Ganeshji Srivastava and Anr. vs State of U.P.,through Secretary Institutional Finance U.P.,Lucknow & Ors.

D.K. Seth, J.—Petitioners'' case was considered in the light of the judgment in the case of I.G. Registration v. Awadesh Kumar and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 365. Their case was considered by an Order dated 1481996 which is Annexure4 and 5 to the writ petition. It appears from the said order that the petitioners were unable to show anything for which period they had worked. They have also not been able to produce anything to show that they had worked continuously for three years. Therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions laid down in the order dated 2791995. It was also recorded that the petitioners were unable to prove their total period of working. Therefore, their case was rejected.

Relying on paragraph 24 of the writ petition and Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ petition, Shri P.S. Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the are proof for the period during which there petitioners had worked. He had made a positive statement in paragraph 24 of the writ petition that the petitioners had filed their experience certificates before respondent No. 2 which had not been considered. On being asked the original certificates, Shri Baghel, learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the originals were produced before the concerned respondent and the Annexures to the writ petition are photo copies of these originals which were produced before the concerned respondent which have not been considered. He also contends that the said order has been passed without any application of mind inasmuch as in every such cases orders are being passed which are identical words bywords.

Learned standing Counsel on the other hand contends that the petitioners'' case was duly considered but they have failed to prove that they had continuously worked, therefore, they were not regularised and accordingly their case has been rejected.

After having heard learned Counsel for the parties, it appears that there is a dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioners had filed certain documents or not. At the same time, it is not possible for this court to decide the said question. In that view of the matter, this writ petition is disposed of by directing the respondent No. 2 to reconsider the order dated 1481996 in the light of the documents already produced before the respondent by the petitioners alongwith their representations and their representation dated 2111996 contained in Annexure8 to the writ petition and fresh orders should be passed in accordance with law. The entire exercise should be completed within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned respondent.

With the aforesaid observation this writ petition is finally disposed of.

After the above order is passed, Shri Baghel contends that in view of the direction given by the Apex Court in the case of Awadesh Kumar (supra), the petitioners should be allowed to continue in the meantime. He also contends that in similar matters, interim orders are being issued by other courts, therefore, a similar order should be passed in the present case. According to him the present case is identical with the other cases in which interim orders have been granted. He had also produced copy of such order passed in another case. He also contends that it is a settled principle of law as has been laid down by the Apex Court that similar orders should be passed in similar petitions.

So far as the proposition that similar order should be passed in similar matters is concerned, there is no second opinion. It is an established principle as has been enunciated by the Apex Court. But the fact remains that similar order which Mr. Baghel is insisting is an interim order in a pending writ petition. In the present, the writ petition is being disposed of. The interim orders are not precedent while a writ petition is disposed of finally. Then again, admittedly since 1481996 namely the date of the impugned order, contained in Annexures 4 and 5 to the writ petition, the petitioners are not continuing. There is nothing to show that the petitioners had been continuing even before 1481996. Then again though the order was passed on 1481996, the petitioners did not challenge the same. It seems that the petitioners have been inspired by the interim orders granted in other matters to move this writ petition after a lapse of one year. Since there is nothing to indicate that the petitioners had been continuing, therefore, any order passed to allow the petitioners to continue in service would amount to passing a fresh order for giving appointment to the petitioners. In my view in the facts and circumstances of the present case the said order is not warranted. Inasmuch as the certificates contained in Annexure6 does not show the petitioner No. 1 was in continuous service. In 1983 he had worked for 49 days, 1984 58 days, 1985,72 days and in 1987 he had worked for 53 days and he has shown nothing that he had worked thereafter, so far as petitioner No. 2 is concerned it appears that he had worked for 50 days in 1983,61 days in 1984,72 days in 1985, 66 days in 1986,67 days in 1987 and 45 days in 1989. Nothing has been that he had worked thereafter. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Baghel.

Thus the writ petition stands disposed of in the light of the observation made hereinabove.

Certified copy of this order be supplied to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges.