Gandhi Industrial Corporation vs The General Manager

A.K. Menon, J—The order impugned in this appeal is that of a Single Judge of this Court disposing of Arbitration Petition No. 61 of 2005 filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Arbitration Petition was filed on 4 January, 2005 challenging an award passed by a sole arbitrator to the extent it concerned Claim No. 1, Claim 2A insofar as it related to the claim for interest, Claim 2B and 2B is also part of claim no. 3 and the interest on entire claim no. 3 which were all rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Appellant in the present appeal was the Petitioner in Arbitration Petition No. 61 of 2005 and the original claimant in the Arbitration. The Appellant continued to carry out work for the Respondents. Disputes arose between the parties in relation to delays in payments which resulted in the arbitral reference.

The Appellant at all material times was a registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The Respondent is the General Manager of the India Security Press, a Government of India Undertaking functioning under the Ministry of Finance. Although the cause title indicates that the respondent is the General Manager the press, India Security Press, Nashik, the disputes were between the Appellant and the India Security Press, Nashik. The appellant is a small scale undertaking duly registered under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and is ancillary industrial undertaking and is stated to hold a permanent Small Scale Industries Registration Certificate No. 0419-60159 dated 12 August 1976.

The appellant installed an Automated plant with installed capacity of 64,00,000 sq. mtrs. in accordance with requirement laid down by the Government vide letter dated 4 November 1967. The appellant expanded its Capacity from 64,00,000 sq. mtrs. per annum to 1,20,00,000 sq. mtrs. per annum. The appellant also spent a large sum of money to install a high tension power line to its plant. As part of further expansion, the appellant increased its capacity to 1,50,00,000 sq. mtrs per annum. This enabled the appellant to function as an Ancillary unit of the respondent for manufacturing of Gummed Stamp Papers.

It is the appellant''s case that prior to the year 1966, the respondent was importing its entire requirement of Gummed Stamp Papers from Foreign Countries. In or about 1967 the appellant set up a pilot plant for the purpose of manufacturing Gummed Stamp Papers in Mumbai. The same was set up at the instance of the respondent press pursuant to the letter dated 17 December 1976 stated to have been issued by the respondent to the appellant. The appellant having satisfactorily developed the necessary technology for gumming and super-calendaring Stamp Papers, their efforts were recognised by the Government of India through its Invention Promotion Board which conferred upon the appellant the President''s award.

Between the year 1980 to 1993 the Gumming of Super-calendaring work was awarded to the appellant by the committee of the Bureau of Industrial Costing and Pricing. The appellant has received several certificates from the respondent to that effect of over a period of time. The appellant received Ashok Pillar Water Marked Stamp Base Paper from the respondent on which it carries out Gumming and Super-calendaring work. The Gummed Paper is used for printing of Postal, Revenue, Court Fees Stamps etc.

The Government recommended gradual import substitution of Gummed Stamp Papers and the appellant won several awards including the FASSI Award for having saved large amounts of foreign exchange due to localised gumming and super- calendaring. According to the appellant in or about 1976 the respondent awarded the Gumming and Super-calendaring work to Vindhya Paper Mills Ltd. However, the work was not found satisfactory. The work done by the appellant was found to be superior.

It is apposite to mention that the Respondent in this appeal i.e. India Security Press had also challenged the Award by filing Arbitration Petition No. 36 of 2005 in this Court. In order to appreciate the circumstances under which the present appeal is being argued before us, it will be necessary to deal with the fate of Arbitration Petition No. 36 of 2005 filed by the Respondent (Respondent''s petition).

It was appellant''s case in the arbitration that it was entitled to recover diverse sum of monies inter alia towards (a) excise duty paid in respect of supply order dated 27.10.1990, (b) excise duty short paid (c) claim for defective base paper supplied under supply orders dated 27.10.1990 and 31.5.1995. (d) Balance price of supplies amounting to Rs. 2,95,99,673/- and (e) claim for damages for alleged failure of the respondent press to utilise entire installed capacity of the appellant. The appellant was entitled to and did avail of certain MODVAT benefits during the period of supply. In respect of a supply order dated 31.5.1995, the respondent press contended that the benefit of MODVAT availed of by the appellant was required to be passed on to the respondent press. A claim that the appellant had denied. Accordingly, while making up accounts in respect of transactions between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent adjusted a sum of Rs. 51,48,460/- against the amount of consideration payable by the respondent Press. The appellant contested this adjustment.

