Ganesh Chandra Dash vs State of Orissa and Others

G.K. Misra, C.J.—The Petitioner who was a Conductor in the State Transport Service joined service on 15-5-1961. A departmental proceeding was drawn up against him on certain charges, and be was ultimately discharged from service on 27-9-1968. He filed an appeal against the order of discharge which was allowed on 27-11-1968, and the Appellate authority in his order Annexure-7 directed further enquiry as sufficient opportunity had not been given to the delinquent in course of the enquiry. After further enquiry the Petitioner was again discharged on 5-2-19-69.

The sole contention raised by Mr. Rath is that there is no provision for a second enquiry to be directed by the Appellate authority after the first proceeding was quashed. The contention, in its bald form, is not applicable. Principles of law is well settled that if an the reasonable opportunities have been given to the delinquent in course of the enquiry, then he cannot challenge the final order of punishment unless it is one without any evidence. If in such a case where all opportunities were given he is exenterated on the ground that there is no evidence in support of the charges a second enquiry would be barred. But where in the first enquiry the order of punishment is quashed on the ground that such opportunities were not given, then a second enquiry is not precluded. The object of the second, enquiry is to give all opportunities and collect evidence and then decide whether the delinquent is guilty of the charges or not.

Mr. Rath places reliance on K.R. Deb v. the Collector of Central Excise, Shillong in support of the contention that a second enquiry in no circumstances is permissible. This decision deals with Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 which is in pari material with the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962. We find nothing in this decision which runs counter to our view.

In this case, as would appear from the order of the Appellate authority Annexure-7, the order was quashed not because there was no evidence but because at certain stages evidence was taken ex parte in the absence of the delinquent and an the material evidences to be given in the case were not presented. In a case of this nature the Appellate authority was quite competent to give a direction for fresh enquiry, after quashing the order of punishment.

There being no objection that in the subsequent enquiry any of the opportunities was not given to the Petitioner, the order of discharge passed on 5-2-1969 cannot be questioned as being contrary to law. We find no substance in the sole contention.

The writ application is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.

S. Acharya, J.

I agree.