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Judgment
This criminal revision filed on behalf of petitioner Chhunna alias Rajjan is directed against the judgment dated 20.04.2000 passed by the Court of X Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.59/1999; whereby the conviction of petitioner/accused Chunna @ Rajjan under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, was affirmed. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years imposed upon him by the trial Court was reduced to the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year.
The case of the prosecution before the trial Court in brief was that petitioner Chhunna had married victim Urmila Bai in March 1988. At that time, her father had given Rs.4000/- in cash, 62 pieces of utensils, a cycle and a watch in dowry, as per his status. Ever since the marriage, petitioner Chhunnalal, his father Radhelal, his mother Shanti Bai, his sister Muggo Bai and his brother Guddu used to beat the victim alleging that she had not brought sufficient dowry. They used to demand Rs.20,000/- in cash and a big vehicle. They used to threaten that if aforesaid items were not brought in dowry, they would not keep the victim well. They used to starve the victim for 2-3 days at a stretch. Petitioner Chhunnalal was a drunkard and a characterless rogue. A case of attempt to murder was pending against him in the Court. When the victim became pregnant, petitioner Chhunnalal took her to her maternal home. At that time also, he beat the victim; whereon, the neighbours of victim had intervened on her behalf. About 2 years after the date of the marriage, the victim gave birth to a daughter on 25.03.1990. Ever since she was dropped at her maternal home for delivery, she is living in her maternal home. Petitioner Chhunnalal has kept another woman as his wife. Meanwhile, he visited her maternal home twice or thrice but did not take the victim back with him on different pretexts. The remaining accused persons namely Shanti Bai, Radhelal, Gudda and Muggo Bai used to visit her maternal home and blame her for being dark complexioned and they used to beat her. Consequently, the victim filed a written report dated 25.07.1993 before Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur. As a result, the case was registered on 18.07.1993.
A final report under section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed against petitioner Chhunnalal and his parents Radhelal and Shanti Bai, brother Guddu @ Manoj and sister Muggo Bai under section 498-A and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. After trial, they were convicted by the trial Court under aforesaid two provisions by judgment dated 29.07.1999 passed in Criminal Case No.513/1996 and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 years each, and a fine in the sum of Rs.2000/- each under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months each and a fine in the sum of Rs.1000/- each under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Each of them was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 6 months each, in default of payment of fine imposed under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and 3 months of rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of fine under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Petitioner Chhunnalal and co-accued persons Shanti Bai, Radhelal, Guddu @ Manoj and Muggo Bai challenged the conviction and the sentence imposed upon them before X Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Appeal No.59/1999. By impugned judgment dated 20.04.2000, co-accused persons Shanti Bai, Radhelal, Guddu @ Manoj and Muggo Bai were acquitted of the charges under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; however, the conviction of petitioner Chhunnalal under aforesaid two provisions, was affirmed and the substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment imposed upon him under section 498- A of the Indian Penal Code was reduced from 2 years to 1 year. However, the fine and the default stipulation imposed upon him under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and the substantive jail sentence, fine and default stipulation imposed upon him under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, was maintained.
The appellate Court has observed in paragraph no.10 of the impugned judgment dated 20.04.2000 that it appears that victim Urmila Bai had exaggerated the incident of beating and dowry demand so that father, mother, brother and sister of the present petitioner would also be convicted and punished for dowry harassment. The testimony of victim Urmila Bai with regard to role of Shanti Bai, Radhelal, Guddu @ Manoj and Muggo Bai was not supported by independent witnesses; therefore, it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons, other than petitioner Chhunnalal, also used to demand Rs.20,000/- in cash and a vehicle in dowry and used to beat up the victim because their demand was not met. Consequently, aforesaid four co- accused persons namely Shanti Bai, Radhelal, Guddu @ Manoj and Muggo Bai were acquitted of the offence punishable under sections 498-A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
So far as petitioner Chhunna is concerned, it was observed that on the basis of statements of victim Urmila Bai, her father Gasitelal and other prosecution witnesses, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had demanded cash and a vehicle in dowry and for fulfillment of aforesaid demand, he used to beat up victim Urmila Bai. The aforesaid conduct of petitioner Chhunnalal fell under the category of ''cruelty'' as defined under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, his conviction under section 498-A and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was upheld.
