G. Raniammal vs Commissioner, Corporation of Madras and another

The writ petition is for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the proceedings of the 1st respondent in P.W.D.N. No.

G3/3783/84 dt. September 26, 1990 and to direct the 1st respondent to consider the petitioner''s applications dated February 28, 1983 and

January 20, 1984 and to provide any suitable job to the petitioner with the 1st respondent.

The petitioner is the wife of one Govindan, who died on May 13, 1977 while he was working as a watchman in Velachery Town Panchayat,

after undergoing an operation under Family Planning Scheme. After the death of the petitioner''s husband, the Velachery Town Panchayat has been

merged with the 1st respondent Corporation with effect from June 1, 1978. The petitioner submitted an application on January 28, 1983 to the 1st

respondent seeking suitable appointment for herself on compassionate ground. At that time she was aged 26 years. Again the petitioner made

another application for suitable appointment and January 20, 1984, relying upon G.O. Ms. No. 225, dt. February 15, 1972 and G.O. Ms. No.

1579 Labour and Employment Department dt. July 21, 1981. Thereafter the petitioner was directed to furnish legal heirship certificate, death

extract in connection with her husband''s death, identification certificate, etc. and accordingly the petitioner furnished those particulars in 1989 itself.

Thereafter on May 30, 1989 the petitioner was informed that she could approach the Development Officer, Saidapet as the Family Benefit

Scheme Fund had been settled by the Development Office, Saidapet. Thereafter the petitioner approached the 2nd respondent for a suitable job.

In the meanwhile the 2nd respondent addressed a letter to the 1st respondent seeking certain particulars about the petitioner''s husband.

Subsequently, the 2nd respondent sent a letter to the petitioner stating that since the Velacherry Town Panchayat has been merged with the 1st

respondent Corporation, the 1st respondent alone could provide employment to her and it appears that the Collector also recommended the case

of the petitioner to the 1st respondent by a letter dated February 19, 1990. However, by the impugned order the 1st respondent has rejected the

request of the petitioner mainly on the ground that Velacherry Panchayat has been merged with the respondent after the death of the petitioner''s

husband; and that the Family Benefit Fund has been disbursed by the Development Officer, Saidapet. Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition

has been filed.

Notice of motion has been ordered on April 9, 1991. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the 1st respondent had not rejected

originally the application of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds, and only directed the petitioner to furnish certain certificates

and particulars; that the Velacherry Town Panchayat has been merged with the 1st respondent Corporation on and from June 1, 1978, and

therefore, the 1st respondent alone can give employment of the petitioner on a compassionate ground; that Development Officer, Saidapet has

nothing to do with the employment to the petitioner; that the 2nd respondent by his letter dt. February 19, 1990 has stated clearly that the 1st

respondent alone can provide employment to the petitioner and none else; that though the petitioner has been agitating for employment on

compassionate ground with the 1st respondent right from 1983, only in 1990, the 1st respondent had informed the petitioner that the petitioner

should approach the Development Officer, Saidapet and thus the petitioner has been driven from pillar to post for the last eight years, and the

petitioner was under a bona fide belief that she would be provided with a job but ultimately turned out to be futile one. In support of his contention,

the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on G.O. Ms. No. 73, Employment Services dt. October 26, 1983, read with U.O. Note No.

14924/N2/77-2 dt. April 28, 77 and G.O. Ms. No. 312, Rural Development and Local Administration Department dt. May 29, 1978 by which

Velacherry Town Panchayat has been included with in the limits of the Madras Corporation. The learned counsel for the petitioner further

contended that according to the said Government Order the 1st respondent has to take over all the assets and liabilities of the Velacherry Town

Panchayat and the claim of the petitioner will also come within the term ''liability'' and therefore the 1st respondent is bound to give employment to

the petitioner.

Per contra, Mr. Tamilmani, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, contended that on the date of death of the petitioner''s husband, he was not

an employee of the Velacherry Town Panchayat, that on the date of death of the petitioner''s husband no Government Order was in existence

enabling the petitioner to claim appointment on compassionate grounds and that the Government Orders relied on by the learned counsel for the

petitioner are not applicable to the case of the petitioner; that in none of the Government Orders referred to above, it is mentioned that local

authority will also come within the purview of the said Government Orders; that there was no liability on the part of the 1st respondent to give

employment to the petitioner on a compassionate ground and that the 1st respondent Corporation has got certain procedures with regard to the

appointments to the legal heirs of the employees of the Corporation on the compassionate ground and since the petitioner''s husband was not an

employee of the Corporation of Madras at the time of his death, the petitioner cannot seek employment on compassionate ground.

The 2nd respondent has not filed any counter.

