High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 11 BOM CK 1970

Ganesh S/o Arun Meshram vs The State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench · Decided on 5 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Urmila Joshi-Phalke, J · Raj D. Wakode, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Writ Petition No.641 of 2026

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Judgment

63 paragraphs · 5,582 words

(PER : RAJ D. WAKODE, J.)

. Heard Shri. Mahesh V. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri. A. R. Chutkey, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents/State.

2.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties.

3.

By this petition, the petitioner challenges the order of detention dated 16.02.2026 passed by respondent No.2 -District Magistrate and Collector, Wardha, whereby the petitioner has been ordered to be detained under the provisions of Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act, 1981 (for short, “the MPDA Act”).

4.

The Detaining Authority, while passing the impugned order, recorded its satisfaction that the petitioner is a dangerous person and a bootlegger within the meaning of the provisions of the MPDA Act and that his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order of detention was thereafter forwarded to the State Government and the petitioner also challenges the consequential orders passed by the State Government in relation to the approval and confirmation of his detention.

5.

The principal contention of the petitioner is that the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority does not disclose any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order so as to warrant preventive detention. According to the petitioner, the two offences specifically relied upon by the Detaining Authority arise out of individual incidents and, at the highest, constitute a breach of law and order. It is further contended that the reliance placed upon an old offence under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, and the statements of the two in-camera witnesses does not furnish sufficient material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction for passing the order of preventive detention.

6.

Shri. Mahesh V. Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of preventive detention is unsustainable, as the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority does not establish that the activities attributed to the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He submitted that the two offences specifically relied upon by the Detaining Authority, namely Crime No.1798/2025 registered under Section 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Crime No.1245/2025 registered under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act, arise out of individual incidents and do not disclose any disturbance affecting the community at large. According to him, the allegations in Crime No.1798/2025 relate to a personal dispute between the petitioner and the informant, whereas the material in Crime No.1245/2025 does not establish that the petitioner was moving in the locality while carrying a sword, as alleged. He, therefore, submitted that the incidents, at the highest, constitute a breach of law and order and cannot be elevated to a disturbance of public order warranting preventive detention.

7.

Learned counsel further submitted that though the Detaining Authority has described the petitioner as a bootlegger, neither of the two offences relied upon for passing the detention order is registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act. The reliance placed upon Crime No.688/2023, registered under Section 65(e) of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, is only in respect of an isolated incident of the year 2023, wherein the Chemical Analyser’s report indicated ethyl alcohol content of 26.96%. According to him, the said incident is stale and has no live link with the detention order passed on 16.02.2026. He further submitted that the medical opinion obtained on 07.01.2026 regarding the harmful effects of consumption of such liquor cannot revive an incident which had occurred more than two years earlier, particularly when no subsequent offence under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act is registered against the petitioner.

8.

Learned counsel also assailed the reliance placed upon the statements of in-camera witnesses A and B. He submitted that the statement of witness A does not establish that the witness was present when the alleged incident involving persons from the vicinity took place, nor does it disclose the manner in which the alleged incident was witnessed by him. Similarly, the statement of witness B regarding the alleged incident of the first week of January 2026 is vague and does not satisfactorily explain the circumstances in which the petitioner allegedly threatened him. He further submitted that the verification undertaken by the Deputy Superintendent of Police does not establish that the alleged incidents were independently verified and that the Detaining Authority has not personally verified the genuineness of the statements. He, therefore, submitted that the statements of the two witnesses do not furnish reliable material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction.

9.

It was further submitted that the petitioner was enlarged on bail in both the offences relied upon by the Detaining Authority and no application for cancellation of bail was moved by the investigating agency. The petitioner had also been subjected to preventive proceedings and externment proceedings earlier. Learned counsel contended that the mere registration of criminal cases or the failure of earlier preventive measures cannot, by itself, justify invocation of the extraordinary power of preventive detention. He further questioned the orders passed by the State Government under Sections 3(2), 3(3) and 12 of the MPDA Act, contending that the requisite circumstances justifying conferment of powers upon the Detaining Authority have not been demonstrated and that the approval and subsequent confirmation of detention are mechanical. He also questioned the manner in which the opinion of the Advisory Board was considered. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned detention order is vitiated by non-application of mind and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

10.

