging the validity of judgment and order dated 28.03.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/ Fast Track Court (for criminal cases relating to the women), Sultanpur in Sessions Trial No.81 of 2004, State Vs. Garunesh Singh and Another, arising out of Case Crime No.312 of 2000, Police Station- Jagdishpur, District- Amethi, whereby the appellant no.1 has been convicted for the offence under Section 498A of IPC and sentenced for three years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, six months’ additional rigorous imprisonment; for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC, he has been convicted and sentenced for life imprisonment and for the offence under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, he has been convicted and sentenced for two years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional rigorous imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

Notably, pursuant to the report dated 31.03.2018 given by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur, the appeal has been abated in respect of appellant no.2- Dr. Jitendra Nath Singh, who died on 30.12.2017. The appeal is surviving only for appellant no.1-Garunesh Singh. Hence, appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh is hereinafter referred to as “appellant”.

The present case was instituted on the basis of an FIR lodged by the complainant on 29.10.2000, alleging that his daughter had married appellant No. 1 on 10.06.1997. At the time of marriage, the complainant had given dowry according to his financial capacity. However, after the marriage, the husband of the deceased and his family members allegedly started demanding additional dowry for purchasing a V.C.R. and a Bullet Motorcycle. Upon the complainant expressing his inability to fulfill the said demands, the husband of the deceased and his family members allegedly subjected his daughter (since deceased) to harassment and cruelty. A girl child was born out of the wedlock, who was approximately 4–5 months old at the time of the incident. It was further alleged that, owing to the complainant's failure to meet the additional dowry demands, the accused persons murdered his daughter and her dead body was lying in B.K. Nursing Home.

The post-mortem examination mentioned five ante-mortem injuries: (1) Contusion 2.0 cm x 1.0 cm x oblique on (R) side of chin; (2) Mark of ligature 30.00 cm long x 1.0 cm broad continuous horizontally placed over thyroid cartilage one cutting neck muscles ecymosed; (3) Swelling over front of neck 10 cm x 25 cm beginning from just below ligature mark extending upto clavicles; (4) Contusion 5 cm x 6 cm on (R) palm and (5) Contusion 4 cm x 7 cm on (Lt.) palm. In the opinion of the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem, death occurred due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation.

The prosecution examined the complainant (Ramji Singh) as PW-1; complainant’s son (Pankaj Kumar Singh) was examined as PW-2; Devi Baksh Singh, who was Constable Moharrir and scriber of the FIR, was examined as PW-3; Jang Bahadur Yadav, Naib Tehsildar, Amethi, who had prepared the inquest report, was examined as PW-4; V.D. Verma, retired Inspector, CBCID and subsequent Investigating Officer of the case, was examined as PW-5; Dr. Irfan Wajih, who had conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased, was examined as PW-6 and he proved the post-mortem report; Sanjay Kumar, the then C.O. and earlier Investigating Officer, was examined as PW-7; S.I. Mewaram Chaudhary was examined as PW-8.

After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused person was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he outrightly denied all the charges and incriminating evidence against him and claimed himself to be innocent.

The prosecution examined Ramji Singh as PW-1, who is the complainant and father of the victim (since deceased), and deposed that he married Archana to Garunesh on 10.06.1997 and gave Rs.2 lakh cash, 6 tola gold, TV, VCR, dinner set, cooler, sofa and other goods. After the marriage, the accused persons (Dr. Jitendra Nath, Garunesh, Pushpa and Anupama) repeatedly demanded a VCR, a dining table, a Bullet motorcycle and an NSC/Indira Vikas Patra of Rs. 1 lakh. He gave the VCR and Dining table but expressed his inability to give rest of the demands. Archana told him of harassment, abuse, starvation and beatings. The demand was repeated at the time of Gauna (06.05.1998) and again on Telephone on 26.10.2000. On 29.10.2000, he had received a phone call to come at once to the in-laws’ place of his daughter. At about 8:30–9:00 AM, he found the body of his daughter on a plank with marks on both palms, a chin injury, a swollen neck with a ligature mark, blood oozing out from the nose and mouth and torn, bloodstained clothes. He believed she was killed and made to look like a case of hanging. He had got the FIR written and proved the dowry letters Ex. Ka-2 to Ka-10, the telephone bill (Ka-11) and the registered-letter envelope (Ka-12). He stated that Archana was not ill and no suicide note was found at the spot.

