G. Narayanaswami Naidu and Others vs The Inspector of Police

P.V. Rajamannar, C.J.—These are applications filed u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on behalf of certain persons ostensibly

detained under the provisions of Madras Act I of 1947, praying that they may be set at liberty on the ground that they were being illegally and

improperly detained. Some of the applications were filed on or before 25th May, 1948, while the rest of the applications were filed subsequent to

that date. Objection was taken that the applications were not maintainable on account of Section 16-A of the Act which was inserted by Clause 4

of Ordinance No. II of 1948 promulgated by His Excellency the Governor on 25th May, 1948. It runs thus:

Nothing in Section 491, Sub-sections (1) and (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply to any person detained, or deemed to

have been detained, u/s 2 of this Act by the Provincial Government or any officer or authority authorized by them in that behalf.

In reply to this objection, learned Counsel for the petitioners raised objections to the validity of Section 16-A of the Act and also contended that in

any event it would not apply to any of the petitions either actually pending on the date of the Ordinance or filed subsequently. He set forth his

contentions in the following memorandum:

In the matter of Criminal Miscellaneous Applications made u/s 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and awaiting disposal or in the process of filing

in the Registry of the High Court Office, the New Madras Ordinance ''The last clause therein'' has been pleaded in Bar and some of the

applications recently filed have been returned.

In support of the position, namely, that the High Court''s jurisdiction notwithstanding the new Ordinance remains intact, the following legal

submissions are sought to be made:

The New Madras Ordinance, that part of which seeks to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, is ultra

vires of the Governor (and the Provincial Legislature) as the High Court''s powers shall remain paramount subject only to the legislative Powers of

the Governor-General in Council. The subject''s rights u/s 491 are substantive rights and not of the nature of the procedural rights and do not fall

under either list 2 or 3 of the Government of India Act.

The clause numbered 16(a) of the New Ordinance is manifestly repugnant to Clause 44 of the Letters Patent as well as Section 223 of the

Government of India Act, 1935. It is also contrary to the spirit of the Instrument of Instructions to the Madras Governor.

In any event the New Ordinance limiting the powers of the High Court cannot affect the pending cases or the vested right u/s 491, Criminal

Procedure Code, of the persons already detained.

If it was meant to apply to the pending cases, or in other words to operate retrospectively, the Ordinance would have stated it as the main Act

itself has done in Section 16, clause a, where the pending cases have been expressly referred to.

Under all circumstances the High Court''s Power cannot be taken away and must remain supreme in order to see, by directions of the nature of

habeas corpus, that the particular person or persons detained or deemed to be detained actually fall under the provisions of the given Act. Where

any case is seen to be outside the four corners of the Act or vitiated by mala fides on the part of the detaining authority, then High Court alone can

set matters right u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code.

When the applications came on for hearing before Yahya Ali, J., during the vacation on 1st June, 1948, the learned Judge considered that as the

objections raised appeared to be of vast constitutional and public importance, they should be heard and disposed of by a Bench rather than by him

sitting singly. He therefore adjourned all the applications and directed that the papers may be placed before me for orders. I thought it desirable

that the cases, in so far as it raised points of constitutional importance, should be heard by a Special Bench of three Judges. Accordingly, a Special

Bench was constituted, and many points were argued at length by several learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners and by the learned

Advocate-General on behalf of the Government.

As the validity of the Ordinance generally and Clause 4 of the Ordinance inserting Section 16-A in particular have been impugned, it is

necessary to deal with these objections at the outset. The validity of the Ordinance as a whole is attacked on the ground that the conditions laid

down by Section 88, Sub-section (1) of the Government of India Act have not been complied with. Section 88, Sub-section(1) runs thus:

If at any time when the Legislature of a Province is not in session the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for

him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him to require: Provided that the Governor shall

not, without instructions from the Governor-General, promulgate any such Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing same

provisions would under this Act have been invalid, unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, it had received

assent of the Governor-General.

The preamble to the Ordinance is as follows:

Whereas the Legislature of the Province is not in session, and the Governor of Madras is satisfied that immediate action is necessary for the

purpose of amending the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947;

And whereas the instructions of the Governor-General have been obtained in pursuance of the proviso to Section 88, Sub-section (1), of the

Government of India Act, 1935;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 88, Sub-section (1) aforesaid, the Governor hereby promulgates the following

Ordinance.

Mr. A.K. Pillai, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners developed his contention on this point in the following manner: The Legislature of a

Province must be deemed to be in session till it is dissolved or prorogued. The Legislature of the Madras Province was prorogued only on 24th

May, 1948. The Ordinance was promulgated on the next day, that is, 25th May, 1948. The action of the Governor u/s 88 must be taken not in his

individual discretion but on the advice of his Ministers. The Governor cannot seek or obtain the advice of his Ministers or instructions from the

Governor-General till the Legislature ceases to be in session. Having regard to the short interval between the prorogation of the Legislature and the

promulgation of the Ordinance, it was extremely improbable, if not impossible, that the Governor should have obtained the advice of his Ministers

and then obtained instructions from the Governor-General, after the prorogation of the Legislature. At the beginning of the hearing, there was some

doubt as to when exactly the two Chambers had last met, but the learned Advocate-General informed us that the Legislative Assembly met last on

28th April, 1948, and the Legislative Council met last on 3rd May, 1948, and the meeting of both Chambers stood adjourned sine die.

In answer to specific questions from the Court, learned Counsel for the petitioners were unable to state that it was their definite case that the

Governor had not obtained the advice of the Ministers or that the Governor did not obtain instructions from the Governor-General. On this point,

the only allegations on record are to be found in the affidavit of Mr. N.S. Varadachari, a Member of the Legislative Assembly, filed before us on

14th July, 1948. The affidavit is as follows:

I am a Member of the Legislative Assembly and closely follow the general events in the Province, particularly events in Madras of Public

interest.

The promulgation of the Ordinance No. 2 of 1948, dated 25th May 1948, seeking to amend the Madras Maintenance of Public Safety Act,

1947, came as a surprise to me because the Legislature was then due to meet shortly.

It is significant that the notification in the Extraordinary Gazette of the 25th May, 1948, was meant to be in effect as from the 24th May, 1948. It

was from this notification that we for the first time knew that the Legislature was not to meet as originally arranged, and has been prorogued.

I say that it is physically impossible for the various statutory steps including the meeting of the Cabinet for the formal consideration of the need

for the Ordinance, advising the Governor thereupon and then for the Governor to take instructions from the Governor-General, I say that these

steps which are statutorily necessary before the promulgation of the Ordinance could not possibly have been taken within less than 24 hours

between the prorogation of the Legislature on the 24th May, 1948, and the actual promulgation of the Ordinance on the 25th May, 1948.

I say that to the best of my knowledge His Excellency the Governor of Madras was absent at Ootacamund on the 24th and 25th May, 1948.

There appears to be a slight inaccuracy in paragraph 3 of the affidavit because the Extraordinary Gazette in which the notification as to prorogation

was published is dated the 24th of May, and not the 25th of May. It is clear from this affidavit that the deponent is unable to say that the steps

which in his opinion are statutorily necessary before the promulgation of the Ordinance were not as a matter of fact taken. He only gives his opinion

that the steps could not possibly have been taken.

The learned Advocate-General contended that in the absence of any definite allegation that any of the conditions contained in Section 88, Sub-

section (1) of the Government of India Act were not fulfilled and in the absence of any evidence on the point he was not called upon to meet any

objection raised on that ""score. He also referred us to Section 51(4) of the Government of India Act which is in these terms:

The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any Court.

Mr. Pillai, learned Counsel for the petitioners, conceded that this Court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the question whether any advice was at

all tendered by the Ministers to the Governor, but he contended that it was nevertheless open to this Court to hold that no advice could have been

in the circumstances tendered because what he called the "" time factor "" made it most improbable. In other words, he asked us to give a finding on

the probabilities on a question on which we are precluded from giving a finding after a regular inquiry. This contention must be stated only to be

repelled. Sub-section (4) of Section 51, in my opinion, completely prohibits the Court from going into the question whether or not any advice was

tendered by the Ministers to the Governor, and that prohibition would equally apply to the question whether or not any advice could have been

tendered by the Ministers to the Governor.

I agree with learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Legislature must be deemed to be in session till it is prorogued or dissolved. Under Rule

3(a) of the Rules for the Madras Legislative Assembly, ""A session of the Assembly is terminated by prorogation."" The following passage from

May''s Parliamentary Practice, 14th Edition, is apposite:

A session is the period of time between the meeting of a Parliament, whether after a prorogation or dissolution, and its prorogation.... During the

course of a session either House may adjourn itself of its own motion to such date as it pleases. The period between the prorogation of Parliament

and its reassembly in a new session is termed a ''recess''; while the period between the adjournment of either House and the resumption of its sitting

is generally called an ''adjournment.'' A prorogation terminates a session; an adjournment is an interruption in the course of one and the same

session.

As the sessions of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council were prorogued only on 24th May, 1948 (vide G.O. No. 1284 Public

(Elections) dated 24th May, 1948), the Legislature of the Province must be deemed to have been in session till 24th May, though the meetings of

the two Chambers were adjourned sine die. But actually the Ordinance was promulgated on 25th May at a time when the Legislature of the

Province was admittedly not in session. It was also contended that the Governor must be satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it

necessary for him to take immediate action only when the Legislature was not in session and likewise he could seek and obtain instructions from

the Governor-General only when the Legislature was not in session. It is not necessary to give a final opinion on this point because assuming that

the petitioners'' contention is correct, it has not been alleged anywhere, still less proved, that the Governor was satisfied at some time when the

Legislature was in session, and equally it has not been alleged or proved that the Governor obtained the instructions from the Governor-General

when the Legislature was still in session. All that has been pressed upon us is that the interval between the prorogation of the Legislature and the

promulgation of the Ordinance is so short that it was improbable that any of the above steps was taken after the prorogation of the Legislature. Mr.

Pillai frankly said that he cannot assert that the recitals in the preamble to the Ordinance were false. He only emphasized on the "" time factor "" and

the general improbabilities in the circumstances set out above. It does not concern us to say whether the Ordinance should have been promulgated

so soon after the prorogation of the Legislature. This Court is not concerned with questions of policy or the propriety of the action of the

Governor, so long as the action is legal and not vitiated by any defect in procedure. I am therefore unable to agree with the contention on behalf of

the petitioners that the entire Ordinance is invalid on this ground.

The main target of the attack by the petitioners was, of course, Section 16-A inserted by Clause 4 of the Ordinance. Various grounds were put

forward during the course of the arguments on which it was contended that the section was invalid and void, and I shall deal with them in their

logical sequence.

First comes the large contention that it is not competent for the Provincial Legislature to make any law with respect to the subject-matter of

Section 16-A, that is to say, the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the subject does not fall within

any of the items set out in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. Nor does it find a place in List I. The result is-

so the argument ran- that the subject-matter came within the residual powers of legislation conferred on the Governor-General by Section 104,

Sub-section (1) of the Constitution Act which so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this question is in these terms:

The Governor-General may by public notification empower either the Dominion Legislature the Provincial Legislature to enact a law with respect

to any matter not enumerated in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to this Act.

As admittedly there is no public notification as contemplated in that section, it is urged that the Provincial Legislature is not competent to enact in

respect of that matter.

There can be no doubt that Section 104 cannot be called in aid of the petitioners'' argument unless we are driven to the conclusion that the

subject-matter of Section 16-A is not covered by any of the items in any of the Lists. On this point, the proper approach is to be found in the

observations of the learned Chief Justice of India in Manikkasundara Bhaitar v. R.S. Nayudu (1946) 2 M.L.J. 17 : 9 F.L.J. 57:

We cannot believe that such a far-reaching curtailment of legislative powers would have been made in a sphere of legislation of such importance to

British India by mere silent omission. Rather we should have expected, if such had been the intention of Parliament, to have found some express

prohibition or curtailment of legislation on these subjects, such as is to be found in Section 108 of the Act. We should moreover in any event prefer

a construction which would enable legislation on a subject of such vital importance in India to be enacted by some legislative body rather than leave

it to be dealt with u/s 104. * * * *

But when there is a choice between two possible constructions of an entry or entries, one of which will result in legislative power being conferred

by some entry or entries in the Lists and the other in a finding of no existing power, but if legislation is required that recourse must be had to

Section 104, the first construction should on principles analogous to those applied to the Canadian Constitution be preferred...Lastly, such a

construction should be preferred where there is actual legislation on the subject, in which case the Court will incline to a construction which will

give validity to such legislation.

Now, are we driven to say that the subject-matter of Section 16-A, that is, Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not covered by

any of the items in the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule. I am clearly of opinion that we are not so driven. The subject-matter can properly fall

within either item 2 of List III or items 1 and 2 of List II. Item 2 of List III is as follows: ""Criminal Procedure including all matters included in the

Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act."" Prima facie it would appear that this item covers the jurisdiction of the High

Court u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because it was certainly a matter included in that Code at the material date. Mr. N.S. Mani, one

of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, strenuously contended that this item would not comprise Section 491 because it was not a matter of

mere procedure but a matter of a substantive right. Assuming that it is, nevertheless the question remains whether having been included in the Code

of Criminal Procedure it would not fall thin the item. Much controversy arose on the interpretation of the word "" including."" Mr. Mani''s contention

was that only matters of procedure included in the Code of Criminal Procedure would be comprised in the item. If that were so, the whole clause

would be superfluous and otiose, because the expression, "" criminal procedure "" would be sufficient to connote them. The decision of the Judicial

Committee relied on by him in Rajah Bijoy Singh v. Surendra Narayan Singh (1928) 55 M.L.J. 456 : 55 L.R. IndAp 320 : ILR 56 Cal. 1 (P.C.)

has no bearing on the point. In that case, a patni lease was granted by a Zamindar. The document of lease contained the words, "" The entire

zamindari including all interests therein."" It was contended that by these words it was intended to grant a lease not only of the surface of the land

but also of the sub-soil with a right to use the same for any purpose which the grantee wished, even if such user caused substantial damage to the

subject of the lease. This contention was repelled as in Their Lordships'' opinion "" including all interests therein "" did not increase the corpus of the

subject of the lease. Two other cases were cited by the learned Advocate-General which appears to me to be more relevant. In Stewart v.

Brojendra Kishore AIR (1930) Cal. 628 item 4 of the Concurrent List came up for construction. That item is similar to item 2 and runs thus:

Civil Procedure, including the Law of Limitation and all matters included in the CPC at the date of the passing of this Act.

It was held by Mitter and B.N. Rau, JJ., that the provisions of the CPC itself, whether they are "" Civil Procedure "" in a limited sense or not, were

specifically included in the entry, but there was no warrant for including in that entry any provisions which were not in the Code and which did not

appertain to "" Civil Procedure."" In Vishwanath Narayan Singh v. Sri Mahant Hanhar Gir ILR (1938) Pat 714, the same item 4 was the subject of

interpretation. The learned Judges say:

This item makes '' Civil Procedure '' a Concurrent Legislative subject ''Civil Procedure '' includes Law of Limitation and all matters included in the

CPC as it stood on me day the Government of India Act was passed. In other words, all matters whether relating to procedure or not included in

the CPC on the date of the passing of the Government of India Act are Concurrent Legislative Subjects. The words ''and all matters, etc., enlarge

the subjects of Concurrent Legislation by including every matter included in the CPC on the date of passing of the Government of India Act.

On this analogy, all matters whether relating to procedure or not included in the Code of Criminal Procedure on the date of the passing of the

Government of India Act would be Concurrent Legislative Subjects. In my opinion, the word including is used as a word of enlargement and not of

restriction. As Lord Watson in Dilwortn v. Commissioner of Stamps, Dilworth v. Commissioner for Land and Income Tax (1899) A.C 99 says:

The word ''include'' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the

statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their

natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they small include.

In Mellows v. Low (1923) 1 K.B. 522 McCardie, J., observed thus:

In my view the word '' includes '' as used in paragraph (g) is not a term of limitation or precise definition; it means what it says-that it includes the

matters thereafter mentioned; in other words it is a word of enlargement rather than of restriction.

Item 2, therefore, can properly be held to comprise the subject-matter of Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Assuming it does not, then it must fall within items 1 and 2 of List II. Items 1 and 2, so far as they are material, are as follows:

I. Public order (but not including the use of His Majesty''s naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power); the administration of justice;...

preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; persons subject to such detention.

Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court with respect to any of the matters in this List.

It was conceded on behalf of the petitioners that Madras Act I of 1947 originally enacted and the provisions other than Section 16-A inserted

by Madras Ordinance II of 1948 are directly covered by item 1. The Act which is called the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was

intended to provide for preventive detention, etc., for the maintenance of public-safety and to prevent and put down disorders involving menace to

the peace and tranquility of the province. In so far as Section 16-A purports to affect the jurisdiction and power of the High count with respect to

the matters in item i, namely, preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order and persons subject to such

detention, it would seem that its subject-matter falls directly within item 2.

Having regard to these items both in List III and List II, it is impossible to agree with the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the subject-

matter of Section 16-A is not covered by any of the items in any of the Lists and that recourse should be had to the powers conferred u/s 104 of

the Government of India Act before any Legislature could proceed to enact in respect of it.

The next alternative contention on behalf of the petitioners is based on Section 107, Sub-section (1) of the Government of India Act, which

runs thus:

If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Dominion law which the Dominion Legislature is competent to enact or to

airy provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, then, subject to the provisions of

this section, the Dominion law, whether passed before or after the Provincial law, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the

Provincial law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

The arguments of learned Counsel on this aspect of the case were not consistent and were often difficult to follow. That section deals with

repugnancy or inconsistency and not with in competency. If the argument based on Section 104 of the Government of India Act fails, and in my

opinion, it should fail as I have already held, then there can be no question of the Provincial Legislature not being competent to enact Section 16-A,

whether its subject-matter falls within List II or List III. Though it was strenuously contended at one time that the subject-matter of Section 16-A

was not a matter enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, yet for the purpose of this part of the argument, it was evidently assumed by

learned Counsel for the petitioners that it was such a matter. On that assumption, it was contended that Section 16-A was a provision of a

Provincial law which was repugnant to a provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative

List, that is, to Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore void. As this was not sufficient for their purpose, learned Counsel

went further and contended that Sub-section (2) of Section 107 has no application to the case. This attitude they had to take perforce because of

the proviso to Section 88, Sub-section (1) of the Act and to the fact that the proviso has been complied with. If Section 107, Sub-section (2),

applied to the case, then any repugnancy would have been cured by the reservation of the Act for the consideration of the Governor-General and

by his assent. The corresponding provision for an Ordinance is the proviso above referred to, and it would follow that the repugnancy would be

equally cured. Section 107, Sub-section (2) is in the following terms:

Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent Legislative List contains any provision repugnant to the

provisions of an earlier Dominion law or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial law having been reserved for the

consideration of the Governor-General has received the assent of the Governor-General, the Provincial law shall in that Province prevail, but

nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter: Provided that no Bill or amendment

for making any provision repugnant to any Provincial law, which, having been so reserved, has received the assent of the Governor-General shall

be introduced or moved in the Dominion Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.