Per contra, Shri. A. R. Chutkey, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents/State opposed the petition and submitted that the Detaining Authority, after carefully considering the material placed before it, was satisfied that the petitioner is a dangerous person and a bootlegger within the meaning of the MPDA Act and that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He submitted that two offences committed within a period of six months, namely Crime No.1798/2025 under Section 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Crime No.1245/2025 under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act, were specifically considered while passing the detention order. The petitioner had allegedly used dangerous weapons, including an iron sharp-edged knife and a sword, thereby creating an atmosphere of fear and terror in the locality. The learned APP further submitted that the statements of the confidential witnesses clearly disclose the petitioner’s involvement in bootlegging activities and the manner in which he used threats and weapons to carry on such activities. The material, therefore, establishes that the petitioner’s activities were not confined to individual disputes but had an adverse impact upon the people residing in the vicinity.

11.

The learned APP further submitted that the earlier offences referred to in the grounds of detention were mentioned only to demonstrate the criminal antecedents of the petitioner and his continued involvement in unlawful activities. The Chemical Analyser’s report in Crime No.688/2023 and the medical opinion regarding the harmful effects of consumption of the seized liquor were also referred to in order to demonstrate the nature of the petitioner’s bootlegging activities. He submitted that the petitioner continued his activities despite preventive action taken against him, including externment proceedings and execution of a bond for maintaining good behaviour. Even during the subsistence of the preventive measures, the petitioner allegedly committed further offences, thereby demonstrating that the earlier measures had failed to curb his activities. The learned APP also relied upon the decision in Arjun Ratan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra and Others, decided on 20.08.2024, and submitted that where the activities of a bootlegger involve the sale of liquor harmful to public health and the creation of terror in the locality by use of weapons, such activities can certainly be treated as prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He further relied upon the decision in Hirabai Kondiba Kale v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No.1533 of 2023, in support of his submission that the fact that the petitioner was not arrested during investigation or was released on bail cannot, by itself, be a ground to invalidate an order of preventive detention. He, therefore, submitted that the Detaining Authority had arrived at the requisite subjective satisfaction on the basis of relevant material and that no interference with the impugned order is called for.

12.

Before adverting to the rival submissions on merits, it would be appropriate to consider the scheme of Section 3 of the MPDA Act. Sub-section (1) thereof authorises the State Government to pass an order of detention against a person, if it is satisfied that such detention is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

13.

Sub-section (2) of Section 3 empowers the State Government to authorise the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police to exercise the powers conferred upon the State Government under sub-section (1). Such conferment of powers, however, is not an unfettered exercise of authority. The State Government is required to be satisfied, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such officer, that it is necessary to confer upon him the power to pass an order of detention for preventing a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

14.

The proviso to sub-section (2) further stipulates that the period specified in the order conferring such powers shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months. The State Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary to do so, extend such period from time to time, but each such extension shall not exceed three months.

15.

Thus, the satisfaction contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 3 is required to be founded upon the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in a particular area falling within the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police. The order conferring such powers must, therefore, reflect consideration of the circumstances warranting such conferment. A general or routine exercise of power, without reference to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in the concerned area, would not meet the requirement of the statutory provision.

16.

Sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that where an order of detention is passed by an officer empowered under sub-section (2), such officer is required to forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter. The provision further mandates that such order shall not remain in force for more than twelve days from the date of its making, unless it is approved by the State Government within the said period.

17.

Thus, a conjoint reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3 makes it clear that the primary responsibility for exercising the power of preventive detention rests with the State Government. The power conferred upon the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police under sub-section (2) is an enabling arrangement, subject to the satisfaction and approval contemplated under the provision. The State Government, while considering the order forwarded to it under sub-section (3), is required to examine the grounds and the relevant material placed before it and apply its mind to the necessity and legality of the detention.

18.

The aforesaid statutory requirements have been considered by this Court in Akshay Bhaskar Sahare v. State of Maharashtra and Another, Criminal Writ Petition No.223 of 2025 and connected matters, decided on 30.09.2025. The Court has emphasised that the State Government must record its satisfaction with reference to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in the particular area and that the order of approval under sub-section (3) must reflect consideration of the material forwarded by the Detaining Authority. The said decision also explains that the power of preventive detention cannot be exercised by treating the statutory requirements as a mere formality.

19.

Perusal of the grounds of detention reveals that the Detaining Authority has referred to nine offences registered against the petitioner during the period from 2019 to 2025. However, out of the said offences, only two offences have been specifically relied upon for passing the order of preventive detention. The remaining offences have been referred to as criminal antecedents of the petitioner.

20.

The two offences relied upon by the Detaining Authority are Crime No.1798/2025, registered on 15.12.2025 for the offence punishable under Section 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Crime No.1245/2025, registered on 26.08.2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. The Detaining Authority has also taken into consideration the in-camera statements of witnesses ‘A’ and ‘B’ while arriving at its subjective satisfaction.

21.