PW-2 Pankaj Kumar Singh, son of the informant, has deposed that he corroborates the evidence of PW-1 on the factum of marriage and Rs.2 lakh and goods, which were given at the time of marriage, and the demands for IVP, Bullet Motorcycle and VCR. He relies on the letters Ex. Ka-2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Archana told him, she was taunted that Garunesh would have fetched Rs.10 lakh, had he got married elsewhere. He reached Jagdishpur at about 5:00 PM on 29.10.2000 and saw injury marks on both palms, chin cut mark, swollen neck with ligature mark, blood oozing from the nose and mouth of the deceased and torn, bloodstained clothes. He wrote the application for lodging the FIR (Ka-1) at his father’s dictation.

PW-3, Devi Baksh Singh, the scriber of the FIR, has deposed that he registered the FIR on 29.10.2000 at 18:10 hours (Case Crime No. 312/2000) on the written report of Ramji Singh.

PW-4, Jang Bahadur Yadav, the then Naib Tehsildar, Mushafirkhana, Sultanpur, has deposed on 30.10.2000 that he conducted the inquest (panchayatnama) at Qasba Jagdishpur, at 10:00 AM alongwith one Sub Inspector and one A.S.I. Shiv Dutt. There were five inquest witnesses including Garunesh Singh and others present at the spot. He proved the inquest report (Ex. Ka-16) and the post-mortem papers and photographs (Ex. Ka-17 to Ka-21). In cross-examination, he noted 15 bangles on each hand, a chin injury on the right side, ligature mark all around the neck, and blood oozing from the nose and mouth of the deceased. He did not record the blood oozing from nose and mouth of the body of the deceased in the inquest report and could not recall her height.

PW-5, V.D. Verma, the Investigating Officer, who was a retired Inspector of CBCID, in his examination-in-chief has stated that he took over the charge of investigation on 14.03.2001 under a Government Order and recorded statements of various witnesses. He found no dowry-related mention in the letters, including nine letters written by the deceased. A handwriting expert and expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) found the suicide note in the deceased’s handwriting. He filed charge sheet against Jitendra Nath and Pushpa on 21.11.2003 (Ex. Ka-22) before the court concerned. The local police had earlier charged Garunesh and Anupama. He proved Ex. Ka-23 to Ka-30 (letters to FSL and the Medical Jurisprudence Expert). To the Court, he admitted that the charge sheet was based on the complainant’s side and the expert’s opinion despite the finding that the note was in the deceased’s hand writing. No witness other than the complainant’s side spoke of dowry demand or harassment. He found that Archana had been treated for nervousness and restlessness, and two Doctors told him that she was depressed and could commit suicide. Upon investigation, he noted that she was hanged after being killed, but admitted that the rope was sent to FSL about 2 years and 3 months after the incident and he had not seen it. He drew the conclusion that the deceased was not harassed for dowry and on the contrary, PW-1 was given Rs.40,000/- as per Bank Statement. He recorded that Pankaj did not tell him about demand of dowry for Rs.10 Lakh, IVP/Kisan Patra or he having seen injuries.

PW-6, Dr. Irfan Wajih, deposed that he conducted the post-mortem on 30.10.2000 at 1:45 PM alongwith Dr. C.P. Tiwari. As per his evidence, the deceased was about 25 years old and had died about one day ago. He opined that the death might have caused on 29.10.2000, (32 hours before the post-mortem). He has proved the post-mortem report and in his opinion, death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation.

PW-7, Sanjay Kumar, has deposed that he was posted as C.O. at P.S. Gauriganj, District- Sultanpur and had been initially appointed as Investigating Officer. He took the informant’s statement on 30.10.2000, inspected the scene and prepared the site map (Ex. Ka-32). He recorded statements of Garunesh, Shanti Devi, Asha Singh and others. After finding sufficient evidence against Garunesh and Anupama, he filed charge sheet (Ex. Ka-33), after that, the investigation was transferred to CBCID. He proved Ex. Ka-32 and Ex. Ka-33.