The implications of the argument may be developed thus: The two Sub-sections of Section 107 are not necessarily connected with each other.

There may be cases to which Section 107, Sub-section (1) alone would apply but not Sub-section (2) and this is such a case. This is supposed to

follow from the difference in the language employed in the two Sub-sections, namely, "" any provision of a Provincial law "" in Sub-section (1) and

a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List,"" in Sub-section (2). It was urged that Madras

Act I of 1947 and the rest of the Ordinance after excluding Section 16-A deal exclusively with matters enumerated in the Provincial List or in other

words the pith and substance of the enactment was a matter exclusively falling within the Provincial Legislative List. The Ordinance, therefore,

would not be a Provincial Law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List and Sub-section (2) would not

apply.

During the course of the argument, in answer to a question from one of us'' learned Counsel conceded that the Provincial Legislature could

have validly dealt with the subject matter of Section 16-A alone in a separate enactment, if the procedure in Section 107, Sub-section (2) had

been followed. But he contended that in an enactment which in pith and substance dealt with a Provincial subject a provision which was repugnant

to a provision of an existing law with respect to a matter in the Concurrent List could not be validly inserted even after following the procedure laid

down in Sub-section (2) of Section 107. No direct authority or authority which would necessarily lead to this conclusion was cited on behalf of the

petitioners.

Let as assume that the subject-matter of Section 16-A is comprised in the Concurrent List and also assume that the other provisions of the Act

fall exclusively within the Provincial List. Is there anything in any of the provisions of the Government of India Act or any general principle which

would preclude the Provincial Legislature from dealing with both in the same enactment after taking care to comply with the procedure laid down in

Sub-section (2) of Section 107 with respect to a provision which is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, a matter in the Concurrent List ? There is no

such provision or general principle.

In my opinion, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 107 must be read together, and so read, they both deal with matters enumerated in the

Concurrent Legislative List, and inconsistency between Provincial law on the one side and Dominion law and existing law on the other with respect

to such matters. In my view, the words, ""subject to the provisions of this section"" which occur in Sub-section (1) of Section 107 support this

construction. These words would have no meaning if Sub-section (2) is dealing with something completely different from Sub-section (1). The

relative rights and disabilities of Provincial and Dominion Legislatures with respect to Lists I and II are dealt with in Section 100 of the Act and

Section 107 deals only with conflicts which may arise in respect of matters in the Concurrent List. I agree respectfully with the following

observations of Pal, J., in Sree Sreejut Maharaja Sir Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya Bahadur Vs. Tafazzal Hossain and Others, :

In my opinion the two Sub-sections must be read together. In order to fall within the mischief of Section 107(1), Government of India Act, 1936,

both the Provincial law and the existing Indian law must be with respect to the same matter and that matter must be '' one of the matters

enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List.'' Sub-section (1) declares a provision to be void '' subject to the provisions of this section.'' The

invalidity imposed by Sub-section (1) will not attach to the provision if the Provincial law in question is passed in the manner contemplated by Sub-

section (2). In my opinion, therefore, only that kind of the Provincial law is contemplated by Sub-section (1) as is covered by Sub-section (2).

Sub-section (2) clearly contemplates only a Provincial Law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List.

I also agree with that learned Judge that the expression "" Provincial Law "" does not necessarily mean and refer to the entire statute. Any provision

of a Provincial Act or of a Provincial law will also be a Provincial law.

The following remarks of Varadachariar, J., in United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp.) 65 : 3 F.L.J. 97 : 1940 F.C.R.

110 also throw light on another aspect, of the matter:

It seems to me that the words ''with respect to'' are not by any means less comprehensive than the words ''relating to.'' (Cf. Observations in The

King v. Kidman (1915) 20 Com. L.R. 425; Wynes : Legislative and Executive Powers in Australia, at pages 28, 29). The significance of these

expressions may become important in a case where the impugned legislation contains a number of provisions relating to different matters and a

question arises as to whether one set of provisions can be described as '' passed in respect of a forbidden subject'' or can be considered as only

incidentally affecting such a subject while forming part of an Act which in the main deals with an authorised subject.

If as the petitioners contend the Ordinance is not a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List because in

pith and substance it deals with a Provincial subject, then it must be held that Section 107, Sub-section (1) will have no application to any of its

provisions. But if it is held that a part of the Act, namely, Section 16-A deals with a Concurrent subject which is repugnant to a provision in an

existing law, namely, Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then that repugnancy is cured by reason of the compliance with the

conditions laid down in Sub-section (2) of Section 107 read with the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Government of India Act.

Mr. N. S. Mani, one of the learned Advocates for the petitioners, relied on the recent ruling of the Judicial Committee in P.K. Mukherjee v.

The Bank of Commerce, Ltd., Khulna (194.7) 2 M.L.J. 6 : L.R. 74. IndAp 23 : 1947 F.L.J. 34 (P.C.) as supporting to some extent this

contention. But on a detailed examination of the decision, it appears to me that it practically negatives this contention. The validity of the Bengal

Money-Lenders Act, 1940, arose for decision in that case. This Act whose provisions are similar to the Madras Act IV of 1938 inter alia limited

the amount recoverable by a money-lender on his loans for principal and interest and prohibited the payment of sums larger than those permitted

by the Act. It was contended that as some of the provisions of the Act dealt with banking and with promissory notes, matters solely within the

Federal jurisdiction, it was ultra vires. It was also contended that some of the provisions in the Act were repugnant to the provisions of existing law,

namely, the Negotiable Instruments Act. But the Act had received the assent of the Governor-General u/s 107 (2) of the Constitution Act. The

High Court held that the Act was valid in its entirety. But on appeal the Federal Court took a different view and thought that the Act was a clear

interference with a subject in the Federal List and declared it ultra vires, in so far as it dealt with those subjects. There were two main contentions

by the appellants in the appeal to the Judicial Committee against the decision of the Federal Court : One, the impugned Act is in pith and substance

an Act with respect to money-lenders and money-lending, a Provincial subject, and is not rendered void in whole or in part because it incidentally

touches upon matters outside the authorised field. Two, if money-lending was to be regarded as an incidence of contract, then the subject-matter

lay in contract and it was in conflict with an existing Indian law, but inasmuch as the impugned Act had received the assent of the Governor-

General it must prevail over the Negotiable Instruments Act. The respondents contended inter alia that if money-lending was to be regarded as an

incidence of contract, then the Negotiable Instruments Act being an Act of the Government of India, had precedence over the impugned Act in

those subjects with which they both dealt. Their Lordships held that the Act was valid because it dealt in pith and substance with money-lending

and whether it be urged that the Act trenched upon the Federal List by making regulations regarding banking and promissory notes it would still be

an answer that neither of those matters was its substance. Dealing with the other objection as to repugnancy, their Lordships say as follows-though

they did not determine this issue:

For instance it is no doubt true, as has been pointed out above, and has been accepted in the Courts in India that in the case of a matter contained

in the Concurrent List, the Act of a Provincial Legislature which has been approved by the Governor-General prevails over an Existing Indian Law

(see Section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935). If then the impugned Act is to be considered as a matter of contract, it would prevail

over the Negotiable Instruments Act if that Act or the part of it in respect of which repugnancy is alleged is also to be regarded as c6ntractual and

therefore coming within List III.

All this is on the assumption that the subject-matter of Section 16-A is one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. If, however, it is

held that it is a matter enumerated in the Provincial List, item 2 read with item 1, then Section 107 would have no application at all. Section 16-A is

no doubt repugnant to a provision of an existing law but is not a law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. The

insistence by the petitioners to exclude the subject-matter of Section 16-A from item 2 of List III leads them to this impasse

Lastly, it was contended for the petitioners that the Provincial Legislature was not competent to take away the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s

491 of the Criminal Procedure Code because under Clause 44 of the Letters Patent it was only the Governor-General who had the power to

affect the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court. Clause 44 is as follows:

And we do further ordain and declare that all the provisions of this Our Letters Patent are subject to the Legislative powers of the Governor-

General in Legislative Council, and also Governor-General in Council u/s 71 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and also of the Governor-

General in cases of emergency u/s 73 of the Act, and may be in all respects amended and altered thereby.

I am unable to follow the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners based on this clause. Assuming that the powers and jurisdiction which the

High Court obtained under the Letters Patent are saved from interference by any authority except the Governor-General and the Governor-

General in Legislative Council, the important fact which cannot be overlooked is that the jurisdiction and power of the High Court now in question

was not conferred on it by any of the provisions of the Letters Patent but by an Act of the Indian Legislature, namely, the Code of Criminal

Procedure. Reliance was placed by Mr. N. S. Mani, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, on the ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in

District Magistrate Vs. K.C. Mammen Mapillai and Others, But I am unable to see anything in this decision which is of any assistance to the

petitioners. It was decided therein that the High Court has no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus as known to the English Common Law; its

powers were confined in this respect to those conferred by Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After quoting Clause 44 of the Letters

Patent, Leach, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, said:

It is manifest that the Court was given the same jurisdiction, power and authority which the Supreme Court possessed, but subject and without

prejudice to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council. Counsel who appears for the first respondent would have the Court hold

that the Indian High Courts Act does not contemplate the abolition of the right to issue prerogative writs but only confers the power of regulating

the issue. This contention ignores the express words of the statute and of the Letters Patent, and therefore is obviously fallacious. It is not

necessary for the purpose of deciding the present application to consider whether the Supreme Court did in fact possess the power of issuing

prerogative writs and I will assume that it had.

I do not see anything in this passage to suggest, that any power of the Supreme Court, assuming it had, to issue a writ of habeas corpus was

preserved in the High Court after the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1875, Section 148 of which enacted inter alia that neither the

High Court nor any Judge thereof shall thereafter issue any writ of habeas corpus for any of the purposes mentioned therein. I am further of opinion

that Section 223 of the Government of India Act clearly provides for the jurisdiction of the High Courts being altered and interfered with by the

appropriate Legislatures by virtue of the powers conferred on them by that Act. On this part of the case, I need refer only to a judgment of the

High Court of Bombay in Hirji Laxmidas Vs. Francis Fernandez, Dealing with a similar contention, Stone, C.J., said:

That brings us to the fourth ground, which is, whether the Provincial Legislature could have passed the 194.4 Act. The only argument addressed to

us on this point is founded on Clause 44 of the Letters Patent, which declares that all the provisions of the Letters Patent, and it is Clause 12 which

gives the High Court jurisdiction, are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General as therein mentioned. There is nothing in this point,

since by the conjoint effect of Section 293 of the Constitution Act and Sections 2 and 7 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws)

Order of 1937, the reference to the Governor-General in Clause 44 of the Letters Patent refers to all other competent authorities.

Karma, J., as he then was, dealt with the argument thus:

The last argument advanced under this heading was the same as the fourth contention advanced in a different form. The contention was that Clause

44 of the Letters Patent can be altered only by the Central Government and not by the Provincial Legislature, and therefore much less by the

Governor acting u/s 93. This contention overlooks the provision made in the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937.

Section 293 of the Constitution Act is wide enough to cover the Letters Patent, as a law, according to the last sub-clause of that section. u/s 2(2)

of the Adaptation of Indian Laws, Order, 1937, ''Indian Law'' includes every law which is covered by Section 293 of the Constitution Act. u/s 7 of

the Adaptation of Laws Order ''proper authority'' is the authority entitled to legislate on the subject in question. Reading all these together, it is clear

that the proper authority to legislate in respect of the matter in question is the Provincial Legislature. As the powers of the Provincial Legislature, by

virtue of the Proclamation issued u/s 93, are now vested in the Governor, the proper legislative authority is the Governor. This contention therefore

must also fail.

There is no substance therefore in this contention on behalf of the petitioners.

To sum up, if the subject-matter of Section 16-A were to fall within the matters enumerated in items 1 and 2 of List II, then the Provincial

Legislature was undoubtedly entitled to legislate on it, and likewise, the Governor could promulgate an Ordinance. If, on the other hand, the

subject-matter is covered by item 2 of List III, then the provision is no doubt in conflict with a provision in an existing law, namely, Section 491 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, but it is not void by reason of the instructions of the Governor-General obtained by the Governor under the

proviso to Section 88, reading it for this purpose along with Sub-section (2) of Section 107. As all the objections raised as regards the validity of

the Ordinance and of Section 16-A of the Act inserted by Clause 4 of the Ordinance fail, it must be held that Section 16-A is valid.

The next question for consideration is whether Section 16-A inserted by Clause 4 of the Ordinance applies to all the petitions, petitions filed

before the promulgation of the Ordinance and petitions filed after. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that it applied to neither, while

the learned Advocate-General contended that it applied to both.

I shall take the petitions pending in Court on the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance. The general rule is well established that when the

law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun,

unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. Jessel, M.R., laid down the rule thus in Joseph Suche & Co., In re Ltd. (1875) I

Ch. D. 48:

It is a general rule that when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in

express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect

procedure and do not extend to rights of action.

In my opinion, it is impossible to hold that the right of a detained person to apply to the High Court u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, for release,

can be treated as a matter of procedure. It is a substantive right and a very valuable right. Examples of laws merely affecting procedure are given

by Pollock, C.B., for instance,

declaring what shall be deemed good service, what shall be the criterion to the right to costs, how much costs shall be paid, the manner in which

witnesses shall be paid, or what witnesses the party shall be entitled to, and so on.

In the well-known case of Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irwing (1905) A.C. 369 a right of appeal was held to be not a matter of

procedure. Lord Macnaghten said:

To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating

procedure.

I think it follows that the right of a suitor to have his pending application disposed of by a competent Court is equally a matter of right and not a

matter of procedure. Section 8 of the Madras General Clauses Act also embodies this general rule of construction.

But it is equally well established that whenever the intention is clear that the Act should have a retrospective operation it must unquestionably

be so construed even though the consequences may appear unjust and hard. (Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 8th edition, page 196.)

Before giving such a construction, one would require that it should either appear very clearly in the terms of the Act or arise by necessary and

distinct implication, that is, when the result cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. The learned Advocate-

General contended that it was a necessary implication from the language of Section 16-A that it was intended to have a retrospective operation. To

ascertain the intention of the Legislature, he said that we must also have regard to the general scope, object and purview of the statute. He also

sought to invoke the aid of the rule of construction that the fact of a statute being remedial or designed to protect the public interest is a matter to

which great weight is to be attached, and in such cases, the statute will be allowed to operate retrospectively. (Halsbury''s Laws of England, 2nd

edition, pages 514, 515 and Craies on Statute Law, page 342.)

The argument of the learned Advocate-General is not without force, but I do not find anything in the language of Section 16-A which compels

me to apply it to pending proceedings. The utmost that can be said is that the words, "" detained and deemed to have been detained "" are wide

enough to cover the cases of persons so detained who have made applications to this Court. But that is not enough. The language must clearly

establish that the intention of the Legislature is contrary to the sound and well-established canon of construction that an enactment is to be read as

prospective generally. A statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. (Per

Lindley, L.J., in Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402) If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought

to be construed as prospective only. (Craies on Statutes, p. 331.) On this point, I agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there is

one circumstance which supports their contention to a great extent. In Madras Act I of 1947 itself, we find a provision expressly having

retrospective operation. Section 16 (2) of the Act runs thus:

If at the commencement of this Act there is pending in any Court any proceedings in which the validity of an. order made u/s 2 of the Madras

Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, is called in question, such proceeding shall not be continued and shall be discharged.

Here is an example of language which does not leave any room for doubt. It is highly unlikely that without such clear language it was intended that

Section 16-A should apply to pending proceedings and discharge them.

It was also contended by the learned Advocate-General that an order u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was discretionary and that a

suitor cannot be said to have a vested right in it. His contention was largely based on the use of the words, ""may, whenever it thinks fit."" I do not

agree that the use of these words affects the legal position in any way. It has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases

of statutes enacted for the public good and the advancement of justice, expressions which appear to belong to the language of mere permission like

may "" have a compulsory force. (Vide Maxwell, on interpretation of Statutes, 8th Edition, pp. 210 and 211.)

Finally, the learned Advocate-General argued that there was no question of retrospective operation in these cases, and the question really is

whether at the time when a final order has to be made there is any power or jurisdiction in the High Court to pass the order. He cited the decision

of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. The King-Emperor (1945) 1 M.L.J. 3651 : 8 F.L.J. 40 to show that the final order of the High

Court must have relation to the circumstances at the date of the order and not to circumstances which might have existed at the time of the

application. In that case, owing to doubts expressed as to the validity of the original order of detention a fresh order of detention was passed in the

place of a prior order to avoid an argument being based on such defects during the pendency of an application under, Section 491 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, and it was held that the Court could not release the detenu. Spens, C.J., observed thus at page 44:

The analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings

cannot be invoked here. If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenu a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court

cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the later

order validates the earlier detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the Court can direct the release of the petitioner.

I do not think the principle of this decision applies by analogy to the present case"" No doubt if the jurisdiction of the High Court had been

completely abolished the argument might have been more compelling. But in this case the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 491 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure remains. The only question is whether it shall not be exercised in favour of persons who have invoked that jurisdiction by

reason of a subsequent enactment, namely, Section 16-A. I am, therefore, unable to accept the learned Advocate-General''s contention.

The next question, namely, whether Section 16-A applies to applications filed subsequent to the promulgation of the Ordinance is not free from

difficulty. It is common ground that there is no case before us in which the detention itself was after the date of the Ordinance. The limited

contention, therefore, on behalf of the petitioners who had filed their applications after the 25th May, 1948, was that a person who was detained

before the date of the Ordinance had a vested right to obtain his release by an order of the High Court u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

and that vested right cannot be affected or taken away by a retrospective operation of Section 16-A. The provisions of Section 8 of the Madras

General Clauses Act were relied on, in particular, Clauses (d) and (f), which refer to a right accrued and a remedy in respect of such right.

The question must be approached from two aspects: (1) whether the person detained can be said to possess a vested or accrued right, and (2)

whether there is language which expressly or by necessary intendment enforces retrospective operation

Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on the ruling of this Court in Rajah of Pittapur v. Venkata Subba Rao (1915) 29 M.L.J. 1 : ILR 39

Mad. 645 and on two decisions of the English Courts, viz., Hough v. Windus (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 224 and Knight v. Lee (1893) 1 Q.B. 41 Hough

v. Windus (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 224 obviously has no application as the new enactment was passed when a proceeding was pending. In Rajah of

Pittapur v. Venkata Subba Rao (1915) 29 M.L.J. 1 : ILR 39 Mad. 645 Wallis, C.J. and Kumaraswami Sastri, J., held, Seshagiri Aiyar, J.,

dissenting, that Section 211 of the Estates Land Act which prohibited the application of Section 7 of the Limitation Act to suits under the Estates

Land Act should not be applied retrospectively to a suit filed by a landholder for recovering arrears of rent due for faslis before the passing of the

Estates Land Act within three years of his attaining majority but more than three years after the rents had become due. By the time he filed the suit,

the Estates Land Act had come into force. The ground of the decision was that Section 211 of the Estates Land Act should not be construed

retrospectively so as to destroy or practically destroy rights of action existing on the date that Act came into force. In Knight v. Lee (1893) I Q.B.