I have considered the arguments of the respective counsel and perused the relevant files. There is no dispute that the husband of the petitioner

was working as a watchman under the Velacherry Town Panchayat at the time of his death, and there cannot be any dispute that on and from June

1, 1978 the Velacherry Town Panchayat has come within the control and jurisdiction of the Madras Corporation. When the petitioner approached

the 1st respondent for suitable job on compassionate grounds in the year 1983-84 the 1st respondent directed the petitioner in the year 1989 to

approach the Development Officer, Saidapet, who is stated to have settled the Family Benefit Fund to the petitioner consequent upon the death of

the petitioner''s husband. When the petitioner approached the District Collector, she was directed to approach the 2nd respondent for

employment. Moreover, the 2nd respondent by his letter dated February 19, 1990 has clearly stated that it is only the 1st respondent who can

decide about the employment to the petitioner on compassionate ground. It is also not denied that the 1st respondent is providing employment to

the deceased employees of the Corporation on compassionate ground. The only objection of the 1st respondent is that the petitioner''s husband

was working in Velacherry Town Panchayat at the time of his death and therefore, he cannot claim employment under the 1st respondent. I am

unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner.

It is not the fault of the petitioner, that the Velacherry Town Panchayat has been included in the limits of Madras corporation. Admittedly at the

time of merger, the entire assets and liabilities of the Velacherry Town Panchayat have been taken over by the Madras Corporation. As such, in

my view, though the Government Orders referred to above are not strictly applicable to the petitioner''s case herein, when the Corporation of

Madras is providing appointment to the legal heir of the deceased employees, on compassionate ground, there is no reason why the same practice

is not followed in the case of the petitioner, whose husband died while he was in the service of the Velacherry Town Panchayat, which has been

merged with the Corporation. Further the reasons given by the 1st respondent in the impugned order rejecting the claim of the petitioner are

unreasonable. The inclusion of Velacherry Town Panchayat, where the petitioner''s husband was working at the time of his death within the

Madras Corporation limits is not because of the fault of the petitioner as I have stated already. The petitioner has rightly applied for appointment on

compassionate grounds to the 1st respondent in 1984 and only after nearly five years the petitioner has been informed to approach the

Development Officer, Saidapet. Later, the 2nd respondent directed the petitioner to approach the 1st respondent, who alone could consider the

appointment for the petitioner on compassionate ground. Thus it is clear that the petitioner has been driven from pillar to post for the last seven

years unnecessarily. When the Corporation of Madras has taken the entire assets and liabilities of the Velacherry Town Panchayat, it is only the 1st

respondent who alone can consider the appointment to the petitioner on compassionate ground. For all practical purposes, in my view, the

petitioner has to be treated as the wife of the deceased employee of the Corporation so as to enable her to seek appointment for herself on

compassionate ground, otherwise Article 14 of the Constitution of India will stare at the face of the Corporation.

Though the principle of promissory estoppel may not be applicable strictly to this case, but still it can be said that had the petitioner been

informed, immediately after the receipt of her application for an appointment on compassionate ground, she could have saved six or seven years by

seeking employment elsewhere. But unnecessarily the petitioner had been kept under false hopes from 1984, when the petitioner made her

application for appointment on compassionate ground, till 1989, when she was informed that she could approach the Development Officer,

Saidapet, and that too, after directing the petitioner to furnish certain documents in support of her claim and after receiving the same from the

petitioner. When the petitioner was asked to furnish certain documents in support of her claim, she was put under a belief that she may be given

appointment on compassionate ground in the 1st respondent-Corporation itself. Though the petitioner had not altered her position at any point of

time to attract the principles of promissory estoppel, in this connection it is relevant to note the following observation of the Supreme Court

reported in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., :

Now the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well established in the administrative law of India. IT represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid

injustice and, though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The basis of this

doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always been true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law. This doctrine though of

ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was in his celebrated judgment in Central London

Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. 1956 1 ALL ER 256.. The true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his

word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal

relationship to arise in the future knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is

made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party the promise or presentation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be

entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the

parties. It has often been said in England that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action; it can only be a shield and

not a sword; but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a result of the decision of this Court in

Motilal Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1979 20 SCR 641, it is now well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its

application only to defense but it can also found a cause of action. The decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills case (supra) contains an

exhaustive discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with the various parameters of this doctrine

outlined in that decision.

The Supreme Court has again in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), affirmed the said principle referring to the judgment

of Lord Denning in Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd., 1956 3 All ER 905 and that passage has been quoted with an

approval in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, . In the said decision Delhi Cloth and General Mills

Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), the Supreme Court has observed :

We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered detriment as

a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee were to recede from

his promise then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the

promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promissor were allowed to go back on the

promise.

So on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court as above, I am of the view, that the petitioner has been hoping to get an appointment on

compassionate ground for all these years till 1989 from 1984, and it is not open to the 1st respondent now to say that the petitioner can approach

the Development Officer, Saidapet for appointment on compassionate ground and the petitioner''s husband was not an employee of the

Corporation at the time of his death. Under such circumstances, I am of the view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set

aside. The writ petition shall stand allowed. The 1st respondent is directed to consider the petitioner for suitable appointment on compassionate

ground taking into account that the petitioner is a young widow aged years and who lost her husband at her early age and the 1st respondent shall

pass orders in this regard on or before March 1, 1992. No costs.