PW-8, S.I. Mewaram Chaudhary, recovery witness, deposed that he was present at the time of Panchayatnama on 30.10.2000 and took two ropes (one blue and one turquoise) in his possession from the room where the dead body was laid, in the presence of the villagers, namely, Akhilesh Singh and Shyam Narayan Singh. He prepared the memo (Ex. Ka-34) and sealed them in cloth on the spot. He proved Material Exhibits 1 and 2 as the ropes he had sealed. He accompanied the Circle Officer when the site was inspected. A stool was found at point B and a rope was found near point A on the site map. He could not say whether the ropes were sent for chemical examination.

In his defence, appellant produced, two medical witnesses, DW-1 Dr. Shyam Karan Pathak and DW-2 Dr. Brijesh Kumar Yadav, who were examined to show that the deceased suffered from psychological illness before her death. DW-1 proved three prescription slips dated 19.02.1999, 02.03.1999 and 30.03.1999 (Ex. Kha-18 to Kha-20) for “Archana Singh W/o Garunesh Singh”, diagnosing “Anxiety Neurosis” and stated that in a severe state, the patient may commit suicide. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that he never saw the patient, wrote the medicines only on symptoms described to him, and could not say whether she was in depression. He also accepted before the Court that doing so was not within his duty. DW-2, a Government Medical Officer at CHC Jagdishpur, stated that he examined a patient “Archana Singh, aged 24 years” on 18.12.1998, 03.01.1999 and 04.02.1999 and found “Acute Anxiety and Anxiety Neurosis”, and issued three slips. He could not say with certainty whether suicide was possible in this illness and did not remember whether she was Dr. J.N. Singh’s daughter-in-law or whether the CBCID had recorded his statement. He conceded that the slips carry no husband’s or father’s name or address. He also could not say whether the slip related to Archana or to another patient, nor he saw her inside or outside the hospital.

Three other defence witnesses were examined on money given to the complainant (PW-1) from the side of the appellant and other documents. DW-3 Ramakant Mishra, Branch Manager, SBI Jagdishpur, produced the original Cheque No.373340 for Rs. 40,000/- dated 20.06.1999, issued by B.K. Nursing Home (proprietor J.N. Singh) in the name of Ramji Singh and paid in cash to Ramji Singh on 01.07.1999 (Ex. Kha-24). The ledger had been destroyed, and he could not identify Ramji Singh. DW-4 Hridayram, Branch Manager, Baroda U.P. Gramin Bank, proved that accused Garunesh applied to District Industries Centre on 27.01.1999 for a Mini Rice Mill and was sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,50,000 on 24.11.1999, secured by two guarantors and an NSC/KVP of Rs.1 lakh, which has been fully repaid (Ex. Kha-25). The purpose is to suggest the NSC/IVP was a loan security rather than a dowry demand. He admitted that he was not posted at the Branch when the loan was sanctioned and did not know the writing of the forwarding Manager. DW-5 S.P. Gupta, a private handwriting expert, opined that the two signatures on the back of the cheque were made by the same person who wrote the specimen writings of Ram Ji Singh (Ex. Kha-26), which would contradict PW-1’s denial of going to the Bank or taking the money. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was a private expert, was paid a fee and had never served the Government, and he denied that he had prepared reports in favour of his clients.

After going through the entire evidence, the Trial Court concluded that the deceased died in her in-laws’ home in unnatural circumstances, within seven years of her marriage. Accordingly, the Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn attention of this Court towards the suicide note, wherein the deceased did not blame the present appellant and made no allegation of demand for dowry or harassment against him. As per the post-mortem report, there was no substantial ante-mortem injury except the ligature mark around the neck. A perusal of the suicide note indicates that it was an emotional note in which the deceased expressed her deep love for her husband. She stated that as she was not a beautiful woman, her husband, the present appellant, did not love her properly, which had caused her great disappointment. She further stated that she was leaving this world but leaving behind her daughter and requested the appellant to take proper care of their daughter. She also expressed that if the appellant looked after their daughter properly, she would have no regret about leaving behind her husband and daughter. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the prosecution had failed to prove that the deceased, Smt. Archana, had been subjected to cruelty soon before her death. Further, learned counsel has stated that the present appellant remained on bail during trial and did not misuse the liberty of bail.

