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Judgment
The appellant having suffered an adverse order in the hands of learned Single Judge, under writ jurisdiction, has preferred this intra-Court appeal.
The learned Single Judge agreed with the view taken by the Central Industrial Tribunal as per its award dated 15th December, 1986 (Ex. D) that the reference made to it was untenable. There is no dispute about the facts relevant for answering the questions raised. The petitioner was employed with the respondent-M/s. Bharath Gold Mines Limited. On a charge of theft he was dismissed from service on 10-1-1981. This order of dismissal was assailed by the appellant by filing a civil suit in O.S. No. 215 of 1981 on the file of the Munsiff at K.G.F. On contest, the suit was dismissed on 18-12-1984. Against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the appellant preferred an appeal being R.A. No. 9 of 1985. But, subsequently, he filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC seeking permission to withdraw the appeal. The same was granted by an order dated 10th March, 1987, as per Annexure-E. Subsequently thereto the appellant raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the Government to Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labor Court, Bangalore under its order dated 8-12-1988, for adjudication by the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that since with the withdrawal of the regular appeal the judgment passed in the civil suit became final, no reference could have been made for adjudication and as such they rejected the reference. Then a writ petition was filed before this Court in which the impugned order came to be passed by the learned Single Judge.
Mr. Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Nath Biswas Vs. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylon Tea Co. and Another, holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suits pertaining to the industrial disputes falling within the ambit of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the judgment rendered against the appellant in the suit filed by him was a nullity in the eye of law and, therefore, that could not have been made a ground for rejecting the reference made at the instance of the appellant.
On the other hand, Sri Bopanna appearing for the management has placed reliance on the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others, , to substantiate his stand that the judgments and decrees passed by the Civil Courts in relation to the Industrial Disputes prior to 3-5-1995 have to be held as good in law and binding on the parties.
In the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, supra, the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 took note of the conflicting opinion of the various Benches of the Supreme Court regarding maintainability of the civil suits in relation to disputes covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and after reviewing all the earlier pronouncements has finally laid down that the Civil Courts cannot entertain the suits pertaining to industrial disputes.
Anyhow, in paragraph 34 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation''s case, supra, it has been clarified that:
"It is directed that the principles enunciated in this judgment shall apply to all pending matters except where decrees have been passed by the Trial Court and the matters are pending in appeal or second appeal, as the case may be. All suits pending in the Trial Court shall be governed by the principles enunciated herein as also the suits and proceedings to be instituted hereinafter".
(emphasis supplied)
In the present case, admittedly, the judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by the appellant was much prior to the authoritative declaration of law by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation''s case, supra. In the above view of the matter, the said judgment and decree cannot be held to be a nullity or void ab initio.
In the above view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed either by the Industrial Tribunal or the learned Single Judge.