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Judgment
N.S. Singh, J.—The above appeals namely F.A. No. (Sic) of 1991 and (Sic) 48 of 1991 arise from the common judgment and decree (Sic)(Arb.) No. 38 of 1984 closing to set aside the award passed by the (Sic) 15.12.89 and also refusing to afford interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the due date of payment by the Food Corporation of India till realisation of decretal amount to Sri Jugdish Chandra Saha and as such these two appeals involve common question of facts and laws and as such we hereby propose to dispose of these two appeals with the following judgment.
The facts of the case in a short compass are as follows:
Sri Jadgish Chandra Saha is a Government contractor and supplier, who is the Appellant in F.A. No. 48/91 and hereinafter referred to as ''claimant-Petitioner'', and the Food Corporation of India is engaged in providing food-grains and food-stuffs to different states with its offices including the Appellant No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 who are the Appellants in F.A. No. 43 of 1991, and hereinafter referred to as ''Respondents-Corporation.
The claimant-Petitioner entered into an agreement with the Respondents-Corporation in response to Tender No. F. 9/NSFR/HTC/80 dtd. 7.2.1980 floated by the Regional Manager of the Respondents-Corporation for appointment of loading/unloading, handling and transport Contractor at Food Corporation/Godowns and Rail Heads at Dharmanagar/Churaibari (Tripura) to FCI Depots at various places including Agartala/Pencharthal/Hanger, etc. within the state of Tripura. The validity of the contract was for a period of 2 year commencing from 1.6.1980 to 31.5.1982, which was further extended for a period of 2 months more upto 31.7.1982. During the execution of the works under the contract, a dispute/difference has arisen amongst the parties and subsequently the claimant-Petitioner demanded for arbitration from the Managing Director of the Respondents-Corporation but there was no response from the end of the said Managing Director. Having no alternative the claimant-Petitioner filed a petition before the competent Court u/s 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 on 29.8.84. The said petition was amended as per order dtd. 9.9.86. In the said petition the claimant-Petitioner contended that he made claims for payment in terms of the agreement for some item of works but the Respondents-Corporation did not make payment of the legal dues to the Petitioner claimant for which he demanded to the Regional Manager of the Respondents-Corporation on 9.5.1983 for payment of his claims to the tune of Rs. 20,61,489.61p plus interest, or for appointing an Arbitrator. The Petitioner also simultaneously demanded the same claim to the Managing Director of the Respondents-Corporation coupled with a request to appoint an Arbitrator within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice or else the Petitioner would have to approach the appropriate Court for redress. The said Managing Director of the Respondents-Corporation received the said letter on 12.5.1983 but nothing had come up despite several remainders of the claimant Petitioner. In continuation with the claim dt. 18.7.1981 (Sic) 82.848. for illegal deduct on made by the District Manager of the (Sic) Corporation. However, the Petitioner received the same payment (Sic) his original claims. Again the Petitioner demanded the Respondent No. 2, namely the Managing Director, on 4.1.84 for appointment of Arbitrator but it was in vain. Thereafter the Petitioner sent reminder on 16.4.84 on the same subject but of no result. Having no alternative the Petitioner filed an application u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act before the competent, Court, and the competent Court, namely the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, West Tripura District, Agartala, by his order dtd. 30.1.87 referred the dispute/matter to the Arbitrator, namely to the Managing Director of the Respondents-Corporation, either to act or to appoint any other person as arbitrator to decide the dispute. Being dissatisfied with the order dtd. 30.1.87, the Respondents-Corporation filed a revision petition being Civil Revision No. 33 of 1987 before this Court. This Court dismissed the said revision petion vide outer dtd. 15.4.88 passed in Civil Revision No. 33 of 1987. The (Sic) the learned Arbitrator made an award on 15.12.89 by holding that the claimant Petitioner is entitled to Rs. 3,58.000/- (Rupees three lakhs fifty eight thousand) only on account of detention charges of Truck; Rs. 5,20,361.61p (Rupees five lakhs twenty thousand three hundred sixty one and paise sixty one) only, on account of additional transport charges, Rs. 82,848. 