Further submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgment of the learned Trial Court is based on perverse findings and improper appreciation of the legal provisions inasmuch as demand of dowry and on such demand, cruelty and harassment should be soon before the death but no prosecution witness has deposed that the deceased was harassed for demand of dowry soon before her death. On the contrary, if the suicide note left by the deceased is taken on its face value, it does not disclose any demand for dowry. Learned counsel has submitted that if the suicide note is considered as concrete evidence on the ground that the deceased had narrated the relevant facts therein before her death, its entire contents must also be considered as they are. It has been further submitted that had the deceased committed suicide after narrating the facts and circumstances compelling her to take such an extreme step, she could also have mentioned the demand for dowry or cruelty allegedly inflicted upon her. However, admittedly, no such allegation has been made against the appellant in the suicide note.

Learned counsel has further submitted that the victim (since deceased) was suffering from severe depression after giving birth to a girl child and that fact was brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court. According to the appellant, the deceased committed suicide in that mental state, which was also reflected in her suicide note. However, the learned Trial Court completely overlooked this aspect of the matter. It was also pointed out that the prescription papers issued by the Doctor had been produced before the learned Trial Court and according to the opinion of the Doctor, the deceased was at risk of committing suicide, but the learned Trial Court has not considered the said medical opinion and ignored this material piece of evidence.

In addition to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has requested for reducing the sentence to the period for which the appellant has already remained in custody. He has submitted that the appellant has no prior criminal history of any kind whatsoever. He has placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana: (1994) 6 SCC 727 and Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand: (2020) 11 SCC 343.

As learned counsel for the appellant has requested for reducing the sentence to the period for which the appellant has already remained in custody, Sri Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Counsel, has left it to the discretion of the Court to decide the period of sentence.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. Even if the prosecution story is taken on its face value, the suicidal note indicates that under compelling circumstances as indicated in the suicide note, the victim might have committed suicide and in that case, this case may be considered under Section 306 IPC but no charge under Section 306 IPC was framed and no such evidence was led, therefore, we are not going into such aspect. However, for the offence under Section 306 IPC also, the maximum punishment is 10 years. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that since the present appellant has already served about 12 years of actual period of incarceration and with remission, this period is about 14 years, therefore, the minimum punishment under Section 304-B of IPC, which is seven years, has already been served by the appellant. For imposing the maximum punishment of life imprisonment under Section 304-B of the IPC, the learned Trial Court must have recorded specific reasons and findings justifying the imposition of such punishment. Therefore, considering the request of learned counsel for the appellant that the sentence of life imprisonment may be reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant and the appeal may be allowed, we find it appropriate that the aforesaid request made on behalf of the appellant be considered sympathetically.

A custody certificate issued by the Senior Superintendent of Central Jail, Naini, Prayagraj dated 25.07.2025 has been annexed as Annexure No.5 with the fourth bail application, as per which the appellant had remained in custody for 1 year, 4 month & 17 days during trial and after conviction till 25.07.2025, he remained in custody for 9 years, 3 months and 27 days. Thus, actual period of custody of the appellant is 10 years, 8 months and 14 days till 25.07.2025 and till today, it would be around 11 years, 11 months and 24 days and with remission, it has been indicated in the custody certificate as 12 years, 4 months and 17 days custody of the appellant as on 25.07.2025.

Since 25.07.2025, the appellant has spent a further period of 1 year 3 months 10 days in custody, which makes the period undergone in custody after adding the period of remission earned after 25.07.2025, the total period undergone by the appellant in custody becomes about 13 years and 11 months.

This Court now proceeds to consider and examine the proportionality of sentence awarded to the appellant commensurate to the offence, in view of evidence led by parties and the prayer of leniency qua sentence is again examined in the light of certain authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which governs the field, with respect to sentence particularly life imprisonment in relation to Section 304-B IPC (major penal provision). The penal provision under Section 304-B provides, Courts could award sentence in exercise of its discretion between seven years to life imprisonment, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, thus, the minimum sentence provided is ‘not less than 7 years’ and the extreme punishment is ‘life imprisonment’. The extreme penalty of life imprisonment in cases of section 304-B is not imposed as a matter of course, but only in rare cases.