Before the Arbitrator, several claims had been made of which the Arbitrator partly allowed claim 2A to the extent of Rs. 48,712.11 in respect of payment of Excise duty which was required to be reimbursed. The arbitrator also granted an award in the sum of Rs. 50,64,155/- in respect of "wrongful deduction of the value of MODVAT credit". The learned arbitrator also awarded interest on a sum of Rs. 48,712.11 and 50,64,155/- from 13th February, 2002 being the date on which the claimant has filed the claim till realisation. The Respondent''s challenge to the award in Arbitration Petition No. 36 of 2005 was limited to the direction to pay to the Appellant a sum of Rs. 50,64,155/-. The amount of Rs. 50,64,155/- formed a part of claim No. 3 for recovery of Rs. 2,95,99,673/- towards balance consideration under the contract which was apparently wrongfully withheld by the Respondent.

The Respondent''s petition came to be dismissed vide order dated 14.6.2005. Against the said order of dismissal an appeal was filed, being Appeal No. 671 of 2006 which was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. Being aggrieved by this dismissal the Respondent preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vide order dated 12.10.2007 allowed the Civil Appeal to the extent of Modvat benefits claimed under a Supply Order of 31-5-1995. The Supreme Court while disposing of Civil Appeal No. 4857 of 2007 has set out relevant facts and observed that the Appellants had sought a sum of Rs. 2,95,99,673/- as balance of the price to the Appellants. The Appellant also demanded and claimed interest thereon at the rate of 25.50 % per annum based on the provisions of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (since repealed by the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006).

While considering the arguments of the parties, the basic question before the Apex Court was whether the Respondent was entitled to get benefit of MODVAT availed of by the Appellant or not. The relevant terms of supply were contained in the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995. The Apex Court reproduced clause 2 of the relevant Supply order which reads thus :

"2. TAXES/CED : No Sales Tax at present. This will be paid extra, if & when applicable, on presentation of documentary evidence. Excise Duty is payable as per rules and Modvat Credit, if any, availed by the Firm against element of Excise Duty included in the Base Paper, is to be passed on to the India Security Press, Octroi Exemption Certificates will be issued, as per requirement."

It was the Appellant''s case that the benefit was not required to be passed on, since in an advertisement issued prior to issuance of the Supply Order, did not mention such a condition. It is only when the Supply Order was issued, that the aforesaid condition was stipulated. The Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in view of the express provision in the Supply Order that MODVAT credit, if any, availed of by the Appellant against the element of Excise Duty included in the Base Paper, is to be passed on to the Respondent the Appellant was not entitled to retain the benefit. The Supreme Court found that after receipt of the Supply/Purchase Order dated 31.5.1995 the Appellant vide letter dated 31.5.1995 protested inclusion of this clause requiring passing over the Modvat benefit but it continued to perform the contract.

After considering the arguments on both sides, the Supreme Court was of the view that if the Appellant was not agreeable with this specific term of contract requiring it to pass on the Modvat benefit, it could have withdrawn from the contract. It did not do so but continued with the contract. The Supreme Court held that the "contract" was contained in the terms and conditions of the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995 which was binding and not the terms of advertisement which preceded the Supply Order. In the circumstances the Supreme Court found that the views taken by the Arbitrator, Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court could not be sustained. The appeal was allowed and the order of the arbitrator with regard to MODVAT credit as well as the order of the Single Judge and the Division Bench to that extent was set aside.

