Gaffar Ahmad vs State of U.P.and Others

R. K. Gulati, J.—This writ petition is directed against the order dated 6th January, 1996 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Gorakhpur Range, Gorakhpur.

The petitioner is a Police Constable. An enquiry was instituted against him by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mau on a complaint being received about his misbehaviour. The petitioner was served with the chargesheet on 23rd September, 1992. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, District Gorakhpur, the third respondent passed an order on 28th December, 1993 directing forreduction to a lower scale rank� against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of punishment. The appeal was allowed in part by the impugned order dated 6th January, 1996, inasmuch as, the enquiry proceedings were set aside from a specific stage indicated in the appellate order with a direction for a fresh enquiry. It is in this background that the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 6th January, 1996 passed by the Inspector General of Police in appeal.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that while remanding the matter, the appellate authority could not have directed the enquiry to be held at Gorakhpur as under Rule 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, an enquiry against a police officer can be held either in the district in which the act and omission regarding which the enquiry is proposed, taken place, or where the police officer may be posted at the time of the institution of the enquiry. It is not disputed that the earlier enquiry which was set aside in part, was held at Gorakhpur. No objection of this nature was taken either before the enquiry officer, or in appeal. The earlier order of punishment dated 28th December, 1993 was passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gorakhpur, who is arrayed as opposite party No. 3. In these circumstances, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner at this stage to say that the directions to hold the enquiry at Gorakhpur was uncalled for, or was in breach of the rules referred above. The first contention is accordingly rejected.

It was next contended that the appellate authority had no power to remand and consequently the remand order is vitiated in law. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Rule 20 of the rules aforesaid. The said rule, inter alia, speaks about the orders against which an appeal shall lie and also prescribes for the procedure for filing an appeal. The provisions contained in that rule make no reference about the nature of the orders that can be passed by the appellate authority. No other provision under the Act or Rules was referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate the contention under discussion. It is to be remembered that in appeal t'' e petitioner had challenged the order of punishment questioning the validity of the enquiry proceedings. The appellate authority accepting the contention set aside the enquiry proceedings upto the stage where the irregularity was found in conducting the enquiry. Powers conferred by an enabling statute include not only such as are expressly granted, but also, by implication, all powers which are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the object intended to be secured. It is a firmly settled rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. In other words where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing ail such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. It would not be wrong to say that unless the special law creating a right of appeal prescribes a different procedure, the ordinary powers of an appellate court described in the Code of Civil Procedure apply and would be available to an authority discharging quasijudicial functions like in the instant case. The power of remand is anciallary to the main power given to the appellate authority and has to be exercised in aid of the main power. The order directing a remand is generally made where the appellate authority finds that the order appealed against was made without proper investigation or examination or on the facts available in a given case it is not possible to arrive at a decision either way unless a further enquiry is conducted into the matter. In this view of the situation, the appellate authority did not commit any error of law when it set aside the order appealed against in part directing a further enquiry from the stage directed in the appellate order. The second contention is also rejected.

Learned counsel for the petitioner raised yet another argument that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had passed the order dated 28th December, 1993, had no jurisdiction to pass that order of punishment in view of the provisions contained under Rule 7(4) of the Rules referred hereinabove. The appellate authority has directed for a fresh enquiry against the petitioner. The point raised was not taken before the appellate authority. I do not consider it necessary to go into this question at this stage. However, the petitioner will be at liberty to raise the plea in the enquiry proceedings directed by the appellate authority or when it comes to passing of a final order in pursuance of the enquiry.

In the result, subject to the above, the writ petition is rejected in limine.