41 the facts were these : Defendant employed the plaintiff, a betting agent, to make certain bets in his (the plaintiff''s) name on the defendant''s

behalf. The bets having been made and lost, the plaintiff paid the amount of the losses on the defendant''s account, and commenced an action to

recover from the defendants the moneys so paid. But by that time the Gaming Act of 1892 had been passed which provided that no action shall be

brought or maintained to recover any sum of money paid by any person under or in respect of a contract or agreement rendered null and void by

an earlier Act. It was held that the Act was not retrospective and that the action might be maintained. It must be observed that in both these cases,

the plaintiff had a right to recover money, in the one case as rent, in the other case as money paid by an agent on behalf of his principal. The

question in both the cases was whether such an existing right could be affected by a legislation passed before the right was sought to be enforced in

a Court. Mathew, J., deals with this point thus:

It would, however, be altogether contrary to principle to hold that the statute had a retrospective operation so as to take away a vested cause of

action, unless the language clearly compels us to do so. The implied promise by the defendant to repay to the plaintiff the sums paid by him on the

defendant''s account, was a perfectly valid promise at the dale when it was made, and the presumption is that the Legislature did not by subsequent

legislation intend to deprive the plaintiff of his rights under that promise.

Bruce, J., said:

Here the plaintiff had a vested right of action acquired before the statute came into force, and it cannot be supposed that the statute was intended

to take such a right away.

Can a person detained be said to have acquired a right merely because of his detention ? No doubt he could have availed of the remedy given

to him by Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But in my opinion the opportunity of availing himself of a statutory remedy cannot be

treated as an acquired right.

A mere right existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the

meaning of the usual saving clause providing that ail rights accrued by virtue of the statute repealed are to be unaffected by such repeal.

(Halsbury''s Law of England, Vol. 31, page 517.) In Abbot v. The Minister for Lands (1895) A.C. 425 the proposition is thus stated:

The mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an

enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a '' right accrued '' within the

meaning of the enactment.

Certain decisions (H. C. Proceedings Mo. 1368, 30-7-1872 1 Weir 781 and In Re: T.S. Chockalingam, ) were cited in which it was held that

an offence under an enactment committed when it was in force could be the subject of a prosecution on a date when that enactment had ceased to

be in force. The question as to whether an offence was committed or not was held to depend on the state of the law when the offence was

committed and not on the law as it was on the date on which the prosecution was started. But I do not think these decisions have any bearing on

the question now in issue. In my opinion, the persons detained before the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance who had not however applied

to the Court u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, did not possess any vested or accrued right which could not be affected adversely by Section 16-

A.

It is equally clear that as contended by the learned Advocate-General, the language of Section 16-A reveals an intention that it should apply to

such cases. The words used are "" detained or deemed to have been detained."" These latter words obviously have a reference to Section 19 (1)

and (2) of Act I of 1947 which runs thus:

(1) The Madras Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, is hereby repealed.

(2) All orders made under the said Ordinance and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue in force and be

deemed to have been made, and shall have effect as if they had been made under this Act.

The persons deemed to have been detained are the persons who were detained under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947.

These words, to my mind, make it abundantly clear that it was intended that Section 16-A should apply to persons detained even prior to the

passing of the Ordinance and that its application should not be restricted only to persons detained after the passing of the Ordinance. The persons

deemed to have been detained are persons who were necessarily detained long before the passing of the Ordinance. This shows unmistakably an

intention to have a retrospective effect. I, therefore, hold that Section 16-A inserted by Clause 4 of Madras Ordinance II of 1948 will apply to the

petitions filed after 25th May, 1948, the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance, even in respect of persons detained before that date.

There remains only one contention relating to this aspect of the case based upon facts set out in the affidavit of one T.V. Janakiram Chetty, the

head clerk of Messrs. Row and Reddy, Advocates, presented in Court on 13th July, 1948. According to this affidavit, the papers with respect to

Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 1309 to 1325 of 1948 were received by the office of Messrs. Row and Reddy only on 25th May, 1948,

from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras and as the affidavits received were in manuscript form necessary copies had to be typed

before filing them in the High Court together with the necessary petitions which could be filed only on the next Court day, that is, 31st May, 1948.

These facts are not controverted, but I fail to see how they make any difference so far as the conclusion I have arrived at is concerned. It is stated

in the affidavit that no unreasonable delay has been caused in filing the petitions. I am willing to assume that it is so. The point made by Mr. Pillai,

learned Counsel for the petitioners, was that the communications were received by the Chief Secretary, prior to 25th May, 1948, and the delay, if

any, was caused by the Chief Secretary to whom the papers were sent by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Vellore. There is no allegation of any

mala fides or deliberate withholding of papers for any considerable time, and I do not think that the observations of the Lahore High Court in

Baldev Mitter v. Emperor (1944) 7 F.L.J. 149 can be applied to this case. In the Lahore case, the Chief Secretary to the Government admitted

that the petitions forwarded by the detenus were detained by the Provincial Government for about four months, because it was thought that the

petitions did not lie to the High Court. The learned Judges say that the withholding of any petition addressed to the High Court could not be

justified. But even assuming that there was an improper withholding, that may be a matter for comment or for censure, but cannot make any

difference on the question of the applicability of Section 16-A.

The next question which falls for decision and which was elaborately argued is what is the scope of inquiry in (a) applications filed on or before

25th May, 1948, and (b) those filed thereafter. In this connection, it is necessary to set out another provision of Madras Act I of 1947 to which

reference has not been made yet, and that is, Section 16, Sub-section (1) which runs thus:

No order made, in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act or deemed to have been made under this Act by virtue of Section 19,

shall be called in question in any Court.

Sub-section (3) of the same section is as follows:

Where any such order as is referred to in Sub-section (1) purports to have been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power

conferred by or under this Act the Court shall, within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presume that such order was so made by

such authority.

In dealing with applications falling under Clause (a), the effect of this provision must be determined. It must next be considered whether the

addition of Section 16-A makes any difference by way of further curtailment of the powers of this Court.

Though the number of cases on enactments in pari materia or similar to the said provisions is legion, I do not think it necessary to refer to more

than a few of these decisions which have the highest authority. The language of Section 16, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Defence of India Act is

practically the same as that of Section 16, Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Madras Act I of 1947, and is as follows:

(1) No order made in exercise of any powers conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court.

(2) Where an order purports to have been made and signed by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, the Court

shall, within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presume that such order was so made by that authority.

The power and jurisdiction of the High Court in an application u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the face of such a provision as the

above, have been clearly defined and declared by their Lordships of the judicial Committee in King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (1945) 2 M.L.J.

325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C) After setting out the section, their Lordships say:

Sub-section (1) assumes that the order is made in exercise of the power, which clearly leaves it open to challenge on the ground that it was not

made in conformity with the power conferred, heavily though the burden of proof may lie on the challenger.... Sub-section (2) raises a presumption

of fact which may be displaced, though here again the burden is likely to be heavy.... Accordingly, the contention of the Crown that the Court has

no jurisdiction to investigate the validity of the orders fails.

On what grounds, then, can an order of detention be attacked in spite of Section 16 of Madras Act I of 1947? It was conceded by learned

Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that if it appears that the Provincial Government or ''the officer or authority empowered u/s 15 of the Act is

satisfied on materials placed before them with respect to a particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public

safety or the maintenance of public order, then this Court cannot inquire into the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds on which they were so

satisfied.

It follows from what was laid down by the Judicial Committee in construing Section 16 of the Defence of India Act that if an order of detention

is established to have not been made in conformity with the power conferred, the Court will have power; u/s 491 to direct the release of a person

detained by reason of such an order. Examples of orders not in conformity with the power conferred by the Act are furnished by the cases of

respondents Nos. 1 and 5 in the appeal before the Judicial Committee in that case. These two persons were detained under orders signed by Mr.,

Porter, Additional Home Secretary to the Bengal Government and ex facie they were regular and proper. But it became apparent from the affidavit

filed by Mr. Porter that they were issued not on an independent consideration by Mr. Porter him self on the materials before him but that they were

issued as a matter of course in pursuance of a. ""routine order"" issued earlier by the Home Minister which directed that on receipt of a report of

arrest under Rule 129 of the Defence of India Rules together with a recommendation of the police for detention under Rule 26, orders of detention

under Rule 26 should at once be issued as a matter of course. Applying that test to orders under the Public Safety Act, if it is established that the

order of detention was made not on the Provincial Government or the authorised officer being satisfied on the material placed before them or him

but purely on the recommendation or report of the police, then the order of detention would be bad.

Considerable light on these matters is thrown by the speeches of the several Law Lords who decided the case of Liversidge v. Sir John

Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 The relevant statutory provision there was Regulation 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, the material

paragraphs of which are the following:

Para. 1. If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently

concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason

thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained.

Para 8: Any person detained in pursuance of this regulation shall be deemed to be in lawful custody and shall be detained in such place as may be

authorised by the Secretary of State and in accordance with instructions issued by him.

The case arose out of a suit filed by one Liversidge who had been detained by an order made by Sir John Anderson as Home Secretary under

the above ''Regulation for a declaration that his detention was unlawful and for damages for false imprisonment. In that suit, Liversidge applied for

particulars (a) of the grounds on which the respondent had reasonable cause to believe the appellant to be a person of hostile associations, and (b)

of the grounds on which the respondent had reasonable cause to believe that by reason of such hostile associations it was necessary to exercise

control over the appellant. The Master, the Judge in chambers, and the Court of Appeal, successively refused to grant the application and the

matter came up before the House of Lords finally, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, Lord Atkin dissenting. It was held; that

the Court could not compel the Secretary of State to give particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff to be

a person of hostile associations or that by reason of such hostile associations it was necessary to exercise control over the plaintiff. It was further

held that the production by the Secretary of State of an order of detention made by him and ex facie regular and duly authenticated constituted a

defence to an action for damages for false imprisonment unless the plaintiff discharged the burden of establishing that the order was invalid. Their

Lordships discussed the scope of the provisions of the Regulation at considerable length, and the principles laid down by them would apply to a

case of an application for the writ of habeas corpus, which is evident from their succeeding decision in Greene v. Secretary of State for Home

Affairs. (1942) A.C. 284

The order of detention passed against Liversidge was in the following terms:

DEFENCE (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 1939. DETENTION ORDER.

Whereas I have reasonable cause to believe Jack Perlzweig alias Robert Liversidge to be a person of hostile associations and that by reason

thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him : Now, therefore, I, in pursuance of the power conferred on me by Regulation 18-B of the

Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, hereby make the following order : I direct that the above mentioned Jack Perlzweig alias Robert Liversidge

be detained.

(Signed) John Anderson,

One of His Majesty''s Principal Secretaries of State.

Beyond the production of this order, the Secretary of State who made the order did not make an affidavit in the action. It was contended inter alia

that the mere production of an order signed by the Secretary of State was not a sufficient prima facie defence and the onus lay on the respondent

to give evidence at the trial to prove that Sir John Anderson had reasonable grounds for the belief recited in the order. Viscount Maugham sums up

his conclusion thus:

The result is that there is no preliminary question of fact which can be submitted to the Courts, and that in effect there is no appeal from the

decision of the Secretary of State in these matters provided only that he acts in good faith.

In support of this conclusion, the learned Lord relies on four circumstances : First, that it was a matter for executive discretion and the possibility of

the action of the Secretary of State being subject to the discussion, criticism and control of a Judge in a Court of Law could not have been

contemplated; secondly, that the Home Secretary could act on hearsay and was not required to obtain any legal evidence and therefore the Home

Secretary was not acting judicially in such a case; thirdly, that in many cases he will be acting on information of a most confidential character which

could not be communicated to the person detained or disclosed in Court without the greatest risk of prejudicing the future efforts of the Secretary

of State in this and like matters for the defence of the realm; and fourthly, that the person who is primarily entrusted with the duties under the

Regulation is one of the Principal Secretaries of State and a member of the Government answerable to Parliament for the proper discharge of his

duties.

Dealing with the question whether the onus was thrown on the Secretary of State who made the order for detention to give evidence to show

that he had reasonable cause, his Lordship said:

In my opinion, the well-known presumption omnia esse rite acta applies to this order, and, accordingly, assuming the order to be proved or

admitted, it must be taken prima facie, that is unless the contrary is proved, to have been properly made and that the requisite as to the belief of the

Secretary of State was complied with. It will be noted that on the view I have expressed as to the construction of the regulation it is the personal

belief of the Secretary of State that is in question, and that, if the appellant''s contention 011 this point were correct, the same question would arise

in the numerous cases where an executive order depends on the Secretary of State or some other public officer being '' satisfied '' of some fact or

circumstance. It has never, I think, been suggested in such cases that the Secretary of State or public officer must prove that he was so '' satisfied ''

when he made the order.

These last observations have a great bearing in this case, because the language of Section 2(1) of Madras Act I of 1947 is:

The Provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public

safety or the maintenance of public order...

Lord Macmillan states the rival views on the subject thus:

Before he exercises the power confined to him of making a detention order against any individual the Secretary of State must have reasonable

cause to believe certain things about that individuals. Does this mean that the Secretary of State must have such cause of belief regarding the

relevant facts as a Court of Law would hold sufficient to induce belief in the mind of any ordinary reasonable man ? Or does it mean that he must

have such cause of belief as he himself deems to be reasonable? To require that a cause of belief shall be reasonable necessarily implies a reference

to some standard of reasonableness. Is the standard of reasonableness which must be satisfied an impersonal standard independent of the

Secretary of State''s own mind, or is it the personal standard of what the Secretary of State himself deems reasonable? Between these two

readings there is a fundamental difference in legal effect. In the former case the reasonableness of the cause which the Secretary of S(sic) had for

his belief may, if challenged, be examined in a Court of Law in order to determine whether he had such cause of belief as would satisfy the ordinary

reasonable man, and to enable the Court to adjudicate on this question there must be disclosed to it the facts and circumstances which the

Secretary of State had before him in arriving at his belief. In the latter case it is for the Secretary of State alone to decide in the forum of his own

conscience whether he has a reasonable cause of belief, and he cannot, if he has acted in good faith, be called on to disclose to anyone the facts

and circumstances which have induced his belief or to satisfy anyone but himself that these facts and circumstances constituted a reasonable cause

of belief.

In discussing those rival views, the learned Lord refers to the following rule of construction:

The purpose of the regulation is to ensure public safety, and it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather than to defeat its

efficacy for the defence of the realm. That is in accordance with a general rule applicable to the interpretation of all statutes or statutory regulations

in peace time as well as in war time.

After stating that a Court of Law manifestly could not pronounce on the reasonableness of the Secretary of State''s cause of belief, the learned

Lord finally pronounces the following opinion:

... In my opinion, the production by the Secretary of State of an order of detention by him ex facie regular and duly authenticated, such as the

House has before it in this case, constitutes, a peremptory defence to any action of false imprisonment and places on the plaintiff the burden of

establishing that the order is unwarranted, defective or otherwise invalid.

Lord Wright meets the argument pressed before the House based on the liberty of the subject and to the suggestion that the House was being

asked "" to countenance arbitrary, despotic or tyrannous conduct."" Notwithstanding all his prejudices in favour of upholding the liberty of the

subject, he came to a clear conclusion which agreed with that of the Court of Appeal, though his Lordship was inclined to hold that the Court may

no doubt be called on to decide questions of bona fides or mistaken identity, if they should ever arise.

Lord Romer poses the question for decision thus:

Before an order can be made by the Secretary of State is it necessary that there should in fact exist reasonable grounds for his belief, or is it

sufficient that there are grounds for his belief that appear to him to be reasonable?

and he accepted the contention of the respondent, that it is the second alternative which is a condition precedent. At page 282, he says:

It is also to be noticed that the words of para. I are not ''if there is reasonable cause to believe,'' but, '' if the Secretary of State has reasonable

cause to believe''.... Not only is the belief to be his. The estimate of the reasonableness of the causes that have induced such belief is also to be his

and his alone.

The decision in Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1942) A.C. 284 turned on a construction of the same Regulation, but it directly

arose out of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. It was held that the production of the Home Secretary''s order of detention, the authenticity

and good faith of which were not impugned, constituted a complete answer to an application by the appellant for a writ of habeas ''corpus, and no

affidavit by the Home Secretary justifying his cause of belief was necessary, and the decision in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1942) A.C. 206

was followed. Viscount Maugham states the two propositions laid down in the Liversidge''s case (1942) A.C. 206 us:

Your Lordships there decided that the words, in the context in which they are found, refer simply to the belief of the Secretary of State based on

his view as to there being reasonable cause for the personal belief which justifies the detention order....Your Lordships also expressed the opinion

that the Secretary of State could not be called on to disclose his information or grounds of belief if he took the view that it would be contrary to the

public interest to do so.

He held that the order itself was a sufficient answer and that it must be presumed that the Secretary of State had what he considered reasonable

cause for his belief.

The following observations from the speech of Lord Macmillan are to the same effect:

The Secretary of State is not bound to disclose or to justify to any Court the grounds on which he conceived himself to have reasonable cause to

believe that the appellant was a person of hostile associations and that by reason thereof it was necessary to exercise control over him. The result,

in my opinion, is that the production of the Secretary of State''s order, the authenticity and good faith of which is in no way impugned, constitutes a

complete and peremptory answer to the appellant''s application.

There is an interesting account of the history of the writ of habeas corpus in the speech of Lord Wright, and the use of the writ to secure

freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, both by Government and by private parties. The learned Lord answers the main question in the appeal,

namely, whether there is a legal cause of detainment, in the following manner, after referring to Liversidge''s case (1942) A.C. 206:

It is enough here to say that the regulation gives to the Secretary of State a plenary discretion to make a detention order against the appellant if he

has in his own mind and according to his own judgment reasonable cause to believe that the appellant is a person of hostile associations and that by

reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him .... The order relied on by the respondent is ex facie good and valid. Its authenticity is

not disputed. It is not said that the appellant is not the person intended. The order itself justifies the detention.

Again, at page 307:

In the present case there are no facts to inquire into. The only possible inquiry of fact, when once the authenticity of the order and its application to

the appellant is conceded or established, is whether the Home Secretary had in his own mind what appeared to his mind to be reasonable cause.

It is more than of passing interest to refer to the following passage in Lord Macmillan''s judgment in the Liversidge''s case (1942) A.C. 206

referring to the advisory committees constituted under the Regulation which are very similar to the advisory council constituted under Madras Act I

of 1947:

Were the person detained left without any safeguard, this might be an argument against holding that an absolute discretion has been conferred on

the Secretary of State, but the argument is the other way when it is found, as it is in this regulation, that elaborate provision is made for the

safeguarding of the detained person''s interests. I refer to the constitution of advisory committees to which any person aggrieved by a detention

order may make representations. The duty is imposed on the chairman to inform the objector of the grounds on which the detention order has been

made and to furnish him with such particulars as are in the chairman''s opinion sufficient to enable him to state his case. I say nothing as to the

efficacy of this safeguard, for I do not know how it operates in practice, but I emphasise the significance of its presence in the regulation. It

suggests that this special procedure was introduced for the very reason that review by the law Courts was excluded.

