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Judgment
K.N. Phaneendra, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and also learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent -State. Perused the records.
The allegations made against petitioners, who are arrayed as accused Nos. 1 to 3 in S.C. No. 133/2013 for the offences punishable under Sections, 498A, 323, 504 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ''I.P.C for brevity). It is alleged that on 13.06.2013 at about 7 a.m. the petitioners, who are husband, mother-in-law and father-in law of deceased Smt. Sharadamma, residents of Bhuvanahalli, Hospet taluk, have abused the deceased alleging that she is the root cause for petitioner No. 1 to cultivate the habit of consuming alcohol. By saying so, the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 have assaulted the deceased and poured kerosene on the deceased and petitioner No. 1 - husband of deceased has lite? fire. Inspite of her cry for rescue they did not try to put off the fire. Immediately she went to bathroom and poured water on herself. On hearing her hue and cry, the neighboured came there and there afterwards she was shifted to Jindal Sanjeevini Hospital and later she was shifted to V.I.M.S. Hospital, but there she succumbed to the injuries. There are three Dying Declarations. According to the prosecution, the earliest dying declaration was made before C.Ws. 5 and 6. Another Declaration was made before the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and one more before C.W.27 Tahsildar.
The learned counsel for petitioners, at this stage, strenuously contends that when the injured was first admitted to the hospital, history shows, that the burn injuries were due to lighting the stove in her house. He also contends that the Dying Declaration was recorded by A.S.I., between 3.00 to 4.00 p.m. The Tahsildar, who records the Dying Declaration also states in the said document that he has recorded the Dying Declaration from 3.00 to 3.30 p.m. It is also alleged that the FIR has reached the Magistrate on the next day at 10.00 a.m. Therefore, there are serious. discrepancies in recording the Dying Declaration and also about sending the FIR to Magistrate. This creates serious doubt with regard to investigation done by police.
On perusal of the documents in the charge sheet cited by the learned counsel for petitioners, it is seen that the deceased has given a statement before A.S.I., which 13 stated to have been recorded between 3.00 to 4.00 p.m. This particular document is certified by the Doctor stating that the patient was fit to give statement, was conscious while giving statement and same was recorded in the presence of a Doctor. Though in the Certificate it is mentioned "for Dr. Khalid Mohiddin", but it is mentioned that said certificate was issued by Dr. Khalid Mukeem, who was the duty doctor in the V.I.M.S. Hospital, Bellary "At this stage, this Court cannot come to fee conclusion that certificate given by a duty Doctor though mentioned for Dr. Khalid Mohiddin cannot be at this stage appreciated about the truth or falsity of the document. It cannot be foreseen as to how the prosecution has established this aspect by examining the said Doctor before the Court. Even though the time mentioned in complaint, statement of victim and of Tahsildar differs, this Court cannot come to the conclusion that the entire statement has to be discarded at this stage. The contents of Dying Declarations are not only supported by C.Ws. 5 and 6, but it is also supported by Tahsildar - C.W.27. As rightly contended by learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that, the statements of C.Ws.5 and 7, A.S.I. and C.W.27 are consistent in all material particulars that deceased has consistently stated by making allegations against the petitioners. The grounds urged by learned counsel for petitioners, in fact, have to be appreciated by means of looking into the surrounding circumstances, but that cannot be done at this stage by entering to the area of appreciating the evidence on record. Therefore, under the above said circumstances, when such strong materials are available against the petitioners, I do not find any strong reason to release them on bail. Under the above said circumstances, in my opinion, petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, petition is dismissed.