The distinction between the offences referred to as antecedents and those specifically relied upon for passing the detention order is material. The State, in its affidavit-in-reply, has also clarified that the earlier offences, including Crime No.688/2023 registered under Section 65(e) of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, were referred to only to indicate the petitioner’s criminal antecedents and were not treated as the basis for passing the detention order.

22.

The particulars of the two offences relied upon by the Detaining Authority are as under:

Sr. No.Police StationCrime No.Sections of lawDate of registration
1.Hinganghat1798/2025Section 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 202315.12.2025
2.

Hinganghat 1245/2025 Sections 4 and 25 of 26.08.2025 the Arms Act

23.

Apart from the aforesaid offences, the Detaining Authority has also referred to preventive actions initiated against the petitioner. The record, as referred to in the pleadings, indicates proceedings under the preventive provisions of law, an externment order dated 01.03.2024 under Section 56(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Police Act, and proceedings under Section 129(e) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in Istegasha No.154/2025. The State has specifically contended that, despite the preventive measures taken against the petitioner, his activities continued and, therefore, such measures were found insufficient to curb them.

24.

The grounds of detention further refer to two in-camera statements, described as statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B', both recorded on 10.01.2026. The Detaining Authority has relied upon these statements to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner had created an atmosphere of fear and terror in the locality and that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

25.

Before examining whether the aforesaid material was sufficient to form the requisite subjective satisfaction, it would be appropriate to consider the distinction between the expressions 'law and order' and 'public order', as the power under Section 3 of the MPDA Act can be invoked only when the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

26.

The issue which arises for consideration is whether the activities attributed to the petitioner, on the basis of which the order of preventive detention has been passed, are prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order' within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the MPDA Act, or whether the allegations, at the highest, relate to a disturbance of 'law and order'. It is well settled that every breach of law does not necessarily result in disturbance of public order.

27.

The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1966 SC 740,wherein it is observed thus:

"54… Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are…

55.

It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State…"

28.

The Court observed that every breach of peace does not lead to public disorder. A quarrel or fight between two individuals may amount to a disturbance of law and order, but it would not, by itself, constitute disturbance of public order. The distinction lies in the degree and extent of the impact of the alleged act upon the society.

29.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court further explained the distinction by referring to three concentric circles. 'Law and order' represents the largest circle, within which lies the circle of 'public order', and within that lies the smallest circle representing the security of the State. An act may affect law and order without affecting public order; similarly, an act may affect public order without affecting the security of the State. Therefore, while considering an order of preventive detention, the nature of the alleged activity and its impact upon the community at large assume significance.

30.

In Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 185, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that stray and unorganised incidents of theft or assault do not ordinarily constitute matters of public order, as they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. It was further observed that the power to detain a person without the safeguards of a regular trial is drastic in nature and, therefore, the Court must ensure that the Detaining Authority does not transgress the limitations subject to which such power can be exercised. The relevant paragraph Nos.4 and 6 of the said judgment reads thus:

“4… The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well-established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder…

6… The power to detain a person without the safeguard of a court trial is too drastic to permit a lenient construction and therefore Courts must be astute to ensure that the detaining authority does not transgress the limitations subject to which alone the power can be exercised…”

31.

In the context of the MPDA Act, the explanation to Section 2(a) clarifies that public order is deemed to be affected where the activities of a person cause, or are likely to cause, harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof, or a grave or widespread danger to life or public health. Thus, the mere registration of criminal cases against a person, or the allegation that such person is involved in criminal activities, would not by itself justify preventive detention. The material must disclose the requisite impact upon public order, as contemplated under the Act.

32.

The aforesaid principles have also been applied by this Court in Shrinath @ Tikya Ashok Shelar v. State of Maharashtra and Others, Criminal Writ Petition No.479 of 2026, decided on 17.09.2026. The Court reiterated that preventive detention is an exceptional measure and cannot be employed as a substitute for the ordinary criminal law where the alleged activities are confined to individual incidents and do not disclose disturbance of public order.

33.

Keeping the aforesaid settled position in view, it would now be necessary to examine the two offences relied upon by the Detaining Authority, the in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B', and the other material referred to in the grounds of detention, to ascertain whether the activities attributed to the petitioner had the requisite impact upon public order so as to warrant the exercise of extraordinary power of preventive detention.

34.

In the present case, the Detaining Authority has relied upon two offences, namely Crime No.1798/2025 registered under Section 118(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Crime No.1245/2025 registered under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. As regards the first offence, the specific contention of the petitioner is that the same arose out of a personal dispute between the petitioner and the informant. The nature of the allegations, as reflected in the grounds raised in the petition, does not indicate that the alleged incident had any impact upon the general public or disturbed the even tempo of public life.