15p(Rupees eighty two thousand eight hundred forty eight and paise fifteen only) by way of refund realized on account of food grains, and Rs. 9,235.15p (Rupees nine thousand two hundred thirty five and paise fifteen only) by way of refund on account of oil-soaked rice from the Respondents-Corporation. The said award further entitled the claimant-Petitioner to pray before the learned Court for interest pendetelite and for the period from decree till realisation. Being dissatisfied with the award dtd. 15.12.89 passed by the learned Arbitrator, the Respondents-Corporation submitted objection as required u/s 30 and 33 of the Arbitration act, 1940 before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, coupled with a prayer for setting aside the award dtd. 15.12.1989. The Petitioner-claimant also submitted written objection to the objection of the Respondent-Corporation made u/s 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, and the Petitioner made a prayer before the learned Court below for making the award dtd. 15.12.89 a ''Rule'' of the Court, and also prayed for interest pendentelite till realisation of award money. The case was registered as Title Suit (Arb.) No. 38 of 1984. After hearing the parties the learned Additional Sub-Ordinate Judge West Tripura District, Aganala, disposed of the case on 12.8.91 making the said award dtd. 15.12.89 of the Arbitrator at a Rule of the Court. The learned Court further ordered that the Respondents-Corporation is to pay 6 per cent interest per annum on the decretal amount from the date of decree till realisation. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment/order and decree dtd. 12.8.91 passed by the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, West Trupura District, Agartala in case Title Suit (Arb) No. 8 of 1984, the present Appellants, namely the Respondants- Corporation, preferred this appeal.
Mr. S. Deb, learned Sr. Counsel for the Appellants in First Appeal No. 43 of 1991, who is also representing the Respondents-Corporation in First Appeal No. 48 of 1991, at the very outset contended that there was/is no dispute arbitrable under the relevant contract/agreement executed by and between the parties for the aforementioned works for the period from 1.6.80 to 31.5.82, which has been extended upto 31.7.82. According to Mr. S. Deb, the learned Court below had failed to appreciate the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Vishwanath Sood Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court has held that only those disputes adjudication of which are expressly provided for in the contract document are alone be referred to and adjudicated upon by Arbitration, but the learned Court below did not examine this aspect while passing the impugned judgment and decree. Sri Deb, further, contended that the learned Court below ought to have held that the claim of the claimant-Petitioner is barred by limitation inasmuch as the claim was not brought within the prescribed period of limitation, i.e. one year on and from 31.7.1982. It is also contended by Sri S. Deb that the learned Court below had failed to appreciate properly the orders passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge; West Tripuril Agartala on 30.1.87 in T.S. (Arb.) No, 38/84, and also the order dtd. 15.4.88 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 33 of 1987 while passing the impugned judgment and decree inasmuch as the said orders did hot speak about the question of limitation or maintainability of the claim of the Petitioner-claimant; Sri Deb, further, contended that no compensation shall be admissible to the Contactor, namely, the claimant-Petitioner, in respect of detention of trucks/any other vehicles at godowns/railway stations or a railway sliding or any other loading/unloading site(s) or any other place(s) unless such detention be of extraordinary kind and the decision of the Regional Manager. FCI on such claims shall be final both as regards the admissibility and amount, if any of the compensation and as such the claim for detention charges of the vehicles/lorries detained beyond usual period of loading or unloading during the period of contract from 1.6.80 to 31.7.82 for Rs. 3,58,000/- (Rupees three lakhs fifty eight thousand only) is not tenable in the eye of law. According to Mr. S. Deb, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator as well as the learned trial Court to decide this matter as the jurisdiction is vested to the Regional Manager F.C.I. in the matter. However, both the learned Arbitrator as well as the learned (Sic) jurisdiction while making the award as well as the impugned.(Sic) Sri Deb contended. The learned Counsel further (Sic). below has indisputably acted illegally in not setting aside the award (Sic) relates to the interest for the period pendente lite, These points of arguments has already been advanced by the learned Counsel of the Respondents Corporation before the learned Arbitrator as well as before the learned Trial Court in support of their case.
