Firoz Khan vs Union of India And Ors

Heard Mr. Rishu Ranjan, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Madan Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Union of India.

This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard.

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing of the order dated 19.05.2016 as contained in Annexure-3 whereby the order of reduction of pay by two stages for a period of one year with further direction that he will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay, has been passed.

Mr. Rishu Ranjan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.6626 of 2007 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 20.02.2015 and that order was challenged before the Division Bench in L.P.A No.161 of 2015 and the Division Bench after considering the entire aspect of the matter and considering the case of "Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Ors." reported in (2009) 15 SCC 620 and "Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd." reported in (2003) 8 SCC 9 remanded back the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsidering the case of the writ petitioner/appellant viz-a-viz quantum of punishment. With such direction, the L.P.A was allowed and disposed of. Pursuant to that order of the Division Bench now the impugned order has been passed whereby in paragraph no.5, the disciplinary authority has observed that upon examination by the competent authority has decided to implement the judgment dated 01.03.2016 passed by the Division Bench and thereafter the said punishment order has been passed. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Division Bench remanded back the matter to reconsider the punishment order and the Division Bench has not directed the respondents to implement the order of the Court. He further submits that it is well settled proposition of law that once the matter is remanded back to the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority is required to apply mind and thereafter pass a reasoned order. From the impugned order, it transpires that the disciplinary authority has not applied the mind. To buttress his argument, he has relied in the case of "Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney", reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240. Paragraph nos.5 and 7 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

"5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover case has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.

In the present case, since the appellate authority's order does not contain any reasons, it does not show any application of mind."

He further relied in the case of "S.N. Chandrashekar v. State of Karnataka" reported in (2006) 3 SCC 208. Paragraph no.34 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow :

"34. The Authority, therefore, posed unto itself a wrong question. What, therefore, was necessary to be considered by BDA was whether the ingredients contained in Section 14-A of the Act were fulfilled and whether the requirements of the proviso appended thereto are satisfied. If the same had not been satisfied, the requirements of the law must be held to have not been satisfied. If there had been no proper application of mind as regards the requirements of law, the State and the Planning Authority must be held to have misdirected themselves in law which would vitiate the impugned judgment."

Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India submits that the entire aspect of the matter has been considered by the disciplinary authority and in paragraph no.10 by way of counter affidavit the reason has been disclosed. He submits that the impugned order has been passed in the light of the order passed by the Division Bench.

Having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, this Court has perused the impugned order whereby it transpires that there is certainly non-application of mind. There is no reason assigned in the impugned order that the Division Bench remanded back the matter to the disciplinary authority to consider the punishment part without disclosing anything. The disciplinary authority has almost passed the similar order, only one stage has been reduced by the impugned order. It is well settled provision of law that the grounds which are not reflected in the order that cannot be supplemented by way of filing counter affidavit.

In view of the above discussion and considering that the reason has not been assigned in the impugned order and in the light of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney" and "S.N. Chandrashekar v. State of Karnataka" [supra], the impugned order cannot sustain in the eye of law and, accordingly, the impugned order dated 19.05.2016 is quashed. The writ petition [W.P.(S) No.7366 of 2016] stands allowed and disposed of.