35.

So far as Crime No.1245/2025 is concerned, the petitioner has specifically contended that the charge-sheet does not contain any material to show that he was moving in the vicinity while carrying a sword or that the alleged incident had created an atmosphere of fear amongst the residents of the locality. Though the State has relied upon the seizure of weapons and the nature of the offence, the mere recovery of a weapon or registration of an offence under the Arms Act would not, by itself, establish that the activity was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The material must further disclose the impact of such activity upon the community or a section thereof.

36.

It is true that the State has contended that the two offences, when considered along with the seizure panchnama and the statements of the confidential witnesses, disclose the petitioner's involvement in dangerous activities. However, the question is not confined to the nature or gravity of the alleged offences. What is required to be examined is whether the activities attributed to the petitioner had the effect of disturbing public order within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the MPDA Act. The distinction between an offence affecting an individual and an activity having an impact upon the community at large cannot be overlooked while exercising the extraordinary power of preventive detention.

37.

On consideration of the nature of the two offences as projected in the grounds of the petition and the stand taken by the respondents, we find that the material referred to in relation to these offences does not, by itself, demonstrate that the alleged incidents disturbed the even tempo of public life or created a feeling of insecurity amongst the general public. At the highest, the allegations disclose individual acts which could be dealt with under the ordinary criminal law. The existence of criminal cases, however serious their allegations may be, cannot automatically furnish a justification for preventive detention unless the statutory requirement of disturbance to public order is independently satisfied.

38.

The Detaining Authority has also placed reliance upon the in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B' recorded on 10.01.2026. These statements assume significance, as the respondents seek to rely upon them to establish that the petitioner was indulging in bootlegging activities and, in the course of such activities, was creating an atmosphere of fear and terror in the locality. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether the contents of these statements provide sufficient material to support the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority.

39.

The statement of witness 'A', as referred to in the petition, indicates that in the first week of January 2026, certain persons from the vicinity had approached the petitioner to advise him against his activities, whereupon the petitioner allegedly abused and threatened them. The petitioner has specifically contended that the witness has not disclosed that he was a member of the said group or explained the circumstances in which he witnessed the alleged incident. It is further pointed out that the statements of the other persons who allegedly formed part of the group have not been recorded.

40.

The aforesaid aspect assumes relevance because the statement is relied upon to demonstrate that the petitioner's conduct had created fear amongst the residents of the locality. However, in the absence of particulars indicating the presence of the witness at the alleged incident or explaining the basis of his knowledge, the statement, as projected before us, does not satisfactorily establish the alleged incident or its impact upon the locality. A general assertion that the petitioner abused and threatened certain persons, without adequate particulars demonstrating its wider impact, would not be sufficient to conclude that public order was disturbed.

41.

The statement of witness 'B' refers to an incident allegedly occurring at about 7.00 a.m. during the first week of January 2026. The witness is stated to have been brushing his teeth when the petitioner allegedly arrived with country liquor (Moha liquor) wrapped in clothes and stopped his vehicle near his house. When the witness allegedly asked the petitioner to drive slowly, the petitioner is stated to have abused and threatened him. The petitioner has questioned the circumstances of the alleged incident and has specifically contended that the statement does not explain the basis on which the witness identified the substance allegedly carried by the petitioner as country liquor.

42.

Even accepting the contents of the said statement as they stand, the incident described therein appears to be an individual interaction between the petitioner and the witness. The statement, as projected in the pleadings, does not disclose any further circumstance indicating that the alleged conduct affected the residents of the locality or disturbed the normal life of the community. The mere use of abusive language or issuance of threats during an individual interaction, without material showing its wider impact, cannot automatically be elevated to an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

43.

The petitioner has also questioned the verification of the in-camera statements. According to the petitioner, the verification undertaken by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer does not disclose any independent verification of the incidents narrated by the witnesses. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the purpose of verification was to ascertain the identity and genuineness of the witnesses and that such verification was duly undertaken.

44.

It is true that the authority verifying an in-camera statement is not necessarily required to reproduce the entire incident in the verification report. However, verification of the identity of the witness, by itself, cannot dispense with the requirement of examining whether the statement contains sufficient particulars and whether the circumstances narrated therein inspire confidence. The material relied upon must enable the Detaining Authority to arrive at an independent and informed satisfaction. In the present case, as noticed above, the two statements do not disclose adequate particulars explaining the circumstances in which the witnesses witnessed the alleged incidents. The verification, as projected before us, does not remove these deficiencies. Consequently, the in-camera statements cannot be treated as sufficient material to establish that the petitioner’s activities had adversely affected public order.