At the hearding Sri A.M. Lodh, learned Sr. counsel assisted by his junior Advocate, argued that the claim of the claimant is not barred by limitation inasmuch as it was made within time and the same was in accordance with the terms and conditions of the related agreements entered amongst the parties The Petitioner claimant always followed and abided the terms and conditions of the said Comma and sought for referring the dispute for Arbitration before the competent authority, namely the Respondents-Corporation, repeatedly under separate and continuous notice and demand letters from time to time but it was in vain. Having no alternative the claimant-Petitioner approached the competent Court for redressed and the competent Court under the relevant order of 30.1.87 passed in T.S. (Arb.) No. 38/81 referred the matter to the Managing Director, F.C.I , for Arbitration either to act himself in the matter or to appoint any other person to decide the dispute on basis of consensus made by the learned Counsel of the parties particularly on the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Respondents-Corporaiion. The order dtd. 30.1.87 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripuru, Agartala, in case No. T.S. (ARB) No. 38/84 though validity of which has been challenged by the Respondents-Corporation, the name was affirmed by the order dtd. 15.4.87 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 33 of 1987. So far as the question of limitation is concerned both the learned Arbitrator as well as the learned Trial court gave a concurrent finding on the issue and held that the claims of the claimant-Petitioner are within time and as such tins Court should not interfere with such concurrent finding of both the learned Arbitrator as well as the learned trial Court. Sri A.M. Lodh, contended. Next contention of Sri A.M. Lodh is that even (Sic) the Sr. Regional Manager, F.C.I. has the jurisdiction in the matter (Sic) claims of the claimant-Petitioner to the extent of Rs. 3,58,000/- for detention of claimant''s lorries/vehicles by the Respondents-Corporation beyond reasonable period on account of Respondent'' failure/neglect/omission in the matter of loading/unloading of food-stuff, no decision has been made by the Sr. Regional Manager of the F.C.I./Respondents-Corporation and as such, such claim is required to be examined in the Arbitration proceedings as the competent authority had failed to take any decision in the matter. Sri A.M. Lodh, further, argued that the learned Arbitrator as well as the learned trial Court gave a reasoned order on the relevant issues except the fact that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence and the available materials on record in not affording interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the due date of payment by the Respondents-Corporation till realisation of the decretal amount. According to Sri A.M. Lodh the learned Trial Court erred in law in not giving interest of 12 percent per annum on the decretal amount; therefore this Court should allow the First Appeal No. 48 of 1991 entitling the claimant-Petitioner to get interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the due date of payment by the Respondents-Corporation till realisation of the decretal amount.
Learned Counsel on both sides had relied upon the decisions of the apex Court rendered in many cases reported in Hindustan Tea Co. Vs. K. Sashikant Co. and Another, , Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI), and 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 385 and had argued at a length in support of their cases.
No we are to examine as to whether the learned Trial Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity while passing the impugned judgment/order and decree, and whether-there is/was an error apparent on the face of the record and that the learned Arbitrator has exceeding his jurisdiction while awarding the award; and also whether the learned Arbitrator had committed error of jurisdiction in not considering the arbitrability of the claims, and whether the Arbitrator had passed a reasoned or non-speaking award or not.
While examining the above aspects and points for determination of real points of controversies between the parties, we are to always bear in our judicial mind the related/recent decisions of the apex Court rendered in B.V. Radha Krishna Vs. Sponge Iron India Ltd., and another decision rendered in Tamil Nadu, Electricity Board - Appellant v. Bridge Tunnel Construction and Ors. - Respondents reported in AIR 1977 SC 1376. In the first case B.V. Radha Krishna - Appellant v. Sponge Iron India Ltd. Respondent (supra) the apex Court held thus:
Bearing in mind, the principles laid down by this Court in the above said cases, if we look into disposal of the matter by the High Court, it would be evident that the High Court has substituted its own view in place of the Arbitrator''s view as if it was dealing with an appeal. That is exactly what is forbidden by the decision of this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation to set aside the judgment of the High Court on this issue.