I next come to the class of cases to which Section 16-A would apply. With respect to this class the case in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. King

Emperor (1944) 2 M.L.J. 167 : 1944 F.I.J. 203 : 1944 F.C.R. 295 a decision of the Federal Court, is instructive in so far as it dealt with

Ordinance No. III of 1944. Section 10(1) of that Ordinance ran as follows:

No order made under this Ordinance, and no order having effect by virtue of Section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance, shall be called

in question in any Court, and no Court shall have power to make any order u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) in

respect of any order made under or having effect under this Ordinance, or in respect of any person the subject of such an order.

Dealing with this provision, Spens, C.J., observed thus:

But it does not follow from this that the Court can no longer consider the validity of an order which on the face of it appears or purports to have

been passed under Rule 26. It is on this aspect of the case that the judgment of the Bombay Full Bench is of assistance. We respectfully agree with

the learned Judges that the Ordinance does not protect a document which is not really '' an order under Rule 26 '' though it may appear on its face

to be the order of an authorised officer. Clauses (1) and (3) of Section 10 of the Ordinance have not introduced any new principle of immunity.

Except for the reference to Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, they only re-enact Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 of the Defence of

India Act, and they had to be so re-enacted because all future orders of detention would be made under the Ordinance itself and could not

therefore attract the benefit of Section 16 of the Defence of India Act. The addition in Clause (1) of Section 10 of the words which preclude the

exercise of the power u/s 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code involves no change in the legal position. That part of the clause is only consequential

upon and must be held to be co-extensive in operation with the preceding part of the clause. Its scope is also limited by the repetition of the words

'' any order having effect under this Ordinance''.

In our judgment, no further curtailment of the power of the Court to investigate and interfere with orders for detention has been imposed by

Ordinance III of 1944. The Court is and will be still at liberty to investigate whether an order purporting to have been made under Rule 26 and

now deemed to be made under Ordinance III or a new order purporting to be made under Ordinance III was in fact validly made, in exactly the

same way as immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance. If on consideration the Court comes to the conclusion that it was not validly

made on any of the grounds indicated in any of the long line of decisions in England and this country on the subject, other than the ground that Rule

26 was ultra vires, Section 10 of Ordinance III will no more prevent it from so finding than Section 16 of the Defence of India Act did. Such an

invalid order, though purporting to be an order, will not in fact be an '' order made under this Ordinance '' or having effect by virtue of Section 6 as

if made under this Ordinance at all for the purposes of Section 10.

The grounds indicated in the long line of decisions in England referred to by the learned Chief Justice of India are those discussed in the speeches in

the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1942) A.C. 206.

The effect of this decision of the Federal Court is that in the present case it may be said that the addition of Section 16-A does not make any

material difference in the curtailment of the powers of this Court to interfere with orders of detention passed under the Act, though of course only

on the grounds indicated in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1942) A.C. 206.

This decision, however, does not stand alone. There is a subsequent decision of the Federal Court in Ex-Rana Birpal Singh of Bhajji State v.

The King-Emperor (1946) I M.L.J. 322 : ILR 1946 Lah. 96 That case related to a person detained under the provisions of Bengal Regulation III

of 1818. Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains in Sub-section (3) thereof the following provision:

Nothing in this section applied to persons detained under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818.

Learned Counsel appearing for the person detained contended inter alia that the appellant was still de jure the ruler of Bhajji State and as such not

within the category of persons in respect of whom any warrant of commitment could be issued under the Regulation and also that the form of the

warrant did not on the face of it sufficiently indicate that it was a warrant issued by the Central Government as required by Section 7-A of

Regulation III and that positive evidence that the matter had been considered and orders given for its issue by the appropriate officials was

required before a Court could hold a warrant a valid warrant under Regulation III. These contentions were rejected by the Federal Court. The

learned Chief Justice dealt with these contentions thus:

It is however in our judgment clear that once the Court is satisfied that a person is being detained under Regulation III, there is no jurisdiction u/s

491 which the Court can exercise in the matter. And throughout there has been no suggestion that there is any other jurisdiction which could be

exercised by the Court in these proceedings. Accordingly, in our judgment, the material question in this case is : Is the appellant a person detained

under Regulation III ? If he is, this application must fail. The jurisdiction u/s 491 is wholly statutory and governed by the terms of the section.

Moreover, it must be appreciated that the very basis of jurisdiction under Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 491, which is the only '' Sub-section under

which the Court could be asked to assist the appellant in this case, is expressed to be, illegal or improper detention in public or private custody,''

and yet by virtue of Sub-section (3) in cases of persons detained under Regulation III, Sub-section (1)(b) has no application. It seems to us

therefore to follow that, something more than allegations that a person is being ''illegally or improperly'' detained under Regulation III is necessary

before the Court can get over the bar to jurisdiction under the section imposed by Sub-section (3). Complaints as to the illegality or impropriety of

the detention, if the detention be under Regulation III, can be dealt with under the procedure laid down in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Regulation III and

may well be the basis of other claims which a Court can properly entertain, but such allegations cannot in our judgment be sufficient to give the

Court jurisdiction u/s 491. If on the facts of the case it is clear that a person is being detained under Regulation III, even though a Court might think

if it investigated those facts, it might find that the detention was illegal or improper, still the Court cannot in our judgment interfere u/s 491. In this

case it is clear that the Government has been claiming to detain the appellant from the 9th September, 194.0, onwards under Regulation III.

The learned Chief Justice then went on to decide the only point raised on behalf of the appellant which could possibly have enabled the Court

to exercise jurisdiction u/s 491 and that was if in fact the appellant was a person to whom Regulation III does not or cannot apply at all. The

appellant claimed to have still the status of a ruler of Bhajji State, but this claim was negatived. It was held that there was no jurisdiction u/s 491 of

the Criminal Procedure Code which the Court could exercise in the case. The other questions were not gone into. The learned Chief Justice says:

We do not propose to go into the other questions raised and argued by Mr. Gauba. At most they amount to allegations of illegal or improper

detention under Regulation III which even if substantiated would not for the reasons earlier explained give the Court jurisdiction u/s 491.

It is true it may appear difficult to reconcile these two decisions of the Federal Court. But after careful consideration, I am of the opinion that

the Federal Court did not intend to depart from the rule which they had laid down in the earlier case of Basanla Chandra Ghose v. The King-

Emperor (1946) 1 M.L.J. 322 : 9 F.L.J. 1 : ILR 1946 Lah. 96 The decision in the Bhajji case (1944) 2 M.L.J. 167 : 1944 F.L.J. 203 : 1944

F.C.R. 295 must be taken along with the special facts and the contentions on behalf of the petitioner in that case. The detention was made under

the provisions of Regulation III of 1818. The material portions of this Regulation are as follows:

Whereas reasons of state, embracing the due maintenance of the alliances formed by the British Government with foreign powers, the preservation

of tranquility in the territories of Indian princes entitled to its protection, and the security of the British Dominions from foreign hostility and from

internal commotion, occasionally render it necessary, to place under personal restraint, individuals against whom there may not be sufficient ground

to institute any judicial proceeding, or when such proceeding may not be adapted to the nature of the case, or may for other reasons be

unadvisable or improper; and whereas it is fit that, in every case of the nature herein referred to, the determination to be taken should proceed

immediately from the authority of the Governor-General in Council....

(1) When the reasons stated in the preamble to this Regulation may seem to the Governor-General in Council to require that an individual should

be placed under personal restraint, without any immediate view to ulterior proceedings of a judicial nature, a warrant of commitment under the

authority of the Governor-General in Council, and under the hand of the Chief Secretary to Government, shall be issued to the officer, in whose

custody such person is to be placed.

(2) The warrant of commitment shall be in the following form: (The form is not relevant.)

(3) The warrant of commitment shall be sufficient authority for the detention of any state prisoner in any fortress, jail, or other place within the

territories subject to the presidency of Fort William.

In the case before the Federal Court, it was neither alleged nor established that the warrant of commitment was not in the prescribed form or

not in conformity with the provisions of the Regulation. A warrant duly signed by R. Tottenham, Additional Secretary to the Government of India,

and containing the statement that the Governor-General in Council for good and sufficient reasons, being reasons connected with the discharge of

the functions of the Crown in its relations with the Indian States, has seen fit to determine that Birpal Singh, Ex-Rana of Bhajji State shall be placed

under personal restraint at Simla was produced. It was not even suggested that any of the grounds on which the Court could in the circumstances

treat the order of detention as invalid existed in the case. The only point raised on behalf of the petitioner was that he was still de jure the ruler of

Bhajji State and as such not within the category of persons in respect of whom any warrant of commitment could be issued under the Regulation.

The learned Chief Justice of India who delivered the judgment was inclined to the view that: if in fact the petitioner was a person to whom the

Regulation did not or could not. apply at all, then it might be possible to hold that there was no detention at all (legal or illegal, proper or improper)

under Regulation III.

It follows, therefore, that whether Section 16 of Madras Act I of 1947 stands alone, or there is in addition thereto the newly inserted provision,

Section 16-A, the power and jurisdiction of this Court to pass an order u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, remained the same, and

subject to the same conditions, qualifications and limitations. The addition of Section 16-A ""involves no change in the legal position."" (Vide 1944

F.C.R. 295 .)

What then is the residuum of power and jurisdiction of this Court ? It is the power to interfere and set at liberty a person who is being detained

by an order which though purporting to be made u/s 2 of Madras Act I of 1947, is not in fact such an order. This will be so in the following

circumstances:

(a) when the order is not duly authenticated, as for example, when it is passed by an officer or authority not empowered u/s 15 of the Act;

(b) when the person detained in pursuance of the order is not the person, intended to be detained, that is to say, when there is a mistake of identity;

(c) when there is lack of bona fides; and

(d) when it is established that the essential requirement of Section 2, namely, the satisfaction of the Provincial Government or an officer or other

authority empowered u/s 15 with respect to the particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or

the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him it is necessary to direct him to be detained or otherwise dealt with u/s 2(1) of the

Act, is not present. If it is established that neither the Provincial Government nor the officer or other authority empowered u/s 15 has exercised its

or his mind on the material placed before it or him, then an order of detention, though purporting to be passed u/s 2(2) must be deemed to be not

an order u/s 2.

These, then, are the only grounds on which in spite of Section 16 and Section 16-A of Madras Act I of 1947 this Court can exercise the

power conferred on it by Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If these grounds exist, in respect of any detained persons, such a person

will not be a person detained or deemed to have been detained u/s 2 of the Act.

If these grounds do not exist, it is well established on the highest authority that this Court "" cannot investigate the sufficiency of the material or

the reasonableness of the grounds "" (vide 1944 F.C.R. 1) upon which the Government or the empowered officer or authority had been satisfied. It

is not competent for this Court to call upon the Government or the detaining authority to disclose the information and material on which it or he was

satisfied as to the necessity for the detention of the person concerned. The satisfaction required by the section is the satisfaction of the Government

or the empowered authority and not the satisfaction of this Court. There is no question of fact which can be submitted to this Court in this matter.

This position was fairly conceded by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners.

It is equally clear from the authorities which have been cited above that once a duly authenticated order of detention is produced, it must be

taken prima facie to have been properly made and that the requisite as to the belief of the Government or the detaining authority was complied

with. The burden of proof will lie on the challenger and, of course, the burden is likely to be heavy. (Vide 1945 F.G.R. 195at 217.)

Mr. Asker Ali, learned Advocate for some of the petitioners, relied strongly on Section 561 -A of the Code of Criminal Procedure but in my

view that section does not enlarge or add to the power of this Court u/s 491 of that Code.

The above petitions will be disposed of in the usual course in the light of the observations made above.

Govindarajachari, J.

I agree, but in view of the importance and complexity of the questions involved, I desire to state my reasons and conclusions in my own words.

These are a batch of applications filed u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which by Sub-section (1), Clause (b) provides that any High

Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within the limits of its appellate

criminal jurisdiction be set at liberty. In view of a certain contention which has been raised at the hearing of these applications and to which I shall in

due course refer, the material portion of Sub-section (3) of the above section may also be set out. It is in the following terms:

Nothing in this section applies to persons detained under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation, 1818.

The orders of detention complained of in these applications were made under the powers conferred by an Act of the Provincial Legislature,

Madras Act I of 1947. u/s 2(1)(a) of the Act:

the Provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public

safety or the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him, it is necessary so to do, may make an order directing that he be

detained.

Section 15 provides for the delegation of the powers and duties of the Provincial Government under the Act to such officers or authorities as the

said Government may by order specify. Section 2(2) directs that when any order is made under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 by an officer or

authority empowered u/s 15 that officer or authority shall forthwith report the fact to the Provincial Government together with the grounds on which

the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of such officer or authority have a bearing on the necessity for or expediency

of the order. Section 3(1) provides that whenever an order in respect of any person is made by the Provincial Government or by any officer or

authority subordinate to them the Provincial Government shall communicate to the person affected by the order the grounds on which the order has

been made against him and such other particulars as are in their opinion sufficient to enable him to make if he wishes a representation against the

order. u/s 3, Sub-section (3), the Provincial Government is directed to constitute an advisory council whenever necessary. Sub-sections (2) and

(4) of Section 3 provide for the placing of all the material papers by the Provincial Government before the advisory council which is directed to

make a report to the Provincial Government after considering the materials placed before it, and if necessary, after calling for such further

information from the Provincial Government or from the person concerned.

After considering the report of the advisory council the Provincial Government may confirm, modify or cancel the order made under Sub-

section (1) of Section 2. [See Section 3, Sub-section (5).] The maximum duration of an order u/s 2 is fixed by Section 4, Sub-section (r) at six

months from the date on which such order is confirmed or modified under Sub-section (5) of Section 3, but the Provincial Government may cancel

the order at any time before the expiry of that period. Section 4 (2) lays down the procedure where the continuance of an order made u/s 2

beyond the period of six months aforesaid is considered necessary "" or expedient by the Provincial Government.

Madras Act I of 1947, received the assent of the Governor-General on nth March, 1947, and we have been told by the learned Advocate-

General that it received such assent after having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General as contemplated by Section 107(2)

of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The orders of detention in all the applications before us were made before 25th May, 1948, the materiality of which date will presently appear.

Some of the applications were filed before and some after that date.

It is common ground that the Provincial Legislature which is bicameral was in session till 24th May, 1948, and that it was prorogued by the

Governor on that day. On the next day was promulgated Ordinance, No. II of 1948 which is entitled ""An Ordinance to amend the Madras

Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947."" It is necessary to quote the preamble which is in the following words:

Whereas the Legislature of the Province is not in session, and the Governor of Madras is satisfied that immediate action is necessary for the

purpose of amending the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947:

And whereas the instructions of the Governor-General have been obtained in pursuance of the proviso to Section 88, Sub-section (1), of the

Government of India Act, 1935;

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 88, Sub-section (1), aforesaid, the Governor hereby promulgates the following

Ordinance.

There is no need to make any detailed reference to the provisions of this Ordinance apart from Section 4. Section 2 provides for the insertion of

new Sections 2-A and 2-B in Madras Act I of 1947 which render penal the harbouring or concealing of persons ordered to be detained and the

reproducing or publishing of statements made by persons so ordered. Power to seize and search for copies of documents which have been

forfeited is conferred by the new Section 12-A the insertion of which is provided for by Section 3 of the Ordinance. Then occurs Section 4 of the

Ordinance round which a considerable portion of the arguments centred. It may be set out in extenso.

After Section 16 of the said Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:

16-A. Nothing in Section 491, Sub-sections (1) and (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply to any person detained, or deemed

to have been detained, u/s 2 of this Act by the Provincial Government or any officer or authority authorized by them in that behalf.

The validity of the Ordinance generally and of Section 4 in particular was disputed by the several learned Counsel who appeared for the

applicants. It was said that the whole of the Ordinance is invalid as the requirements of Section 88 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, were

not and could not have been satisfied. It may at once be stated that there is no proof whatever that the Governor did not obtain the instructions of

the Governor-General as recited in the preamble to the Ordinance or that the Governor did not receive or act upon the advice of his ministers, in

promulgating it, the argument being that the power conferred on the Governor by Section 88 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, is a power

exercisable by him not in his individual judgment but only on the advice of his ministers. The argument as to invalidity went no farther than a

suggestion, which was much emphasised, that, having regard to the close proximity in time between the prorogation of the Legislature and the

promulgation of the Ordinance there is very little likelihood of the Provincial Cabinet or the concerned minister having tendered the necessary

advice to the Governor and of the Governor having obtained the requisite instructions from the Governor-General.

Section 88 (1) clearly requires that the Legislature should not be in session when an Ordinance is promulgated. It is not denied that this

requirement is satisfied as the Legislature had been prorogued the previous day and was therefore not in session on the 25th of May. Section 88

(1) further requires that the Governor should be satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action.

Assuming that the Governor is for this purpose to act on the advice of his ministers, the satisfaction contemplated by Section 88 (1) would in that

view be, in effect the satisfaction of the Governor on such advice.. Satisfaction in accordance with the wording of Section 88 (1) is recited in the

preamble, and there is no proof to the contrary. u/s 51(4) of the Government of India Act:

the question whether any and, if so, what advice was tendered by ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court.

This excludes all discussion of an allegation that no advice was or could have been tendered, but even assuming otherwise there is nothing offered

by the applicants by way of proof of such an assertion.

The gravamen of the charge finally reduces itself to an attack on the propriety of issuing an order of prorogation on the 24th. If the Legislature

was in session, on the 24th, it was pointedly asked why was not the Legislature immediately summoned to consider the necessity or desirability to

legislate in the terms of what has now been promulgated in the shape of an Ordinance ? It was emphasised that the prorogation was just on the eve

of the promulgation of the Ordinance and was made, it was suggested, with a view to avoid a discussion by the Legislature, at any rate, at that

stage, of the somewhat drastic provisions of the intended legislation.

The propriety or otherwise, however, of the order of prorogation is not a matter for consideration by this Court. Assuming its impropriety, that

would in no way, furnish a legal ground for invalidating the Ordinance that has been issued.

Presuming, as we must, the correctness of the recitals in the preamble to the Ordinance and in the absence of any admissible evidence that any

of those recitals is inaccurate, we must hold that the conditions laid down in Section 88 (1) of the Government of India Act are satisfied and that

the attack on the validity of the Ordinance on this ground falls.

The next contention was that Section 4 of the Ordinance is, in any event, invalid. It was said that Section 4 deals with a matter not enumerated

in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act and that consequently there can be no valid legislation in respect of it by

the Provincial Legislature or by the Governor acting in the place of the Provincial Legislature u/s 88 in the absence of a public notification by the

Governor-General empowering the Provincial Legislature to enact a law with respect to it as required by Section 104 (1) of the Government of

India Act. This argument necessarily invites a discussion as to whether the subject-matter of Section 4 of the Ordinance falls outside all the items in

the several Legislative Lists in the Seventh Schedule. On behalf of the Grown it was argued that the matter would fall under item 2 read with item 1

of the Provincial Legislative List. (List II). Item 2 is:

Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.

and item 1 includes inter alia "" public order"" and preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; and "" persons

subjected to such detention."" In any event it was said that Section 4 of the Ordinance deals with a matter which would fall under item 2 of Part I of

the Concurrent Legislative List (List III) which is in the following terms:

Criminal Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act.

