Forest Range Officer vs P. Amanthiah and another

1.This writ appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the short ground that the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam made in Cri. Appeal No. 46/84 is not amenable to writ jurisdiction but that the appellant could have preferred a criminal revision to the High Court. The learned Judge also permitted the appellant to convert the writ petition into a revision. Against this order the present writ appeal has been preferred.

In this writ appeal, it is contended by the learned Government Pleader that the appeal preferred to the Addl. Sessions Judge was an appeal under S. 44(2F) of the A.P. Forest Act. That section reads as follows:

"Section 44(2F): Any person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-sec. (2A) or sub-sec. (2D) may, within 30 days from the date of communication to him of such order, appeal to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the property has been seized, and the District Court shall, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, for such order as it may think fit and the order of the District Court so passed shall be final."

In the present case the appeal to the 1st Addl. District Judge, Khammam under S. 44(2)(E) was preferred by the respondent for setting aside an order dated 16-8-84 made by the Divisional Forest Officer (South Division) Bhadrachelam. Under the said order dated 16-8-84 the said officer ordered confiscation of the timber together with lorry, tarpolin etc. on the ground that they had been used in committing the forest offence. It is not in dispute before us that the order passed by the Divisional Forest Officer is an order passed under sub-sec. 2A of S. 44.

A question has arisen in this Court earlier as to whether, against the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge made under S. 44(2)(E), the aggrieved party could prefer a criminal revision to this Court. That question arose in Criminal Revision Case No. 616/84 and was decided on a reference to a Division Bench by Raghuvir, J. (as he then was) and and Sriramulu, J. The learned Judges referred to a conflict of opinion between two learned single Judges in two different cases, one in Cri. M.P. No. 2688/84 decided on 16-11-1984 and the other reported in V. P. Nagireddy v. State of A.P., 1987 Cri LJ 29.

After referring to the provisions of the A.P. Forest Act as well as the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972 and Art. 236 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench held that the decision in Nagireddi''s case was not correctly decided, They held that the appeal lay to the "District Judge" as a Civil Court and his decision was final under the Act. They observed:

"We see in Nagireddi''s case the definition of Court in S. 2(b) of the Act was not adverted to. The word "Court" is defined to mean the Principal Civil Court of the original jurisdiction. When ''District Court'' is referred in the Act, it means Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is the authority to hear appeals. The decision that a District Judge to hear appeals under S. 13 is unexceptionable."

The above observations are made after referring to Chapter 7 of the A.P. Forest Act and in particular S. 44 and also to the heading "penalties and procedure" and after referring to a contention that provisions prescribing penalties cannot be treated as civil procedure. Finally, the learned Judges considered whether the matter should be transmitted to the Additional Sessions Judge with a direction to return the papers to be resubmitted before the District Court or whether to straightway send back the papers to the District Court. They were of the opinion that it would be in the interest of the parties to short-circuit the procedure and direct the appeal records to be transmitted to the District Court direct from this Court (High Court). They also observed as follows:

"We also direct as a practice note appeals under Act I of 1967 including S. 44 appeals to be hereafter numbered as ''Forest Appeals'' to distinguish them from other general run of appeals."

The correctness of the above said decision of the Division Bench has not been challenged before us, and we do not therefore propose to go into the said question. Accepting the decision to be correct it follows that a writ petition will be maintainable in this Court against appellate order passed under S.44(2)(E) of the A.P. Forest Act. This is because of the finality given to the order passed under the said sub-section by the very provisions thereof. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and also the orders passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam and direct the Registry of the High Court to send the papers to the District Court, Khammam. The learned District Judge, shall register the Criminal Appeal No. 46/84 as a fresh appeal in his Court and describe it a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal or as a Forest Appeal and deal with the matter afresh. The appeal will be so registered without raising any further question as to maintainability or in regard to delay. It will be open to the parties to raise all questions which they wish to raise before the District Court.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition is also allowed and the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam dated 28-1-87 in Cri Appeal No. 46/84 is set aside. The Registry of the High Court is directed to send the papers to the District Court, Khammam. If the file relating to Criminal Appeal No. 46/84 has not been transmitted to the High Court earlier and is still with the Additional Sessions Judge at Khammam, he shall transmit whatever papers are available with him in the said appeal to the District Court, Khammam. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate''s fee Rs.250/-. Pending transmission and registration of the appeal to the District Court the status quo as on today will be continued. It shall, however, be open to the District Court to pass all other appropriate interim orders during the pendency of the appeal.

Appeal allowed.