Gain Chand vs State of Haryana

S.S. Sudhalkar, J.—The petitioners have filed this application for anticipatory bail in connection with FIR No. 397 dated 3.8.1997, registered at Police Station Pundri, District Kaithal, for the offence under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Interim anticipatory bail was granted to the petitioners. Thereafter, the complainant made an application being Crl. M. 27518 of 1997 to implead her as respondent No. 2. The said application was allowed. The complainant had also earlier submitted written statement alongwith documents. The same is also being taken into consideration.

1 have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the State and learned Counsel for the complainant-respondent No. 2.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that the maximum sentence for both the offences alleged against the petitioners is three years and fine and that by granting anticipatory bail, the investigation is not likely to hamper and that even police remand was not granted by the learned Judicial Magistrate and nothing remains to be recovered from the petitioners and, therefore, anticipatory bail be granted to them.

The learned Counsel for the complainant has vehemently objected to the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners. He has produced the translated version of the FIR at Annexure R1 and has contended that the petitioners while reproducing the FIR have dropped certain portions and they have deliberately done it and therefore, pentitioners should not be granted anticipatory bail. The petitioners have reproduced the FIR in the petition itself. Comparing it with Annexure R1, it is apparent that certain portion of the FIR is missing. However, it can be found that in the FIR reproduced in the petition, the petitioners have mentioned of giving the dowry, taunting by the petitioners for not giving dowry articles, as per status, threatening divorce if Rs. 35,000/- were not paid, payment of Rs. 35,000/- by the brother of the complainant to the mother-in-law and father-in-law, obtaining signatures of the complainant on blank papers, giving her medicines under the pretext of her ailment and thereby intoxicating her, meeting convened by the complainant''s brother, convening of Panchayat on 21.2.1995, harassment subsequent to holding of Panchayat and further demand of Rs. 50,000/-, her being not taken in the house for non-fulfilment of the demand of Rs. 50,000/-, convening of a meeting by her brother, uncle Sat Pal Sharma, Dr. Narain Sharma and other close relatives and other respectable persons like R.P. Attri and Ram Nath taking the complainant to Teha on 24.2.1996, mis-appropriation of dowry articles when the Panchayat reached there, turning of the complainant and all the relatives out from the house, lodging of DDR No. 23 dated 24.2.1996 at Police Station, Bilaspur, convening Panchayat of Brahman Sabha three days thereafter regarding not allowing the relatives to enter the house and shifting of the dowry articles, the meeting being attended by other respectable persons of the village, father-in-law and husband of the complainant feeling sorry at the meeting for the demand of dowry, beating and mis-appropriation of dowry articles etc. and the promise that the complainant will be treated nicely.

The facts missing in the FIR reproduced by the petitioners and as per Annexure R1 are regarding taking the complainant back to their house at Teha at that very moment in front of the Panchayat, reporting the matter to the police at Bilaspur vide Report No. 19dated 27.2.1996, in-laws starting trouble after some days and raising demand for dowry, her (complainant) writing two letters to her brother and mother, in-laws beating her daily and demanding more dowry, threatening to kill the complainant by burning her, not giving her meals, her brother, mother and others taking her from her in-laws'' house, her staying with her brother and widowed mother, misbehaving with her by her father-in-law and mother-in-law on 27.2.1997 and asking for Rs. 50,000/-, demanded earlier for the school, telling the complainant that she would be taken back if the amount is paid, pressurising her for divorce, threatening to kill if the amount was not paid or divorce was not given, her in-laws beating her. One Suresh Kumar, his wife and other neighbours coming there on hearing her shouts, her in-laws running away on scooter.

Thereafter, there is a list of the dowry articles and the statement as to in whose presence the (sic.) were given. This is the portion missing from the FIR reproduced by the petitioner in the petition; The photo-copy of the FIR, which is in Hindu language, is also produced. The learned Counsel for the petitioners admitted that this was a mistake and has made a statement that the mistake was his and it was not a deliberate one but it was inadvertently made because he missed certain pages of the FIR while translating.

The learned Counsel for the complainant also argued that the concession of interim anticipatory bail has been misused by the petitioners. He has relied on . Annexures R2 to R4, which are the affidavits of Mohinder Pal (brother of the complainant), Shanti Devi (mother of the complainant) and Ram Gopal (brother of the complainant). The affidavits are dated 15.9.1997. In the said affidavits, there is an allegation of the incident on 10.9.1997, when the petitioners came to the village in the shape of Panchayat alongwith some bad elements of the society and cal led the deponents and other witnesses. When they found that no compromise was there, they and their associates threatened the deponents with dire consequences that they will kill the deponents if they made statements before the Court against them. They have further mentioned that they apprehend breach of peace from the side of the petitioners.

