G. Narayanaswami Nayudu, Receiver of Nidadavole and Medur Estates vs N. Subramanyam

Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.—Plaintiff, the receiver of the Nidadavole estate sues to recover possession of certain lands let to the Defendant in

fasli 1320 together with mesne profits. His case is that the letting was for one year, and that the Defendant is holding over after the expiry of the

term. The Defendant pleads that he has acquired the occupancy right to these lands u/s 6 of the Estates Land Act. The lower Court has dismissed

the suit and the Plaintiff appeals.

The principal question which arises for determination in the appeal is whether Venkatapuram agraharam in which the suit lands are situate is an

estate within the meaning of Section 3, Sub-section 2, Clause (d) of the Estates Land Act. Venkatapuram agraharam is an inam village belonging to

Bala Venkateswaia Swami and the grant seems to have been made by a former Zamindar of Nuzvid. The Plaintiff sues as trustee of the temple.

The Venkatapuram agraharam is described in the various documents filed in the case as the sarva or rent-free agraharam of Sri. Bala

Venkateswara Swami, and this description ocours from the earliest times. (See Exhibit H, the Jamabandi Account for fasli 1268.) This would

obviously mean that the whole village of Venkatapuram belonged to the temple as inam. However, there are certain minor inams in this village

which appear to be of three classes; one class of inams being archaka service inams, another class being village service inams and the third dharma

dhaya inams. It does not appear whether the grant to the temple of the village was made first or Whether the minor inams were granted first.

The Appellant contends that inasmuch as there are these minor inams in the same village, it would not be said that the Venkatapuram agraharam

is a village of ''which the land revenue has been granted as inam within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 2(d) of the Act, his contention being that

inasmuch, as the land revenue on some of the lands in the village had been granted as inam to third parties, it cannot be said that the temple is the

grantee of the revenue of that village. We are unable to agree in this contention. The definition in Sub-section 2, Clause (d) was obviously intended

to exclude from the definition of ""Estate"" what are known as minor inams, namely, particular extents of land in a particular village as contrasted with

the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter are known as ""whole inam villages."" The existence of ""minor inams"" in whole inam

villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the definition of ""Estate"" almost all the agraharam, shrotriyam and mokhasa

Tillages will be excluded. This certainly cannot have been the intention of the legislature. These minor inams are generally granted for services to be

rendered to the village or to the owner and that seems to be the nature of the minor inams in this case. In all the documents the temple is described

as the owner of the whole village and in these circumstances the burden is upon the Plaintiff to show that the grant was only of the revenue of a

portion of the lands in the village and he has not put in evidence the inam register which would have supported his case if true. We therefore

disallow this contention.

It is next contended that it is not shown that the inamdar, that is, the temple, was not the owner of the kudivaram at the time of the grant which

again would take the case put of the definition of an estate. The evidence which is discussed in paragraphs 15 to 17 of the lower Court''s judgment

shows clearly that the inamdar, namely, the temple was not owner of the kudivaram at the time of the grant. We therefore hold that the

Venkatapuram agraharam of which Sri. Bala Venkateswara Swami is the inamdar or the agraharamdar is an estate within the meaning of Clause

(d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Estates Land Act. Mr. Nagabhushanam for the Appellant also argued that the suit lands are not ""ryoti

lands,"" but are ""old waste."" In the muchilika, Exhibit B, executed by the Defendant, these lands are described as ""jeroyati lands,"" and in Exhibit IX,

a previous lease of the same lands, they are described as ""mamul wet."" We hold therefore that these lands are not proved to be ""old waste""; but

are ""ryoti lands.

The Appellant finally contended that the receiver is not a landholder within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. It is admitted that the definition

of ""landholder"" in Section 3 includes the Plaintiff. But it is said that unless the landholder is also a beneficial owner of the estate, he is not a

landholder within the meaning of Section 6. We do not see any reason to put any such restricted construction on the word ""landholder,"" in that

section. A receiver must have the same powers of management as an owner, and letting a tenant into possession of cultivable lands in the estate

would ordinarily be included in the power of management. We agree in the conclusions of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.