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Judgment
This criminal revision under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. has been filed against the order dated 12.4.2018 passed by 6th Additional Sessions Judge,
Guna in S.T.No.30/2018 by which the charge under Section 308 of IPC has been framed.
The necessary facts for the disposal of the present revision in short are that the complainant Mahendra Singh Lodhi lodged a FIR on 17.7.2017 to the
effect that he is a practicing lawyer and at about 1:00 PM he was sitting in the Bar Room, at that time all the four accused persons came inside the
Bar Room and started abusing the complainant Mahendra Singh Lodhi and they were alleging that the complainant should be assaulted on his private
parts by the sleeper till he expires. Accordingly, all the accused persons started assaulting the complainant by sleepers, Babli Kushwah was shouting
whereas Guddi, Ganeshi, Munni, Krishna assaulted on the private part of the complainant by sleepers so that he may expire. The matter was
intervened by the other advocates. The complainant in order to save his life ran towards the open place of the Court premises but he was chased by
all the accused persons. The complainant entered inside the Collectorate premises in order to save his life but again he was assaulted by the accused
persons in the corridor of the Office of Additional Collector, Guna. Thereafter, the complainant in order to save his life entered inside the Court Room
of Additional Collector, Guna. Thereafter all the accused persons chased him and assaulted him till he became unconscious and thereafter the accused
persons went away. On the report of the complainant, the Police Station Guna registered the FIR No.451/2017 against the applicants for offence
under Sections 308, 294, 323, 149 of IPC.
After completing the investigation, the police filed the charge sheet of the aforementioned offence.
The Trial Court by order dated 12.4.2018 has framed the charge under Sections 294, 308 of IPC.
Challenging the order passed by the Trial Court, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that assaulting on the private part of the complainant
would not amount to an offence under Section 308 of IPC and thus a lesser offence would be made out instead of an offence under Section 308 of
IPC.
Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent/State that it is medically undisputed that, in case, if any serious injury is caused on the
private part of the male, then a person may die also. It is submitted that the act of assaulting the complainant on his private part clearly indicates that
the intention of the applicants was to make attempt to commit culpable homicide. It is further submitted that even otherwise if the Trial Court after
conclusion of the trial, comes to a conclusion that a lesser offence has been committed by the applicants, then they can always be convicted for lesser
offence and, therefore, the Trial Court did not commit any mistake in framing charge under Section 308 of IPC. It is further submitted that the
intention is always in the mind of the culprit which can be inferred from his act and it is highly disputed question of fact. It is further submitted that at
the stage of framing of charge roving enquiry is not permissible and if the Court is of a prima facie opinion that the accused might have committed an
offence and if there is any strong suspicion of commission of offence, then the charge has to be framed.
The Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. K. Narayana Rao reported in (2012) 9 SCC 512 has held as under:-
“14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar (2010) 9 SCC 368,
this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21)
“19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should
proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it
is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be
no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case
before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing
whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or
the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on
which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the
Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of
jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC.
On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering thequestion of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie
case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed beforethe court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as apost office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material onrecord, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges,the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must
apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift
the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common
sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one ofthem gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.â€
The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander & Anr. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under:-
“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under
Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case†and documents submitted
therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court
would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a
presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence
is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to
say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an
approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
x x x x x x x
At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an
offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with
the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this
Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4)
“4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused
and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the
record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge
has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ‘the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other
hand, ‘the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence whichâ€" … (b) is exclusively triable
by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence
which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused.
It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding
regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the
Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the
conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in
France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the
court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully
accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the
offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to
one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of
pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is
to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation
ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.†20 to 26 x x x x x x x
Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional
distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is
not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this
Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge
either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of thepowers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to
be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the
Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as towhether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not undulyinterfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in
conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power isabsolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might
be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in
exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal barenacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution
and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance thefreedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the
offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot bepermitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and asthey appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a
“civil wrong†with no “element of criminality†and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in
quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution thatthe courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine
whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations
taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is thecourt called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies
to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civilclaim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a
criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction underSection 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an
accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record
and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is anexception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be
more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a
view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, reportunder Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its
jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of theabove, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice
favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of
which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao
Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v.
State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.
Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v.
State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC
222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. 8 MCRC.6606/2015
Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and
S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]).
27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of
extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have
not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.
x x x x x x x
In the light of the above principles, nowif we examine the findings recorded by the High Court, then it is evident that what weighed with the High
Court was that firstly it was an abuse of the process of court and, secondly, it was a case of civil nature and that the facts, as stated, would not
constitute an offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC. Interestingly and as is evident from the findings recorded by the High Court
reproduced supra that “this aspect of the matter will get unravelled only after a full-fledged trialâ€, once the High Court itself was of the opinion
that clear facts and correctness of the allegations made can be examined only upon full trial, where was the need for the Court to quash the charge
under Section 306 at that stage. Framing of charge is a kind of tentative view that the trial court forms in terms of Section 228 which is subject to final
culmination of the proceedings.
We have already noticed that thelegislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offenceâ€. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are
satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste.
A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume†while
relying upon Black’s Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidenceâ€; “to take as proved until
evidence to the contrary is forthcomingâ€. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses
are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the
accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its
final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the
allegations constituting the criminal offence.â€
If the allegations made against the applicants are considered, then it is clear that when the complainant who is an Advocate by profession was sitting
in the Bar Room, then he was attacked by the applicants and he was assaulted on his private part. When the complainant tried to run away from the
spot, then he was chased and even after the complainant took shelter in the Collectorate Office, he was assaulted by the applicants.
Considering the allegations made against the applicants, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court did not commit any mistake in
framing charge under Section 308 of IPC. Accordingly, the order dated 12.4.2018 passed by 6th ASJ, Guna in S.T.No.30/2018 is hereby affirmed.
Before parting with this order, this Court finds it appropriate to mention that the facts of the case have been considered in the light of limited scope of
interference at the stage of framing of charge. The Trial Court must decide the trial strictly on the basis of the evidence which would ultimately come
on record without getting prejudiced by any observations made by this Court in this order.
The revision fails and is hereby dismissed.