On behalf of the detenue it was argued that Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code is not, strictly speaking, concerned with a purely procedural

matter, that it confers on the other hand a substantive and valuable right on the citizen, and that item 2 of the Concurrent Legislative List must be

read so as to include only those provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure which can be strictly regarded as pertaining to procedure. I am

unable to accept this argument. As a matter of statutory construction the word "" include "" with all its grammatical variations has always been read

as widening the scope of the definition so as to bring in what would not otherwise be comprised in it. Delivering the judgment of the Judicial

Committee in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899) A.C. 99 Lord Watson said:

The word '' include '' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of

the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to

their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

My construction of item 2 of List III receives support from the decision of the Patna High Court in Vishwanath v. Sri Mahout ILR (1938) Pat. 714

where it was held referring to item 4 of the same List which is in similar terms that

all matters whether relating to procedure or not included in the CPC on the date of the passing of the Government of India Act are concurrent

legislative subjects,

and that the words and all matters, etc."" enlarge the subjects of concurrent legislation to the extent stated above. The decision in Rajah Bejoy Singh

v. Surendra (1928) 55 M.L.J. 456 : L.R. 55 IndAp 320 : ILR 56 Cal. 1 (P.C) cited on behalf of the detenus in which it was held that the

expression in a patni lease "" including all interests therein "" does not increase the corpus of the subject of the lease, is in my opinion distinguishable.

Drawing attention to the essential characteristic of a lease, namely, that the subject is one which is occupied and enjoyed and the corpus of which

does not in the nature of things and by reason of the user disappear which characteristic was pointed out in their earlier decision in Shashi Bhushan

v. Jyoti Praskad (1916) 32 M.L.J. 245 : L.R. 441. A. 46 : ILR 44 Cal. 585 (P.C.) the Privy Council held that the corpus was sufficiently

ascertained as the surface of the land and did not include the sub-soil and the lessee had therefore no right to use the lands leased for making

bricks. The words. "" including all interests therein "" only carried with the corpus all rights appurtenant thereto such as rights of passage, water or the

like. The decision of the Privy Council is also based on a consideration of all the terms of the lease and on the absence of anything to suggest that

the land included therein was to be put to any use other than that to which the zemindari lands were subject at the time of the lease.

In my opinion the words "" all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure "" emphasise that any provision contained in that Code can be

varied or repealed by either the Dominion or the Provincial Legislature subject of course to the statutory conditions and procedure laid down in

regard to legislation on matters falling within the Concurrent Legislative List. It would indeed be odd if the Parliament altogether overlooked

Section 491, notwithstanding that a reference is made to all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure in item 2 of List III and if it made

no provision for the matter comprised in that section in any of the Lists. But this is what the argument on behalf of the applicants involves. As held

by the Federal Court in Manikkasundara v. R.S. Nayudu (1946) 2 M.L.J. 17 : 9 F.L.J. 57:

When there is a choice between two possible constructions of an entry or entries, one of which will result in legislative power being conferred by

some entry or entries in the lists and the other in a finding of no existing power, but if legislation is required that recourse must be had to Section

104, the first construction should on principles analogous to those applied to the Canadian Constitution be preferred.

It is unnecessary to decide whether item 2 of the Concurrent Legislative List should be read along with items 1 and 2 of the Provincial Legislative

List so as to allot Section 491 to the former sphere or whether it should be held to fall within the scope of item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List

read with item 1, there being to that extent a subtraction out of item 2 of the Concurrent Legislative List. As observed by the Privy Council in

Profulla Kumar v. The Bank of Commerce, Ltd. (1947) 2 M.L.J. 6.:

it is not possible to make so clean a cut between the powers of the various Legislatures : they are bound to overlap from time to time.

For the purpose of the present contention it is sufficient to hold that the matter falls under either the one or the other of the items referred to above.

In this view the argument based on Section 104(1) must be rejected.

Alternatively, it was argued that Section 4 is invalid as it is a provision of a Provincial law which is repugnant to a provision of an existing law

(namely, Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code) with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, and that

consequently the Provincial law is to the extent of the repugnancy void. Reliance was placed for this argument on Sub-section (1) of Section 107.

It was part of the argument that Section 107 (1) is absolute, and that Section 4 of the Ordinance would not fall u/s 107(2) which provides for the

enactment of a Provincial law so as to prevail over an existing Jaw with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List.

The material portions of Section 107(1) and (2) may be usefully quoted:

(1) If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant ... to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the

Concurrent Legislative List, then subject to the provisions of this section...the existing law shall prevail, and the Provincial law shall, to the extent of

the repugnancy, be void.

(2) Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List contains any provision repugnant....to

an existing law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial law, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General has

received the assent of the Governor-General the Provincial law shall in that Province prevail, but nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at any

time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter.

Learned counsel appearing for the detenus strenuously contended that there is a difference between the language of Section 107, Sub-section (1)

and the language of Section 107, Sub-section (2). For the purpose of the question under consideration I am unable to see any difference. The

subject common to both the Sub-sections is the repugnancy between a provision of a Provincial law and a provision of an existing law with respect

to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List. Sub-section (1) lays down generally that where there is such a repugnancy the

existing law shall prevail and the Provincial law shall be void. This however is statedly ""subject to the provisions of this section."" This would bring in

Sub-section (2) which provides that if the procedure therein laid is followed, the Provincial law shall prevail over the existing law in the Province

concerned, and it is then stated that even in such a case the Dominion Legislature may at any time thereafter enact further legislation with respect to

the same matter. The argument that Section 107(1) is absolute is, I think, answered by the language of the Sub-section itself which provides that it

operated "" subject to the provisions of this section,"" the only relevant provision for this purpose being Sub-section (2). On my reading of Section

107 the present case falls u/s 107(2) and the procedure laid down in that Sub-section or rather what is equivalent to it u/s 88 (1), namely, the

obtaining of instructions from the Governor-General having been satisfied, Section 4 of the Ordinance would prevail over Section 491, Criminal

Procedure Code and its validity cannot be questioned on this ground even If Section 4 is assumed to relate to a matter in the Concurrent

Legislative List. Whether and how far Section 4 is retrospective and whether and how far it affects the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with

applications u/s 491 are quite different matters which I shall in due course deal with.

The point was also raised that Section 4 of the Ordinance is invalid by reason of Clause 44 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. By a

reference to the wording of that clause it was said that the provisions of the Letters Patent are subject only to the "" Legislative powers of the

Governor-General in Legislative Council."" Section 223 of the Government of India Act, however, provides that the jurisdiction of any existing High

Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court shall be the same as immediately

before the establishment of the Dominion and that they should further be subject to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted

by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by the Constitution Act. That the High Court has no power to issue a prerogative writ of Habeas

Corpus as known to English Law in matters contemplated by Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, and that it had no such power immediately

before the establishment of the Dominion cannot possibly be disputed in view of the decision of the Full Bench in District Magistrate Vs. K.C.

Mammen Mapillai and Others, which was affirmed by the Privy Council in Mdthen v. The District Magistrate of Trivandrum (1939) 2 M.L.J. 406 :

L.R. 66 IndAp 222 : ILR 1939 Mad. 744 That being so, the question again comes back to what has already been discussed, namely, whether

Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, has been validly varied or affected by the Ordinance in accordance with the provisions of the Government

of India Act, 1935.

An argument based on Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code though it bears not on the validity but on the effect of Section 4 of the

Ordinance or Section 16-A of the Act may conveniently be referred to here, as it is in my opinion answered by the decision in District Magistrate

Vs. K.C. Mammen Mapillai and Others, to which reference has just been made. There was no claim in that case that the High Court had at any

time any inherent power to deal with cases of illegal or improper detention other than the power to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus or the statutory

power u/s 491. No case has ever asserted the existence of any such power. Moreover, it is clear law that where a power is given expressly there

is no scope for the exercise of an inherent power.

The question has next arisen as to whether Section 16-A would apply to the applications before us which for this purpose would fall into two

groups, namely, those which were filed before and were pending on 25th May, 1948, when Section 16-A came, in to operation and those which

were filed subsequent to 25th May, 1948, though in respect of orders of detention which had been passed prior to that date.

The argument on behalf of the Crown goes so far as to claim that the jurisdiction u/s 491 ceases to be exercisable on the promulgation of the

Ordinance and that this is indicated by the sweeping reference to "" any person detained or deemed to have been detained "" u/s 2 of the Act.

There was a learned discussion as to how in America a person can be deprived of his liberty only by judicial process by reason of the

interpretation placed by the American Courts on what are known as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and how the constitutional position in

India is different. It was pointed out that according to Dicey the rule of British jurisprudence that no member of the Executive can interfere with the

liberty of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a Court of justice is still a principle of

private law "" and is not a part of the Constitution. But as has been pointed out by the Federal Court in Baburao v. King-Emperor (1944) 1 M.L.J.

305 : 6 F.L.J. 187 : ILR 1944 Nag. 300 (F.C.). all this does not mean that the well-established principle of British jurisprudence as to the

sacredness of personal freedom is not part of the law of British India.

Though at one stage the learned Advocate-General referred to the use of the word '' may '' in Section 491 and to the discretionary nature of

the jurisdiction of the High Court under that section, he did not finally maintain that the right of a citizen to prosecute his application u/s 491 is not a

substantive right. It is certainly more and not less important than a right of appeal in respect of a pending suit, which has been held not to be a mere

matter of procedure and which can be taken away retrospectively like other vested rights only by the express language or the necessary intendment

of an act of the Legislature. (See Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin ILR (1928) Cal. 512 As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 9th edition,

page 222:

No rule of construction is more firmly established than this that retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right

or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the

enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is capable of either interpretation it must be construed as prospective only.

I shall deal first with applications filed after 25th May, 1948. The reference in Section 16-A to persons deemed to have been detained under

the Act, by which expression are meant persons detained u/s 2 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, which preceded

Madras Act I of 1947, seems to me to indicate that Section 16-A is meant to apply to orders of detention passed before 25th May, 1948 and that

it was not meant only to apply to detentions made after that date. It was argued by the learned Counsel who appeared in this group of applications

that by virtue of the very orders of detention their clients obtained a right to apply u/s 491 which right they characterised as a vested right. The

argument was sought to be supported by a reference to Section 8, Clauses (d) and (f) of the Madras General Clauses Act I of 1891 which

provides that:

where any act to which this Chapter applies repeals any other enactment, then the repeal shall not affect any right accrued .... under any enactment

so repealed; or affect any ... remedy in respect of any such right....

This is, however, answered by the decision of the Privy Council in Abbott v. The Minister of Lands (1895) A.C. 425 where it was held that a

mere right existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the

meaning of the usual saving clause in an interpretation statute. In any event, as I have already indicated, there would be no content whatever for the

words "" persons deemed to have been detained under the Act"", if Section 16-A is to operate only in regard to persons detained after 25th May,

1948. The legitimate inference would, therefore, be that persons whether detained under the Act before 25th May, 1948, or deemed to have been

detained under the Act by virtue of orders passed before the Act of 1947 under the Ordinance then in force would be affected by Section 16-A if

they made no applications before the promulgation of the Ordinance.

The next question is, would pending applications also be affected? The language of Section 16-A is susceptible of two constructions: (1) The

provisions of Section 491, Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the applications filed after 25th May, 1948; and (2) the applications filed

even before 25th May, 1948, shall be dealt with as if Section 491, Sub-sections 1 and 2 do not apply to them. There is considerable force in the

argument on behalf of the detenus pointing out the sharp contrast between the language of Section 16-A and the language of Section 16 (2) which

in terms provides that proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act questioning the validity of orders made under the Madras

Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, shall not be continued and shall be discharged. On the principle laid down in The Colonial Sugar

Refining Company, Ltd. v. Irving ILR (1905) A.C. 369 and Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin 56 Cal. 512 (S.B.) and applying the well-established rule of

interpretation that:

a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.

I hold that Section 4 of the Ordinance and Section 16-A of the Act must be so read, as to leave applications filed before 25th May, 1948, and

pending on that date altogether untouched.

It was claimed that applications despatched by the detenus before 25th May, 1948, but which could be filed into Court only after that date by

reason of the delay occasioned by the exigencies of communication and transmission through official channels should be regarded as standing on

the same footing as applications presented before 25th May, 1948. But if as we have held, a right accrues only on the filing of an application, the

material date would be the, date of filing and not any earlier date when preparations had been or were being made for such filing.

We have heard elaborate arguments in regard to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court and of the Superior Courts

generally in dealing with applications challenging the legality and propriety of detentions under statutes similar to Madras Act I of 1947. One

preliminary observation must here be made.

The challenge in every one of the cases involved in the batch of applications before us is a challenge against the order of detention itself and not that

even if the order was valid at its inception the continuance of the detention has become illegal or improper in view of what happened subsequently

or by reason of what the Government subsequently did or failed to do. I say this merely to guard myself against being understood as having-

decided anything more than what is strictly required by the applications under consideration.

The broad division of the applications into two categories, namely, (1) those which were filed before 25th May, 1948, and (2) those which

were filed thereafter has, as already been indicated, to be borne in mind in determining whether there is any and if so what difference in our

jurisdiction in dealing with each of the two groups. If Section 4 of the Ordinance is not to be construed so as to render Section 16-A of the Act

applicable to pending applications, it follows that these applications have to be dealt with in the light only of Section 16(1) of the Act but not in the

light of Section 16-A. Applications filed after 25th May, 1948, must, by reason of our judgment that Section 4 of the Ordinance makes Section

16-A applicable to them, be considered on the footing that they are governed both by Section 16(1) and Section 16-A of the Act.

The argument of the several learned Counsel for the applicants regarding the latter batch of applications is that Section 16-A of the Act does

not repeal Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code and should not be read as negativing the jurisdiction of the High Court altogether in regard to

orders of detention which purport to have been made under the Act. The argument of the Advocate-General on the other hand is, in effect, that

once an order expressed to have been passed under the Act is produced, Section 491 is completely excluded or in other words we must proceed

on the footing that there is no Section 491.

The question falls to be decided in the light of certain decisions of the Federal Court to which I shall immediately refer. In The King-Emperor v.

Benoari Lal Sharma and Ors (1943) 2 M.L.J. 207 : 1943 F.C.R. 96 : 6 F.L.T. 79 (F.C.) the Federal Court had to consider the effect of Section

26 of the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (II of 1942) which provided, inter alia, that no Court is to have authority to revise any order or

sentence of a Court constituted under the Ordinance or to transfer any case from such Court or to make any order u/s 491. The language of the

section was undoubtedly wide. Referring to the Ordinance generally and to Section 26 in particular, Varadachariar, Officiating C.J., described their

true effect in the following passage which seems to be apposite:

The Ordinance

he said:

has not repealed the Criminal Procedure Code in whole or in part or declared it or any of its provisions inoperative in any part of the country or in

respect of any defined categories of crimes. Even the provision in Section 26 excluding the powers of revision, habeas corpu, transfer, etc., is

governed by words referring to the acts of or proceedings in the Special Courts.

The judgment of Varadachariar, O.C.J., which was concurred in by Zafrullah Khan, J., was reversed by the Privy Council in The King-Emperor v.

Benoari Lal Sharma and Ors (1945) 1 M.L.J. 76 : L.R. 72 IndAp 57 : 1945 F.C.R. 161 : 1945 F.L.J. 1 (P.C.) the Privy Council agreeing with

the views of Rowland, J., of the Federal Court and of Derbyshire, C.J. and Khundkar, J., of the Calcutta High Court in regard to certain questions

which have no bearing on the point now under discussion; there is however no disagreement expressed by the Privy Council with what

Varadachariar, O.C.J. and Zafrullah Khan, J., stated on this particular aspect, namely, the real scope and bearing of the provisions of the

Ordinance on the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court.

In Basantha Chandra Ghose v. The King-Emperor (1944) 2 M.L.J. 167 :I.L.R. 23 Pat. 678 : 7 F.L.J. 203 (F.C.) Sir Patrick Spens, C.J.,

who delivered the judgment of the Federal Court first quoted the language of Section 10(1) of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance 3 of 1944

which was in the following words:

No order made under this Ordinance and no order having effect by virtue of Section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance, shall be called

in question in any Court, and no Court shall have power to make any order u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (V of (898), in respect of

any order made under or having effect under this Ordinance or in respect of any person subject to such an order.

He then pointed out that:

section 10 does not purport to repeal Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code

and that:

section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code confers a certain power or jurisdiction on the High Court and all that Section 10 of the Ordinance

does is to interdict the High Court from exercising that power or jurisdiction in a certain class of cases.

The position is stated in language which is even more explicit in a later judgment of the Federal Court in Basantha Chandra Ghose v. The King-

Emperor (1945) 1 M.L.J. 365 : ILR 24 Pat. 187 : 8 F.L.J. 40 (F.C.) where the same provision of law, namely, Section 10 of the Restriction and

Detention Ordinance (III of 1944) had to be considered. How the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 491 is retained notwithstanding the sweeping

language of Section 1 o and the grounds on which that jurisdiction will be exercised were categorically-stated by Sir Patrick Spens, C.J., in a

passage which may usefully be set out. The learned Chief Justice said:

It was no doubt open to the detenu to show that the order was not in fact made by the Governor of Bihar or that it was a fraudulent exercise of the

power. The observations in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 and Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1942) A.C. 284

establish that the burden of substantiating these pleas lies on the detenu. In the words of Viscount Maugham, once the order is proved or admitted

it must be taken prima facie, that is, until the contrary is proved, to have been properly made and that the requisite as to the belief of the Secretary

of State (here, the Governor) was complied with ... The mere fact that the detenu challenges the factum or the bona fides of the order or the fact

that the officers of Government must naturally be in possession of information on the subject cannot be said to be '' proof to the contrary '' so as to

make it incumbent on the Government to adduce evidence in support of the order. In Greene''s case (1942) A.C. 284 Goddard, L.J. (as he then

was) referred to the possible ignorance of the detenu as to the reasons for his internment and said that that would not shift the burden of proof

because '' it in no way shows that the Secretary of State had not reasonable cause to believe or did not believe '' that it was necessary to detain the

person.

Some reliance was placed by the learned Advocate-General on the judgment of the Federal Court in Birpal Singh v. The King-Emperor

(1946) 1 M.L.J. 322 : 1946 F.L.J. 1 : 1946 F.C.R. 21 (F.C.) as supporting his contention that the jurisdiction u/s 491 is altogether excluded. The

Federal Court was there dealing with an application u/s 491 by a person who was detained under the Bengal State Prisoners Regulation (III of

1818) which is one of the Regulations referred to in Sub-section 3 of Section 491. In rejecting the application the Federal Court made certain

observations which may, at first sight, seem to go so far as to hold that if the Government claims to have passed an order under the provisions of

that Regulation there is no more jurisdiction in the High Court u/s 491 to consider any matter arising out of or in relation to the detention. If the

judgment of the Federal Court is to be so read it may seem to be in conflict with the view expressed by the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra

Chase''s case (1945) 1 M.L.J. 365 : ILR 24 Pat. 187 : 8 F.L.J. 40 (F.C.) On a close reading however of the judgment in Birpal Singh v. The

King-Emperor (1946) 1 M.L.J. 322 : 1946 F.L.J. 1 : 1946 F.C.R. 21 (F.C.), popularly known as the Bhajji case, I think the Federal Court did

not go to the extent of denying the jurisdiction of the High Court in those respects in which it had affirmed such jurisdiction in the case of Basanta

Chandra Chose (1945) 1 M.L.J. 365 : ILR 24 Pat. 187 : 8 F.L.J. 40 (F.C.) Particular reference must be made to the limited scope of the

contentions raised by Mr. Gauba, counsel for the detenu in the Bhajji case. At page 28 of the Report the Federal Court sets out as (a), (b), (c) the

points which he argued. Of these, point (a) alone is material for the present discussion and it is to the effect that the detenu

was still de jure the ruler of Bhajji State and as such not within the category of persons in respect of whom any warrant of commitment could be

issued under the Bengal State Prsoners Regulation (III of 1818).