When the present appeal was taken up for final disposal. Mr. Shelat, learned counsel for the Appellant pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court did not set aside the entire award in respect of MODVAT credit. It was pointed out that throughout the judgment the Supreme Court had specified that the Respondent would be entitled to retain the amount equivalent to MODVAT credit claimed by the Respondent under the supply order dated 31.5.1995. By necessary implication the period prior thereto was not in contemplation in the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court.

Although it seemed that the entire claim of the Appellant would stand negated by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court, that does not appear to be so on an interpretation of the judgment. The challenge in the SLP was restricted to the amount of MODVAT benefit to be passed on the respondent by virtue of the provisions of Supply Order dated 31.5.1995. The respondent was entitled to retain only an amount equivalent to the Modvat amount claimed by the respondent. The award was set aside, not in its entirety but to the extent of specified Modvat benefit pursuant to the Supply Order. The Award survived to extent of the sum of Rs. 48,712.11 and interest thereon awarded under claim 2A and perhaps the claim for balance consideration for supplies to the extent it was not covered by the amount of Modvat benefit under adjustment pursuant to the Supply Order of 31/5/1995.

Mr. Shelat, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that although the present appeal seeks to challenge the award in its entirety. The challenge is now restricted to amount of Modvat benefit for the period prior to the supply order of 31.5.1995 and the difference in interest rate between amount of 10% awarded by the arbitrator and the amount that the Appellant claimed as interest under the Interest on Delayed Payments Act. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Shelat pointed out that there was no dispute about the fact that Modvat could have been claimed and availed of by the manufacturer alone. However, it is case of the Respondent that by virtue of agreement between the parties as specified in the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995, Modvat credit availed of by the Appellant would be required to be passed on to the Respondent by virtue of clause 2 of the Supply Order reproduced above. The learned counsel submitted that the Respondent had in their affidavit in rejoinder in the Arbitration Petition (appearing in the appeal compilation at Page No. 130) annexed a telex message from the Deputy Commissioner of Excise addressed to the Respondent Press wherein it was clearly specified that the amount of Rs. 50,64,155/- availed of as Modvat credit upto 1996 included a sum of Rs. 7,21,909/- for the previous year 1994-95, namely, for a period prior to the date of Supply Order dated 31.5.1995.

Mr. Shelat pointed out that the judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court entailed that all MODVAT benefit availed of by the Appellant company pursuant to the purchase order dated 31.5.1995 would have to be passed to the Respondent Press by the Appellant. By necessary implication, therefore, the amount of Modvat credit availed by the Respondent Press prior to 31.5.1995 would not have to be so passed on. We are, therefore, called upon to interpret the effect of the judgment of Supreme Court in context of pendency of present appeal and challenge to the order of learned Single Judge rejecting the Section 34 petition. Mr. Shelat''s submissions were two fold; Firstly, the rate of interest awarded by the learned arbitrator ought to have been in accordance with the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (the Act). Secondly, the effect of the judgment of Supreme Court is that only MODVAT benefit availed of pursuant to the Supply Order of 31.5.1995 is to be passed on to the Respondent. Accordingly, the amount of MODVAT benefit availed of prior to 31.5.1995, i.e prior financial year 1994-1995 amounting to Rs. 7,21,909/- ought to be retained by the Appellant and need not be passed on to the respondent.

On the first issue of interest, Mr. Shelat took us through the provisions of the said Act and relied upon Section 4 of the Act. He submitted that where the buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under Section 3, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at one and a half times the Prime Lending Rate charged by the State Bank of India. By relying upon this provision, he submitted that according to the claimant, interest was payable at 25.50 per cent. He submitted that the prime lending rate of the State Bank of India at the material time was 15% and therefore, he was entitled to compound interest at the rate of 25.50% from 16.6.2001.

The learned counsel further submitted that the Appellant was entitled to interest under the provisions of the said Act by virtue of obligation to pay which is contained in the non obstante provision. According to him, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, although 18% was claimed under the contractual documents the Appellant would be entitled to benefit of section 4 of the said Act.

