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Judgment
K. Kannan, J.—I find that no substantial question of law has been framed by this Court on 11.12.1985 when the case was admitted. I, therefore, sought the assistance of the counsel to formulate the proposition which he wants to rely on and from arguments raised, I would frame the following substantial questions of law as arising in the appeal:-
Whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment of the trial Court to admit a certified copy of the lease deed when the original had not been filed by the plaintiff?
Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the fact that the lease was for agricultural purpose and by virtue of Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction?
On the first issue relating to reliance of the Appellate Court on the registration copy of the lease deed, the contention was that original lease was with the land owner himself and he alone must have filed the same. I would reject this contention on a simple issue that a transaction creating a lease and entrusting property to a lessee must invariably secure the original only in the hands of the person in possession and it could not be expected to be in the hands of the landlord at all. Situation could be that two sets of documents are prepared and each set in original is retained by each party. Under normal circumstances, the documents of lease must have been held only with a lessee and the explanation given by the tenant that the original was only with the lessor cannot be accepted as a normal feature. Even otherwise the production of registration copy ought not to be taken as objectionable since it is a document admitted by both parties. The lease itself was not denied nor was the status of the defendant as tenant denied. A production of even registration copy which is secondary evidence of a document which is admitted is permissible u/s 65 of the Evidence Act. The reliance placed by the lower Appellate Court on the certified copy of the document was, therefore, perfectly in order.
As regards the character of lease as whether it appertains to an agricultural purpose or a non-agricultural purpose could be seen from the admitted fact that the defendant had admittedly established a saw mill and he was using the property for a period of 10 years. A saw mill is not an agricultural purpose. The examination of the meaning of agricultural purpose becomes relevant only because the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 itself constitutes Revenue Courts as the exclusive forum for adjudication of rights of leases for agricultural purposes. The provision for ejectment of a tenant from land, in the context of the definition of land as contained u/s 4(1) of the Act, is reproduced as under:-
4(1) "land" means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land.
The land defined also refers only to a lease let out for agricultural purpose. The lease on the property for establishing a saw mill is not an agricultural purpose. The issue of whether establishing a lease for a saw mill is an agricultural purpose has also been considered by the Supreme Court in K. Kunhambu Vs. Smt. Chandramma and Others, , while considering whether a lease providing for running a saw mill and tending care of coconut trees amounted to agricultural purpose to find the eligibility of tenant for occupancy rights under local law. The Supreme Court held that it was an industrial purpose and the benefit of agricultural tenancy did not apply. In Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Others Vs. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani and Others, the Supreme Court held that a tenant for running a saw mill and continuing in possession beyond the period of lease was a tenant at sufferance liable for eviction even without notice. The court was rejecting consideration of the lease either as an agricultural lease or meant for manufacturing purpose to require 6 months notice as contended by the tenant. The judgments squarely apply to the issue dealt with in this case. The Madras High Court, in P.P. Subba Raja Vs. E.S. Gurusamy, while considering the adequacy of notice to a tenant who had been inducted for running a saw mill in the demised premises held it was neither an agricultural purpose nor a manufacturing purpose and hence a notice to quit 15 days next before termination of tenancy was valid. The lower Court was, therefore, justified in finding that lease was not for agricultural purpose and therefore, the bar of institution of suit before a Civil Court without resort to revenue court constituted under the Punjab Tenancy Act did not apply. The findings on the propositions have been properly answered by the Court below and I find no reason for interfering with the same. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed and points of law raised are taken as having been properly considered and affirmed by this Court.