After setting out points (a), (b) and (c) the Federal Court observed that:

At one stage Mr. Gauba also urged that the form of the warrant of the nth April, 1941, did not on the face of it sufficiently indicate that it was a

warrant issued by the Central Government as required by Section 7-A of the Regulation III, and that positive evidence that the matter had been

considered and orders given for its issue by the appropriate officials was required before a Court could hold the warrant a valid warrant under

Regulation III.

There was evidently no evidence offered on behalf of the detenu to substantiate the argument of Mr. Gauba in this respect and as the burden of

proof in regard to allegations of that description undoubtedly lies on the challenger there need be no surprise if the Federal Court did not say

anything further in their judgment in respect of this argument. From the manner in which the Federal Court refers to this particular argument it looks

as if the counsel made a passing reference to it at one stage of his argument without emphasising it. As to what is described as point (a), the

Federal Court observed that this point was legitimately open to the detenu and proceeded to deal with it on its merits.

The observations of the Federal Court to which pointed attention is drawn on behalf of the Crown are the following:

Once the Court is satisfied that a person is being detained under Regulation III there is no jurisdiction u/s 491 which the Court can exercise in the

matter.

and again,

In our judgment the material question in this case is : Is the appellant a person detained under Regulation III ? If he is, his application must fail.

In the light of what I have already said I am not inclined to regard these observations as excluding the preliminary jurisdiction of the High Court

to decide, if the contention should be raised, whether the order was not in fact made by the concerned officer or authority, and did not represent

his or its belief, and secondly, whether the order constituted a fraudulent exercise of the power. These questions are concerned with ascertaining

whether the order under challenge is really one made by the concerned individual or body of individuals under the statutory power conferred on

him or them. They are in a sense preliminary or collateral questions and seek to decide whether the order could at all be said to be one under the

relevant statute. If those questions are decided adversely to the detenu we reach the position that the order is one which can be said to have been

passed by the Government in the exercise of its statutory power. After that it may not any longer be open to the person concerned to show that the

detention is either illegal or improper. After making the observations which I have quoted above, the Federal Court goes on to state that:

something more than allegations that a person is being illegally or improperly detained under Regulation III is necessary before the Court can get

over the bar to jurisdiction under the section imposed by Sub-section (3)--, if on the facts of the case it is clear that a person is being detained

under Regulation III, even though a Court might think if it investigated those facts, it might find that the detention was illegal or improper, still the

Court cannot in our judgment interfere u/s 491.

In my opinion in speaking of a person detained under Regulation III the Federal Court was contemplating a person who has been detained by an

officer duly empowered in that behalf by an order which is not a fraudulent exercise of power and which is based on the satisfaction of the officer

that its issue is necessary or expedient.

The conclusion which I have indicated above receives considerable support from the decisions of the Federal Court in King-Emperor v.

Sibnath Banerji and Ors (1943) 2 M.L.J. 468 : 1943 F.L.J. 151 : 1944 F.C.R. 1 and of the Privy Council in Sibnath Banerji''s case (1945) 2

M.L.J. 325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.). The detentions in that case were under Rule 26 of the rules framed under the Defence of India Act which

provided that

the Central Government or the Provincial Government if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from

acting in any manner prejndicial to the defence of British India it is necessary so to do may make an order .... (6) directing that he be detained.

All the Judges of the Federal Court were agreed that it was a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the power of detention conferred by Rule

26 that the Provincial Government should have applied its mind and been satisfied that such detention was necessary for preventing the person

proceeded against from acting in a manner prejudicial to the matters mentioned therein and that therefore orders of detention made in pursuance of

a "" routine order "" that if the Police recommended detention of any person under Rule 26 such person may be detained were invalid. All the Judges

were again agreed in holding that a mere recital in the order that the Provincial Government is satisfied to the effect stated in Rule 26 cannot

prevent the Court from enquiring into its accuracy and if there is sufficient material, from coming to the conclusion that the recital is inaccurate

though the presence of the recital in the order will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce admissible evidence to controvert it. There is a

presumption attaching to an order regular on the face of it that it has been properly made; but this is a rebuttable presumption. Relying on

Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 and Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1942) A.C. 284 the Federal Court held that the

Court could enquire whether there was not any consideration by or any satisfaction on the part, of any properly authorised person before the

orders for detention were made.

The Judgment of the Judicial Committee in Sibnath Banerji''s case (1945) 2 M.L.J. 325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.) approves of the judgment of the

Federal Court in the above respect. It was maintained for the Crown before the Privy Council:

that the orders being on their face regular and in conformity with the language of the rule, it was not open to the Court to investigate their validity

any further.

Their Lordships quote Section 16 (1) of the Defence of India Act which it would appear, was not brought before the Federal Court, and which

provides that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court, and go on to observe

that the said provision:

assumes that the order is made in exercise of the power, which clearly leaves it open to challenge on the ground that it was not made in conformity

with the power conferred, heavily though the burden of proof may lie on the challenger.

Their Lordships conclude that:

accordingly, the contention of the Crown that the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate the validity of the order fails.

Agreeing with the unanimous conclusion of the Federal Court that the orders of detention in the case of two of the respondents were proved to

have been issued on the basis of police reports without any examination of the available materia by the Provincial Government or in other words

that there was substitution of the recommendation by the Police in the place of the satisfaction of the Governor prescribed by Rule 26, their

Lordships set aside those orders.

Section 16 (1) of the Defence of India Act is almost identical with Section 16(1) of Madras Act I of 1947, but the Defence of India Act

contained no provision corresponding to Section 16-A of the Madras Act, and there was no specific reference to the jurisdiction of the High Court

u/s 491. Section 16-A however makes, in my opinion, no real difference. The jurisdiction of the High Court is in no way limited or restricted by

Section 16-A beyond what was done by Section 16 (1), so that even in regard to applications filed after 25th May, 1948, the scope of the enquiry

by this Court is no narrower than the scope of the enquiry in applications filed before that date.

101.The only point remaining to be considered is as to the grounds on which the orders of detention are open to challenge. Most valuable guidance

is afforded on this subject by three well-known decisions of the House of Lords in Halliday''s case (1917) A.C. 260 Liversidge''s case (1942) AC

206 and Greene''s case (1942) A.C. 284 The first of these was concerned with regulation 14-B of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation)

Regulations, 1914, issued under the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act of 1914, Section 1, Sub-section (1). The regulation empowered

the Secretary of State to order the internment of any person:

of hostile origin or association where on the recommendation of a competent naval or military authority it appears expedient for securing the public

safety or the defence of the realm.

The other two decisions arose out of orders of detention under the Defence (General) Regulations, regulation 18-B, issued under the Emergency

Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, Section 1, Sub-section 1, para. (1) of the regulation was in the following terms:

If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned in

acts prejudicial to public safety or the defence of the realm or in the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary

to exercise control over him, he may make an order against that person directing that he be detained.

By para. (8):

Any person detained in pursuance of this regulation shall be deemed to be in lawful custody.

Notwithstanding the differences in the enactments of 1914 and 1939 all the three decisions embody certain common statements of principle.

The decisions of the Privy Council and the Federal Court to which I have had occasion to refer are in great part based upon these three

decisions and interpret what is therein stated. There is no need to quote from any of these decisions at any length and it will suffice to set out briefly

the grounds which have been recognised in them as grounds on which a detenu can impeach the validity of the order of detention against him.

(1) At the very outset lies the authenticity of the order which it is open to the detenu to disprove, if he can successfully do so. It is sufficient to refer

in this connection to the speeches of Lord Macmillan and Lord Wright in Greene''s case (1942) A.C. 284 where they refer to authenticity as a fact

to be enquired into if impugned.

Section 16, Sub-section (3) of Madras Act I of 1947 provides that where any order purports to have been made and signed by any authority in

exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act, a Court shall presume that such order was so made by such authority, but the presumption is

obviously one which may be rebutted.

(2) It is settled by the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Banerji''s case (1945) 2 M.L.J. 325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.) that the detenu may show

if he can that the officer or authority purporting to issue the order of detention did not apply his mind to the necessity or expediency of issuing such

an order and was not and could not have been satisfied in regard thereto as required by the statute. Sibnath Banerji''s case (1945) 2 M.L.J. 325 :

8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.) affords a concrete illustration of how this may happen.

(3) I am clear though the decisions do not directly refer to it that it will be open to a detenu to prove that the officer issuing the order is not legally

empowered to do so.

(4) The detenu may also show that he is not the person intended : or in other words that it is a case of mistaken identity-See per Lord Wright in

Liversidge''s case (1942) AC 206 and in Greene''s case (1942) A.C. 284.

(5) There is a considerable body of judicial opinion that the order should have been made in good faith by the officer or authority concerned, the

bona fides of the order being presumed. There are several references to this in Liversidge''s case, Greene''s case and in Sibnath Banerji''s case

(1945) 2 M.L.J. 325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.) In Halliday''s case (1917) A.C. 260 Lord Wrenbury states that the statutory authority must be

exercised honestly. It may be difficult for the detenu to establish the absence of bona fides, but it cannot be doubted that it is a ground of challenge

which is open to him where he can, for instance, show that the order was not issued in the public interest but was actuated by personal malice or

spite or is the result of political animosity.

(6) Negatively it can be said that the sufficiency of the available material or information to justify the order of detention and the question whether

the officer concerned could be said to have reasonable grounds for the issue of the order in question are not matters which are within the

cognizance of the Court. The satisfaction is the satisfaction of the officer. He is the sole Judge and once the conclusion is reached that he was

satisfied the detenu cannot invite the Court to go behind it and dissect the reasons which weighed with the officer and find out for itself whether the

order should have been issued. While the satisfaction of a properly constituted authority is a condition precedent to the issue of an order of

detention, whether the circumstances called for the issue of such an order is a matter entirely for its consideration and nobody else''s.

It may no doubt be asked as it was asked in the cases which went up to the House of Lords whether apart from the challenge in a superior

court of law, on the grounds which have been detailed above there is any other effective safeguard against the encroachment by the executive on

the liberty of the citizen. As said by Lord Wright in Liversidge''s case (1942) A.C. 206:

the safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has been

evolved.

Later on in his speech in that case, His Lordship refers to the provision that the detenu should be informed of the grounds of his detention and

should be given such other particulars as may be considered sufficient to enable him to present his case, the constitution of an advisory committee

with powers of recommendation and advice which however the Home Secretary may decline to follow and the requirement that the Home

Secretary should report to the Parliament periodically as to the action he has taken on the advice of the committee as providing some check though

not a very effective check on an unreasonable exercise of the power. The ultimate remedy however is to be sought only in public opinion,

expressed through recognised democratic channels. To quote His Lordship''s words once again:

If the sense of the country was outraged by the system or practice of making detention orders, or indeed, by any particular order, it could make

itself sufficiently felt in the press and Parliament to put an end to any abuse and Parliament can always amend the regulations.

However that may be the jurisdiction of this Court established and defined by the above precedents remains unimpaired and unaffected by anything

contained in the Madras Ordinance and these applications will have to be dealt with accordingly.

Govinda Menon, J.

As the facts and circumstances that led to the hearing of these petitions by this Full Bench have been exhaustively considered by my Lord the

Chief Justice and my brother Govindarajachari, J., I need not set them out at any length : but in view of the importance of the constitutional subjects

arising for decision and the elaborate arguments addressed to the Court, I may as well state shortly in my own words the reasons for my

concurrence with the judgments now delivered.

As a preliminary step, the learned Counsel appearing for the various petitioners have contended that Madras Ordinance II of 1948

promulgated by H.E. the Governor of Madras on 25th May, 1948 is ultra vires; because the necessary prerequisites for the validity of such a law

not only do not exist, but that the essential conditions precedent to the promulgation of such an ordinance have also not been complied with.

Though no specific authority has been cited before the Court, it can be clearly assumed, that after the 15th August, 1947, the position of the

Governor, vis-a-vis., the Council of Ministers, is that he acts entirely as a constitutional head. That means the Governor suo motu or of his own

initiative wilt snot take any effective steps in the administration of the Province without Toeing previously advised by the Ministry-to that extent I do

not feel that there can be any doubt and therefore the argument of the petitioners'' Counsel is that under the circumstances that existed on the 25th

May, 1948, as a matter of fact between the afternoon of 24th May, 1948, and the time of the promulgation of Ordinance II of 1948, the Governor

was not advised by the ministers because there was hardly any time for the Council of Ministers to meet, discuss the matter and place their

conclusion before the Governor. It is said that after the Legislature was prorogued by a notification (G.O. No. 1284-Public Elections) dated 24th

May, 1948, and before the Ordinance was issued on the 25th May, 1948, not even 24 hours had elapsed which time would not have been

sufficient for the Cabinet to meet and discuss the situation and advise the Governor to promulgate the Ordinance. It is next pointed out that even if

during this short period of nearly 24 hours the Cabinet of the Madras Government conferred together and advised the Governor to promulgate the

Ordinance there existed the physical impossibility of obtaining the instructions of the Governor-General during this short interval. There was also a

feeble contention put forward without any attempt to substantiate it that during this relevant period His Excellency the Governor of Madras was not

in the City of Madras but was residing in Ootacamund and that since the Council of Ministers did not meet in Ootacamund it would not have been

possible for the Governor to have taken their advice. The argument outlined above was contested by the learned Advocate-General appearing for

the Government of Madras on the ground that all these matters raise questions of fact, for the elucidation of which the petitioners have taken no

steps by letting in evidence. He contends that the petitioners are prohibited from raising any question of fact on which evidence would have been

necessary. It is further pointed out that u/s 114 of the Evidence Act there is a presumption of legality in favour of the Ordinance and the party who

impugns its legal nature should prove his contention. The Ordinance itself recites that the Legislature of the Province is not in session, that the

Governor is satisfied that immediate action is necessary for the purpose of amending the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1947 and

that the instructions of the Governor-General have been obtained in pursuance of the proviso u/s 88 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The correctness of these recitals cannot be questioned before this Court without any material to prove the contrary. Reference was also made to

Sub-section 4 of Section 51 of the Government of India Act, 1935, for negativing the contention of the petitioners regarding the absence of advice

by the Council of Ministers. According to this Sub-section the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by the ministers to the

Governor shall not be inquired into in any Court. Further the learned Advocate-General brought to our notice that though the Madras Legislature

was in session till the 24th May, 1948, the last day on which the Madras Legislative Assembly met was on the 28th April, 1948, after which the

Assembly was adjourned sine die. The last meeting of the Legislative Council prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance was on the 3rd May,

1948, after which this House was also adjourned sine die. Therefore on the day when the Legislature was prorogued there was no likelihood of

any immediate meeting of either House of the Legislature. Before the Legislature could meet, intimation has to be sent to the members thereof to

assemble on a specified date and ordinarily sometime must elapse between the summoning and the meeting of the Legislature. In addition, the

Advocate-General argued that on a proper construction of Section 88 all that is necessary is that the Governor should be satisfied when he

promulgated the Ordinance, that immediate action was necessary and that it is not essential that his decision must be eo instanti with the

promulgation. It may be that he might have thought about it earlier, come to a decision, got the previous instructions from the Governor-General

and promulgated the Ordinance at a time when he thought that immediate action was necessary.

It seems to me that the argument addressed by the Advocate-General on this aspect has to be accepted. The recital in the preamble to the

Ordinance that the Governor was satisfied that immediate action was necessary and that the instructions of the Governor-General have been

obtained must be accepted as correct especially since nothing has been shown to the contrary. I do not see how it can be successfully urged that

the provisions of Section 88 of the Government of India Act have not been properly complied with. On the 25th May, 1948, the Legislature was

not in session. The Ordinance recites that the Governor is satisfied that immediate action is necessary. I am not prepared to agree with the

contentions of the petitioners regarding the impossibility of tendering advice to the Governor by the Council of Ministers or that no advice was

tendered. Mere assertions in Court by the petitioners'' Counsel cannot be taken as proof of those statements. Applying the following dictum of

Viscount Maugham in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson 1942 A.C. 206 it has to be concluded that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary

all the necessary conditions contemplated by Section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, have been complied with.

In my opinion, the well known presumption Omnia esse rite eta applies to this order, and accordingly, assuming the order to be proved or

admitted, it must be taken prima facie, that is until the contrary is proved, to have been properly made and the requisite as to the belief of the

Secretary of State was complied with.

It cannot also be successfully contended that since the Ordinance does not make mention that the instructions of the Governor-General have not

been obtained u/s 107 of the Government of India Act, the Ordinance in so far as it affects the existing law is, ultra vires. The fallacy in the line of

reasoning is that Section 107 deals with an Act and since an Ordinance has all the essentials of an Act, it is unnecessary to make specific mention

of Section 107 at all. In the face of express provisions contained in Sub-section 4 of Section 51 of the Constitution Act, we will not be justified in

embarking upon an enquiry as to whether the Council of Ministers ever met at all or that any advice was tendered to the Governor even if they

met, or what that advice was. If this Court is precluded from investigating whether any advice was tendered, it necessarily follows, that the

contentions regarding the ultra vires nature of the Ordinance on the ground that no advice was tendered to the Governor cannot be accepted. It is

also in my opinion not within the province of this Court to find out why the Legislature was prorogued or whether it could have been possible to

have convened a meeting of the Houses of Legislature before the Ordinance was promulgated unless the petitioners can show that the whole action

was fraudulent and constituted a fraud upon the power exercised. I need hardly add that no attempt was made to substantiate any of those

allegations.

As an alternative, if not, the main argument, counsel for the petitioners have raised the important question that even if the entire Ordinance is

intra vires, Clause 4 dealing with Section 16-A to be inserted in Madras Act I of 1947, by this Ordinance is repugnant to an existing law and so

the latter law will have to prevail on account of Section 107 of the Government of India Act. Mr. N.S. Mani appearing for some of the petitioners

contends that as the power of the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance in times of emergency is similar to that of the Provincial Legislature to

pass an act, even if Section 16-A had already been enacted in Madras Act I of 1947, still, that would be repugnant to an existing law and hence

void on account of the provisions of Section 107 of the Constitution Act. The argument is put this way. The object of the Ordinance being to

amend the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act of 1947, it was a matter which came directly with in entry No. 1, List II, Provincial

Legislative List of 7th schedule of the Constitution Act and therefore the subject was one which was entirely within the jurisdiction of the Provincial

Legislature. One has therefore to look at the pith and substance of the Ordinance about which there can be no doubt; and according to that test,

the Ordinance by its preamble and object falls within entry No. 1 (List II). But Section 16-A does not at all concern with public tranquillity, but

with a provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 491. If that is so, then according to the petitioners, Sub-section (1) of Section 107 is

applicable; in that a portion of a provincial law, viz., Section 16-A is repugnant to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (List No.