Mr. Shelat then relied upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Modern Industries Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others, AIR 2010 SC 1625 : (2010) 4 JT 10 : (2010) 5 SCC 44 : (2010) 4 SCR 560 and relied upon paragraphs 13 and 52 of the said judgment and submitted that the Appellant was entitled to receive interest at 1 1/2 times as PLR charged by the State Bank of India. We have not found much merit in the said submission and do not consider it necessary to make any observation on this aspect. Mr. Shelat then relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Purvanchal Cables and Contractors Pvt. Ltd. and relying on paragraphs 38, 39 and 40 of the said judgment he submitted that once again the judgment deals with the issue of the interest liability and the prospective effect thereof. There can be no two views about the same. However, Mr. Shelat sought to emphasize as set out in paragraph 38 of the judgment that the Court has discretionary power to award interest along with principal amount as on 31.5.1995. He contended that by virtue of the Act a vested right exists to claim interest at the higher rate. There cannot be two views about entitlement of claim interest under the said Act if a party complies with basic requirements of eligibility but it would always be subject to proof of the rate offered by the State Bank of India to the best borrowers. Before the arbitrator the appellant themselves submitted that they restricted their claim to 18% per annum. The tribunal has in its discretion and in view of falling interest rate granted 10% interest. We have already found that before the learned arbitrator the Appellant made no attempts to prove the rate made available to the best borrower of the State Bank of India as required by the explanation to Section 4 of the Act but later claimed interest @ 18% per annum. It is not open now to challenge the award of the interest at the rate of 10%. Mr. Shelat then relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in ONGC Vs. Western Geco International Ltd. and urged that although this specific ground has not been enumerated under Section 34(2)(a) of the Act, the award was in this respect was against the public policy of the India and therefore, was vitiated to that extent.

Mr. Bhate, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent countered the said submission by contending that as far as interest is concerned, the Appellant is not entitled to benefit of any higher interest under the said Act. He submitted that the explanation to section 4 provided that the Prime Lending Rate (PLR) will have to be determined as rate offered by the State bank of India to its "best borrowers". According to learned counsel, no evidence of the prime lending rate offered to its best borrowers was ever adduced before the Arbitrator. The claim was merely made based on a computation of interest unsupported by any evidence. Mr. Shelat agreed that no oral evidence was adduced by the parties. A computation of interest claimed was made and presented before the arbitral tribunal. We find considerable force in the submission of Mr. Bhate. There was no evidence before the tribunal to establish the PLR offered to the best borrowers of the State Bank of India. Furthermore, a reading of explanation to Section 4 makes it evident that PLR for the purpose of fixing liability under the said Act would be the rate of State Bank of India provided to its best borrowers. Accordingly, in view of the clear provision in the section the grant of interest at the rate at 1 1/2 times PLR would not be justified. It was for the claimant to establish before the arbitral tribunal the rate of interest paid by the best borrowers of the bank. Absent of such evidence, it would not be possible for the arbitrator to grant interest at 1 1/2 times PLR. Even otherwise given a PLR of 15 %, one and a half time PLR would amount to 22.5 % and not 25.5% claimed by the Appellant. Section 31(7) (d) of the Arbitration Act provides that unless the award otherwise directs, interest at the rate of 18% pa will be payable. In the present case, the Arbitrator has in his wisdom granted interest at the rate of 10% pa from the date of filing of the petition. We do not propose to disturb this finding. The Appellants challenge to denial of claim for interest @ 25.5 % therefore must fail.

Now adverting to the submissions of Mr. Shelat that the order of the Apex Court does not contemplate passing on MODVAT benefit for the year 1994-95 is sought to be made good by relying upon the fact that entire focus of the judgment of the Apex Court was result of the interpretation of the terms published in the advertisement and the subsequent Supply Order. He submitted that the Appellant''s contention that the advertisement did not contain the requirement of passing over MODVAT benefit to the Respondent Press and that it was not bound by the terms of the Supply Order was negated by the Apex Court holding that the terms of contract were to be ascertained from the Supply Order and not from the advertisement. The Supply Order itself was effective from April 1995 and as such would cover MODVAT benefit availed of for supplied after April 1995. He submitted that while interpreting the order of the Supreme Court, the obvious purport and intent was to set aside the award of the arbitrator, the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court which directed that MODVAT benefit could be availed of only by the Appellant manufacturer. The judgment of the Supreme Court held the Appellant was under an obligation to pass on said benefit to the Respondent Press, pursuant to the Supply Order dated 31 May, 1995. Admittedly and as confirmed by Mr. Bhate, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent the Supply Order dated 31 May, 1995 did not apply to the period prior thereto. In other words, the terms and conditions of the Supply Order did not apply to the supplies/work done by the Appellant during the year 1994-95. It would apply only to the period 1995-96 and thereafter.

