Faqir Singh vs Sadhu Singh and another

D.S. Tewatia, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the pre-emptor for possession of the suit land by way of pre-emption. The trial Court rejected the plaint on the ground that the plaintiff-pre-emptor did not file the sale-deed either along with the plaint or till the date the trail Court rejected the plaint The pre-emptor approached the lower appellate Court in appeal against the order of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court set aside that order and remanded the case for decision on merits. It is against that order of the lower appellate Court that the present second appeal has been presented by the vendee.

The point that requires decision in this case is as to what is the effect of non-filing of a document in the Court at a certain stage of the proceedings as required by Order 7, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure. Before proceeding with the consideration of this point, at this stage it will be profitable to notice that the trial Court rejected the plaint at a stage when the issues had been framed and evidence had been adduced by the parties. Now to appreciate the legal controversy, the provisions of Order 7, Rules 14 and 18 Code of Civil Procedure, may be noticed which are reproduced below:

ORDER VII

14(1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document in his possession or power, he shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented, and shall at the same time deliver the document or a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint.

(2) Where he relied on any other documents (whether in his possession or power or not) as evidence in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint.

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18.(1) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint, and which is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.

(2) Nothing in this rule applies to documents produced for cross-examination of the defendant''s witnesses, or in answer to any case set up by the defendant or handed to a witness merely to refresh his memory.

Mr. H.S. Sangha, learned counsel for the Appellant, basing himself on the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure, has urged that the trial Court rightly rejected the plaint and the lower appellate Court was not right in setting aside that order and remitting the case back for decision on merits. In support of his submission, he has relied on a decision of Nagpur High Court reported In Kisan Yeshwant v. Nuraji Dagan AIR 1964 Nag. 269, and another decision, this time of Allahabad High Court, reported in Kewal Ram Vs. Mihi Lal Ram Khiloni, . Kisan Yeshwant''s case relates to a suit, wherein the plaintiff was held to be negligent in not producing certain documents and it was held that the appellate Court could not remand the case merely on the ground that by non-production of the documents no prejudice has been caused to the other party, as what had to be shown by the defaulting party was that the document in question could not have been filed in time. In that case, there is no discussion about the object of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure, nor the case depended for its decision on the consideration of the compliance or non-compliance with the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure; and thus it is clearly distinguishable and its ratio does not cover the facts of the present case. In Kewal Ram''s case it was held that an appellate Court cannot remit a case to enable a party to produce a certain document unless it comes to the conclusion that the party was unlawfully prevented from producing the said document in evidence. There is no dispute with the proposition of law enunciated in this ruling, but it is hardly relevant for our purposes. Kewal Ram''s case also does not relate to the production of any document in terms of Order 7, Rule 14, Civil procedure Code, and the consequences that flow from an omission to do so did not arise for consideration in that case.

learned counsel for the respondents, on the contrary, has urged that when a plaintiff fails to present the documents along with the plaint or fails to produce the documents thereafter in the Court in compliance with the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14, Code of Civil Procedure, it is not open to the Court to reject the plaint. At best, it can shut out that document and at a later stage may not allow the party to produce that document. He has further urged that Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, is the only provision which enumerates the grounds on which a Court can reject a plaint. Order 7, Rule 11, Civil procedure Code, reads as under:

ORDER VII

The Plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action:

(b) where the relief claimed is under valued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so:

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so:

(d) where a suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.

A perusal of the order of the trial Court would show that it has not rejected the plaint on either of the grounds enumerated in the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on Hikmat Ullah Khan Vs. Abdul Azim Khan and Others, Munusamy Mudaliar Vs. Chengalvaraya Naicker and Others, and Vishram Arjun v. Irukulla Shankariah AIR 4957 A.P. 784. In Hikmatulla Khan''s case the plaintiff failed to produce the mortgage deed in the trial Court and the first appellate Court dismissed the suit on that ground. It was held that where the factum of the mortgage had been admitted by the other side, the fact that the mortgage deed was not produced along with the plaint in the Court would be of no consequence. The mortgage-deed will be relevant only for the purpose to show as to whether the mortgage has been discharged and in the absence of the said document, the only course open to the Court was to proceed to decide the factum of the discharge of the mortgage on the evidence available on the record and not to dismiss the suit. In the present case also, one of the vendees Faqir Singh has admitted the factum of the sale and the Sale amount and so the ratio of the above decision in Hikmatullah Khan''s case is clearly attracted to the facts of the present case. In Minor Munusamy Muddaliar''s case, the Court concerned itself with the consideration of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, as also those of Order 7, Rule 18, and after carefully considering the same it held that a plaint can be rejected only on the ground enumerated in Rule 11 and not on the ground for non-production of the document required to be produced in the Court under Rule 14, because for such an omission the consequence are provided in Rule 18, which lays down that if such a document is not produced as required by Rule 14, then it cannot be received in evidence at the hearing of the case without the leave of the Court. In Vishram Arjun''s case, the Court has discussed the scope and the object of Rule 14 and has held that the purpose for which this provision is incorporated is to reduce the chances of the production of forged documents in the Court by insisting on their being produced in the Court at the earliest opportunity. and if a party fails to produce a document at the relevant stage, as required by Rule 14, then Rule 18 provides the consequences for such an omission. In the case of registered documents, the question of their being forged at a later stage does not arise and so it is open to a Court to receive a document if sufficient reasons are shown for its non-production at a relevant stage. Being in respectful agreement with the views expressed in all the above-quoted three decisions regarding the object of the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14. Code of Civil Procedure, and the consequences of the omission to comply with the said provisions, I hold that the lower appellate Court has rightly set aside the order of the trial Court which was patently without jurisdiction and has rightly remanded the case to the trial Court for decision on merits.

In view of what is stated above, this second appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of this case I make no order as to costs.