In other words, the High Court cannot substitute its own view in place of the Arbitrator''s view and the High Court cannot examine the matter as a regular appellate Court. In case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board - Appellant v. Bridge Tunnel Constructions and Ors. - Respondents (supra) the apex Court held thus :
26 It would thus be clear(SIC) the arbitrator cannot clothe(SIC) himself conobisively(SIC) with the jurisdiction to decide or own to decide the (SIC) of a perticular iteam or the claim made by the parties. When (sic) has been made to the arbitrator (sic). Section 32, he is to decide the arbitrability of the despite (sic) while giving reasons in support thereof. The decision of the arbitrator granting a particular sum by a non-speaking award, therefore brings upon the arbitrability of a dispute arising under the contract or upon a particular item claimed thereunder. He is required to give the decision thereon. The question of decision by implication does not a rise since his jurisdiction to decide the dispute on merits hinges upon his jurisdiction to decide the arbitrability of the dispute. In this case, in view of the finding recorded by the Court, which has become final, as referred to earlier, the arbitrator/Umpire was enjoined to decide the arbitrability of the claims set up by the Respondent and disputed by the Appellant. Admittedly, the award of the Umpire does not contain any decision on arbitrability of the claims.
In the said case the Supreme Court further held that the arbitrator. having been invested with the jurisdiction to decide the arbitrability of certain claims, has committed error of jurisdiction in not considering the arbitrability of the claims and passed a non-speaking award, awarding certain sum. It is difficult to as certain as to what extent he bas awarded die claim within the contract or the claim outside the contract. It is therefore difficult to give acceptance to the award made by the Umpire. In. the said case Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (supra), the Supreme Court further held that in the matter of challenge to ,the award there are two distinct and different grounds, viz., that there is an error apparent on the face of the record and that the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction. In the latter case the Court can look into the arbitration agreement but under former it cannot do so unless the agreement was incorporated or cited in the award or evidence was made part of the agreement. In the case of jurisdictional error, there is no embargo on the power of the Court to admit the contract into evidence and to consider whether or not the umpire had exceeded the jurisdiction because the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined. In the ease of non-speaking award, it is not open to the Court to go into the merits. Only in a speaking award the Court can look into the reasoning in the award and correct wrong proposition of law or error of law. It is not open to the Court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, when no reasons have been given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at this conclusion. But in the later case the Court, with reference to the terms of the contract/arbitration agreement, would consider whether or not me arbitrator/umpire has exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding or refusing to award the sum of money awarded or omitted.
The learned Arbitrator adjudicated upon the disputes of the parties by framing as many as 8 issues, and those issues are quoted below:
Is the claimant''s claim barred by limitation for not raising the demand within the time mentioned in the Agreement?
Is the claimant entitled to Rs. 48,118/- as claimed or any amount on account of residuary dues for supply of casual labour and for handling operation performed by the claimant?
Is the claimant entitled to Rs. 3,58,000/- as claimed or any amount for detention of the claimant''s lorries caused by the Respondent beyond reason able period on account of the Respondent''s failure/neglect/ommission in the matter of loading and unloading of foodstuffs?
Is the claimant entitled to get Rs. 5,20,361.61 paise as claimed or any amount on account of additional transport charges due to increase statutory price of petroleum products?
Is the claimant entitled to refund of Rs. 82,848.15 paise as claimed or any amount out of the deducted sum of Rs. 2,54,976.45p towards value of 100.422 Mt. rice @ 1 1/2 times of issue price?
Is the claimant emitted to refund of Rs. 9,235.15 paise deducted by the Respondent from the bills of the claimant on a account of alleged oil-soaked foodgrains?
Is the claimant entitled to interest @ 18% per annum as claimed or at any other rate from the dates the payments due till the date of payment or realisation from the Respondent?
To what other relief or reliefs, if any is the claimant entitled to against the Respondent?