3) viz., entry No. 2 therein. Then it follows that the portion of the Provincial Law to that extent is repugnant and void. Two recent decisions of the

Privy Council reported in P. K. Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce Limited, Khulna (1947) 2 M.L.J. 6 : L.R. 74 IndAp 23 : 1947 F.L.J. 34

(P.C.) as well as an earlier decision in Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras (1945) 1 M.L.J. 225 : L.R. 72 IndAp 91 : 1945

F.L.J. 69 (P.C.) were referred to. In those decisions, their Lordships of the Privy Council have held that the Lists in the 7th Schedule are bound to

overlap from time to time, that it is not possible to make a clean cut between the powers of the various Legislatures and therefore the existence of a

Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list the particular provision

should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. They further point out that it is possible that the Provincial Legislature may invade into

the realm of the Federal Legislature and the provisions of a particular statute may advance therefore into the Federal territory as to show that its

true nature is not concerned with Provincial matters; but the question is not, has it trespassed more or less, but is the trespass, whatever it be, such

as to show that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is a Provincial subject or a Federal subject. If that question is determined, then the Act

falls on one or other side of the line and can be seen as valid or invalid according to its true content. It was further pointed out that the pith and

substance of the Bengal Money Lenders Act was money lending and therefore it was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature even if

some portions of it related to Negotiable Instruments. Their Lordships held that the particular Act in question was intra vires the Provincial

Legislature. The question was also raised whether such an Act could interfere with transactions in which promissory notes formed a part, in order

to make such transactions valid only subject to the provisions of the Money Lenders Act. The Federal Court had already decided on this point that

where the liability in the promissory note had passed into a liability under a decree, there was nothing to prevent the decree being affected by the

provisions of the Money Lenders Act and hence in such cases it would be valid where judgments were sought to be reopened, but invalid where

no judgment had been obtained and the borrower''s liability was still secured by the promissory note. The Judicial Committee left the question open

and did not pronounce any decision on the soundness of this view. The other decision cited Governor-General in Council v. The Province of

Madras (1945) 1 M.L.J. 225 : L.R. 72 IndAp 91 : 1945 F.L.J. 69 (P.C.) also dealt with a similar topic and the conclusion of their Lordships is

that it is not the name of the tax but its real nature, viz., its pith and substance, which must determine whether it can be levied by the Federal or

Provincial Legislature. I am not able to see how these decisions support the argument of learned Counsel. If at all, the decision in P. K. Mukherjee

v. The Bank of Commerce, Limited, Khulna (1947) 2 M.L.J. 6 : L.R. 74 IndAp 23 : 1947 F.L.J. 34 (P.C.) is, as I read it, against his contention.

Their Lordships did not declare any portion of the Bengal Money Lenders Act repugnant to any existing law. The dictum of Sir Maurice Gwyer,

C.J., in Subramania Chetty v. Muthuswami Goundan (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp.) 1 (F.C.) was quoted with approval in the judgment of the Judicial

Committee to the effect that the rule which has been evolved is that the impugned Act has to be examined to ascertain its pith and substance for the

purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that list. I am unable to find any clear pronouncement in any

of these cases to the effect that, if the pith and substance of an enactment is within the purview of a Provincial List even though it trenches upon

some incidental or ancillary matter in the Concurrent List, that part of the legislation which trenches upon the Concurrent List is invalid or

inoperative. Moreover the conflict in these cases was between Lists I and II and not between Lists II and III. It has further to be observed that

Sub-section (1) of Section 107 is subject to Sub-section (2) as is specifically mentioned therein. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of a proviso to

Sub-section (1) and therefore one has to consider the matter by a joint application of both the Sub-sections together and not by applying the

provisions of Sub-section (1) alone literally.

It is next contended that Sub-section (2) alone is to be taken into consideration and then also Section 16-A is repugnant and therefore void.

The argument is that the entire Ordinance cannot be said to deal with a matter in the Concurrent List but only a portion of it, and therefore Section

107 (2) has no application. This argument overlooks the important circumstance that the word "" Provincial Law "" does not necessarily mean the

whole of the Provincial Law. The learned Counsel admitted that a portion of the Provincial Law is also a Provincial Law within the meaning of

Section 311 of the Constitution Act. If that is so, then Sub-section (2) is clearly applicable because if Section 16-A of the Ordinance relates to a

matter in the Concurrent List, that is entry No. 2 and even though it is repugnant to the existing law still since the previous assent of the Governor-

General has been obtained the Provincial Law shall prevail in the Province. Moreover the words used are "" with respect to."" These words do not

necessarily mean that the entire Provincial Law should relate to one or more of the matters in the Concurrent List. If any portion of a Provincial

Law relates to such a matter, then it is certainly with respect to one of the matters in the Concurrent List. It seems to me therefore that if Section

16-A dealt with a matter in the Concurrent List then Sub-section (2) of Section 107 is applicable and the law is valid so far as the Province is

concerned.

At one stage of the argument, some of the learned Counsel while conceding that if the Governor or the Provincial Legislature had

promulgated an Ordinance or passed an Act as the case may be, solely confined to the matter contained in Section 16-A, then, such Ordinance or

Act will be valid, urged that it is the admixture of a Provincial subject with a Concurrent List subject that made the impugned Ordinance inoperative

and void. This defect, if at all is merely one of form and not substance.

The learned Advocate-General contended that the subject-matter of Section 16-A is one coming within the ambit of entry No. 2 in List II,

viz., jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court with respect to any of the matters in List II. Section 491 being one of the

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court is a matter subject to the legislative

jurisdiction of the Province. We have therefore to ascertain under what basis and authority, the writs in question are to be issued, if such an action

is at all called for. Mr. Asker Ali one of the Counsel for certain petitioners went to the extreme length of urging that u/s 561-A of the Criminal

Procedure Code, this Court is vested with the jurisdiction and power to issue the writ. It is unnecessary to dilate on this contention, because there

has been a long catena of cases of this and other Courts that Section 561-A does not enlarge the powers of a Criminal Court just as Section 151,

CPC does not add to the powers of a Civil Court. The question has to be viewed in the light of other relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure

Code.

It seems to be that the act of issuing a writ is the exercise of a power of jurisdiction and not the strict following of a specific procedure and I

would uphold the contention of the Advocate-General to that extent.

The applicants have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to issue directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus only u/s 491 of Criminal

Procedure Code. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that the power of this Court to issue the writ is to be ascertained from the jurisdiction vested u/s

491, Criminal Procedure Code. What enables the High Court to take action, where a person is illegally or improperly detained within the limits of

the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, is the direct result of the jurisdiction and power conferred by Section 491. Such being the case, in my

opinion, such power or jurisdiction is a matter about which the Provincial Legislature has power to legislate. The old Supreme Court, on which had

been conferred the right to issue the prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus under the common Law, was the predecessor of the High Court and the

High Court inherited those powers when the Supreme Court was abolished. But this common law right was made a statutory one, by the

provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the power of the High Court to issue the writ in a manner other than what is specified in Section

491 was taken away (the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 and 1875). District Magistrate Vs. K.C. Mammen Mapillai and Others, overruled

two earlier decisions in Kochunni Elaya Nair, In Re: Kochunni Elaya Nair, and Govinda Nair, In Re: Erada Padinharedil Govindan Nair and

Another, which held that the High Court had powers, apart from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. This decision of the High Court

was confirmed by the Judicial Committee in Matthen v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum (1939) 2 M.L.J. 406 : L.R. 66 IndAp 222 : ILR 1939

Mad. 744 (P.C.) Under these circumstances the Counsel appearing for the petitioners had, perforce to admit that they could not invoke any power

other than what is contained in Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. The result is, that the power to issue the writ comes within the meaning of

the terms ""jurisdiction and power of the High Court "" in entry No. 2 in the Provincial List and it was within the competence of the Governor to

promulgate the Ordinance taking away such a power.

It is next contended that the right to issue the writ is contained in entry No. 2 of the Concurrent List, namely Criminal Procedure Code

including all the matters included in the Criminal Procedure Code. I am prepared to accept the contention to this extent, that the two entries namely

entry No. 2 is in the Concurrent List and No. 2 in the Provincial List overlap each other to some extent and Section 491 may also come within the

expression

including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure

but does such overlapping take away the right of the Provincial Legislature to deal with the subject-matter under consideration ? In G.P. Stewart

Vs. Brojendra Kishore Roy Chaudhury, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court had to deal with entry No. 4 in the Concurrent List and No. 2 in the

Provincial List; and the learned Judges have observed that merely because the CPC contains certain provisions relating to the jurisdiction and

powers of Courts, it does not follow that Civil Procedure in the Concurrent Legislative List includes everything relating to the jurisdiction and

powers of Courts. So to hold would be completely to wipe out the second entry in the Provincial Legislative List. It is true, that where a subject-

matter might fall either in the Concurrent Legislative List or in the Provincial Legislative List, Section 100 makes the former the dominant list; but

this principle cannot apply where the result would be to rob the provincial entry of all its content. The learned Judges further observe following a

decision in Marriage Legislation in Canada, In re (1912) A.C. 880 that '' Civil Procedure '' in the Concurrent Legislative List must be held to

exclude matters relating to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts since special provision is made for these matters elsewhere in the list. The

provisions in the CPC whether they are civil procedure in the limited sense or not are of course specifically included in the 4th entry in the

Concurrent Legislative List. The same remarks, in my opinion, apply with equal, if not greater force, to entry number 2 in the Concurrent List as

well as in the Provincial List respectively. Now applying that decision to the facts of the present cases, I would hold that Criminal Procedure in the

Concurrent List must be held to exclude matters relating to jurisdiction and powers of all Courts including the High Court since special provision

for that, is made in the Provincial Legislative List. The word '' including '' in entry No. 2 was the subject of some comment and Mr. Mani invited

our attention to a decision of the Privy Council in Rajah Bejoy Singh v. Surendra Narayanan Singh (1928) 55 M.L.J. 456 : L.R. 55 IndAp 320 :

ILR 56 Cal. 1 (P.C.) to the, effect, that the expression "" including all interests therein "" does not increase the corpus of the subject of the lease in

that particular case. It is unnecessary to consider the real import of that expression since I am of opinion that entry No. 2 in the Provincial List

covers the present case.

Relying upon Section 223 of the Constitution Act which re-affirms and upholds the existing powers, jurisdiction, etc., of the High Court on

the establishment, of the Dominion as exactly what they were, before that period, it is urged that as Clause 44 of the Letters Patent of the High

Court declares that the provisions of the Letters Patent are only subject to the Legislative Powers of the Governor-General, -the equivalent of

which is, at present, the Dominion Legislature,-the Provincial Legislature or the Governor has no power to promulgate the Ordinance with the

inclusion of Section 16-A thereby interfering with Clause 44 of the Letters Patent. The short answer to this is that Clause 44 itself makes the

Letters Patent subject to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General and since such legislative powers relating to the jurisdiction and powers

of Courts as the Governor-General had, became transferred to either the Provincial Legislature or the Dominion Legislature by virtue of the

Constitution Act the objection can have no validity. In Hirji Laxmidas Vs. Francis Fernandez, Stone, C.J., and Kania, J., had to consider a similar

question and the conclusion arrived at therein was that by the joint effect of Section 293 of the Constitution Act, and Sections 2 and 7 of

Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937, reference to the Governor-General in Clause 44 of the Letters Patent refers to all

other competent authorities including the Provincial Legislature. The clauses of the Letters Patent can therefore be altered by the Provincial

Legislature. It follows therefore that Section 293. of the Constitution Act was wide enough to cover Letters Patent as a Law and the proper

authority to legislate is the Provincial Legislature. Ex concesso if the issuing of a writ of Habeas Corpus is included in either Clause 2 of List No. 2

or in, Clause 2 of List No. 3 it cannot be said that Clause 44 is a bar to the promulgation of the Ordinance.

Before leaving this topic it is necessary to advert to another really desperate argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, and that is, that

in the alternative the power to issue directions in the nature of a writ of Habeas Corpus is a matter not enumerated in any of the lists in the 7th

schedule to the Constitution Act, but is a residuary power and therefore according to Section 104 of the Act such residual powers of Legislation

are vested in the Governor-General who may empower either the Dominion Legislature or the Provincial Legislature to enact a law with respect to

it. As admittedly there has been no such empowering of either Legislatures so far as the issuing of the writ is concerned, according to the

petitioners, the Ordinance to that extent is void. This argument cannot be accepted because, :in my opinion, this matter is governed either by entry

No. 2 in List No. 2 or entry No. 2 in List No. 3. Moreover as observed by the Federal Court in Manikka Sundar Bhattar v. R.S. Naidu (1946) 2

M.L.J. 17 : 9 F.L.J. 57 where there is a choice between two possible constructions of an entry or entries, one of which will result in legislative

power being conferred by some entry or entries in the list and the other finding of no existing powers, but if legislation is required, that recourse

must be had to Section 104,-then, that construction which would include the subject in an entry or entries should be preferred. This is an additional

reason for holding that the subject-matter of Section 16-A is included in Lists 2 and 3.

The next line of attack is that even if the Ordinance is intra vires so far as Section 16-A is concerned, the petitioners object to its application

to the various cases under consideration. Out of the applications now before us, 17 applications were filed after the 25th May, 1948, but the rest

of them were pending in this Court on the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance. The learned Advocate-General does not dispute the fact that

the petitioners, in all the cases, were arrested under Act I of 1947 and detained in custody before the promulgation of the Ordinance. The question

therefore arises as to the applicability of the Ordinance and its provisions to the cases already pending in this Court and to those filed subsequent to

25th May, 1948, by persons who have been arrested and detained prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance. It is not seriously disputed that

Section 16-A relates to a matter of substantive right and not one of procedure. In Vasudeva Samiar, In re (1928) 56 M.L.J. 369 : ILR 52 Mad.

361 a Full Bench of this Court following Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369 decided that the amendment of Clause 15 of the

Letters Patent by which the right to prefer a Letters Patent appeal was restricted to cases where the Judge who heard it has granted a certificate

permitting the filing of such Letters Patent appeal, was held to be not retrospective in order to affect appeals in suits which had been filed before

the amendment. The institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all appeals then in force are preserved to it through the rest of its career

unless the Legislature has either abolished the Court to which an appeal then lay or has expressly or by necessary intendment given the Act a

retrospective effect. If the right to file an appeal cannot be impliedly taken away by construing the law as having a retrospective effect, a fortiori it

follows that that right to get one''s illegal detention set aside cannot also be taken away. To this aspect of the case the contention on behalf of the

Crown is that that Section 16-A expressly applies to all pending cases, or at least by necessary intendment applies to such cases. The learned

Advocate-General points out that the words:

Shall apply to any person detained or deemed to have been detained u/s 2 of this. Act.

make it clear that all persons whose liberty has been curtailed by applying the provisions of Section 2 of the Act or who are deemed to have been

detained under the provisions of Section 19 of Madras Act I of 1947 are affected by Section 16-A. I am unable to read Section 16-A as

expressly giving it a retrospective operation. The Ordinance making authority could have used appropriate words if the intention was to make the

section retrospective. We are familiar with legislative enactments where suitable and proper words had been explicitly and clearly used in order to

bring out the intention to make the statute retrospective in operation. In the absence of any such words I am not prepared to agree with the learned

Advocate-General that the words "" detained or deemed to have been detained "" should be understood as denoting a clear retrospective operation

to the statute.

Then, the question is whether by necessary intendment it was given a retrospective operation. Neither the preamble to the Ordinance nor any

other provision gives any direct indication about the intention to make it retrospective. The learned Advocate-General relied upon some cases,

which according to him showed that such a piece of legislation should be deemed to have retrospective effect. In Basanta Chandra Ghose v. King-

Emperor (1945) 1 M.L.J.365 : 8 F.L.J. 40 there is a passage in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice to the effect that the analogy of civil

proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as from the date of the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked

in matters of detention. If at any time before the Court directs release of a detenu on the ground that he is wrongfully detained a valid order

directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot order his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for

his detention. The question is not whether the later order validates the earlier detention, but whether on the face of the later valid order the Court

can direct the release of the detenu. It cannot be said that these observations can be directly applied to the present petitions, because the Court has

not yet considered whether the applicants were validly detained or not. It is not as if the original detention under the Public Safety Act having been

found illegal, a validating Act is passed justifying such detention and making it legal. In Shib Nath Banerjee and Others Vs. A.E. Porter and Others,

Mitter, J. considered the effect of an Ordinance as affecting pending proceedings. Though the learned Judge held in that case that the illegal

detention was later on validated by the Ordinance, his general observations can be read only as laying down that unless there is an express

provision, retrospective operation cannot be given to an Ordinance like the one he was considering. He also expressed the opinion that where the

statute gives its provisions retrospective operation in express terms it would be a matter for consideration how far the retrospective operation

extended and whether pending actions were intended to be affected by it and therefore the question finally resolves itself into a matter of

construction, though express words are not essential. I do not see how this decision helps the contention of the learned Advocate-General. The

other decisions relied on by him, viz., Mukherjee v. Mussammat Ram Ratan Kuer ILR (1936) Pat. 268 and The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqua

Begum (1941) 1 M.L.J. (Supp.) 65 : 1940 F.C.R. 110 : 3 F.L.J. (F.C.) 97 do not carry this contention any further. In the former case their

Lordships found that Section 26(N) of the Bihar Tenancy Act was retrospective because the words used were sufficiently plain. In the latter case

the Federal Court had to consider the "" requirements of Remission Acts of 1938 (United Provinces) "" and Sulaiman, J., in discussing the

retrospective nature of that piece of legislation observed that when a statute deprives a person of his right to sue or affects the power and

jurisdiction of a Court in enforcing the law as it stands, its retrospective character must be clearly established. Ambiguities in it should not be

removed by Courts nor gaps filled up in order to widen Its applicability. It is a well-established principle that such a statute must be construed

strictly and not given a liberal interpretation. As I construe the section, I am clear that there is no intention, even implicit, as can be gathered from

the objects and from an overall examination of the whole Ordinance to make Section 16-A retrospective, much less is there any express provision

to that effect. These applications that were pending on the 25th May, 1948, should be decided in accordance with Act I of 1947, as it stood

before its amendment by the Ordinance. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to Lauri v. Renaud (1892) 3 Ch. 402 where Lindley, L.J.,

observed:

It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed so as to have retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly

to require such a construction; and the same rule involves another and a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to

have a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary.

(See also Craies'' Statute Law, 4th Edition, pp. 329 and 330). Similar observations are found in Maxwell''s Interpretation of Statutes (8th Edition,

page 199)- Quoting from Warne v. Beresford 6 L.J. Ex. 192 the learned author observes:

Where for instance the defendant pleaded to an action for a small sum that the jurisdiction of the Court had been taken away by the Court of

Requests Act and that Act was repealed after the filing but before the trial, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.

(See also Halsbury, Vol. 31, Hailsham''s edition, pages 515-517).