Annexure R5 is the copy of Report given by the brother of the complainant viz. Mohinder Pal on 27.2.1996. Annexures R6 and R7 are the letters written by the complainant on 17.3.1996 and 25.3.1996 respectively.

As stated earlier, some part of the FIR has not been reprodued in the petition and learned Counsel for the petitioners has owned his responsibility stating that it was his mistake. The learned Counsel for the complainant has stated that petitioners have not come with clean hands and have suppressed material facts and are not entitled to the concession of anticipatory bail. He has cited before me the case of Welcom Hotel and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said case that when the petitioners obtained ex-parte stay suppressing material facts, they were not entitled to any consideration at the hands of the Court. On this point, he has also cited before me the case of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr. 1994 (5) SLR 73. The Division Bench of this Court in the said case has held that when there was suppression of material facts and there was attempt to mislead the Court, High Court was justified in declining relief in favour of a party who made such attempts.

The principles in these two cases are very clear. However, the question of fact that will have to be seen in this case is whether the petitioners have tried to suppress the material facts. From the FIR as reproduced, it cannot be said that there are no allegations against the petitioners so far as the offence under Sections 406 and 498-A of the I.P.C. is concerned. I have mentioned above what facts have been missed from the facts stated and the facts missing. From all the above facts, it cannot be held that there was deliberate attempt to mislead the Court by not reproducing the part of the FIR. Therefore, I believe the statement made at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that it was his bona fide mistake which resulted into the lapse in not producing part of the FIR. Therefore, the principles stated in the above rulings will not apply to the facts of the present case. I do not, therefore, express any opinion whether those principles can be considered in granting anticipatory bail. The affidavits Annexures R2 to R4 dated 15.9.1997, are for pointing out the misuse of the grant of anticipatory bail. Most of the portions in the said affidavits are reproduced in verbatim. No reason is shown as to why affidavits were sworn so late.

At Annexure R5 is the copy of the DDR, produced by the complainant. It shows that though report was lodged by the brother of the complainant on 24.2.1996, on 27.2.1996, it has been stated by him before the police that the matter has been settled not to take any further action with Report No. 33 dated 24.2.1996. This corroborates the statement made in the FIR by the complainant. Letters Annexures R6 and R7 also corroborate her say. However, at this stage of anticipatory bail, I have not to decide whether the allegations against the accused persons are correct or not because it is for the Trial Court to consider the same at the trial. The question is when for both the offences for which the petitioners are likely to face trial, the maximum sentence is three years and fine, whether anticipatory bail should be granted or not. Regarding misuse of bail, it cannot be held from the evidence shown to me that the petitioners have misused the bail, as alleged, in view of the reasons stated earlier.

The learned Counsel for the complainant argued that most of the dowry articles are still to be recovered. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has stated that prosecution had asked for police remand but that was not granted. This point is not disputed. It may be mentioned at this stage that when the order of interim anticipatory bail was passed, the right of the Investigating Officer to obtain police remand was kept open, to be decided by the concerned Magistrate.

The petitioners have produced a copy of the affidavit of the complainant at Annexure PI. In the body of the said affidavit, the date is not mentioned. However/the attesting witness marked the date as 14.4.1995. The affidavit is in favour of the petitioners. The learned Counsel for the complainant argued that signature of the complainant were taken on blank papers and the said affidavit is the result of it. I do not consider the said affidavit at this stage and it will be open for the Trial Court to consider the rival arguments on this point.

From the above reasons, I find that anticipatory bail can be granted to the petitioners Regarding the duration of anticipatory bail, there is a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Verma v. State and Arn. 1997 (1) R.C.R. 493 in which it has been observed that the order of anticipatory bail will not enure till end of trial but it must be of limited duration as the regular Court could not be bypassed and ordinarily on the expiry of the duration or extended duration, the Court granting anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence placed before it after the investigation has made progress or the charge-sheet is submitted. It was also observed in the said case that limited duration must be determined having regard to the facts of the case and the need to give the accused sufficient time to move the regular Court for bail and that anticipatory bail may be granted for a duration which may extend to the date on which the bail application is disposed of or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to move the higher Court, if they so desire.

This petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed. The order of interim anticipatory bail dated 12.8.1997 deserves to be made absolute for the period mentioned in the order below.

As a result, this petition is allowed. The interim anticipatory bail order dated 12.8.1997 is made absolute alongwith the same terms and conditions. The petitioners shall, within 15 days of their arrest (if not still arrested) file a regular bail application before the competent Court. If the petitioners are already arrested, they shall file a regular bail application before the competent Court within 15 days from the date of this order. If no bail application is filed within the period mentioned above, this order shall automatically terminate. If any such bail application if filed is dismissed, this order shall terminate 15 days thereafter.