Mr. Shelat relied upon the admission of the Respondent in its affidavit in reply to Notice of Motion No. 6 of 2009 in the present appeal and submitted that annexure to Exhibit R-3 at Page 158 of the paper book was an admitted document being a telex message received by the Respondent from the Deputy Commissioner (Tech), Central Excise, Surat on 10.8.1996 which provided the break up of MODVAT credit availed of by the Appellant. Relying upon this letter Mr. Shelat submitted that out of total amount of Rs. 50,64,155/- only an amount of Rs. 42,43,246/- pertaining to MODVAT availed of pursuant to the supply order dated 31.5.1995 (see item 2 and 3 in Exhibit R-3). According to Mr. Shelat an amount of Rs. 7,21,909/- pertains to the period prior to 31.5.1995 and, therefore, was outside contemplation of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. He submitted that reliance placed by the Respondent on the said letter was not a coincidence. The stand of the Respondent repeated in the affidavit of Mr.S.R Wajpe, Deputy Chief Engineer of the Respondent Press dated 2nd June 2000 wherein the said letter is once again produced at Exhibit R- 7. Mr. Bhate agreed that according to record, the amount of Rs. 7,21,909/- did not constitute MODVAT benefit availed of by the Appellant pursuant to the supply order dated 31.5.1995. On a query from the Court, Mr. Bhate was not able to show us any document which contains the terms and conditions or any agreement or obligation of the Appellant to pass over MODVAT benefit prior to the period covered by supply order dated 31.5.1995.

Mr. Shelat then relied upon a Supply Order dated 14.5.1994 which dealt with supply for the period prior to 31.5.1995. This document was tendered across the bar and was not before the Tribunal or before this Court or before the Supreme Court earlier. Mr. Bhate confirmed that this is indeed the purchase order which was on record of the Respondent Press and for the period prior to 31.5.1995. We must clarify that we have not based our decision merely on this document. Clause 2 of the said Supply Order dated 14.5.1994 is very relevant inasmuch as the requirement of passing over benefit of MODVAT credit to the Respondent Press was conspicuous by its absence.

Mr. Shelat then submitted that even otherwise, while interpreting the judgment of the Supreme Court, the award was set aside to the extent it pertained to quantum of Modvat benefit accrued to the Appellant pursuant to the supply order dated 31.5.1995. On this count, he submitted that the Appellant''s stand is justified having regard to the admitted position that Modvat benefit for the period 1994-95 was outside the scope of Supply Order dated 31.5.1995.

Having considered the facts and submissions of the learned counsel. we are of the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court did not contemplate passing of benefit of MODVAT credit for the period prior to supply order dated 31.5.1995 and hence the award is liable to be upheld and to the extent that it was not set aside viz in respect of Claim No. 2A for Rs. 48,712.11 and the sum of Rs. 7,21,909/- for MODVAT benefit prior to 31.5.1995. We have gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court at the length and it is obvious from the contents in paragraph 4, 8 and 9 of the judgment that the extent to which the of MODVAT credit is passed by the learned arbitrator, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench was set aside was limited to the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995 and not any earlier period. The observation that the respondent would be entitled to the amount of MODVAT credit availed of by the appellant is subject to the contract between the parties which the Hon''ble Supreme Court has clearly held to have come into existence on 31.5.1995.