45.

The respondents have also relied upon the petitioner’s alleged involvement in bootlegging. In this connection, reference is made to Crime No.688/2023 registered under Section 65(e) of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act. The petitioner contends that the said offence relates to an incident of June 2023 and, therefore, is too remote to furnish a live and proximate link with the order of detention passed on 16.02.2026. It is further pointed out that the Chemical Analyser’s Report and the opinion of the Medical Officer, even if taken into consideration, relate to the said incident and do not establish any continuing activity of bootlegging immediately preceding the detention order.

46.

The respondents have specifically stated in their reply that Crime No.688/2023 has been referred to only as a criminal antecedent and has not been relied upon as an independent ground for passing the order of detention. If that be so, the said crime cannot, by itself, be treated as proof of any continuing activity of bootlegging in the period immediately preceding the detention. The material relating to an incident of June 2023, without any further contemporaneous material demonstrating continuation of such activity, would not be sufficient to establish the petitioner’s propensity to indulge in bootlegging in February 2026.

47.

We are conscious of the fact that preventive detention is not necessarily founded upon a conviction in a criminal case and that the Detaining Authority is entitled to consider relevant antecedents while arriving at its subjective satisfaction. However, antecedents cannot be considered in isolation or used to bridge an otherwise unexplained gap in the recent activities relied upon for detention. In the present case, the material relating to Crime No.688/2023 is separated from the detention order by a considerable period. In the absence of material demonstrating continuity of such activity, reliance upon the said incident does not strengthen the respondents’ case that the petitioner’s activities had reached a magnitude affecting public order.

48.

The respondents have further relied upon the preventive measures initiated against the petitioner, including proceedings under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Maharashtra Police Act. It is their contention that such measures failed to deter the petitioner from continuing his alleged activities. The petitioner, however, has pointed out that the proceedings initiated under Section 129(e) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, being Istegasha No.154/2025, came to be closed by order dated 12.01.2026. Thus, the mere fact that preventive proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner would not, in itself, establish that his activities had assumed such proportions as to disturb public order. The outcome and effect of the proceedings would also be relevant while assessing the material placed before the Detaining Authority.

49.

The respondents have also referred to the externment proceedings and the execution of a bond for maintaining good behaviour. The petitioner has disputed the manner in which these proceedings have been relied upon. In any event, the existence of an earlier externment order or a bond cannot, by itself, justify an order of preventive detention. The Detaining Authority was required to examine whether, notwithstanding the preventive measures, the petitioner had indulged in activities of such nature and magnitude as to affect the even tempo of public life. The material discussed hereinabove does not satisfactorily establish such a consequence.

50.

It is also relevant that the petitioner was granted bail in Crime No.1245/2025 on 30.08.2025 and in Crime No.1798/2025 on 24.12.2025. The petitioner has contended that the respondents did not seek cancellation of either bail order and that no breach of the conditions imposed while granting bail was brought to the notice of the competent Court. We are conscious that grant of bail does not, by itself, preclude the exercise of powers of preventive detention. Nevertheless, the circumstances in which the petitioner was released on bail, and the availability of remedies under the ordinary criminal law, were relevant considerations while examining the necessity of resorting to the drastic measure of preventive detention. The material placed before us does not indicate any specific circumstance demonstrating that the ordinary criminal law had become inadequate to deal with the alleged activities of the petitioner.

51.

Thus, upon considering the two criminal cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority, the two in-camera statements, the material relating to the alleged bootlegging activity and the earlier preventive proceedings, we find that the material does not establish the requisite nexus between the alleged activities of the petitioner and the disturbance of public order. The incidents, even if taken at their face value, appear to be confined to individual occurrences and interactions. The material does not disclose how such incidents affected, or were likely to affect, the community at large or disturbed the even tempo of public life in the locality.

52.

It is settled that the power of preventive detention is an extraordinary power and its exercise must conform strictly to the statutory requirements. The mere existence of criminal antecedents, registration of offences or allegations of threats and intimidation cannot, without more, justify preventive detention. The distinction between a law and order situation and a public order situation cannot be lost sight of. In the present case, the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority, when considered cumulatively, does not satisfy the requirement of showing that the petitioner’s activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the meaning of the MPDA Act.

53.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority that the petitioner’s activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is not supported by adequate material. The impugned order of detention, therefore, cannot be sustained.

54.

In result, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 16.02.2026, passed by the District Magistrate and Collector, Wardha, is quashed and set aside. The petitioner namely Ganesh Arun Meshram is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

55.

Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.