Food Corporation of India and Others vs Dayal Singh

N.C. Jain, J.—Plaintiff-Respondent filed a suit for possession of land measuring 3 Kanals 6 Marias, fully described in the heading of the plaint and as shown in Jamabandi for the year 1980-81 (Exhibit PI). It has been averred in the plaint that the aforementioned land was owned by the Plaintiff. The disputed land was neither acquired by the Defendants nor any compensation was paid and the Defendants constructed stores over the suit land without any right, taking advantage of the old age of the Plaintiff. The Defendants were described as trespassers. The defence of the Defendant-Appellants was that the suit land along with other land measuring IS Kanals 15 Marias was acquired by the Punjab State, in terms of the award dated 19-11-1970, and that the aforementioned land measuring 15 Kanals 15 Marias including the disputed land was sold to Defendant No. 1 by negotiation by the Rehabilitation Department, for a total consideration'' of Rs. 1,59,000/-. It was farther averred by the Defendants in the written statement that the sale consideration was deposited by Defendant No. 1 in the Treasury. The possession of the land was delivered to Defendant No. 1 by the Halqa Patwari. On July 28, 1971. The suit was described not to be within time and it was further stated that the Plaintiff was estopped by his act and conduct, because he did not raise any objection, at the time of construction. The plea of adverse possession was also taken.

On the rival pleas of the parties, the following issues were farmed:

Whether the Plaintiff is owner of the suit land? OPP.

Whether the suit is within time? OPP.

Whether Defendant No. 1 had become owner by adverse possession? OPD.

Whether the Plaintiff is estopped to sue by his act and conduct? OPD.

Relief.

Under issue No. 1, the trial Court held the Plaintiff to be the owner of the suit land and decided issue No. 1, in favour of the Plaintiff. Under issues No. 2 and 3, the suit was held to be time barred and the Defendants were held to have become owners by adverse possession. Issue No. 4 was also decided by the trial Court, in favour of the Defendants and it was held that the Plaintiff was estopped by his act and conduct, from filing the suit. The Plaintiff-Respondent filed appeal before the first appellate couit, which has been allowed by the Additional District Judge, vide his impugned judgment and decree dated 17-11-1988.

It has been found by the appellate Court that no valid title passed to the Food Corporation of India, in pursuance of the offer made by the Rehabilitation Department, as the money was to be deposited on a particular date, which was not done and, therefore the offer made by the Rehabilitation Department,- stood cancelled. It has further been found that no proper negotiation was there between the Food Corporation of India and the Plaintiff Dayal Singh, pertaining to the land in dispute. On the point of adverse possession, the appellate court has recorded a firm finding that all the ingredients constituting adverse possession were not specifically pleaded by the Defendant-Appellants and, therefore, the mere fact that the Plaintiff-Respondent did not take any step before the filing of the suit in the year 1985, does not mean that the possession of the Food Corporation of India, ripened into ownership by way of adverse possession. The Plaintiff stands recorded as owner in the Jamabandi of the year 1980-81, and on the basis of trial Court found the Plaintiff to be the owner of the disputed property. This finding of ownership was not challenged before the first appellate Court by the Appellants.

In the aforementioned circumstances, I am of the considered view that it did not be have a Government undertaking to take up the plea of adverse possession. The minimum which was expected of Food Corporation of India, was this much that it should have come with the offer of payment of reasonable compensation, which has ultimately been done by the appellate Court. The Appellate Court, while applying the ratio laid down in R.S. Muthuswami Gounder Vs. A. Annamalai and Others, remanded the case to the trial Court, for determining the amount of compensation for the land upon which the godowns have been constructed by the Food Corporation of India. It was held in R.S Muthuswami Gounder''s case (supra) that principles of acquiescene apply to a case where a person allows the putting up of construction and in such a situation, he is entitled to a decree for compensation in respect of his property, in lieu of recovery of vacant possession of such property. The following lines are reproduced with advantage:

Held, the Plaintiff, who resided about a mile away from the suit property, would have come to know about the Defendant putting up construction on a major portion of the suit property if he had cared to find out and since he had not done so and kept quiet until the Defendant had completed his construction and had sent the notice only about 7 or 8 months later, asserting his right to the suit property, the principles of the acquiescence had to be made applicable to the facts of the case and the Plaintiff had to be given only a decree for compensation in respect of the property, namely, the market value of the suit property in lieu of the relief of recovery of vacant possession of the property.

The ratio in R.S. Muthuswami Gounder''s case (supra) applies with full force to the facts of the present case, in view of the finding recorded by the Additional District kludge, which is based upon evidence produced in the present case. A judicial notice was taken by the Additional District Judge that village Dalla, where the Plaintiff resided, was at a distance of about 1 KM from Urmar Tanda. It was not the case of the Plaintiff that he had resided at a distant place for a long period from the place of construction and, therefore, in the ordinary course, he should have known about the construction of godowns, to which no objection was raised. There is nothing wrong with the view of the appellate Court that such a person to whom the principle of acquiescence apply is not entitled to a decree for possession but only to a decree for recovery of money. The appellate Court ultimately remanded the case to the trial Court, for ascertaining the market value of the suit land. The finding recorded by the appellate Court, in my view, is unexceptional and deserves to be endorsed. I was told, at the time of hearing, that after the case was remanded, the trial Court has granted a decree. Be that as it may, if any of the parties is aggrieved from such a decree, the matter can be agitated in appeal. The counsel for the State has submitted before me that the Rehabilitation Department, has been paid the price of the land. It has been found by both the courts below that the offer nude by the Rehabilitation Department, stood cancelled. In any case, if payment has been made to the Rehabilitation Department, and such payment has been accepted, it is between the Food Corporation of India and the Rehabilitation Department, to sort out their rights. As regards the Plaintiff-Respondent, his and having been built upon, by raising godowns, he is certainly entitled to a decree for compensation at market value, as has been done by the appellate Court.

In the light of the observations made above, the appeal is found to meritless and the same is, consequently, dismissed with no order as to costs.