With regard to the 17 petitions filed subsequently, the petitioners contend that Section 16-A cannot take away their right to invoke the

powers of this Court to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus, if their detention is found to be illegal or improper. The question as to what the powers of

this Court are in the absence of Section 16-A and with it in the statute will be considered later. The only point now to be decided is whether

Section 16-A debars the petitioners from filing the applications after the 25th May, 1948, and the Court from hearing them. The petitioners put

forward the plea that though their applications reached the High Court only after the 25th May, 1948, they had been despatched from their places

of detention by the respective petitioners some days before the promulgation of the Ordinance and that the delay caused in transit or occasioned

by the action of the executive authorities should not prejudice them. There is no allegation that their applications were fraudulently or wantonly

withheld until the Ordinance was passed. Though it was very feebly suggested that the executive authorities withheld the transmission of these

applications to the Advocates till the Ordinance was promulgated, no attempt whatever has been made to substantiate such a suggestion. I am

definitely of opinion that in the absence of any tangible material, it is not open to this Court to entertain or accept a suggestion of the kind. Even if it

be so, I fail to"" see what this Court can do in a matter like this.

The petitioners in these 17 applications further contend that there is a right vested in them u/s 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to invoke

the jurisdiction of this Court, the moment they were illegally detained under the Madras Public Safety Act and therefore if Section 16-A of the

Ordinance cannot be construed as having a retrospective operation, that vested right which inhered in them prior to its promulgation should not be

prejudiced or taken away, by the application of Section 16-A. The arguments proceeded on the basis that recourse to Section 491 and the

application to invoke the same are rights vested in the petitioners from the moment of their detention. I am prepared to accept that it is a right

which a person possesses to see that he is not wrongfully confined. It is one of the essential elements in the liberty of a human being, but to say that

it becomes vested the moment he is illegally detained is to my mind overstating the principle and going too far. In order that a right might become

vested, there must be an antecedent act or, omission with an intention to avail of or take advantage of the privilege; otherwise, as is well known the

right is only contingent. A mere right to take advantage of a certain privilege cannot be styled as a vested right. In Abbott v. Minister for Lands

(1895) A.G. 425 the Privy Council in dealing with the Crown Alienations Act, 1861, of New South Wales in Australia has laid down that the mere

right existing at the date of a repealing Statute to take advantage of the provisions of the Statute repealed is not a right accrued. To my mind in the

case of the petitioners in 17 cases they did not have any right accrued in their favour by their mere detention. The above decision has been

followed in Hamilton Gell v. White (1932) 2 K.B. 422 where Atkin, L.J., was of opinion that abstract rights conferred by a repealed Statute

cannot be considered as specific rights accrued in favour of an individual. In this connection it is also useful to refer to the observations of Sulaiman,

J., in United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqua Begum (1941) 1 M.L.J. Supp. 65 : 1940 F.C.R. 110 : 3 F.L.J. (F.C.) 97 where a number of cases of the

English Courts were considered and discussed. As against the above line of authority, Mr. K. Krishnamurthi, appearing for the petitioners in one of

these petitions relies upon the observations of the Court of Appeal in Hough v. Windus (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 224. In that case what happened was

that before the enactment of Section 146 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 and in accordance with the law as it stood, a sheriff had entered into

possession and seized the goods of the defendant under a writ of elegit at the suit of the plaintiff, a judgment-creditor of the defendant; but no

delivery of the goods had been made to the plaintiff at the time the Bankruptcy Act became law. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the

Bankruptcy Act of 1883 had not deprived the plaintiff of his right to the delivery of such goods, even though the writ of eligit had ceased to exist as

a result of the Act. On the analogy of the principle stated here, learned Counsel wants the Court to say that the right which the petitioner had, to

apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus before the promulgation of the Ordinance cannot be taken away by Section 16-A. I am unable to apply the

analogy to this case for unlike the case in the Court of Appeal there was no action taken by the petitioners in the 17 petitions here. Hough v.

Windus (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 224 would certainly be an authority in favour of the contention that Section 16-A cannot be applied retrospectively in

order to take away the right of the petitioners in applications pending at the time of the promulgation. Mr. B. V. Subramaniam on the other hand

wants to evolve a theory by the acceptance of a converse proposition of law as is seen from the two cases cited by him, viz., Weir''s (Criminal

Procedure and Rulings) 791 and Chockalingam, In Re: T.S. Chockalingam, In the former case this Court decided that an offence committed under

an enactment since repealed when that enactment was in force may be tried under the repealed enactment. This principle is embodied in Section 6,

Clauses (c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) as well as in Section 8, Clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the Madras General Clauses

Act (Act I of 1867). The decision of Kuppuswami Aiyar, J., in Chockalingam, In Re: T.S. Chockalingam, applied these provisions of law to the

Newspaper Control Order, 1942, though the General Clauses Acts as such do not apply to such orders. I am unable to accede to the contention

that the principles deducible from these decisions can be successfully applied here. A recent decision of the House of Lords in Wicks v. Director

of Public Prosecution (1947) A.G. 362 affirms the principle that the repeal of a Statute will not prevent the initiation and trial after its repeal of a

prosecution regarding an offence committed when the law was in force. This, again, is a converse case.

Certain observations of Wallis, C.J., in Raja of Pithapur v. Venkatasubba Rao (19815) 29 M.L.J. 1 : ILR 39 Mad. 645 were also relied

upon. The learned Chief Justice and Kumaraswami Sastri, J., agreed with Sadasiva Aiyar, J., who had followed an earlier decision in Ramakrishna

Chetty v. Subbaraya Aiyar (1912) 24. M.L.J.54 : ILR 38 Mad. 101 laying down that where an Act contains provisions for the limitation of suits

which take away a vested right of suit without providing for any equivalent remedy, then, according to the approved rule of construction the

provisions must be construed to have been enacted subject to the implied exception that they were not to extend to such vested rights to sue which

were to continue subject to the rules of limitation in force at the passing of the Act. These decisions proceed upon the rule of law that where there

is a vested right of suit it cannot be impliedly taken away by an enactment. Such abolition of a right of suit must be in express terms or by necessary

intendment. It seems to me that the principles of law discussed in these cases as well, cannot be applied to the present petitions. The whole

question is whether the petitioners have a vested right to avail themselves of Section 491, even if they do not move their little finger or take any

steps in that direction. Certain observations in the judgment of Fazl Ali, J., in Banwari Gope v. King-Emperor ILR (1943) Pat. 175 tend to show

that in the case of criminal proceedings instituted against a person, he is deemed to have a right of appeal vested in him. in accordance with the law

existing on the date when the criminal proceedings were instituted. By implication it can be inferred from this decision, that in order that a right

might be vested in an individual there must be some overt action taken by him or some proceeding instituted against him. As the learned Judge

observes, as soon as a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence there is a criminal case against the accused person and at that point of time he

acquires such a right of appeal or revision as the case may be as the law confers upon him. The right of appeal being a right incidental to and

continuing from an accusation alleged against a person is not exactly the same as the right to apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus for any illegal

detention. Probably a person arrested and detained under the Public Safety Act (Act I of 1947) may have a right vested in him from the moment of

his arrest to have recourse to the provisions of Madras Act I of 1947, regarding the service of the reasons for the detention on him, and the right to

have his case sent before the Advisory Board constituted by the Act. In one sense, these advantages may be said to be rights vested in him. But I

find it impossible to hold that a person detained under the Public Safety Act has got a vested right of applying for a writ of Habeas Corpus u/s 491

by mere inaction. Such being the case, Section 16-A must be held to be applicable to the cases filed after the 25th of May, 1948.

The most important question discussed at length during the hearing of these applications has now to be considered. In so far as the petitions

pending in the Court at the time of the promulgation of the Ordinance are concerned, what exactly are the powers of interference by this Court ?

According to Section 491(1)(b), if a person is illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within the appellate criminal jurisdiction

of the High Court, the High Court can order that he be set at liberty. Section 491(1)(a) gives the power to the High Court to direct that a person

within the limits of such appellate jurisdiction be brought up before the Court to be dealt with according to law. Section 16(1) of Madras Act I of

1947 enacts that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act or deemed to have been made under this Act by virtue of

Section 19, shall be called in question in any such Court. Sub-section (2) deals with the discharging of proceedings calling in question the validity of

an order made u/s 2 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Ordinance and Sub-section (3) says that where any order as is referred to in

Sub-section (1) purported to have been made and signed by an authority in the exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, the Court

shall presume that such order was so made by such authority. There has been a large body of case law in the Indian High Courts as well as in the

Federal Court on a similar and analogous subject, viz-, the provisions of the Defence of India Act and the rules thereunder. Most of those

decisions refer to the well-known decisions of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 and Greene v. Secretary

of State for Home Affairs (1942) A.C. 284 In the earlier of them, the House of Lords had to consider whether the applicant who was detained by

the Home Secretary under Regulation 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations of 1939 was entitled to get the particulars of the reasons of his

detention from the Home Secretary and in the second case, it was an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus by a person detained under the

same Regulation. The House of Lords by a majority held in the first case, (Lord Atkin dissenting) that the Court cannot compel the Secretary of

State to give particulars of grounds on which he had reason to believe the detenu to be a person of hostile associations or that by reason of such

hostile associations it was necessary to exercise control over the detenu. The production by the Secretary of State of an order of detention made

by him and ex facie regular and duly authenticated constitutes a defence to such an action unless the plaintiff discharges the burden of establishing

that the order is invalid. In Greene''s case 2 the majority of the Learned Law Lords held that the production of the Home Secretary''s order, the

authenticity and good faith of which were not impugned constituted a complete answer to an application by the detenu for a writ of Habeas

Corpus. I do not think it necessary to discuss at any length the principles of law and the precepts of the Constitution considered at great length by

the Law Lords because the matter has been so exhaustively and thoroughly considered in all the various aspects that could be ever imagined, if I

may say so, in the speeches of the Noble Lords. A very clear and succinct summary of the principles in those cases has been pithily given in R. v.

Home Secretary Budd (Ex parte) (1942) 3 L.J. (K.B.) 475 The legal position is, that the Court has now power to inquire into the grounds for the

Home Secretary having reasonable cause to believe or having been satisfied within the meaning of the Regulation and that the only matters upon

which the Courts have power to inquire are- (1) the good faith of the Home Secretary, (2) the authenticity of the order and (3) its application to

the persons detained. I may straightaway say, for reasons which are being given hereafter, that applying these principles to the present petitions, I

am of opinion that if the Provincial Government is, bona fide, satisfied with respect to any person that he is acting or about to act in a manner

prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, then, it is not open to the Court to inquire into the sufficiency or validity of the

reasons which made the Provincial Government to pass such an order.

Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules is very similar in wording to the present Section 2 of Madras Act I of 1947 and there is similarity in

many respects between the above two provisions and Rule 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations of 1939. They are in many respects in pari

materia, though not ad idem. One can safely assume that Regulation 18-B is the parent of similar provisions of law, either enacted or promulgated

in India. Now, the words used in Regulation 18-B are "" Has reasonable cause to believe "" and those in Section 2 of Madras Act I of 1947 are "" If

satisfied that ...."" These two expressions denote the same state of mind and are not intended to express anything different from each other and such

being the case the decisions on the interpretation of Rule 18-B of Defence (General) Regulations as well as on Rule 26 of the Defence of India

Rules are very helpful in deciding this question. There is the further circumstance that Section 16 (1) of Madras Act I of 1947 is worded practically

in the same terms as Section 16 (1) of the Defence of India Act with a very minor addition, viz., "" deemed to have made ...."" The construction of

Section 16(1) of the Defence of India Act and Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules came up for decision finally before the Privy Council in

Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (1945) 2 M.L.J. 325 : 8 F.L.J. 222 (P.C.) and the Judicial Committee has laid down what the powers and functions of

the High Court are when approached by a person detained under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. Briefly stated, the principles of law

enunciated are that it cannot be said that in view of Section 16(1) of the Defence of India Act and Section 59 (2) of the Government of India Act,

1935, that the High Court has no jurisdiction to investigate the validity of orders of detention made under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules.

Sub-section (1) of Section 16 assumes that an order is made in exercise of the power given under Rule 26. It clearly leaves it open to challenge

such an order on the ground that it was not made in conformity with the power conferred. It is therefore quite open to the High Court to investigate

and find out whether or not the order was made in conformity with and in exercise of the power conferred. The burden of establishing by

admissible evidence prima facie, the inaccuracy of the recitals in the order of detention lies heavily on the person who challenges it; but if a Court is

satisfied that the order was not made in conformity with or in exercise of the powers, it can certainly enforce the provisions of Section 491,

Criminal Procedure Code. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee over-ruled in some respects the decision of the majority of the Federal

Court and the Calcutta High Court, it is unnecessary to refer to those decisions at this stage.

There is an earlier case decided by the Federal Court reported in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. King-Emperor (1944) 6 F.G.R. 295 which

dealt with "" the Restriction and Detention Ordinance III of 1944 "" (Sections 6 and 10) promulgated by the Governor-General of India. That

Ordinance contained, in addition to a provision similar to Section 16 of Madras Act I of 1947 and Section 16 (1) of the Defence of India Act, a

further clause stating that no Court shall have power to make any order u/s 491, Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of any order made under or

having effect under that Ordinance or in respect of any person the subject-matter of such an order (vide Clause 10(1) of the Ordinance). This latter

portion resembles very much Section 16-A of the present impugned Ordinance and therefore the construction of Section 10(1) of Ordinance III of

1944 by the Federal Court will be of immense assistance in deciding what exactly are the powers which this Court possesses when Section 16-A

of the Ordinance is found intra vires. The principles of law that emerge from this decision are (1) that it is open to the detenu to show that the order

of detention was not in effect made by the authority empowered to make it, or (2) that it was a fraudulent exercise of the power by the authority,

or (3) that the detenu was not the person intended to be affected or lastly (4) that the authority which made the order did not act in good faith. In

other words the order must be in proper exercise of the powers conferred by the Statute and not in a colourable exercise, nor should the order be

the result of bad faith on the part of the authority. It should also not be an abuse of the powers conferred under the Act or for the purpose of

effecting a fraud on the Act. Consistently with these principles, good faith on the part of the order-making authority is presumed until the contrary is

proved and a mere challenge by the detenu is not sufficient to shift the onus on the authority. In my judgment the above principles are well

established from the decisions cited, and they are fully applicable to Madras Act I of 1947 and Ordinance II of 1948. Moreover in Basanta

Chandra Ghose v. King-Emperor (1944) 6 F.G.R. 295 the Federal Court also considered the effect of Section 10(1) of Ordinance III of 1944

which corresponded to Section 16-A of the present Ordinance. Spens, C.J. in delivering the judgment has emphasised the aspect that Section

10(1) of Ordinance III of 1944 did not protect a document which was not really an order under Rule 26, that Clause (1) of Section 10 had not

introduced any new principle of immunity, that except for reference to Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, Clauses 1 and 3 of Section 10

merely re-enact Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 16 of the Defence of India Act, and that such re-enactment was necessitated because all future

orders of detention should be made under the Ordinance and could not therefore attract the benefit of Section 16 of the Defence of India Act. It is

also further observed that no curtailment of the powers of the Court to investigate and interfere with the orders of detention has been imposed by

the taking away of the powers of the High Court u/s 491. The Court is still at liberty, even after insertion of Section 10(1) in the Ordinance to

investigate whether an order purporting to have been made under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules and deemed to be made under the

Ordinance....was in fact validly made in exactly the same way as immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance. Such being the case, it

cannot be said that by a similar insertion of Section 16-A in the Madras Ordinance II of 1948, there has been any curtailment of the limited powers

which this Court already had when Section 16(1) of Madras Act I of 1947 was on the statute book. To my mind, this Section 16-A seems to be

surplusage and it does not in any way reduce or minimise the powers of this Court, nor does it add to the qualified immunity which the authority

making an order of detention already had. Even without the insertion of Section 16-A the powers of this Court, as I have already discussed, were

restricted to finding out whether the order of detention was made by an authority empowered to make it in conformity with the Statute or whether

it was a fraudulent exercise of the power or whether the order itself was authentic or whether it applies to the person concerned and the good faith

of the authority in making the order is presumed. The Court can also investigate whether there was any colourable exercise of power or whether it

was made in bad faith or in abuse of the powers conferred under the Act, but with the addition of Section 16-A of the Ordinance the above limited

powers are not in any manner reduced. But it is not open to the Court to find out whether the grounds on which Provincial Government is satisfied

are sufficient. Different standards of satisfaction are likely to exist in the case of different individuals even if the society were ideal. In the society as

it is constituted today, we cannot expect the same standard in every individual, so that if the executive authority states bonafide that it is satisfied,

this Court cannot say that it is not a proper or valid satisfaction. It is interesting to note that under the Defence Regulations in England, there was no

provision either like Section 16 of the Defence of India Act or like Section 16 or 16-A of the Madras Act and Ordinance. Even then, the House of

Lords held that it was not open to the Court to go behind the satisfaction of the Home Secretary.

In my opinion, these are principles deducible from a discussion of cases of the highest, authority so far as this Court is concerned. These

principles ought to be applied in considering questions of detention here. But it was suggested that another decision to which the attention of the

Court was invited, reported in Ex-Rana Birpal Singh of Bhajji State v. The King-Emperor (1946) 1 M.L.J. 322 : ILR 1946 Lah. 96 : 9 F.L.J. 1

(F.C.), strikes a somewhat different note. On a careful reading of that decision and the comparison of it with the earlier cases of the Federal Court

and the Privy Council, I do not feel that anything different has been laid down. The argument of the counsel before the Federal Court was that

Regulation III of 1818, the detention under which was specifically excluded from the operation of Section 491 by Sub-clause (3) of that section,

did not apply to the petitioner in that case, who was said to be the ruling Prince of Bhajji State. It was therefore urged that the detention of a ruling

prince under that Regulation was absolutely outside its purview, was a negation of it and not the exercise of the power The question that was

considered was whether the person detained was a ruling-Prince or not, and on that basis, the question came within one of the three principles. laid

down by the Privy Council and the House of Lords, viz., the applicability of the regulation to the person concerned. The good faith of the authority

making the order and the authenticity of it were not questioned and therefore the Federal Court did not have to consider those aspects. Having

carefully read that decision of the Federal Court, I feel that the following passage in the judgment should be read only as an answer to the question

argued, viz., the applicability to the person concerned:

It is however clear in our judgment that once the Court is satisfied that a person is being detained under Regulation HI, there is no jurisdiction u/s

491 which a Court can exercise in the matter.

I do not interpret this decision as in any way proceeding in any divergent direction from the line of decisions in England and in this country on the

subject referred to by the learned Chief Justice in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. The King-Emperor (1944) 2 M.L.J. 167 : 1944 F.L.J. 203 : 6

F.C.R. 295 (F.C.). In view of the above discussion in which I have considered the authorities which are binding upon us, it is unnecessary to

discuss the observations of the various other High Courts to which our attention was draw.n, viz., Prabhakar v. Crown ILR (1943) Nag. 154

Emperor v. Harish Chundra ILR (1943) All. 773 and Manubhai Bhikabhai v. The Crown ILR (1943) Bom. 433 in all of which similar conclusion

to the one arrived at above has been reached.