The impugned order has been challenged on behalf of the petitioner/accused Chhunna @ Rajjan mainly on the ground that the marriage of the petitioner took place in the year March 1988. Admittedly, the victim gave birth to a female child about two years thereafter i.e. on 25-3-1990. Likewise, the parties are admittedly living separately since the time when the victim became pregnant and she was sent by the petitioner to her maternal home. However, the FIR was lodged on 18.07.1993 i.e. after a delay of more than 3 years. As such, the cognizance of the offence by the trial Court was barred by law of limitation. Inviting attention of the Court to the statement of Meena (PW-3) and Ranjana (PW-4), it has been contended that there are numerous material contradictions and omissions which dent the credibility of the prosecution case. It has further been submitted that no independent witness has been recorded with regard to dowry harassment at the matrimonial home of the victim but on the basis of the fact that the petitioner had gone to her maternal home and demanded dowry and beat her up, it was presumed that she must have been subjected to same kind of treatment in her matrimonial home as well.
It is true that ordinarily under revisionary jurisdiction, the High Court would not meticulously re-appreciate the evidence, as if in an appeal. However, where the appreciation of evidence is grossly improper, the revisionary Court cannot shut its eyes. As per prosecution case itself, the marriage between the parties was solemnized in the year 1988. Two years thereafter, i.e. on 25.03.1990, a daughter was born to the victim. During her pregnancy, petitioner Chhunna had taken her to her maternal home and she has been living at her maternal home ever since. Thus, she must be living at her maternal home from sometime between 25.06.1989 and 25.03.1990. The first information report was lodged on 25.07.1993. It has been vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the cognizance was time barred. The trial Court has considered this aspect of the matter in detail and has come to a conclusion that an offence under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is continuing one. As per prosecution case, the petitioner had visited the maternal home of the victim even after the birth of the child and had demanded dowry and had beaten her up. Therefore, the appellate Court held that the cognizance was not barred by law of limitation. However, in the opinion of this Court, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the petitioner had visited the maternal home of the victim, even after the birth of her daughter and had subjected her to cruelty and dowry harassment at her maternal home and therefore the cognizance was within limitation, there can be no doubt that longer the delay in lodging FIR after the victim started living permanently at her maternal home, weaker the prosecution case would be. Thus, probative force of the prosecution evidence in general, has suffered due to inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. The Courts below ought to have appreciated the evidence in the light of aforesaid fact. It ought to have scrutinized the evidence more minutely.
Thus, the main ground on which the petitioner has been convicted is that he used to visit the maternal home of the victim even after she had gone to her maternal home. However, in her examination-in-chief, she gave a different version on aforesaid point. She has stated that when after giving birth to a daughter, she had gone to her matrimonial home. The accused persons taunted her for giving birth to a daughter and had beaten her up and had expelled her. When her husband came to drop her at her maternal home, he had beaten her and had also beaten her younger brother and sister. She had lodged a written report (Ex.P/1) in Mahila Thana, whereas in paragraph no.2 of her cross-examination, she admits that she has been living in her maternal home ever since she was dropped there by her husband when she was 7 months pregnant. In paragraph no.5 of her cross- examination, she categorically states that she did not lodge any written report in Mahila Thana but she had made an oral complaint.
Meena Bai (PW-3) and Gita Bai (PW-5) are neighbours of the victim. They have supported the prosecution case on the point that when the petitioner had gone to the maternal home of the victim to drop her, he had beaten the victim, her brother and sister. None of the aforesaid witnesses states at what time the aforesaid incident had taken place. They have given very general and cursory kind of statements. Meena Bai (PW-3) has admitted in her cross-examination that she was brought to the Court by victim Urmila Bai, who had instructed her to give statement against Chhunnalal and his family members. She had also instructed her to give statement to the effect that they were demanding a vehicle. She also admitted that she had given statement, as instructed by Urmila Bai, though at the end she had added that she was stating whatever she had seen; however, in paragraph 4, she has admitted that for a period of about 2 1/2 years after the marriage of Urmila Bai, there was no dispute between the parties. Another independent witness Rajni (PW-8) has simply stated that petitioner Rajjan had come and had beaten Urmila and her brother and sister. She has not given any time and date of the incident. She has not even clearly stated that when the incident took place when she was present. She has also admitted that she had given statement to the police a month and a half after the date of the incident.
In aforesaid circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, the prosecution evidence is very scratchy and full of glaring discrepancies. Even if it is assumed that the cognizance was not barred by law of limitation, the FIR has been lodged after an inordinate delay, which has affected the credibility of the prosecution evidence. The testimony of so called independent witnesses appeared to be concocted, as they have given perfunctory statements shorn of necessary details.
In aforesaid circumstances, the appellate Court grossly erred in holding that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner is entitled to benefit of doubt arising with regard to the prosecution case from aforesaid factors and deserves to be acquitted.
Consequently, the criminal revision succeeds. The conviction and sentence of the petitioner Chhunna under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is set aside. He is acquitted of aforesaid charges.