G Devdas @ Devadasan Govindan vs State Of Haryana & Anr.

“Petitioner is one of the accused, who is facing trial in a criminal complaint No.139/2020, titled as “Rakesh Dahiya v. Pawan Kumar and others”, under Sections 18(C), 27(b)(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940, in the Court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Panipat. He had been allowed bail in that case. However, he absented on 20.10.2022, due to which his bail was cancelled; bonds were forfeited and warrants of arrest were directed to be issued against the petitioner.

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that petitioner is ready to surrender before the Trial Court and he be provided necessary protection.

3.

Notice of motion.

4.

Mr. Parveen Kumar Aggarwal, DAG, Haryana accepts notice on behalf of respondent -State.

5.

Learned State counsel has drawn attention towards the conduct of the petitioner and has prayed for dismissal of the petition.

6.

This petition is hereby disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to surrender before the Trial Court on or before 10.01.2024. On his such surrender, the Trial Court shall initiate the proceedings under Section 446 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner and after disposal of those proceedings, shall grant bail to him. Till the disposal of the proceedings under Section 446 Cr.P.C., the petitioner shall not be taken into custody. If in the meantime, due to issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, he is sought to be arrested, he shall be admitted to interim bail to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer. Disposed of.”

“10.

The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom- by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected.

11.

We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence, of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the, applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on. the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a Policy favouring release justly sensible.

12.

A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even, through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offence while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise,' should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our constitution.”

“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court,court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court,court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.”

“21.

In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22.

From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.”