It appears to us that the demand letter dtd. 9.5.83 (Ext. 60) is the origin of the dispute between the parties which was made by the claimant-Petitioner within one year from 31.7.82, when the Contract came to an end at per proviso to Clause XIX of the agreement (Ext. E) entered between the parties. Thereafter, another dispute arose by another letter dtd, 18,7,83 in respect of some additional items being sequal to the settlement of the demand raised by the claimant-Petitioner by. his letter dtd. 9.5.83. From the record it is also seen that while settling the dispute as per the letter dtd. 9.5.83 (Ext. 60) and the letter dtd. 18.7.83 on or about 8th Dec, 1983 Respondents made certain payment to the claimant-Petitioner pursuant to its decision By another demand letter dtd. 4.1.1984 (Ext. 48) of the claimant-Petitioner made one additional demand causing a subsequent dispute and this dispute has also arisen from the decision taken by the Respondent-Corporation on the demand raised by the claimant-Petitioner by his letter dtd, 9.5.83, In bur considered view the demand of the claimant-petitioner under his demand letter dtd. 4.1.84 is a continuous process of his claim under his letter dtd. 9.5.83, and it can well be concluded that the time for preferring Arbitration proceeding was extended by acknowledgement on the part of the Respondents-Corporation. We are of the view that the learned Arbitrator has in no way mis-conducted himself by arriving at a decision on the question of limitation. In this regard the learned Arbitrator made an exhaustive finding on the question of limitation under the relevant Issue No. 1 by holding thus:
It appears that on receipt of the letter dated 9th May, 1983 (Ext. 60) the F.C.I, settled claims with regard to items No. 1 and 2 contained in the said letter and made payments in that regard on or about 8th December, 1983. The claimant by a letter dated 10th December, 1983 (Ext. 68) intimated about his objection and receipt of the sum under protest and prejudice. The item No. 3 contained in the letter dated 9th May, 1983 was left undecided. The claimant by another letter being No. 1628/JCS/FCI/80-82 dated 18th July, 1983 raised additional items of dispute as the claimant to know of the same at that point of time. Lastly, the claimant by a letter being No. 1646/JCS/FCI/Arb/80-82 dated 4th January, 1984 (Ext. 48) revised his demand claiming the deductions made and thereby making additional demands. These facts are available from the letter dated 4th January, 1984. These are not disputed by the F.C.I, the Respondent.
In the above circumstances, it appears that the dispute raised by the letter dated 9th May, 1983 (Ext. 60) that is, within one year from 31st July). 1982, when the contract came to an end as per proviso to Clause XIX of the Agreement (Ext. E) entered into between the parties. Again the dispute raised by the letter dated 18th July, 1983 in respect of some additional items being a dequal to the settlement of the demand raised by the claimant by his letter dated 9th May. 1983 is within time because it is within one year of 31st July, 1982 apart from the fact that the dispute has arisen due to the decision of deduction by the Respondent while setting the dispute raised by the claimant on or about 8th December, 1983 when the Respondent made payment pursuant to its decision. The dispute raised by letter being No. 1646/JCS/FC1/AR1V80-82 dated 4th January. 1984 (Ext. 48) is in respect of one additional demand and it within one year of 8th December, 1983 when the last payment was made by the Respondent, it is within time. This dispute has also arisen from the decision taken by the Respondent on the demand raised by the claimant by the letter dated 9th May. 1983.
Moreover, it appears that the learned Court by its order dated 10th January 1987 passed in case. No. T.S. (ARB) No. 38/1984 (Ext, 49) has been pleased to record that the arguments of the parties were heard at length while passing an order for arbitration. The order of reference dated 1st April, 1987 passed by the Learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura, Agartala includes all the items of dispute.
On consideration of all the facts and circumstances, it is held that the claims of the claimant are within time.