It is well known in the matter of interpretation of judgments, that the entire judgment has to be read as a whole. In case of Prabha Shankar Dubey Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 98 CLT 4 : (2004) 91 ECC 194 : (2003) 10 JT 50 : (2003) 10 SCALE 42 : (2004) 2 SCC 56 : (2003) 6 SCR 444 Supp the Supreme Court observed that while interpreting the judgment, a line or word in the judgment cannot be read in isolation. To read the judgment of the Apex Court in the manner suggested by Mr. Bhate by picking and choosing one sentence from the judgment would not be correct. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4857 of 2007 when read in its entirety reveals that the Respondent was allowed benefit of the Modvat availed of by the Appellant only pursuant to the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995.

The figures availed of as MODVAT credit appearing in the telex message dated 10.8.1996 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Surat to the Account Officer are admitted by the Respondent. Although Mr. Bhate initially submitted that even the MODVAT credit availed of during 1994- 95 being the sum of Rs. 7,21,909/- was also required to be passed on to the Respondent. Mr. Bhate later confirmed that the provisions for passing on benefit under MODVAT claim to the Respondent Press was incorporated for the first time only in the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995 although the Appellant had dealing with the Respondent at least from 1977.

In this view of the matter since prior to 31.5.1995 there was no such contractual requirement of passing over MODVAT benefit to the Respondent, there is no question of the Respondent claiming the said amount. It would be factually and legally incorrect if the Respondents were to stake claim to this amount. We are fortified in taking this view by the observation of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 4857 of 2007 wherein in clause 2 (extracted in paragraph 4 of this judgment) expressly provides that MODVAT credit, if any, availed by the firm is to be passed on to the Respondent. This term was not present in any prior purchase order/ supply order. This is a fact which Mr. Bhate has on instructions confirmed before us.

We are, therefore, of the view that the award to the extent of Rs. 7,21,909/- is liable to be upheld specially since the judgment of the Apex Court does not specify extent of the quantum forming subject matter of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Vide the judgment of the Supreme Court, the award of the arbitrator, judgment of Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court were set aside only to the extent contemplated in the terms and conditions in the Supply Order dated 31.5.1995. The fact that the award was not set aside in its entirety is evident since the other claim awarded being a sum of Rs. 48,712.11 and interest thereon has not been set aside. For avoidance of doubt, we clarify that the judgment of the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms makes express reference to the supply order dated 31.5.1995 in paragraph 3, Page 100, 101, 104, 106 and paragraph 6 at Page 108 and paragraph 8 at Page 111 of the paper book. Furthermore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in clarifying in paragraph 102 as follows :

"Finally on 25.7.1996 the security press informed the claimant that the mod vat credit availed by the claimant after 1996 will be adjusted by deduction of the amount payable to the claimant. Accordingly, the modvat credit availed by the claimant was deducted by the security press."

(emphasis supplied)

Thus, in view of the express contention of the Respondent Press that MODVAT credit availed of by the claimant after 1996 will be adjusted by deduction of the amount payable to the claimant. We find that the Appellant''s contention that amount of Rs. 7,21,909/- which is admittedly claimed from 1994- 95 i.e. prior to 1996 is obviously not part of or could not form part of adjustment by the Respondents. We must state here that even in the award while describing the amount awarded the arbitrator in Point No. 4 has proceeded to describe the same as "value of MODVAT". In fact what the Appellant had claimed was the balance of the price which came to be adjusted to the extent of the value of MODVAT. However, while so adjusting the amount, the Respondent lost sight of the fact that its claim could not include the MODVAT benefit for the period 1994-95 and, therefore, the sum of Rs. 7,21,909/- could not have been so adjusted.

As a result of the above, We pass the following Order :

(a) the Appellants are entitled to receive the amount awarded in paragraph 15(A) of the Award along with interest thereon at 10% from 13.2.2002 till realisation;

(b) the Appellants are entitled to receive an amount of Rs. 7,21,909/- along with interest at 10% from 13.2.2002.

The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.

After the order is pronounced, learned advocate appearing for the respondent prays for stay of the judgment. We do not find any merit in this prayer. Therefore, the prayer is rejected.