AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Rule nisi. The learned Government Pleader for School Education took notice for the respondents. The writ petition was heard finally with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties.
The petitioner claims to be a physically handicapped person but not blind. In this writ petition lie sought a writ in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring Rule 6 of the Teachers Recruitment Notification, 1998, dated 15-3-1998 issued by the Director of School Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad for not giving relaxation of qualifying marks to the Orthopaedically handicapped candidates as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and against the reservation policy and for a consequential direction to the respondents to select and appoint the petitioner either as School Assistant (Social Studies) or S.G, Teacher under physically handicapped reservation without insisting the minimum qualifying marks.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that the respondents having relaxed the qualifying marks in the case of physically handicapped blinds ought to have extended the same relaxation in the case of the petitioner and the like also and the failure on the part of the respondents to do so amounts to invidious discrimination and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Rule 6 of the Teachers Recruitment Notification, 1998 dated 15-3-1998 reads as under:
"The selection procedure includes 85 marks of written test and 15 marks for interview. In case of O.C. candidates, in the written test, the candidates are required to get atleast 50 marks out of 85 marks, in order to get themselves eligible for the interview. In case of B.Cs. the minimum qualifying marks are 45, out of 85 marks, and in case of S.C./S.Ts. and P.M. (blinds only) the minimum qualifying marks are 40 out of 85 marks. The number of candidates for the posts will be limited to the ratio of 1:3."
As could be seen from Rule 6, relaxation in the matter of qualifying marks, is extended among the other classes, to physically handicapped blinds only. Relaxation does not embrace of the petitioner and the like who are also physically handicapped who are not blind. The only question which falls for consideration is whether the petitioner and the like and the physically handicapped blinds, belong to the same class and whether the respondents treated the petitioner differently without good reasons.
It is true that since the guarantee to equal protection enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution embraces the entire realm of ''State Action'', it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the mater of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also in the matter of granting privileges, exemptions and concessions. In all these cases, the principle is that there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the impugned action, their position is the same. In other words, the action of the State must not be arbitrary but must be based on some valid principle which itself must not be irrational or discriminatory. However, the principle of equality does not mean that every State action must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. It is well settled that if a State action deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it lias no application to other persons. It is also equally well settled that it is for the State to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of its action and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the State action are left out would not render the action in any manner discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. When a State action is challenged as a denying equal protection, the question for determination by the Court is not whether it has resulted in inequality, but whether there is some difference which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment or inequality of burden does not perse amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary and that it does not rest on any rational basis. The classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically complete.
In the instant case, it cannot be said that the petitioner and the like and the physically handicapped blinds belong to the same class in terms of nature, attainment or circumstance, having regard to their position. The classification made by the respondents and extending relaxation in the matter of acquiring qualifying marks, in my considered opinion, is grounded on sound intelligible differentia. The petitioner and the like and the physically handicapped blinds can be treated differently within the permissible classification under Article 14 of the Constitution.
No ground in made for interference. The writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.