The Respondent-Corporation resisted the claim of the Petitioner-claimant, firstly, on the ground that the claims having been voluntarily withdrawn by his letter dtd. 7.10.93, he is not entitled to claim it again: secondly, on the ground that the claimant has failed to prove the fact of payment of extra amount and, finally, on the ground that it is within the jurisdiction of the Sr. Regional Manager, F.C.I, and he has decided the same and has conveyed his decision by letter dtd. 27.12.1980 and as such it is beyond the scope of arbitration. While examining this aspect t he learned . Arbitrator found that, the said letter dtd. 17.12.1980 (Ext. A), a reply to me claimant''s, letter dtd. 9,9.80 and 10.9.80 speaks that the complaint of detention of loaded trucks for unloading at Arundhutinager is not correct. Further the said letter did. 10.9.83 (Ext. 23) contains a complaint by the claimant-Petitioner about the delay in unloading at the Central Stores after about 5 hours on 9.9.80,and this fact has been defied by the. Respondents-Corporation. According to the learned Arbitration it cannot be a decision in respect of all the instances of detention of loaded trucks and as such the claim of the claimant-petitioner is required to be examined in the said arbitration proceeding as the competent authority "had failed to take any decision oh this score being authorised under the Contract (Ext. E). So far as the other ground taken by the. Respondent relating to withdrawal of the claim of the claimant Petitioner voluntarily under his letter dtd. 7.10.1983 (Ext. 1) resulting in abandonment of his claim; the learned Arbitrator opined this action on the part of the claimant Petitioner cannot be a ground for succeeding the case of the Respondents-Corporal ion by giving the following observations:
The claimant has given evidence as P.W. 2 to the effect that as the F.C.I, was withholding demurrage charges he bad to withdraw the claim for detention under compulsion. He has stated that by a letter of the same date, that is, 7th October, 1983 (Ext. 40) the decision of the Regional Manager, F.C.L Shillong was intimated and release of the sum on the said account was ordered. The money was actually paid in installments and the last payment was made on 8th December, 1983. Thereafter, the claimant wrote die letter dated 4th January., 1984 (Ext. 41) revoking the letter dated 7th October, 1983 (Ex. 1). This action on the part of the claimant cannot but be due to some reason and the explanation given by him does not appear to be untenable in the facts and circumstances of the case. This ground therefore cannot succeed.
There are overwhelming, evidence on record that the detention was of extra-ordinary type, which has made claimant-Petitioner entitled to compensation as he has hired the trucks and is bound to pay as there was factum of payment to I the truck owners, the learned Arbitrator opined, So far as the other claim of the I j claimant-Petitioner for Rs. 5,20,361.61 p on account of additional transport charges due to increase of statutory price of petroleum products, the learned Arbitrator examined the matter in depth and opined that the Respondents-Corporation''s calculation is not what the claimant agreed on the basis of his claim under Annexure ''C'' nor it is in conformity with the Government''s calculation which the parties agreed to apply (Ext. 7) and as such the claimant is entitled to it. We have perused the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Court below. In our considered view the learned Court below rightly held that the objections raised by the Respondents Corporation on this score is not tenable at all in the eye of law.
So far as the findings of the learned Arbitration that the claimant will be entitled to claim interest pendente lite and for the period from the date o" decree till the realisation before the learned court, the learned Court below after due consideration examination of the case of the Petitioner-claimant afforded an interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the decretal amount, from the date of decree till realisation. In our considered view the teamed Court below while exercising its inherent power/jurisdiction granted the aforesaid interest considering the facts and circumstance of the case and as such the direction has been made by the learned Court below in consonance with the a ward of the learned Arbitrator. It is well settled that an award cannot be set aside on the ground that the Arbitrator reached a wrong conclusion or had failed to appreciate the fact. In this regard a reference can be made to a decision of the apex Court rendered in Hindustan Tea Co. - Appellant- v. K. Sachikant and Co. and Anr. Respondents reported in AIR 1987 SC 57 wherein the Supreme Court held thus:
The award is reasoned one. The objections which have been raised against the award are such that they cannot indeed be taken into consideration within the limited ambit of the Arbitration Act. Under the law, the Arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute between the parties. The Award is not open to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate facts.
Further, on perusal of the available materials on record and upon hearing the learned Counsel on both sides we are of the view that there is no error apparent on the face of the record and no jurisdictional error on the part of the learned Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator rightly decided the arbitrability of the claims of the parties and gave a speaking and reasoned order/findings in the matte. As discussed above, this Court cannot substitute its own view in place of the Arbitrator''s view and cannot examine the matter as a regular Appellate Court. We are further of the view that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Court below. However we affirm the impugned judgment and decree. For the reasons and observations made above these appeals, namely F.A. No. 43/91 and F.A. (Cross Objection) No. 48/91 are devoid of merit and accordingly same stand dismissed, but no costs.