This Court is faced with the question “whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the circumstances of instant case.”

The culpability/guilt under Section 304-B IPC is primarily dependent upon presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Unlike Section 302 IPC, the conviction under Section 304-B IPC do not require direct or circumstantial evidence but almost in every case the presumption as casts by virtue of 113-B of Indian Evidence Act is the foundation, though such presumption remains rebuttable one, but again the million dollar question is ‘can a person be convicted for throughout life based on presumption cast by law and for this reason the sentence of life imprisonment as envisaged under Section 304-B IPC is for rare cases and not in every case. The phrase rarest of rare cases used for section 302 IPC, cannot be compared to be or given same meaning when offence under Section 304-B IPC is tried with. It is profitable to have glimpse of ratio laid down in the case of Hariom Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 10 SCC 577, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the possibility of alteration of sentence in proportion to the gravity of crime. The relevant paragraphs of aforementioned judgment with respect to award of sentence are extracted as under:

The proposition of law qua awarding life sentence under Section 304-B IPC was also examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka Vs M.V Manjunathe gowda & Anr. (2003) 2 SCC 188; and G.V. Siddaramesh vs State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 152; wherein in both the cases the life term was reduced to 10 years.

The question of sentence in penal provision such as under Section 304-B IPC came for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hem Chand (supra), wherein the Trial Court had awarded life imprisonment to the accused under Sections 304-B read with 498A I.P.C., however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reduced the sentence to 10 years and held as under:

In Kashmira Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the decision in Hem Chand (supra) and keeping in view the age of the appellant and also the contribution that would be required to be made by her to the family as the appellant’s husband was also aged and further taking into consideration all other circumstances, the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the High Court was modified by ordering the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay the fine as imposed and thereby the default sentence was sustained.

In K. Pounammal v. State: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1784, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in K. Pounammal (supra) that: -

While deciding the quantum of sentence, the learned Trial Court awarded the maximum sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 304-B IPC, although the minimum sentence for the offence is imprisonment for 7 years. The Trial Court has not assigned any reason for rejecting the appellant’s request for awarding a lesser sentence in view of the mitigating circumstances pleaded by the appellant and has awarded the maximum sentence without assigning any reason.

It is settled law that reason is the very soul of any order and any judicial order bereft of a sound and cogent reasoning has no legs to stand on. In the present case, learned Trial Court without recording any reasons has arbitrarily awarded the maximum prescribed sentence to the accused appellant. Therefore, we are of the view that the Trial Court has committed an error in awarding the maximum sentence without assigning any reason, which in our opinion is not proper.

In the present case, this Court does not find any plausible reasons recorded by the learned Trial Court as to why the maximum punishment of life imprisonment has been awarded to the appellant. The sentence awarded under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act having been undergone by the appellant calls for no interference.

Keeping in view the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, in the light of the proposition of case laws cited above, it was the first offence of the appellant, he has no criminal history and also the fact that the appellant has already undergone about 14 years in custody (including the period of remission), we are of the view that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant- Garunesh Singh deserves to be modified and reduced to an imprisonment for the period for which he has already remained in custody.

Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is allowed in part by upholding the conviction of appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, but the sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC is reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant in custody. Consequently, appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh shall be released from jail forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.

However, the entire amount of fine awarded by the learned Trial Court shall be deposited by the appellant within two months from the date of his release and in default of payment of fine, the default sentence shall remain intact and be served by the appellant.

Appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh shall be released from custody forthwith, upon his executing a personal bond under the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., containing an undertaking to appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case any appeal is filed against this order and the Hon'ble Supreme Court issues notice of the appeal. The bond shall remain in force for a period of six months.

The judgment and order dated 28.03.2016 (supra) passed by the learned Trial Court is modified to the aforesaid extent.

The Trial Court record alongwith copy of this judgment be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith for compliance.

Before parting with, we appreciate the research work and assistance provided by Ms. Vanshika Gaur, Research Associate.